


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




The  Times

HISTORY
OF
THE WAR

VOL. XIII.



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CHAPTER CXCIV.

THE UNITED STATES AT WAR.

THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH GERMANY—TWO CRITICAL MONTHS—PRESIDENT WILSON'S POLICY—LAST HOPES OF PEACE—GERMAN SHIPS IN AMERICAN PORTS—ATTEMPTS TO BULLY MR. GERARD—GERMAN ATTEMPT TO REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS—ARMING OF AMERICAN SHIPS—MORE SUBMARINE CRIMES—MEETING OF CONGRESS ON APRIL 2—TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE—THE UNITED STATES AT WAR—THE OUTLOOK—MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS—GERMAN PLOTS—PUBLIC OPINION—CONFERENCES WITH THE ALLIES—THE JOFFRE AND BALFOUR MISSIONS—ADOPTION OF CONSCRIPTION—THE ARMY DRAFT LAW—AMERICAN TROOPS FOR FRANCE—GENERAL PERSHING—THE LIBERTY LOAN—ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION—SITUATION IN THE SPRING OF 1917.

THE story of the long process by which Germany slowly leavened the great body of American opinion with growing apprehension that the maintenance of peace with her might prove treason to the Republic and to the high ideals of democracy has been told in earlier chapters. It has been shown how the Note of January 31, 1917, by which Germany notified the United States that she would sink at sight all ships within the "barred zones" from February 1, provoked President Wilson to dismiss her Ambassador two days after this date and to justify his action the same day in his Address to Congress.

The President, it will be remembered, did not even then accept war as inevitable. He refused to believe that Germany would do what she threatened to do. "Only actual overt acts," he declared, would convince him that his "inveterate confidence" was unfounded. Should it prove unfounded, he continued, he would have to appear again before Congress and "ask that authority be given to me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful legitimate errands on the high seas." The events which shattered his confidence

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and forced the American people into war and their first preparations for the struggle are the subject of the present chapter.

The President's action was followed by two most interesting and critical months. It has already been explained why the United States, in spite of outrages against her citizens like the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the *Sussex*, in spite of the campaign of crime on American soil, organized, conducted and paid for by the *Buenz*, the *Boy-Eds* and the *Papens*, and in spite of the cumulative evidence that a Teutonic victory would destroy everything in the world that to Americans as to other free peoples makes life worth living, had hitherto maintained a policy of aloof, albeit unofficially indignant, neutrality. Nurtured in a fixed belief that their destiny was one of comfortable and prosperous isolation, encouraged in the belief by the leadership of a President of orthodox, almost mid-Victorian, Liberal tendencies, it was impossible that the American people should see at once that the success of the Prussian menace would compromise their future as surely as, though less immediately than, the future of France or England. The war tended to appear to them as a kind of spectacle upon a stage. Germany's behaviour aroused disgust:

her ambitions were realized to be wrong ; but the idea of helping to punish and restrain her seemed hardly to occur to them. They were the audience ; the tragedy harrowed them, but it was not for them to interfere in the action.

Lest this may seem an extreme judgment, in view of the stalwart sympathy of so many leaders of informed American opinion, two quotations from speeches by the President delivered less than six months before the rupture may be given. Speaking at Omaha on October 5, 1916, Mr. Wilson said : " The singularity of the present war is that its roots and origins and object never have been disclosed. They have obscure European roots which we do not know how to trace. . . . It will take the long inquiry of history to explain this war." And on October 26 at Cincinnati : " Have you ever heard what started the present war ? If you have I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has, so far as I can gather. Nothing in particular started it, but everything in general."

A few weeks later the President was re-elected after a canvass and by a vote which showed that the popular sanction for his continuance in office was based upon agreement with his electioneering speeches. They were to the effect


that the proper policy for the United States was to avoid at almost any cost participation in a contest in which her interest was deemed to be mainly platonic.

It may seem ungenerous to recall the President's attitude as a neutral, in view of the splendid energy with which he soon afterwards started to plan the mobilization of the resources of his country in active alliance with the Liberal Powers of Europe. Those, indeed, among his supporters who are best qualified to speak for him affirmed that the almost careless patience of his neutrality was, in fact, simulated. He always, they said, at any rate since the Lusitania, realized that the United States, sooner or later, would have to fight ; but he did not dare to act precipitately and outstrip public opinion, lest, when the test came, he should have a divided country behind him. He took, they continued, the only means open to him of gaining the confidence of his people, so that in the end he might be able to lead them effectually whither his instincts had always tended. To this Americans who chafed under the President's patience replied that, positive leadership was what was needed to mould public opinion to face the war and the unaccustomed problems that it involved, and



ARRIVAL OF THE U.S. STEAMER "ORLEANS" AT BORDEAUX :
THE CAPTAIN SALUTES THE WAITING CROWD.

The "Orleans" and the "Rochester" (next page) left New York Feb. 10, 1917, for Bordeaux in defiance of Germany's threat to sink neutral shipping. Both ships were enthusiastically welcomed in France.



THE U.S. STEAMER "ROCHESTER" BEING TOWED UP THE GIRONDE.

that, had the President been moving towards an active part in the vindication of Democracy, he would at any rate not have neglected military and naval preparedness to the extent to which it was neglected in Washington up to the very eve of war.

Even after February 3 it was not certain that the United States would go to war. Popular opinion, it is true, applauded the President's Note. The Press prophesied hostilities sooner or later. Stalwart thinkers and leaders proclaimed that the sooner they came the better. The President was congratulated for having taken the bull by the horns. "The blood of a citizen who is first of all things an American pulses more firmly, more proudly, this morning," cried the Republican and Conservative *New York Sun* on the day after the rupture. "His Government has at last spoken with the voice of the nation. He can now hold his head upright, and thank God and the President for the old-fashioned American perpendicularity of it."


Those who approved of the President's patience and sympathized with his efforts to preserve for his country the peace which he rightly believed it ardently desired were equally satisfied. The Democratic and Liberal *New York World* wrote:

The United States is now on the verge of a war with Germany, but the American people can face the crisis without fear and without reproach. The national conscience is clear. In all the records of history there will be found no other example of a great and powerful

nation exerting such effort and making such sacrifices to keep the peace as the United States has done. . . . Mr. Wilson has been patient indeed, but it is a patience that has been shared with the majority of the American people, and it is not to be regretted. The President's desire to keep the country out of the war, if honourable means could be found, has been their desire, and it is nothing that requires apology or extenuation. If he has failed, it is a noble, enlightened failure which does honour to the President and the nation.

The German-American propagandists deemed discretion the better part of Pan-Germanism. Their newspapers proclaimed that, unpleasant as was the path that the President had indicated, it must be followed. Dr. Hexamer, President of the National German-American Alliance, wrote to members of his notorious organization urging them to be loyal Americans. As will be shown later, the intrinsic sincerity of many such professions may be doubted, but that they should have been made at all showed how strongly the President's defiance of Germany had set running the tide of patriotism.

Nevertheless, it soon became evident that, as the careful phraseology of the President's Note indicated, hopes were still cherished in Washington that war might be avoided, or at any rate limited to protection for American shipping and the systematization and expansion under Government auspices of the aid in the way of supplies and of loans to finance them which, thanks to the British Navy, the Allies had been able to get from the United States as a neutral. The first sign of these hopes was the announcement on the day after the rupture



DESTROYER GUARDING GERMAN LINERS AT HOBOKEN.

that the State Department had sent to the heads of American missions in neutral countries the following instructions :

You will immediately notify the Government to which you are accredited that the United States, because of the German Government's recent announcement of its intention to renew unrestricted submarine warfare, has no choice but to follow the course laid down in its Note of April 18, 1916 (the Sussex Note).

It has, therefore, recalled the American Ambassador to Berlin and has delivered passports to the German Ambassador to the United States.

Say also that the President is reluctant to believe Germany actually will carry out her threat against neutral commerce, but if it be done the President will ask Congress to authorize the use of national power to protect American citizens engaged in their peaceful and lawful errands on the seas.

The course taken is, in the President's view, entirely in conformity with the principles he enunciated in his address to the Senate January 12. (The address proposing a world league for peace.)

He believes it will make for the peace of the world if other neutral Powers can find it possible to take similar action.

Report fully and immediately on the reception of this announcement and upon the suggestion as to similar action.

The appeal failed in Europe, and succeeded only to a small extent in the American hemisphere, where Cuba and Panama indicated their willingness to back up the United States, and Brazil made it apparent that, for reasons of her own, her patience with Prussian maritime practices was nearly exhausted. In Europe, the actualities of a situation which for most of the remaining neutrals required the most delicate handling counted for more than the lead of the United States. The motive behind the President's move was, however, important. The step taken made it clear that he had not given up the hope that Germany might be brought to see reason by moral suasion.

His idea was that she might recoil before the prospect of becoming the Ishmael of the nations. For the next six weeks he seemed to hope against hope for peace. Despite much hysterical advertisement by the newspapers, nothing really effective was undertaken to put the country upon a war basis. There was a tendency to overlook German insults and crimes.

Germany, from the moment when she heard that Count Bernstorff had been given his passports, acted with characteristic clumsiness and brutality. The first sign that she did not mean to draw back came upon the night of the rupture. One of the reasons that had been adduced by the more moderate people in Berlin against war with the United States was the fact that, since August, 1914, over 500,000 tons of German shipping, including the giant Vaterland and many other valuable liners, had been laid up in American ports. These ships, some 70 in all, it was realized, might easily be lost to Germany in case of war. When it was decided that war had to be risked in the interests of the submarine campaign, elaborate instructions were sent to the captains of the detained vessels to see to it that, if they were taken over by the United States, they should at any rate be useless to help to increase the tonnage of the Allies for some time to come. Some of the captains were apparently told to try first to scuttle their vessels in the fairways of the harbours they were in, and if that failed to "scrap" their machinery. In New York the fleet of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-America Lines was prevented from carrying out the first part of the instructions.

Indeed, only one vessel in Savannah was actually scuttled. But in virtually all the vessels in all the ports of the United States and her overseas possessions the machinery was methodically smashed. This came out in the course of subsequent court proceedings at Boston, when the captain of the Kronprinzessin Cecile admitted that even before the rupture of relations had been announced he had been instructed by the German Embassy in Washington to disable his vessel. The Germans had, of course, the right to do what they liked with their own property, but to thoughtful people the incident showed that Germany did mean to stake everything on her submarines, and to accept war with the United States as part of the price of the aid it was hoped they would bring.

The second sign that Berlin meant to do nothing to smooth things over was the treatment of the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, at Berlin. Not only were his telephone lines cut, his post interfered with, his passports held back, and his privileges as a diplomatist otherwise abridged, just as happened to the Ambassadors of the Allies at the beginning of the war, but an effort was made to intimidate him into the signature, or rather the reaffirmation of a treaty which in the case of war would have given the Germans various advantages. The treaty was the commercial treaty with Prussia of 1799. It had been denounced some years before the war in consequence of American legislation which ran counter to it. Its reaffir-

mation would have given German subjects the right to remain unmolested in the United States for nine months after the declaration of war. It would also, in the form that was proposed for its renewal, have preserved for Germany her ships. For some days Mr. Gerard was detained in the hope that he might be bullied into signing the document. The affair was, of course, incredibly stupid from the German point of view, as the treaty would not have become effective until ratified by the United States Senate, and in any case Mr. Gerard had shown the Wilhelmstrasse time and again that he was not the sort of person to be bullied.

The excuse that the Germans gave for the retention of the Ambassador was also incredibly stupid. They were, they said, holding him as a hostage for the proper treatment of Count Bernstorff and the crews of the German ships in the United States. Their only justification was that apparently Press dispatches to Germany did speak of the ships and their crews being "seized," but the Wilhelmstrasse had adequate facilities for communication with its Washington Embassy, and must have known that the President was behaving, and making his Government behave, with the most scrupulous and, indeed, patient correctness.

Not only was everything possible done to ensure the comfort of the departing members of the staff of the German Embassy and consulates and their security from their own submarines—Washington prevailed upon Lon-



THE GERMAN LINERS "PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH" AND "KÖNIG WILHELM II" UNDER GUARD IN NEW YORK HARBOUR.

don to allow the ship with Count Bernstorff on board to put into Halifax for search, and thus to avoid a voyage to Kirkwall or some other British port in the danger zone—but the President spared no pains to show that Germany was to have the benefit of every doubt until the case for war was as clear as daylight. It was carefully explained in Washington that there was to be no immediate break with Austria-Hungary, because, it was intimated, it was wished to maintain through Vienna a channel for possible communications with Berlin. Everything was done to make things easy for Germans in the United States. Their property, it was officially stated, would be immune from seizure and their persons from molestation so long as they behaved themselves. Nor was there any effort to construe the deliberate torpedoing of the California with 200 passengers on board, and at least one American, on February 7, or the torpedoing without warning of a succession of other vessels during the ensuing weeks, as the "overt act" which the President stated would be necessary to convince him that the Germans really meant to outlaw themselves. Indeed, on February 10 Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, said in a speech:

Ominous though the situation may seem, there is always hope that our country may be spared the terrible calamity of being forced into a conflict. It is now, as it

has been from the beginning, the wish and the endeavour of the Government to remain at peace with all the world, if it can do so with honour.

Encouraged by this official patience, and convinced that it reflected a general desire of the country to keep out of the war, the Germans, or at any rate those responsible for their diplomacy, tried a change of tactics. Mr. Gerard was finally allowed to depart from Berlin and, through the medium of Herr Ritter, the Swiss Minister and a native of Bâle, who had taken charge of German interests in Washington, a half-hearted attempt was made to reopen negotiations. The story of the attempt was told in the following *communiqué* from the State Department published in the Press of February 13:

A suggestion was made orally to the Department of State late Saturday afternoon by the Minister of Switzerland that the German Government is willing to negotiate with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England would not be interfered with. At the request of the Secretary of State, this suggestion was made in writing and presented to him by the Swiss Minister Sunday night. The communication is as follows:

MEMORANDUM.

The Swiss Government has been requested by the German Government to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby.

(Signed) P. RITTER.

The memorandum received immediate consideration, and the following reply was dispatched to-day:

My dear Mr. Minister,—I am requested by the Presi-



CITIZEN SOLDIERS DRILLING ON GOVERNOR'S ISLAND IN MARCH, 1917, in preparation for possible war.



AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS PRACTISING GRENADE THROWING AT VALCARTIER CAMP IN CANADA.

dent to say to you, in acknowledging the memorandum which you were kind enough to send me on the 11th instant, that the Government of the United States would gladly discuss with the German Government any questions it might propose for discussion were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January, in which, suddenly and without previous intimation of any kind, it cancelled the assurances which it had given this Government on the 4th of May last, but that it does not feel that it can enter into any discussion with the German Government concerning the policy of submarine warfare against neutrals which it is now pursuing unless and until the German Government renews its assurances of the 4th of May and acts upon the assurance.—I am, my dear Mr. Minister, etc.,

ROBERT LANSING.

His Excellency Dr. Paul Ritter,
Minister of Switzerland.

No other interchange on this subject has taken place between this Government and any other Government or person.

In view of Germany's determination to continue her submarine campaign at all costs, including war with the United States, it may, as said above, be doubted whether this official peace move (afterwards repudiated by Berlin) and various unofficial peace intrigues simultaneously set on foot were meant to do more than make it difficult for the President to make up his own mind and that of his countrymen that war was inevitable, and to have Congress behind his ultimatum of February 3.

For it was soon apparent that the transition from neutrality to belligerency would be slow and difficult. The patriotic enthusiasm caused by Count Bernstorff's dismissal quickly waned. There seemed to be scant public appreciation of the gravity of the crisis and the immensity of the stakes upon the table. Serious railway

strikes were only just averted, despite the obvious fact that, especially in a country like the United States, transport is an integral part of military preparations. Washington, instead of stirring things up, rather encouraged the idea of a war of "limited liability," of a "dollar war" in contradistinction to a war of "blood and iron," and seemed to be studiously avoiding any preparation or precautions that savoured of hostilities.

The chief positive result of the German submarine decree and the consequent rupture was to paralyze American and neutral trans-Atlantic shipping. Between February 3 and February 10 no American vessels left New York for the war zone. The American liner *St. Louis* was held up with mails for Europe. Everybody waited to see what step the President would take for the protection of the Stars and Stripes. On February 10 it was announced that American vessels might carry arms and take any steps to meet attack. But that did not help things much. The necessary guns could not be got overnight without Government assistance. The co-operation of the Navy was needed to provide adequate gun crews. Washington refused to take the responsibility. According to the *New York Times*, the President and his advisers, while recognizing the right of American vessels to arm themselves, deemed the situation too delicate to justify the Navy's taking the matter over. So for some weeks nothing was done. American shipping

accumulated and covered in home ports, while its owners either awaited Government help or tried in vain to rake up guns and gunners.

It may be questioned whether, in view of the small number of American bottoms in the trans-Atlantic trade, this interference with the Atlantic trade did much harm. But it happened to synchronize with a rather serious freight congestion on the railways. Trucks and trains of munitions and supplies for the

of the Administration to send out American vessels under the protection of naval guns served by naval gunners and to prepare for the almost certain consequences of such action. As early as February 8 the *New York Times*, perhaps the leading Democratic newspaper of the country, threw its weight on the same side, and wrote :

The *St. Louis*, an American ship, of American registry, and flying the American flag, is barred from the seas by Germany. All other American ships of the transatlantic trade now lying in our ports are in the same position.



BRITISH SUBJECTS ENLISTING AT THE BRITISH RECRUITING OFFICE
IN NEW YORK

after the American Declaration of War.

Allies began to block the sidings. There was consequently a shortage of transport for food from the West for the cities of the East. Prices soared. There were food riots in New York, Philadelphia, and other cities. There was every reason to believe that the riots were largely instigated by walking delegates of the German propaganda, with the idea of doing everything possible to keep the eyes of the United States turned inward. But they helped to make imaginative people indignant at such a surrender to the German blockade, and the stalwarts, led by people like Mr. Roosevelt and by the Conservative Press, chafed openly at what they deemed the unwillingness

Their owners dare not take the risk of venturing within the barred zone, where they have a lawful and absolute right to go, and up to the present time the Government has given no sign of an intention to protect them in the exercise of that right. In effect, therefore, Germany has blockaded our ports, although we are a neutral nation. . . . The German naval commanders have thus far, in the main, refrained from destroying "American ships and American lives," but it is evident that "our seamen and our people" do not as yet enjoy the necessary protection of the Government in "the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas." . . . She [Germany] has forbidden us to send our ships to ports with which we have an unquestionable right to trade, and our present position is one of entire obedience to her behest.

The American people cannot for a moment believe that their Government has decided upon submission as a permanent policy, that it has abandoned the position taken by the President in his address to the Senate, that it will continue indefinitely to respect this German order-



NEWPORT NAVAL TRAINING STATION : RECRUITS.

What overt act could inflict greater damage upon our trade or constitute a more serious affront to the national dignity than this ban, at present entirely effective, upon our right to send out our ships? The hope is cherished that the Government is making its preparations to protect "our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas." "I can do nothing less," said President Wilson.

The justification adduced by the Government for the delay in arming the ships and taking a strong line with Germany, which the Republican and Conservative Press openly ascribed to the President's continued refusal to face the possibility of war, was that this object-lesson to the American people of the intimate way in which the blockade touched them would assure support for the President when it came to the next step towards war.

So soon as they saw that war was not yet a foregone conclusion, the pacifists, prodded by the agents of Berlin, began to pluck up courage again. The first effort of their leaders was to persuade Germany, through the medium of a German newspaper correspondent in Washington, that a large majority of Americans were

still for peace. Their next effort was to create demonstrations to justify this assertion. All their machinery, so familiar in the days of the neutrality of the United States, was put into motion. An agitation was started, under the auspices of Mr. Bryan among others, for a referendum upon peace or war. Meetings were arranged. Patriotic speakers, like the Mayor of New York, were heckled, and even in the House of Representatives members were found to protest against hostilities. So serious had the situation become that by February 20 the *New York Times*, in an urgent leader entitled "Seeking Peace, Inviting War," urged the President to act, on the ground that any appearance of weakness would encourage Germany to force the issue and make war absolutely inevitable.

On February 26 the President took the advice of the weighty section represented by the *New York Times* and backed by the majority of his Cabinet. In an address to Congress he asked for power to institute a



NEWPORT NAVAL TRAINING STATION : THE SAME RECRUITS AFTER TEN DAYS' TRAINING.

policy of "armed neutrality." After pointing out that two American ships had been sunk in the barred zone and that there were other signs that Berlin was resolved on "ruthlessness"—that, in a word, the "situation was fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers"—he said:

I believe that the people will be willing to trust me to act with restraint, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months; and it is in that belief that I request that you will authorize me to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I request also that you will grant me at the same time, along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to enable me to provide adequate means of protection where they are lacking, including adequate insurance against the present war risks.

I have spoken of our commerce and of the legitimate errands of our people on the seas, but you will not be misled as to my main thought—the thought that lies beneath these phrases and gives them dignity and weight. It is not of material interest merely that we are thinking. It is, rather, of fundamental human rights, chief of all the right of life itself.

I am thinking not only of the rights of Americans to come and go about their proper business by way of the sea, but also of something deeper, much more fundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity without which there is no civilization. My theme is of those great principles of compassion and of

protection which mankind has sought to throw about human lives, the lives of non-combatants, the lives of men who are peacefully at work keeping the industrial processes of the world quick and vital, the lives of women and children and of those who supply the labour which ministers to their sustenance. We are speaking of no selfish material rights, but of rights which our hearts support and whose foundation is that righteous passion for justice upon which all law, all structures alike of family, of State, and of mankind must rest, as upon the ultimate base of our existence and our liberty.

I cannot imagine any man with American principles at his heart hesitating to defend these things.

After the address a Bill was introduced into both Houses authorizing the President to arm the ships, and appropriating the sum necessary for "armed neutrality." The step was well received. It was regarded in stalwart quarters as a compromise that was not likely to endure, but the view of the majority was that the President was right to proceed with caution. His policy was not destined to get the sanction of law. The current session of Congress expired automatically on March 4, and, though the House passed the necessary Bill by a huge majority, the Senate, which had then no rules of closure, was prevented from doing so by a band of a dozen pacifists, pro-Germans, and faddists, including Senator Stone, of Missouri, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Com.



SAILORS FROM THE NAVAL TRAINING STATION AT NEWPORT, R.I. They had just completed their course of training and were photographed lined up on a pier in New York waiting to go aboard for active service, April 21, 1917.



THE WASHINGTON POLICE DEAL WITH
A PACIFIST DEMONSTRATION.

mittee. From the practical point of view the failure of the Bill made little difference. The whole Senate, with the exception of the "disloyal twelve," signed a round robin to the effect that it was heart and soul with the President; the country applauded their action and that of the House of Representatives, and denounced the obstructionists; and, after some days of doubt as to his power to adopt such a measure without Parliamentary authority, the President decided to arm merchant ships. In order, however, that the world might see that he had Congress behind him, he summoned an extra session for April 15 to ratify his action.

Once more Prussian savagery forced the President's hands. Congress rose on March 4. On the same day the President signalized the beginning of his second term of office by an inaugural address which left no doubt in the minds of his hearers that he realized that at any moment the United States might be confronted with the greatest crisis of her history. The crisis came a fortnight later. On March 18 it was announced from London that three American steamships, the *City of Memphis*, the *Illinois* and the *Vigilancia*, had been sunk by submarine without warning and with loss of American lives. Two days later



came the news of murderous attacks upon two Belgian relief ships which the Germans had promised should be spared. The country was thrown into a ferment. War, it was thought, could not be avoided. The stalwarts demanded it. The Government, they proclaimed, could not afford to procrastinate further. The President must expedite the meeting of Congress and ask it to declare war. The agitation, as might have been expected, was led by Mr. Roosevelt. In a statement to the newspapers he said:

Seven weeks ago we broke relations with Germany. This was eminently proper. But it amounted to nothing. It was an empty gesture unless it was followed by vigorous and efficient action. Yet during the seven weeks (a time as long as the entire duration of the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866) we have done nothing. We have not even prepared. . . .

Under existing conditions armed neutrality is only another name for timid war; and Germany despises timidity as she despises all other forms of feebleness. She does not wage timid war herself, and she neither respects nor understands it in others.

Seemingly her submarine warfare has failed, and is less menacing now than it was seven weeks ago. We are profiting, and shall profit, by this failure. But we have done nothing to bring it about. It has been due solely to the efficiency of the British Navy. We have done nothing to help ourselves. We have done nothing to secure our own safety or to vindicate our own honour. We have been content to shelter ourselves behind the fleet of a foreign Power.

Such a position is intolerable to all self-respecting Americans who are proud of the great heritage handed down to them by their fathers and their fathers' fathers. Let us dare to look the truth in the face. Let us dare to use our own strength in our own defence and strike hard for our national interest and honour. There is no question about "going to war." Germany is already at war with us. The only question for us to decide is whether we shall make war nobly or ignobly. Let us face the accomplished fact, admit that Germany is at war with us, and, in our turn, wage war on Germany with all our energy and courage, and regain the right to look the whole world in the eyes without finching.

The leaders of the Republican party, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Root, Mr. Choate and others, met and urged the President not to take Germany's attack "lying down," but to declare war, send men to Europe, and back them with all the resources of the country. Democrats joined in the outburst. On March 20 the newspapers announced that at a Cabinet meeting opinion had been solid and urgent that the President should adopt a strenuous policy. Apologetic preparedness, said the *New York Times*, must cease. Facts must be faced; the German menace must be met and crushed. There was consequently scant surprise but much jubilation when, on March 21, the President summoned Congress to meet on April 2, instead of April 15, to consider matters of grave public interest.

The President's action increased the tension. Everybody remembered that in the past he had been prone to fit his decisions to what he believed to be the demands of public opinion. Public opinion, everybody recognized, was still not fully awake to the significance of the situation. The pacifists and the Teutonic manipulators hoped that it might yet be possible to persuade the President to steer a middle course. The stalwarts clamoured for a real war. Probably Mr. Wilson had already made up his mind, but he kept his counsel and let the storm rage. And rage it did, culminating, after much speech-making, in rival pacifist and stalwart demonstrations in Washington on the eve of the opening of Congress. The pacifists started the business. Their


activity during all the critical weeks since the beginning of February had been immense, pricked, as they were, by the goad of their German masters. German propagandists flooded the mails with anonymous articles attacking the United States Government as a partisan of the Allies' cause; denouncing the Allies, particularly England; and urging patience with Germany and allegiance to the American tradition of non-interference in European affairs. Thousands of letters and telegrams, often, it was evident, prepared according to circularized forms, were launched upon Congress. Meetings were arranged everywhere. The newspapers were bombarded with letters to their editors. Finally, thousands of peace delegates, ranging all the way from honest Quakers to obvious Germans, were rounded up in special trains, many with free tickets, for an eleventh-hour demonstration in Washington. The opposing forces of the stalwarts also arrived in their special trains and their thousands.

Both demonstrations were unnecessary. Mr. Wilson's message was already written, and had been gone over by his intimate advisers some days before. It was delivered late in the evening of April 2, before the two Chambers assembled in joint session. In terms that will live for ever, the President denounced the German Government, and threw in his country's lot unreservedly with the Allies.

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination,



PRESIDENT WILSON DELIVERING HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS ON ASSUMING OFFICE FOR A SECOND TERM, March 4, 1917.

their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any Government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in

the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except those which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to



PARADE OF PRINCETON STUDENTS.

underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavour to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defence of rights which no modern publicist

has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the Navy in all respects, but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the

immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war of at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic Governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such



FIELD ARTILLERY GETTING A GUN ON BOARD A RAILWAY TRUCK.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two

circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their Governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbour states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it

may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honour.

One of the things that have served to convince us that

the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic Govern-



THE BEGINNING OF A GREAT TRAINING CAMP IN THE UNITED STATES.

The Camp is intended to accommodate about 35,000 men. The photograph shows the unloading of a trainload of railway "ties" or sleepers.



[Clinedinst.]

THE U.S. COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Seated, left to right: D. F. Houston (Agriculture), Josephus Daniels (Navy), Newton D. Baker (War), Franklin K. Lane (Interior), and W. B. Wilson (Labour). Standing, left to right: Grosvenor B. Clarke (Secretary of the Council), Julius Rosenwald (Chairman, Supplies), Bernard K. Baruch (Raw Materials), D. Willard (Transportation), Dr. F. H. Martin (Medicine and Sanitation), Dr. H. Godfrey (Research), Howard Coffin (Munitions), W. S. Gifford (Director of the Council).

ments of the world. We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancour and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.


I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honour. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has, therefore, not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowsky, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship,—exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbours and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace

and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

After the address, the more pointed passages in which were vigorously applauded, the follow-



THE RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS DECLARING A STATE OF WAR.

ing resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives :

JOINT RESOLUTION, Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial German Government and the Government and People of the United States and Making Provision to Prosecute the Same.

Whereas, The recent acts of the Imperial German Government are acts of war against the Government and People of the United States :

Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared, and

That the President be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to take immediate steps not only to put the country into a thorough state of defence but also to exert all of its power and employ all of its resources to carry on war against the Imperial German Government and to bring the conflict to a successful termination.

A few days later the resolution was adopted by overwhelming majorities of both Chambers, after no opposition more serious than a few

perfunctory speeches by pacifists and provincially-minded politicians. On April 6 the United States was officially at war with the German Empire. A momentous event was consummated in the history of mankind. After a century and more of aloofness from European affairs, after two years and more of what to some had been at times rather heart-breaking official neutrality towards the crimes and illegalities of Prussia-Germany, the American people had been lined up with the Liberal nations of Europe to help punish her for her transgressions and to prevent her fastening on the world her "militarist" tyranny.

It remained to be seen what sort of war would be waged. There had been, as is said above, a good deal of talk, after Count Bernstorff had been given his passports, of a "limited liability" war. Would it be persisted in, or would the men for whom the President asked become the nucleus of great armies to fight in Europe? Would the United States be content to patrol her own waters and perhaps part of the Atlantic against submarines, or would she join her fleet with ours in an effort to catch the pirates as they left their bases and counteract their most dangerous activities? Would the whole national resources be mobilized on the economic side of the war, or would the existing output of munitions and supplies be merely speeded up and their financing assisted by Government loans? It was obvious from the President's Address that he meant business. But what of the country? The declaration of war produced another tremendous effervescence of patriotism. The usual desire to uphold the President through thick and thin was respected from one end of the country to the other. Once more the German-American Press accepted the inevitable with a wry face. Indeed, the organs of the extreme Fenian Irishmen were for a time the only newspapers that dared criticize the President for becoming our ally.

The outburst of patriotic feeling was as inevitable as it was sincere. But it soon became apparent that it had about as much to do with realities as the "business as usual" atmosphere that prevailed in England in the first weeks of the war. Not to put too fine a point upon it, public opinion, for all its patriotism, was still almost as unprepared for hostilities as ten months earlier. The best proof of that was to be found in the early recruiting figures. When

the Republic declared war the strength of the Regular Army was on paper just over 100,000 ; that of the Navy, 64,000 ; that of the Marines, about 14,000. The population of the United States lacks little of 100,000,000. Yet in the first three months after April 6, despite the fact that conscription was imminent for men between 21 and 30, of whom there were some 10,000,000 available, only 130,000 men had joined the Army, 40,000 the Navy, and about 12,000 the Marines.

the United States ? Had not the President said only a few months previously that the war was of no concern to the United States, and that if Americans wished to serve civilization they had best remain neutral ? Why had the President suddenly demolished the comfortable tradition of American aloofness in which he had always seemed to be so firm a believer ? He had promised before his re-election to keep the United States at peace and prosperous ; he had said that war might mean hardship of all sorts ;



REGULARS GUARDING THE POTOMAC BRIDGE.

The masses were, as a writer in *The New Republic* of April 21 put it, "curiously placid and unenthusiastic about the war." The country had, as it were, slipped into the war in the dark. Usually war implies a dislocation of the national outlook. It brings obvious dangers and problems. An enemy has to be defeated, or at best kept at bay, or all sorts of unpleasant things are bound to happen at once. The United States was confronted with no such urgent necessities. The average American found Germany no more dangerous on April 7 than she had been at any time during the past two years. He had, indeed, begun to take her crimes as part of the routine of the contest. She had assassinated the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, and other vessels, and with them some 200 American citizens, and yet the President had only shaken his finger at her. Why should a resumption of her piratical practices suddenly stamp her as a menace to civilization and to

he had warned the electors against voting for the Republicans lest they should commit America to war ; and yet hardly had he been elected than he had plunged the country into Armageddon as decisively as Mr. Roosevelt could have done. The result of these questionings was a curious atmosphere of unreality, which the Germans, for once reading the psychology of a foreign nation aright, were clever enough to make the most of. Having recovered from their first spasm of blustering surprise at finding that the President was not after all "too proud to fight," Berlin had carefully eschewed anything that might arouse the United States.

True there were, during March and April of 1917, various revelations regarding Prussian plots. A revolt in Cuba, which at one moment seemed likely to demand the military intervention of the United States in accordance with her responsibility under treaty for the peace of the island, and thus to interfere with her

preparations against Germany, was found to have been, at any rate, abetted by Germans. Revolutionaries were arrested with proclamations on their persons that Germany was the friend of the rebels and "has promised to



AN ENLISTMENT POSTER.

help us." There were about the same time convincing revelations that Germany had been conspiring with disloyal Hindus, first to make trouble in India and then, when it was found that the Government there had things well in hand, to make trouble in the United States. An agitator called Chakraberty, arrested on these charges, admitted that since the beginning of the war he had been to Berlin and seen high German officials. Finally came the interception and publication of Herr Zimmerman's letter to the German Minister in Mexico suggesting an alliance with Mexico, and, if possible, with Japan, in case of war. The letter and the considerable effect that it had in temporarily hardening public opinion against Germany were described in Chapter CLXXVII. For the purposes of this chapter it is enough to notice that, like German participation in certain other plots in the American hemisphere directly concerned with the United States, it was conceived before the rupture.

After the rupture, the Germans in the United States were as active as ever. They strove hard to increase the confusion of the public

mind in regard to its causes. England, they and their Irish friends proclaimed, among other things, had manoeuvred the United States into the contest to save her own selfish skin. But provocative policies were avoided in Berlin and criminal activities of a spectacular kind were discontinued by its agents in the United States. There was no declaration of war on the part of Germany. Americans, with the exception of a few prisoners, were decently treated. No U boats came to American waters. No German-fomented uprisings were started in Mexico—still less on American soil. Austria was not forced to follow her masterful Ally into the war. When, some time after April 6, the President decided that he could not receive Count Tarnowsky, who had been waiting since just before Count Bernstorff's dismissal to present his credentials as the successor of the unfortunate Dr. Dumba, and sent him back to Europe with his chargé d'affaires and the rest of his staff, Berlin did not even require Turkey and Bulgaria to sever diplomatic relations with the Republic. It was taken for granted in Washington that Count Bernstorff's return to Berlin was responsible for this policy, for it must be admitted that, master spy and arch-intriguer as he was known to be, the German ex-Ambassador left the country with the unwilling respect of those who can admire ability even when employed in the worst of causes. Count Bernstorff had, it was generally felt, proved himself to be one of the small number of Prussians who can really get to know something about a foreign country and the ways of managing its opinions.

The rather perfunctory fashion in which the public, outside educated circles, took the outbreak of war was, as it was bound to be, a great handicap to the President. A statesman with all the orthodox Liberal dislike of militarism would never have come out for conscription, even though, as he was compelled to explain, it should only be conscription for the time of the war, had he not been thoroughly in earnest. But in the United States, of all democracies, it is difficult for a Government to go ahead of public opinion. Even Mr. Roosevelt had always tried to create support for his reforms before he officially promulgated them, and President Wilson, for nearly three years of war, had been chiefly concerned in, at any rate, not fostering the warlike situation to which he had been converted with, to the average man, mysterious suddenness. The

effects of the resultant lack of intimate contact between the Executive and large classes of the population were the more marked, insomuch as there had never been a time when a President had greater need of an aggressive public sentiment to help him with his Government and with Congress. The Government was as unprepared for war as the people. It must always be one of the minor paradoxes of history that, even after February 3, when most thoughtful observers deemed hostilities inevitable and everybody feared war, virtually nothing was done in Washington to anticipate the shock. On the surface there seemed to be changes. Fundamentally everything, or nearly everything, went on as before. There was no real effort to place either the Army or the Navy upon a war footing. The machinery of the fighting departments, though notoriously inadequate, was left as it was. Congress was not even seriously asked to sanction precautionary measures. Neither in the economic nor in the military sense was any policy evolved. All that happened was that a body called the Council

of National Defence, created by the President during the previous winter and consisting of six members of the Cabinet, six business men, a Labour leader, and a scientist, was convoked. Its business members proceeded to sketch a tentative organization of the industries of the country, but as their powers were purely advisory they could not do much.

After April 7 the President tried to make up for lost time with great energy and wideness of vision. He saw at once that, if his country was to do anything, it had to be organized from the ground up. He took advantage of the patriotism of the leading men of business throughout the Union to flood Washington with willing helpers for the Departments of his Government and especially for the Council of National Defence. He told the Council to go ahead and organize on the most comprehensive basis possible. With the advice of Mr. McAdoo he sent to Congress a Bill authorizing the raising of 7,000,000,000 of dollars, 3,000,000,000 of which might be lent to the Allies at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the price at which the



LANDING OF M. VIVIANI AND THE FRENCH MISSION AT NEW YORK.
M. Viviani is on the gangway, and the Reception Committee have turned to greet the other Members of the Mission.



THE BRITISH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

Seated in the centre is Mr. A. J. Balfour, with, on his right, Sir George Eulas Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce of Canada, and on his left Major-General G. T. M. Bridges and Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair.

money was to be raised. He sent another Bill authorizing conscription, and still others giving him that control over food production and distribution, land and sea transport, and other great national activities without which modern warfare cannot be successfully waged. What was even more important, he gave the Allies to understand that he wished to fight shoulder to shoulder with them for the common cause.

Before the United States had been at war a couple of weeks the Admirals commanding the British and French squadrons in American waters visited Washington for a conference with the Navy Department. When they arrived they were doubtful whether the Americans would do much more than help them with their patrol work; when they left they realized that far more was contemplated, and that before long American war vessels would have joined the fleets of the Allies in European waters.

The first Naval Conference was but a meagre preface of what was to come. Towards the end of April the country was electrified by the news that Marshal Joffre and Monsieur Viviani for the French, and Mr. Balfour for the British, accompanied by large missions of military, naval and economic experts, were on the way to a War Council in Washington. The British mission, after an uneventful voyage to Halifax, arrived first, on Sunday, April 22. Marshal Joffre and Monsieur Viviani arrived a few days later, and, like the British mission, settled into a palatial residence in Washington which had been placed at their disposal by the American Government. From their first enthusiastic reception the visits of the missions were, in the political and popular points of view, undiluted successes. If a comparison may be allowed, Mr. Balfour perhaps scored more heavily than his French colleagues. The bluff and sympathetic serenity of Marshal Joffre, the fire and brilliance of Monsieur Viviani's eloquence, captured everybody; but they could not make France more popular than traditional ties and admiration of her gallantry in the war had already made her. England's popularity was, on the contrary, greatly enhanced by Mr. Balfour. All through the war there had been a certain misunderstanding of her position. The necessary predominance of the British Navy in the blockade had aroused somewhat mistrustful memories of British policy during the Napoleonic wars. There was a tendency to believe that England was using her sea power in a rather arbitrary

and brutal manner to secure not only victory, but, after victory, an unfair grip upon the trade of the whole world. These suspicions had been consistently and ingeniously fanned by German and Irish agitators, and, owing perhaps to the cleanness of the British conscience, had never been efficaciously counteracted.

Mr. Balfour dealt with them most effectively. In private conversation and public utterances he demolished misconceptions and accentuated truths. He smashed, it may be hoped once and for all, the idea that intimate relations between England and a State which contains large elements of races hostile to her can depend upon community of blood. In future, he proclaimed in effect, the chief tie between the British Empire and the American democracy should be kindred ideals rather than kindred by descent. Nor was it only through statesmanship that Mr. Balfour succeeded. His "personality" cheered everybody. Many a politician and journalist left the informal gatherings which he frequently attended while in Washington to tell their constituents and readers that there must be something wrong with the common American theory that British statesmen are aloof and unsympathetic. The British Foreign Minister, that much advertised "aristocrat of brains and blood," the ex-dictator of Ireland, they had found, was as genial and charming a "mixer" and as whole-hearted a believer in democracy in general and American democracy in particular as any republican could be. There is no doubt, either, that in their more serious conversations with high officials from the President downwards Mr. Balfour and his subordinates dispelled various misapprehensions about British policy regarding the war and its settlement, such, for instance, as had been set afloat by the Paris Economic Conference in 1916, and laid the basis for closer cooperation with the new Ally than would have seemed possible a few months earlier. As a semi-official statement to the Press said at the time, the British Foreign Minister left Washington with the relationship between the United States and Great Britain upon a better footing than it had ever been since the secession of the American Colonies. No treaties or conventions were concluded. The United States did not formally signify her adherence to the pact of the Allies to stand or fall together: but unofficially it was made clear that she was in the war until the common cause for which they were fighting was vindicated, while the

conversations which Mr. Balfour had with the President and others dissipated any fears that might have existed lest the terms upon which she might be prepared to consider peace should differ in principle from those of the Allies.

Nor was it only the relations of the United States with her new Allies that the visit of the French and British missions benefited. It helped the President in his task of preparing the country for war. Mr. Balfour's journey westward to Chicago was cancelled at the instigation of the State Department, owing, there is reason to believe, to nervousness as to the attitude of the extreme Irish and German factions there; but the French mission, like the subsequent Italian mission under Prince Udine, went on an extended tour in the Middle States, and received everywhere rousing receptions. As to the East, the celebrations in New York, never surpassed even in that city of magnificent pageants and royal hospitality, which were held in the joint honour of Marshal Joffre, Mr. Balfour and M. Viviani demonstrated, in a fashion that none who took part in them will ever forget, the depth of its sympathy with the cause of the Allies. Not that the appeal of the missions was by any

means solely political and sentimental. If they helped to make people realize the nobility of the venture upon which the country had embarked, they also taught them something of its dangers.

So soon as he touched American soil Marshal Joffre urged the United States to send an expeditionary force to France without delay. France, he frankly admitted, was not as strong in reserve man-power as she had been, and even a small expeditionary force would fill her with enthusiasm and Germany with dismay at the thought of the limitless reserves behind that force. Military members of the British mission backed up the Marshal of France. They pointed out among other things how much Great Britain had suffered through her tardiness in adopting conscription. Simultaneously their civilian colleagues exploded the idea that the United States was coming in at the end of the war by accentuating the gravity of the tonnage and food situation and the absolute necessity of preparing for a struggle which must be long and arduous before victory could grace the standards of the Allies.

The effect of Marshal Joffre's plea and of the British revelations was great. Since the President's war address it had been taken for



ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST AMERICAN CONTINGENT IN FRANCE.




M. VIVIANI AND MARSHAL JOFFRE IN NEW YORK.

M. Viviani is in front, leaning on the arm of Mr. Jos. H. Choate, formerly U.S. Ambassador in London ; Marshal Joffre follows immediately behind.

granted that eventually American troops would be sent to France if needed. But it was widely doubted whether they ever would be needed, and the views of the American General Staff were that, in any event, no men should be sent until the United States had a vast army equipped and trained. So far as Washington was concerned such opinions lost vogue almost

overnight. Before the missions departed Congress had enacted a conscription law and arrangements had been made for the despatch of an expeditionary force to France ; plans were on foot for the eventual training of really large armies, for the control of American food production and distribution in the interests of all the Allies, for the systematic



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING.
 In command of the American Forces in France.

Underwood.

building of vessels to transport men, munitions, and food to Europe; the methodical raising of huge loans to the Allies had been arranged; American participation in our blockade had been secured in principle; and, last but not least, it had been announced that a considerable flotilla of destroyers, and perhaps some other boats, were cooperating in British waters

closely and effectively with the British fleet against the German submarines.

The President had in fact attained his first object. He had committed his country as deeply as possible to the war. He had re-established confidence in American policy abroad, and he had got through Congress the two measures he most immediately needed—laws allowing him

to draft men for the Army and to raise loans for his own Government and for those of the Allies. So far as the common cause was concerned, the War Finance Act was the more immediately important ; so far as the domestic situation was concerned, the Conscription Act involved the greater triumph of patriotism. To persuade Congress to vote money for the war was one thing, to persuade it to adopt in six weeks the principle of compulsory service was another thing ; for the principle was at least as exotic in America as it had been in England ; and England, with the war just beyond the narrow seas, with her armies in France and elsewhere crying for reinforcements, took two years to overcome prejudices which the Republic threw aside in six weeks.

As finally passed on May 17, the chief provisions of the Army Draft Law provided for the following things :

Raising of forces by the selective draft system, imposed upon all males between the ages of 21 and 30 years, both inclusive, subject to registration and certain exemptions from service.

Increasing the regular Army to maximum war strength.

Drafting into the Federal service of National Guard units.

Raising an additional force by conscription of 500,000 men, with addition of 500,000 if deemed necessary.

Raising, if the President sees fit, four divisions of volunteer infantry.

The clause about the four divisions of volunteers was the result of Mr. Roosevelt's efforts to persuade the Government to let him go to France at the head of a volunteer expedition, but there can be little doubt that Mr. Wilson was right in his decision to use regulars for the first expedition. The news a few days later that General Pershing had been ordered to proceed to Europe and prepare to take command of the American troops, together with aviators, a generous quota of surgeons and nurses, and other auxiliaries, obliterated any popular disappointment that his refusal to accept Mr. Roosevelt's project might have caused. Mr. Roosevelt himself acclaimed General Pershing's appointment as about the best that could have



MARSHAL JOFFRE AND M. JULES JUSSERAND, FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.



AMERICA'S FIRST WAR LOAN TO BRITAIN.

The Secretary of the United States Treasury, Mr. William G. McAdoo, is signing the Treasury Warrant for \$200,000,000, representing America's first contribution to the war expenses of the Allies. The witnesses are (left to right) Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, British Ambassador (who signed the receipt for the loan), Sir Richard Lever, Sir Richard Crawford and Assistant-Secretary Crosby.

been made. Indeed, except perhaps General Leonard Wood, General Pershing, by career and character, was obviously the fittest man for the post.

Trained at West Point, a cavalryman who had served in one of the last wars against the Indians of the South-west, the General, though only 56 years old, had seen virtually all the service that is open to any American soldier. He fought in Cuba against the Spaniards. In the Philippines he helped conquer the insurgent Aguinaldo and afterwards dealt with one of the most turbulent of the annexed provinces so successfully that Mr. Roosevelt promoted him Brigadier-General over hundreds of heads. After 10 years of service in the United States he was sent to the Mexican border as second in command to the late General Funston in 1916. He was there entrusted with the pursuit of Villa into northern Mexico, after the bandit had fired upon various American communities on the border. Thanks to the vacillation of Washington, the expedition proved abortive; but General Pershing remained for nearly six months at the head of over 10,000 troops isolated in the Mexican deserts, and acquitted himself brilliantly of a task that must have taxed equally his temper and his qualities as a military administrator. Like Admiral Sims, the chief American naval officer in Europe, he represented the best type of modern American officer, experienced, adaptable, and resourceful. Like Admiral Sims also, who, as he himself reminded his hearers in a speech soon after his arrival in London, had been reprimanded some years before by President Taft for showing in public his belief that in any war with Germany the United States would be on the side of Great Britain, General Pershing had never been inclined to share the rather blind worship paid by some of their colleagues to the fetish of German efficiency. As London found out, so soon as he arrived on June 6, General Pershing was admirably adapted by character no less than training to the great part for which the President chose him.

The law authorizing the draft also authorized the President and his General Staff to press on with other military preparations. The first thing that they did was to announce that the National Guard were to be mobilized and to be enrolled in the Federal Service during the summer. The object of this measure was to create the second contingent of the expe-

ditionary force. When the Republic declared war, the regular Army was constituted as follows:—

	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
In the United States ..	3,622	67,416	71,038
In Alaska	23	769	792
In the Philippine Islands :			
Regular Army ..	480	11,404	11,884
Philippine Scouts ..	182	5,603	5,785
In China	41	1,233	1,274
In Porto Rico	35	679	714
In Hawaii	333	8,112	8,445
In the Canal Zone ..	253	6,846	7,099
Troops <i>en route</i> and officers at foreign stations ..	56	554	610
Total	5,025	102,616	107,641

For the purpose of fighting in Europe only the troops in the North American continent need be considered, as it is obvious that the United States as a belligerent could not deplete her already slender overseas garrisons. Nor were all the home forces available, inasmuch as the new troops had to be trained and stiffened without anything approaching an effective reserve system to fall back upon. The National Guard, or that part of it at all fitted for early service, numbered about 150,000 when America joined the Allies. Its standards, especially in view of the fact that it was fresh from active training on the Mexican border, resembled those of our Territorials in 1914. Roughly speaking, its officers were probably rather worse and its men rather better. At the beginning of the war, indeed from after the rupture of relations, the militia had been used to guard bridges and for other home defence work. By mustering this force into the Federal service it was, however, hoped to be able to produce a considerable number of men who could be sent to France during the autumn, together, perhaps, with some more regulars, whose numbers were being slowly augmented by volunteers.

Registration for the 10,000,000 odd men who were estimated to be liable for military service under the Draft Law took place on June 5 and went off splendidly, despite a spectacular anti-conscription agitation got up by pacifists, anarchists, and other weak-minded faddists among whom German agents worked insidiously and tirelessly. Owing to shortage of supplies and equipment of officers and instructors and to the necessity of building adequate cantonments, it was not, however, planned to call up the first 500,000 before the autumn.

The Government seemed, in fact, to be reconciled to the necessity of waiting a year or more before the United States would be ready to

intervene effectively on the European battlefields. The prospect, while regretted, did not depress people. Nor did the fact that the Navy, with its 14 first line Dreadnoughts, its 34 second line battleships, its 51 destroyers, and its fleets of cruisers and other vessels, could not be fully commissioned offhand on account of a shortage in



A LIBERTY LOAN POSTER.

personnel. The number of officers and men had sunk in March to only just over 60,000 instead of 87,000 as authorized by law, but in June it had risen to over 100,000. The British Grand Fleet, it was realized, did not urgently need assistance, and, as for submarine chasing, were not many American destroyers already in European waters and doing yeoman work? Regarding the military situation, comfort was taken from the fact that if the Allies were going to win in 1917 they would have had to do so, in any case, off their own bats, unless the United States had been prepared on Prussian lines impossible to any democracy; while the prompt adoption of conscription proved that, if it came to a long war, the United States would eventually be able to swing the balance decisively with the vast man power of her 100,000,000 population.

Also it had been pointed out by the French and British missions that men were not the

greatest assistance that Americans could give—at first, at any rate. It was explained that in order of urgency what was most needed was: first, money; secondly, food and bottoms to convey the food; thirdly, help against the submarines; and only, fourthly, save for political and future reasons, men. In regard to money the United States had in the first months done more than anybody had expected of her. It was on April 24 that Congress passed a War Finance Act authorizing, as mentioned above, the Secretary of the Treasury to raise by tax-free bonds \$5,000,000,000 to meet the cost of war and also \$2,000,000,000 by certificates of indebtedness, and from those sums or any other sums available in the Treasury, to lend to the Allies \$3,000,000,000. It was under this law that the famous Liberty Loan of \$2,000,000,000 was launched in June, but the Government did not wait for the loan to be subscribed before beginning to lend to the Allies. By the end of June something over \$1,000,000,000 had gone to them, mainly for the financing of supplies bought in the United States. The first instalment of \$200,000,000 was given to Great Britain in the form of a Treasury warrant signed by Mr. McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, and handed to the British Ambassador as early as April 25. Shortly afterwards a war revenue Bill providing for over \$1,800,000,000 taxation, or nearly three times the normal amount, was introduced into the House. Loosely and carelessly drawn, the measure was still under discussion at the close of the period with which this chapter deals; but it is significant of the spirit in which America's financial obligations in regard to the war were being taken that the principle of comparatively heavy special taxes was rather generally upheld.

It has to be admitted that during the spring of 1917 Washington was not so successful in details as it was with its great conscription and finance measures. To depict a war machine running smoothly, oiled by an alert and enthusiastic public opinion, would be to give a false picture of affairs during that period. The very fact that the President had been so quick to recognize the necessity of putting the whole strength of the nation into the contest caused confusion. He was ahead both of public opinion and of the organization of his Government, and in democracies war cannot be levied by the Executives alone. Throughout the country the perplexity that attended

the earlier stages of the war crisis was very hard to uproot. It remained difficult to persuade people that the contest affected them vitally. It would have been curious had this not been so. It took even England, with the enemy thundering at her gates, with her future obviously at stake, nearly two years to pull herself together. The dwellers in the self-centred cities, the remote prairies, and isolated valleys of the interior, bred in traditions of aloofness, had been told from the first that the war concerned Europe alone. How should they be brought to understand overnight that their future as well as ours was at stake on the battlefields of the Old World?

The situation was made worse by the kind of news that was spread abroad. The outcome of the contest, the country was told, hung, as much as upon anything, on the submarine campaign and on the Russian unrest. One day they read that the tonnage situation was desperate and that Russia might be counted out. On the next, talk about an impending Russian offensive or the discovery of some panacea against submarines, coupled, perhaps, with news of some dashing French or British blow on the Western front, spread the idea that the war was as good as over. One day everything was described as running splendidly at Washington. On the next day there would be reports that everything was at sixes and sevens; that no adequate army was being prepared except on

paper; that the building of ships and furnishing of supplies, instead of going splendidly, were hanging fire, and so on. This situation was the fault partly of the newspapers and partly of the Government, which muddled at first the censorship and news questions almost as effectively as our Government had done, only in different ways. Its effect was most visible when the first efforts were made to render the Liberty Loan a popular and not a bankers' investment. The President was constantly hampered in his enormous task of turning an Administration, confirmed in the habits and ways and thoughts of peace, into a war machine and getting a Government, wedded in practice, prejudice, and tradition to the checks and balances of the Constitution, to realize that in war the Executive must be given great and unaccustomed powers. So absorbed was Mr. Wilson in trying to do in a few weeks with unpromising material what it took London years to do, that he could not altogether be acquitted of making things worse by failing at first to see that the time for generalities and idealism had passed, and that the way to get the American people alive to the war was to show them that they would suffer if the Allies were beaten. Hence it was that Senator Borah, one of the most thoughtful of Western politicians, felt constrained to write on June 3 in a newspaper article:

For nearly three years the American people have been



EN ROUTE FOR EUROPEAN WATERS:
U.S. Marines marching to join their ship.



MR. BERNARD M. BARUCH,
U.S. official Purchaser of Raw Materials.

led to look upon this war as a European war—a war with which they had little to do either in thought or act. This was thoroughly and persistently drilled into the minds of our people. The mere declaration of war did not wholly, it seems, revolutionize the public mind in this respect. A great many of our people, even those whose interests in the war are keen, and whose patriotism is undoubted, look upon this war as a European war and continue to treat it as such. So long as that condition continues we shall make progress slowly in the mobilization of our military and industrial forces for the conflict. And, if it should continue indefinitely, we would not in any true sense mobilize our forces at all.

Legislation alone cannot save us; food dictators cannot save us; bureaus cannot save us; only the aroused and sustained interest, the concentration and devotion of a hundred million people can save us. This cannot be had, until the people as a whole come to believe and understand beyond peradventure that this is now our war and involves the immediate and vital interests, the institutions and welfare of our own country and the security of our own people. No people should be called upon, or should be expected, to make the supreme sacrifice which the people of this country are now called upon to make, other than for their own institutions and for the future safety and liberty of their children. We may have our deep sympathy for other people engaged in this war and justly so, but when it comes to the proposition of committing our country to war with all the suffering and sacrifice which is to follow, it should not be done other than when the immediate and vital interests of our own people are involved.

Can we not Americanize this war? We have just and abundant reasons for doing so.

The result of this state of affairs was seen for awhile during, and after, the stay of the French and British missions in Washington. Experts from London and Paris, especially in economic matters, were sometimes hard put to it to

discover their "opposite numbers." They found immense enthusiasm and activity but little co-ordination.

After the Declaration of War the Council of National Defence acted with commendable promptitude. They cooperated with the President in calling to Washington a host of assistants from the business world. Their offices grew by leaps and bounds as their functions increased. Originally numbering about a dozen, the personnel of the Council was nearly 1,000 strong by the end of June. Roughly speaking, they tried to take in hand the industrial organization of the country. Two of their number—Mr. Bernard M. Baruch and Mr. Julius Rosenwald—undertook the organization of supplies of raw materials. Mr. Baruch was well known, before his appointment, as a daring Wall Street speculator, and the President was criticized for having nominated an irresponsible financier to an important position. This criticism, as even the most suspicious soon admitted, was quite beside the point. Mr. Baruch, who was of Iberian Jewish stock, proved himself to be a man of great foresight, judgment, and executive ability. One of his first achievements was to get for the Government prices for copper far lower than that which the Allies had been paying. Afterwards he began to negotiate with the producers of other commodities,



[Clinedinst.]

MR. JULIUS ROSENWALD.

Associated with Mr. Baruch in the organization of supplies, especially for the Army and Navy.

hampered though he was by the limitations of his powers.

Mr. Rosenwald was also a Jew. Chief proprietor of one of the biggest "mail order" houses in the country, he came from Chicago, where he was well known for wealth, ability, and philanthropy. He dealt more especially with supplies for the Army and Navy. Another very important member of the Commission was Mr. Howard Coffin, a motor manufacturer. Mr. Coffin's task was to organize munitions. But he quickly magnified his office. Having appointed Mr. Frank Scott, another Middle Western business man, as head of a general Munitions Board, he hastened to make a speciality of aeroplane production. His plans, together with those of the War Department, for training aviators, were perhaps rather over-advertized in England at the time, so far as their speedy consummation was concerned. The American Aviation Corps hardly existed before the Union was at war, American aeroplane construction was virtually confined to slow training machines, and both organization and manufacture take



MR. FRANK SCOTT.
Chairman of Munitions Board.

time to improvise; but that does not detract from the credit due to Mr. Coffin who set to work with admirable promptitude.

The food question did not fall to a member of the Council. The President, to the satisfaction of everybody, invited Mr. Hoover, whose exploits in Belgium are signalized in many chapters of this history, to be Food Controller. Land transport, which in the United States is a very integral part of the food problem, was assigned to Mr. Daniel Willard, the railway expert of the Council. Mr. Willard, as Presi-

dent of the Baltimore and Ohio system, stood in the forefront of transatlantic railway men. Hardly had he reached his desk when he called in a committee of his colleagues and got the railways of the country on a potentially national basis, so far as traffic was concerned. The Director of the Council, Mr. Gifford, a




MR. HOWARD E. COFFIN,
Organizer of Munitions and Aeroplane Production.

leading official of the great Telephone and Telegraph Company, brought up the tale of business men upon whose expert advice the President relied for the co-ordination of his industrial war machine.

There remained the question of Labour, and not the least important member of the Council was Mr. Gompers, the President of the American Federation of Labour. Mr. Gompers, who during the period of American neutrality had done magnificent work in thwarting German intrigues among Labour, made his influence felt almost immediately. Not only did he bring Labour into line over conscription with remarkable success, but he persuaded it to pledge its support to the President in his conduct of the war. By so doing he minimized the very real danger of labour troubles obviously entailed by the readjustment to war conditions of a labour market largely composed of a floating alien proletariat, and somewhat demoralized by the unparalleled prosperity that America's war trade as a neutral had brought to many classes of business. To deal with medicine and sanitation and scientific

research the President appointed to the Council appropriate experts, but during the process of organization the limelight did not fall upon them.

It might have been imagined that under such management industrial organization would have been comparatively simple. It might have been so had the powers of the Council and



MR. DANIEL WILLARD,
Organizer of Railway Transport.

of people like Mr. Hoover been absolute. But they were not absolute for two reasons. It was necessary for the Council of National Defence to be invested by Congress with administrative authority, and for the functions of the heads of extemporized departments like that of Mr. Hoover to be defined and authorized by Congress. Also there was much overlapping between all the extemporized parts of the Government and its normal branches. The most important case of friction unfortunately concerned shipbuilding. To supervise this all-important activity a body called the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation was created. To manage it the President appointed General Goethals, the builder of the Panama Canal. But General Goethals soon fell out with Mr. Denman, the chairman of the Shipping Board, over the question of wooden *versus* steel ships. General Goethals backed the latter, Mr. Denman the former. Public opinion and the bulk of expert opinion sided with the General; but valuable time was

wasted over the controversy, and, though something like 2,000,000 tons of shipping were on the stocks in private yards, the Government's plan for 3,000,000 dead weight tons or more in 18 months was delayed.


But there is no space to go into details of this sort. It requires little imagination to realize how difficult it was to get things going with Washington full of uncorrelated but impetuously enthusiastic committees, with Congress always jealous of Executive usurpation and in this case somewhat justifiably puzzled by the mass of hastily drafted Bills that it was asked to swallow, hesitating to clear things up by prompt legislation, and with a public opinion too puzzled to see the immediate need for "speeding up."

It was indeed wonderful that so much was done. Despite the fact that Englishmen were the last people in the world to be free to throw the first stone, there was in the early days of June some criticism in Parliament and a section of the British Press over the slowness of the United States in making preparations to send over adequate food supplies. It is true that the great Bills that were destined to give



MR. W. S. GIFFORD.
Director of the Council of National Defence.

Mr. Hoover his powers were held up along with many other important laws, such as those giving the Executive power to participate in the British blockade and those giving sanction to the trading with the enemy regulations, and that the administrative machinery was working with many groans and jars; but, viewed in the proper perspective, in the light of our own experience, in the light of



MR. SAMUEL GOMPERS,
President of the American Federation of Labour.

the American policy of neutrality, what did such delays amount to? The thing that mattered was that, if its organization was still rather weak, the spirit of the Government could not have been better. Conscription, the way in which the financial problem had been grappled, the cordiality with which every possible opportunity of real cooperation with the Allies offered by the French and British missions was taken, the readiness of the President to abandon on better information his former attitude towards the blockade, the keenness with which he appreciated and took advantage of his first diplomatic opportunity to serve the common cause when he sent the Root mission to Russia, all compared most favourably with the "wait and see" attitude which London so long adopted.

Never did a Government show itself more ready to learn and to help. One excellent proof of that was the retention in Washington, after the Allied missions had left, of a number of French and English experts in all branches of the science of modern military and economic warfare. It was the business of some of them to put at the disposal of the Government the experiences of their countries. It was the business of others to help arrange for the close and intimate cooperation which the United States desired. To facilitate this work

the French and British Governments appointed in the late spring special commissioners in the persons of M. André Tardieu and Lord Northcliffe. They soon realized that, if information and advice which the Allies were able to give were of great value to the United States, the eager spirit of her cooperation meant even more to the Allies. During June, for instance, it became evident that the President proposed, after he had got their distribution under our control, to give us raw material and foodstuffs at the same prices as those charged to Americans. What was still more important, he issued, under the authority of a law which Congress had just passed, an order providing for the Government supervision of important exports, so as to assure cooperation with the British effort to stop the smuggling of supplies into Germany through neutral countries.

Great Britain had, during the earlier stages of the war, floated three big loans in the United States through the house of J. P. Morgan & Co. There was the 5 per cent. \$582,630,000 loan of October, 1915, a \$50,820,000 5 per cent. loan in September, 1916, and a \$60,000,000 5½ per cent. loan the following month. Both the latter loans were secured by collateral. The contrast in expense between such tran-



GENERAL GOETHALS,
President of the Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation.

sactions and the 3½ per cent. American Government loans of April, May, and June, 1917, can easily be calculated. Also, during the winter of 1916, and even earlier, it had become evident that even Great Britain might have considerable difficulty in floating more loans through private agencies. One proof of this was our recourse to short term Government paper—a measure against which at one period Washington was inclined to protest, on the ground that it hampered domestic banking. Considering the importance of many American supplies, such as food, cotton, and metals, to our conduct of the war, and the necessity of financing our purchases through money raised in the United States, it is not too much to say that America's entry into the war saved the Allies very grave financial difficulties during the spring of 1917, besides promising her a cheaper and easier flow of supplies in the future. Indeed, the most obscure factor in the situation was how, and how soon, Washington would complete the organization necessary to give full scope to its good intentions.

But delay, as this chapter has tried to explain, was inevitable. What really mattered was that the United States had been officially and practically committed to a wholesale participation in the war. If in regard to details there was still confusion and uncertainty, if the country was still less impressed by the urgency of the crisis than the Government, confidence was growing that in the end order and understanding would arise. There was justifiable satisfaction that the idea of a "limited liability" war had been so quickly exploded, that, in a word, the President was able to speak as he did speak of German and of American war aims in his message to Russia published on June 9:—

Of course the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the *status quo ante*.

It was the *status quo ante* out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples, and

every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the results. Effective readjustments will; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.

But they must follow a principle and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free people of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and, unless we pour out blood and treasure now, and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we stand together victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

A few months before, the President had spoken with seeming approbation of a "peace without victory" and of a "drawn war." This full profession of the moral and political faith of the Alliance and this clear exposition of the practical measures which it demands measure the subsequent development of American policy. Henceforth the great Republic was pledged to vindicate her faith with all her mind and with all her strength. The mists which had obscured and chilled her counsels were broken, and through them there pierced, radiant and undimmed, the first level beams of the quickening vision which Mr. Wilson had made his own—the vision of a covenanted world, seeking and executing for the peoples the "judgment of truth and peace."

CHAPTER CXC.

THE BLOCKADES, 1915-17: BRITISH AND GERMAN METHODS.

THE BRITISH BLOCKADE OF GERMANY—THE GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR ON ENEMIES AND NEUTRALS—GERMAN CRIMES AGAINST "THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE SEA"—SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE BRITISH BLOCKADE—THE "MUCKLE FLUGGA HUSSARS"—THE PEEL COMMITTEE'S REPORT—BRINGING NEUTRAL SHIPS INTO HARBOUR—DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES—GERMAN EVASIONS OF THE BLOCKADE—WORK OF THE BRITISH CENSORSHIP—A STUDY OF GERMAN CRIMES—THE RAPPAHANNOCK—THE NORTH WALES AND ARTIST—THE ALNWICK CASTLE—THE KILDALE—THE CAITHNESS—SUFFERINGS OF SCANDINAVIAN SEAMEN—THE BELGIAN PRINCE—GERMAN MOTIVES AND METHODS—UNIVERSAL DEMAND FOR REPARATION BY GERMANY.

OF the many contrasts presented by the Great War, none was more striking and significant than the difference between the manner in which the British seamen carried out their blockade of Germany and the methods which disgraced the Germans in the conduct of their so-called blockade of the British Isles. The term "blockade" is not used here in its technical sense, but as indicating the kind of sea pressure brought to bear upon the hostile nations for the purpose of exerting influence upon the economic situation in their respective countries. The British blockade was marked by a regard for—even a subservience to—the privileges and susceptibilities of neutrals which by many people was thought to have been carried to the verge of timidity; while all through the operations the utmost precautions were taken to respect legal rights and the sanctity of human life. The German measures were executed on directly contrary lines; neutrals suffered equally with the Allies, and neither the mandates of international law nor the dictates of humanity were recognized. Some description of the means adopted by the British seamen to prevent supplies from going

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into Germany, and several instances of German callousness and inhumanity in their dealings with the mercantile marine of the world, have been given in previous chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to throw more light on this glaring contrast, and by well-authenticated examples to exhibit the true character of Germany's infamous behaviour in conducting her warfare at sea.

During three years of war the blockades were enforced with ever-increasing stringency. That of Great Britain and her Allies was continuous from the very outbreak of hostilities, whereas the German effort exhibited three marked phases, each phase being characterized by an increase in degeneracy and callousness. The constrictive measures taken by Great Britain were originally drawn lightly in order to minimize the hardship to those nations which, although not our allies, were friends whose assistance was essential to the efficiency of the blockade. Even in December, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil told the House of Commons that our procedure was purposely made as little burdensome to neutrals as possible. Indeed, with this object, we spontaneously threw away many of the advantages which flow from



A BRITISH PATROL BOAT.

Sea Power. The treatment of the mercantile fleets of the neutral countries by British seamen was never unnecessarily harsh, our officers and men never displayed the truculence of the submarine commanders in their dealings with arrested ships, and the merchant seamen never suffered at our hands the cruel losses which were imposed upon them by the Germans.

It should be recalled that the geographical conditions of the area within which the British blockade was carried out conferred certain advantages both on this country and on Germany. A strict control upon the two passages out of the North Sea, that between Norway and the Shetlands and alternately the Dover Straits, made it possible to exert an interference with all traffic to and from the enemy's coast. But on the other hand the position of the Scandinavian countries and Holland enabled Germany to receive supplies through the neutral ports almost as if they had been her own. Thus the commercial interests of these smaller Powers were involved, and although they might have little sympathy with Germany, they naturally raised objections when in danger of being deprived of one of their best customers. Then, too, the United States had not abandoned her neutrality, and to tighten further the grip was to run the risk of antagonizing a most useful and valuable friend. It was not sur-

prising, in these circumstances, that, while acknowledging our right to prevent the export of the enemy's commodities, and to deprive her of the import of supplies, the neutrals complained bitterly of the disservice done them by interference with their trade by our cruisers. Not a word of complaint, however, was raised in connection with the behaviour of, and the manner of executing their duties by, our seamen, and it was admitted that we did our utmost not to inflict hardships upon non-belligerents, and even went out of our way to deal as lightly as possible with those we were forced to hinder.

The moderation of our efforts in enforcing the blockade, which permitted the enemy to obtain supplies from oversea through neighbouring countries, prevented us from exerting to the utmost that exhausting pressure upon Germany which Admiral Mahan called "the most striking and awful mark of the working of Sea Power." Moreover, so long as Germany had her heel on Belgium and France, and held Serbia and Rumania, with other fruitful territories, in her grasp, she could, by means of her internal communications, exploit and draw upon their resources to defeat the purpose of the blockade. Thus, although it might be that the constriction exercised upon her mercantile traffic by the fleets of Great Britain

and her Allies was the paramount factor of the war, and had affected enormously the military and commercial condition of the principal enemy, yet after its exercise for three years she showed no sign of economic exhaustion. Our blockade had attained a measure of success unprecedented in the annals of war, and that of Germany had three times failed to effect its purpose. It was not, however, until the United States joined the ranks of the Allies that the blockade became practically complete. This did not involve any change in the British methods of conducting it.

An explanation of the difference in the behaviour of the British seamen to neutrals and enemies alike, and that of the crews of the German submarine to other seamen who fell into their hands, is not far to seek. The

former possessed all the qualities which have been traditionally associated with the men who followed the sea calling, whereas the latter were not really seamen, but were only adventitiously at sea, and were lacking in the true instinct and spirit of its comradeship. Fielding recognized the essential difference between the mariner and the man to whom sea life was merely an incident, that "all human flesh is not the same flesh, but that there is one kind of flesh of landmen and another of seamen." Seamen, whatever their nationality, by very reason of their being engaged in a tireless conflict with the elements and subject to the same perils and dangers, become bound in a fellowship and a brotherhood of their own. Even the corsairs of Barbary and the pirates whose hand was against every man showed special consideration for those



(From a German photograph.)

GUN ON THE DECK OF A U-BOAT.

who, like themselves, followed the profession of the sea; and those sea wolves, living on the pillage of the world, felt in duty bound to succour a shipwrecked sailor. But the German sea wolves reserved their most heartless treatment for the unfortunate mariners, and not content with sinking their ships and putting them afloat in open boats, short of provisions and far from land, the Germans over and over again did them to death by callous, brutal, and inhuman methods. Therefore at the end of the third year of war there was manifest among the seamen of the Allies and neutrals alike a bond of detestation of the sea-pests



LORD ROBERT CECIL,
Minister of Blockade.

who made it a danger and a risk to life and limb to follow the peaceful avocation of mercantile seafaring. And if the conduct of British seamen is here contrasted with the ruthless behaviour of the crews of the U-boats, it is not in order to extol the humanity and uprightness of the former so much as to present an accurate picture of the actions of the latter, and thus to show why it was that the Germans, by what they did at sea, incurred the anger and contempt of the civilized world.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into the many legal and diplomatic questions connected with the two blockades, as, for instance, the discussion with the United States as to what was or was not contraband and as to the constitution and working of the prize courts, the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage, and so on. The aim is to deal with the work of the seamen on both sides with whom rested the carrying into operation of the policy of their respective countries. In many discussions in the Press and elsewhere, when a tightening of the Allied blockade pressure upon Germany was urged, it was often forgotten that the policy did not originate with the Navy. It was the policy of the Government, and was adopted after consideration of the respective views of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and any other departments of State directly concerned. It was the Foreign Office which formulated the instructions, and after a time it was found desirable to organize a separate department for such matters, under a Minister of Blockade, to assist whom an Admiral was appointed as Naval Adviser.* There was also set up a Contraband Committee, on which the Admiralty had a large representation. This Committee investigated the case of each ship detained and sent into port for examination, and if it was found that there was not sufficient presumption of a good case against the vessel, or if she came under one of the rules of exemption formulated in agreements with neutral trading associations, she was released. The work of the Navy ended with the bringing of the ships into port for examination and adjudication, or, in the case of those which it was possible to examine at sea, and which were found to be carrying nothing to or from our enemies, in establishing their satisfactory character.

* See Vol. VII., p. 428.

It may be briefly recalled that no blockade of Germany was declared until the Order in Council of March 11, 1915. When the war began, the action of the Navy in interfering with German seaborne commerce was limited to the right to capture contraband goods. There were



[Swaine.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR DUDLEY DE CHAIR,
Commanded the Blockade Squadron in the
North Sea, 1914-16.

three means by which a belligerent possessing a fleet had in past times operated against an adversary's commerce: (a) by the capture of contraband of war on neutral ships; (b) by the capture of enemy property at sea; and (c) by a blockade through which all access to the coast of the enemy was cut off. The second of these powers, as was pointed out in a Parliamentary Paper issued in January, 1916,* had been cut down since the Napoleonic wars by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, under which enemy goods on a neutral ship, with the exception of contraband of war, were exempted from capture. Enemy goods which had been loaded on British or Allied ships before the war were seized in large quantities immediately after its outbreak:

* Cd. 8145.

but, for obvious reasons, such shipments ceased, for all practical purposes, after August 4, 1914, and this particular method of injuring the enemy became inoperative within a short time.

The change inaugurated in March, 1915, was forced on the Allies by the German violation of the usages of war in connection with submarine attacks on trading vessels. It was in December, 1914, that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz first announced such attacks to be intended, and, after a few isolated cases, the original so-called "submarine blockade" by the U-boats began on February 18, 1915. Only after this unlawful and inhuman procedure had been in operation for some weeks did the British Government, by way of reprisal, take steps to prevent commodities of any sort or kind from reaching or leaving Germany. Previously, food and German goods



REAR-ADMIRAL REGINALD TUPPER, C.B.,
Succeeded Sir Dudley de Chair in command
of the Blockade Squadron.

in neutral ships had been allowed to pass. Even enemy reservists in neutral ships had been permitted to return to the Fatherland. But, in reply to the German campaign of piracy, resorted to as an alternative to a regular and legal blockade which the enemy had no surface ships to maintain, the Allied Fleets were ordered by their respective Governments to utilize their latent powers, although it was several months



AWAITING SEARCH ORDERS.

after March, 1915, before these came to be exercised to anything like their full extent. In announcing the new policy of constriction, Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, said that there was no proposal "to assassinate neutral steamers or destroy their goods." A very telling comparison of the procedure on the two sides was made by Mr. A. J. Balfour in an article published on March 29, 1915. Mr. Balfour said :—

Put shortly, the case is this. The Germans declare that they will sink every merchant ship which they believe to be British, without regard to life, without regard to the ownership of the cargo, without any assurance that the vessel is not neutral, and without even the pretence of legal investigation. The British reply that if these are to be the methods of warfare employed by the enemy the Allies will retaliate by enforcing a blockade designed to prevent all foreign goods from entering Germany and all German goods from going abroad. Whether such a policy be, or be not, in harmony with the accepted rules of international law is a point to which I shall refer in a moment. But this at least may be said in its favour. It cannot cause the death of a single innocent civilian; it cannot destroy neutral lives and neutral property without legal process; it cannot inflict injury upon neutral commerce comparable in character or extent to that which would be produced by a blockade whose legality was beyond question.

Of the type of ships selected to enforce the blockade nothing was revealed officially until Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, who commanded the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron in the North Sea from August 4, 1914, to March 6, 1916, made some passing references to the matter in an interview

granted to Mr. Henry Suydam, the London correspondent of the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*. The Admiral said that to maintain the blockade the British Admiralty had chosen a type of warship known as an auxiliary armed cruiser, usually a converted passenger ship or merchant trader, covered with war paint and mounting several guns of various calibres sufficient for their duties. Such ships were not properly warships at all, for the superior fighting craft of the British Navy—superior in armament, ordnance and speed—were kept inviolate for the long-anticipated engagement which the British seamen hoped to fill with the German Navy. Sir Dudley also informed his correspondent that although there was an adequate sprinkling of Royal Navy men in command, by far the majority of the blockade officers were drawn from the Royal Naval Reserve. These men, many of whom had had splendid careers in the British Mercantile Marine, were peculiarly fitted for blockade work; they were accustomed to manifests and ships' papers; they knew how to make a quick, comprehensive and judicial inspection of cargoes. As to the distribution of the blockading ships, Sir Dudley de Chair dispelled a popular fallacy when he stated that a modern blockade was not a ring of ships, steaming within sight of each other, forming a sort of fence across sea tracks to enemy countries. The Allied North Sea

blockade consisted of the strategic placing of units of patrolling squadrons, all out of sight of each other, but within easy steaming distance. Usually the cruisers were about 20 miles apart, and as each cruiser was afforded a clear view of 15 miles to the horizon no blockade runner could pass between them without being seen by one or both.

With their insatiable love of nicknames, the British sailors christened these blockading cruisers "the Muckle Flugga Hussars," Muckle Flugga being the remote headland on the north of the island of Uist, the most northern of the Shetland group, and therefore the most northerly inhabited point in the British Isles.

luxurious furnishings had given place to mess decks and ammunition stores and the like, "while the promenade decks resounded to the tramp of men being initiated into the mysteries of the squad and rifle drill and the work of their guns."

In a previous chapter* Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair's description of a blockade ship at work was quoted. On the same occasion the Admiral drew attention to the following contrast between British and German practice:

Regarding German submarines in the North Sea, my experience is that they invariably sink at sight, or give the crew only three minutes to clear out before the ship is torpedoed. German submarine commanders witho



A GUN ON THE DECK OF AN AUXILIARY ARMED CRUISER.

It was an apt nickname, in view of the area where so much of the work of intercepting German trade was carried on. In one of his series of naval sketches, the writer known as "Taffrail" described a typical ship of this "sea regiment," whose favourite habitat was "anywhere in the wild waste of waters lying between Greenland, the North Cape, the Naze, and the Orkneys." He also described the transformation wrought by the war in the interior of these vessels, how their palatial and

the North Sea areas have respected no flag, have adopted the same merciless attitude toward neutral and belligerent alike.

British Admiralty orders were issued at the very commencement of hostilities to the effect that all officers and men of the British Navy engaged in blockade work were to treat the captains and crews of suspected neutral ships with the greatest possible courtesy and consideration and to place the neutral in as little danger or inconvenience as was consistent with the proper maintenance of our blockade.

Whenever a ship is discovered to be carrying contraband, an officer and an armed guard of five men are put aboard to conduct the blockade runner into our

* CLIII., Vol. X., page 59.



EXAMINING THE CARGO FOR CONTRABAND.



SUSPECTED CARGO HAULED ABOARD A WARSHIP FOR EXAMINATION.

nearest port, where examination usually takes from two to five days, according to the disposition of the cargo and the consequent difficulty of removing it. The weekly average of ships passing eastward through our patrols is 50; in summer time about 8 per cent. of these are sailing vessels.

On four distinct occasions which have come under my direct personal observation (continued the Admiral) our

by threefold dangers, for there were the perils of the sea in the shape of the ordinary marine hazards; then the risks of enemy attack; and above both of these the liability to treacherous assaults by the unscrupulous methods of the German.



TOWING A TORPEDOED NEUTRAL INTO PORT.

blockading patrols have rescued neutral ships from imminent destruction by German torpedoes in the North Sea. The merchantmen were lowering their boats, with the submarine standing off waiting to fire. A few well-directed shots from our guns soon disposed of the menace, and the neutrals were able to re-hoist their boats and proceed safely about their business.

On another occasion we came upon a Scandinavian with masts broken off at the deck and the crew lashed to the bulwarks, while heavy seas swept her from bow to stern. Our men saved the crew at some risk to their own lives, and stood by until the gale abated, and then towed the wreck to a British port for assistance and repair. We towed one American ship, which had been drifting about helplessly for twelve days without coal or food, into a British port through the worst sort of a sea.

Blockade work is unspectacular, uninspiring, but exceedingly dangerous. The work of officers and men under my command has been consistently faithful and effective under conditions which have always held the possibility, for twenty-four hours a day, of destruction by German mines and German torpedoes. The basis of that blockade rests upon the ability and courage of reserve officers and men drawn from Great Britain's Mercantile Marine. Our effort has been purely to prevent goods from reaching the enemy, never to embarrass or inconvenience neutrals of whatever nationality, who are endeavouring, under conditions of extreme difficulty, to maintain legitimate trade relations necessary to their welfare and prosperity.

These words of Admiral de Chair, spoken at a moment when he was fresh from 20 months' service in command of the British blockading forces in the North Sea, carried conviction to all who looked at the facts of the matter. They showed that, in spite of the intense provocation by the enemy, the British conduct of the blockade was consistently legal and humane. Such work demanded qualities of endurance and patience in the seamen responsible for it, and the British officers and men were not found wanting in these respects. They were faced

Interesting light upon the manner in which the machinery of the Allied blockade was worked in this war was thrown by the report of a Committee appointed in 1916 to inquire into the administration of the Order in Council of March 11, 1915. The report of this Committee, presided over by Lord Peel, was issued in February, 1917.* A description given therein of the methods employed in dealing with ships and cargoes after March, 1915, showed that all ships intercepted by the patrolling squadrons were visited, the time occupied in so doing being about three hours, except in heavy weather, when delay occurred till the weather moderated sufficiently to permit of boarding. On a decision being taken to send the ship in, she was despatched under an armed guard to the most convenient port, called a port of detention; in the case of ships going "north-about," for the most part to Kirkwall or Lerwick, but sometimes, if westward bound, to Stornoway, or occasionally to Ardrrossan. Ships going "south-about" were detained in the Downs or sent into Falmouth or Dartmouth. On arrival at a port of detention the ship was visited by the customs officers, who examined the manifest, bills of lading, and any other relevant documents which she might be carrying, and prepared a detailed analysis of her whole cargo. Ships detained in the Downs were visited and reported upon in the same way by the naval authorities. The question whether the cargo was to be discharged or released had to be determined by different

* Cd. 8469.



BRITISH STEAMERS TO THE RESCUE OF A SINKING NEUTRAL.

authorities in the case of westward-bound and eastward-bound ships, and the procedure by which information as to their cargoes was transmitted also differed slightly. In the case of westward-bound ships, the analysis of the cargo was sent to the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, and the Board of Customs. If the ship was proceeding south-about and the cargo comprised less than 25 items, the analysis was sent by telegram, and if more than 25 items, by train. If the ship was proceeding north-about, the analysis, whatever the number of items, was sent by telegram. In the case of eastward-bound ships, the analysis was sent to the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, the Board of Customs, and the War Trade Intelligence Department, invariably by telegram.

An impression of the magnitude of the duties involved was given by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in a speech at the Fishmongers' Hall on January 11, 1917. "Ships are intercepted and boarded," he said, "in great numbers under every condition of weather, and some idea of the work may be gathered from the fact that an average of some 80 ships of all kinds are intercepted and examined weekly on the high seas by the vessels of this squadron" (the blockading cruisers).

An illustration of some of the perilous tasks which fell to the officers and men of the British Navy in the course of their conduct of the blockade of Germany is afforded by the case of a midshipman from one of the blockading



CREW DROPPING FROM THE WRECK.

cruisers who was placed in charge of a Swedish topsail schooner detained on the high seas. It often happened that duties of this nature, calling for an unusual amount of courage and initiative, nerve and skill, were entrusted to the junior officers of the Fleet. The report of the midshipman above mentioned will show how they were discharged. With an armed guard of three men, he had received orders to take the schooner, named the Valand and bound from Iceland to Leith with a cargo of herrings, into Lerwick on September 16, 1915. Reporting to his commander, he said: "As the wind appeared to be increasing, I deemed it best to run north and sail down the eastern side of the Faroe Islands. . . . On the 25th our provisions were practically exhausted, and we had for the greater part to subsist on salt herrings from the cargo. At noon on that day the wind rose, and by 6 p.m. a strong gale had set in. We sighted Muckle Flugga, but owing to the force of the gale we steered a course further seawards rather than attempt to make port. On the 26th, the fore rigging was carried away and the foremast nearly went overboard, but, by knocking away the bulwarks on the port side, passing wire strops round the ribs of the ship, and rigging up temporary stays, the damage was repaired. On the evening of the 27th I determined to make an attempt to get to Lerwick. Next day the starboard anchor was carried overboard, but was eventually recovered without doing any damage beyond making a dent in the ship. Land was sighted, and we discovered the ship was between Fair Island and Sunburgh Head. As it was then impossible to get to Lerwick, and dangerous to attempt to reach Kirkwall, added to which the ship's gear was in a rotten condition, sails and ropes carrying away incessantly until the lower topsail was the only sound sail on board, I decided to run before the gale for Leith. On the 29th we passed close to a town, which the master thought was Aberdeen. There were two flashing lights in sight, but as these were only sighted once and not seen again, we considered that they were fishing vessels. Owing to the similarity of these lights to shore lights, I decided to keep the watch, and at 10 p.m. the light appeared again. I called the master, but the light was not visible again. The mistake had been caused by the absence of proper charts and instruments. The town which was sighted was Montrose, not Aberdeen. . . . On October 1 we arrived in Leith Roads." Comment upon this simple yet thrilling narra-

tive is not needed to enforce the significance of the splendid achievement of this young naval officer.

Another narrow escape was related by a sub-lieutenant, R.N.R., who was ordered to take charge of a Norwegian brigantine, the Haugar, and bring her to Lerwick. "It was dark," he wrote, "and no lights were visible. We were so near the rocks that it seemed almost possible to touch them, and we drifted, almost scraping them. To leeward there was a ledge of rocks,



HOISTING THE BRITISH FLAG ON A PRIZE.

and as it seemed impossible to clear them I decided that the ship must be abandoned. The lifeboat was hoisted out, and we pulled off and watched the ship drift towards the rocks, but, much to everyone's surprise, she drifted through without touching them. On regaining the ship I found that the compass had been broken to pieces. . . . The provisions which we brought with us were finished, and the ship had not much in the way of stores. We subsisted on hard bread and salt fish." The brigantine

eventually made Kirkwall harbour, six days after being boarded, with four feet of water in her hold. Such experiences as these came as a reminder to the British public that the work of their seamen employed in stopping supplies to the Germans was by no means without its hardships and dangers, apart altogether from those caused by the action of the enemy.

The reasons why it was necessary to bring neutral vessels into harbour to examine them were ably set forth by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in the early part of 1916. The United States Government on November 5, 1915, had addressed a communication on this subject to the

United States Government is not so much that the shipments intercepted by the naval forces were really intended for use in the neutral countries to which they were dispatched, as that the dispatch of goods to the enemy countries had been frustrated by methods which had not been employed by belligerent nations in the past. It would seem to be a fair reply to such a contention that new devices for dispatching goods to the enemy must be met by new methods of applying the fundamental and acknowledged principle of the right to intercept such trade." The British reply went on to point out that the size of modern steamships and their capacity



SHIP'S BOAT ON THE WAY TO SEARCH A SUSPECTED VESSEL.

British Government, directing attention to certain aspects of the interruption caused by the Allied blockade to American trade with neutrals. The first section (paragraphs 3-15) of the United States Note related to cargoes detained by the British authorities in order to prevent them from reaching an enemy destination, and the complaint of the United States Government was summarized in paragraph 33 to the effect that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports, and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes, were without justification. In their reply, the British Foreign Office stated that the wording of this summary "suggests that the basis of the complaint of the

to navigate the waters where the Allied patrols had to operate, whatever the conditions of the weather, frequently rendered it a matter of extreme danger, if not of impossibility, even to board the vessels unless they were taken into calm water for the purpose. The British Note continued :

When visit and search at sea are possible, and when a search can be made there which is sufficient to secure belligerent rights, it may be admitted that it would be an unreasonable hardship on merchant vessels to compel them to come into port, and it may well be believed that maritime nations have hesitated to modify the instructions to their naval officers that it is at sea that these operations should be carried out, and that undue deviation of the vessel from her course must be avoided. That, however, does not affect the fact that it would be impossible under the conditions of modern warfare to confine the rights of visit and search to an examination of the ship at the place where she is en-



A TORPEDOED DUTCH STEAMER TOWED INTO PORT BY BRITISH TUGS.

countered without surrendering a fundamental belligerent right.

Paragraph 7 of the American Note had quoted the opinion of certain United States naval officers on this subject. It said :

The British contention that "modern conditions" justify bringing vessels into port for search is based upon the size and seaworthiness of modern carriers of commerce and the difficulty of uncovering the real transaction in the intricate trade operations of the present day. It is believed that commercial transactions of the present time, hampered as they are by censorship of telegraph and postal communication on the part of belligerents, are essentially no more complex and disguised than in the wars of recent years during which the practice of obtaining evidence in port to determine whether a vessel should be held for prize proceedings was not adopted. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea has been submitted to a board of naval experts, which reports that :

"At no period in history has it been considered necessary to remove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trade or the service on which she is bound, nor is such removal necessary. . . .

"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are, in fact, greater than in former times, and no difference, so far as the necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen between the search of a ship of 1,000

tons and one of 20,000 tons, except possibly a difference in time, for the purpose of establishing fully the character of her cargo and the nature of her service and destination. . . . This method would be a direct aid to the belligerents concerned, in that it would release a belligerent vessel overhauling the neutral from its duty of search and set it free for further belligerent operations."

It was in dealing with this aspect of the question that the British Government sought the advice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, and as a result their reply to the United States contained the following passage : "The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question, and accordingly his Majesty's Government have thought it well to submit the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the United States Ambassador in paragraph 7 of this Note, to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for his observations. The unique experience which this officer has gained as the result of more than 18 months in command of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion of peculiar value. His report is as follows :

It is undoubtedly the case that the size of modern



A TORPEDOED RUSSIAN SAILING SHIP SALVED BY BRITISH PATROL BOATS.

vessels is one of the factors which renders search at sea far more difficult than in the days of smaller vessels. So far as I know, it has never been contended that it is necessary to remove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trade, &c., but it must be obvious that the larger the vessel and the greater the amount of cargo, the more difficult does examination at sea become, because more packages must be removed.

This difficulty is much enhanced by the practice of concealing contraband in bales of hay and passengers' luggage, casks, &c., and this procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, necessitates the actual removal of a good deal of cargo for examination in suspected cases. This removal cannot be carried out at sea, except in the very finest weather.

Further, in a large ship, the greater bulk of the cargo renders it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable metals as nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in places other than the holds of a large ship.

I entirely dispute the contention, therefore, advanced in the American Note, that there is no difference between the search of a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. I am sure that the fallacy of the statement must be apparent to anyone who has ever carried out such a search at sea.

There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the manner in which those in command of German submarines, in entire disregard of international law and of their own prize regulations, attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, neutral as well as British, without visiting the ship and therefore without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe for a neutral vessel which is being examined by officers from a British ship to remain stopped on the high seas, and it is therefore in the interests of the neutrals themselves that the examination should be conducted in port.

The German practice of misusing United States passports in order to procure a safe conduct for military persons and agents of enemy nationality makes it necessary

to examine closely all suspect persons, and to do this effectively necessitates bringing the ship into harbour.

The difference between the British and the German procedure is that we have acted in the way which causes the least discomfort to neutrals. Instead of sinking neutral ships engaged in trade with the enemy, as the Germans have done in so many cases in direct contravention of Article 113 of their own Naval Prize Regulations, 1909, in which it is laid down that the commander is only justified in destroying a neutral ship which has been captured if :

- (a) She is liable to condemnation, and
- (b) The bringing in might expose the warship to danger or imperil the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time—

we examine them, giving as little inconvenience as modern naval conditions will allow, sending them into port only where this becomes necessary.

It must be remembered, however, that it is not the Allies alone who send a percentage of neutral vessels into port for examination, for it is common knowledge that German naval vessels, as stated in paragraph 19 of the American Note, "seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports."

As cases in point, the interception by the Germans of the American oil-tankers *Llama* and *Platuria* in August last may be mentioned. Both were bound to America from Sweden, and were taken into Swinemünde for examination.

This, then, was the British method. It being impossible to exercise the belligerent right of search in a satisfactory manner on the high seas, it was necessary to send into a British port for examination all, or nearly all, ships proceeding to ports in neutral countries adjacent to Germany which did not call voluntarily at such ports. In many cases, however, neutral shipowners arranged for their vessels to make



THE CEASELESS VIGIL.

such a voluntary call. As was pointed out in the Parliamentary Paper on the subject issued in January, 1916, delays caused by the elaborate exercise of the right of visit and search were very irksome to shipping, and many shipping lines carrying on regular services with Scandinavia and Holland found it well worth their while to make agreements with the British Government to lessen such delays. The ship-owners engaged to meet British requirements with regard to goods carried by them, in return for an undertaking that their ships would be delayed for as short a time as possible for examination purposes.

Several agreements of this kind were made. The general principle of them was that the Government obtained the right to require any goods carried by the neutral shipping lines, if not discharged in the British port of examination, to be either returned to England for Prize Court proceedings, or stored in the country of destination until the end of the war, or only handed to the consignees under stringent guarantees that they or their products would not reach the enemy. It was officially explained that the companies obtained the necessary power to comply with these conditions by means of a special clause inserted in all their bills of lading, and the course selected by the British authorities was determined by the nature of the goods and the circumstances of the case. In addition to this, some of the companies made a practice, before accepting consignments of certain goods, of inquiring whether their carriage was likely to lead to difficulties, and of refusing to carry them in cases where it was intimated that such would be the case. The control which the British Government was in a position to exercise under these agreements over goods carried by the shipping lines in question was officially stated to be of very great value.

In regard to the need for submitting the cases of individual ships to the Contraband Committee sitting daily in London, Lord Robert Cecil on July 5, 1916, made the following statement in reply to a question in Parliament. After describing the detention of vessels and their being sent into a British port, he said: "There the search takes place, and it is only after such search that any judgment can be formed as to the probable ultimate destination of the cargo carried by the vessel. The data for such a judgment include the nature of the cargo, the character of the consignors

and consignees, the amount of similar articles recently imported into the neutral country for which the ship is bound, and, it may be, other information of a secret character which has come into the hands of his Majesty's Government. All information bearing on these and other relevant points is collected in London,



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD
BACON, K.C.V.O.,

In command of the Dover Patrol Squadron.

and it is therefore in London that the question is necessarily determined whether there are any grounds for putting into the Prize Court the ship, the cargo, or any part of it. To put into the Prize Court all vessels and their cargoes which are sent into port . . . would be neither just nor wise."

The above reply is typical of the manner in which the Allies exhibited every possible consideration for the interests of neutrals, so far as the working of the blockade had a bearing upon them. Replying to a question in the House of Commons on December 14, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil said: "It is unfortunately



SALVAGE WORK IN THE NORTH SEA: PUMPING OUT A DERELICT.

inevitable that our blockade measures should cause inconvenience and consequent irritation to citizens of neutral countries, much as we regret it. I can only say that consistently with the paramount duty of using to the utmost our legitimate belligerent rights we have done, and shall do, all we can to make their exercise as little burdensome to neutrals as we can."

What did the German merchants really think and feel in regard to the stranglehold maintained by the Navy upon their trade? Light on this phase of the question was shed by a correspondent of *The Times*, who, on December 12, 1916, was permitted to describe a visit to what he called the British Censor's Museum, where he examined some of the intercepted correspondence from enemy firms and agents. He wrote: "In many respects the censorship may be not unfairly said to be the eyes of the blockade. Its principal work lies in detecting and frustrating the innumerable and ever-changing subterfuges contrived by the enemy with the connivance of neutral intermediaries for evading the blockade and carrying the sinews of war into Central Europe in the form either of goods or of credit. The

contrivance of such schemes by cable or by wireless is obviously impossible, and the examination of the mails has in countless cases proved an insuperable obstacle to their success. The enemy frequently expresses himself with frank exasperation, and the following extracts from letters of important enemy firms indicate their views of the censorship:

As you see, the English are making so many disagreeables and seizing the post that our business is quite ruined. People do not dare to send money any more because they do not receive receipts from home. . .

As I see from your telegram sent a few days ago our lists have not arrived for three weeks now. . . I think that if you sent the receipts in 15 private envelopes I should perhaps receive them.

It is incredible how you have helped the English Censor to establish the names of our agents and also the fact that G. and G. looked after our letters. . . you appear to have received no post from us since the beginning of March. Worse still is the fact that because of the censorship you have not got our invoices or bills of lading. From this miserable condition in which the English sea-robbery has placed us there is no way out.

In conjunction with this we should like to say that according to our experience it seems now to be utterly impossible to ship any goods to foreign countries. Since the middle of April we received one single letter from one of our friends in the States in which he advises us that he instructed a banker in Berlin to remit us a certain amount. This remittance, however, we do not receive up to the present.

Whatever the English want they get, for the whole postal communication with Germany is completely

upset, and we never know whether one can draw money or send money to the other side. It is very unpleasant for me also that I send 25,000 marks to Z., and, if this remittance has not arrived, then all the interest will be lost and many many months will go by before I get over all the difficulties. . . . At this moment I have a consignment lying at L., but I have received no invoices and no bills of lading. Everything has again been stolen. These are the difficulties we have to fight against. I hope it will not be long before peace is signed.

In consequence of the condition of the postal service with your side, business is on a dead standstill.

The monetary value of the cheques, drafts, and other documents of transfer in course of transmission for enemy benefit which had already been intercepted in the mails amounted to considerably over £50,000,000, a portion of which was destined for investment in enemy war loans. In case there still should be a doubt as to the value of this work, think of the dislocation which the stoppage of German trade correspondence meant to German trade and finance. A good illustration is afforded by a passage in an intercepted letter from a German firm in South America to its head house in Hamburg :

We last wrote to you on May 1 and have not had the pleasure of hearing from you since then, from which we conclude that the Postal Service between here and Germany is becoming more hopeless every day. We see from the papers that the English blockade of Germany is getting stricter, and we almost fear that

soon no more mail will be able to get through at all. It would produce the greatest consequence for us both if our monthly balance-sheet and bookkeeping details were lost. That would not only mean an unheard-of labour for us but also an endless postponement of all means of settling up with our head house.

Some enemy agents endeavoured to make use of wireless telegraphy to conduct their business, but, as one of them wrote : " It is up to the present very unsatisfactory as a result of atmospheric disturbances. Long delays are unavoidable, and unfortunately messages are often distorted." Not even Marconi, however, had invented an apparatus to transmit solid cash, and it was a sore trial to the German traders to be unable to dispatch securities to their oversea correspondents.

It was inevitable that as the British measures began to make themselves felt all sorts of disguises and ruses should be resorted to by the traders anxious to get their wares into Germany. A writer in the *Windsor Magazine*, recording some facts about the methods of searching ships at sea, said : " As many as 200 vessels pass eastward every month through these police cordons, and the trickery of some is very daring indeed. From a cargo of onions on a small ship an inquisitive petty officer took a fine specimen and threw it sharply on the



SALVAGE WORK IN THE NORTH SEA : THE PUMPING ENGINE.



AN APPEAL FOR RESCUE.

deck. To the amazement of all, the lively 'vegetable'—of pure Para rubber, artfully painted outside—bounced six feet in the air! Ploughshares and agricultural implements made entirely of copper were another discovery. Cotton was dug out of barrels of flour, and nickel from hollow boards in neutral decks."

Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair also described as follows some of the chief ruses adopted by the blockade runners to elude the vigilance of the examination of the British boarding officers or inspectors in harbour:

Double bottoms, decks, and bulkheads, concealing guns, rifles, and other firearms or ammunition.

Copper keels and copper plates on sailing ships.

Hollow masts.

Rubber onions. These were discovered when one of our officers dropped one on the deck.

Rubber concealed in coffee sacks.

Cotton concealed in barrels of flour.

Rubber honey, made in the form of honeycomb filled with a curious liquid mixture.

False manifests. This is the most frequent form of faking. In several cases where the captain of the neutral realized that the "game was up" he produced both the genuine and the fake manifests for our boarding officers to compare, a form of frankness quite amusing.

Although, as was natural, the procedure of the blockade weighed heavily upon neutrals, and their grievances were set forth at great length in diplomatic correspondence, there is not to be found in any of the official letters or documents connected with the matter any complaint whatever against the conduct of the British officers and men who were engaged in the execution of the blockade. On the contrary, there are to be found statements made both by some of those persons who were temporarily arrested for examination and by the seamen of the neutral States in the press of their respective countries testifying to the universal recognition of the fact that the officers and men charged with the carrying out of the blockade performed their duty with courtesy and every possible consideration for the convenience of those with whom they had of necessity to interfere. The testimony in this direction was unanimous, and not a single case of harsh treatment or bullying, much less of any kind of injustice, came to light. This in itself was a high tribute to the spirit in which the British seamen executed an oft-times unpleasant and disagreeable task.

Attention must now be directed to the record of the German "blockade." This cannot better be shown than by setting forth the authenticated facts of some of the principal

attacks on the shipping of the world from November, 1916, to July, 1917; earlier cases having already been dealt with in these pages.

The case of the steamship *Rappahannock* was revealed to the world in an Admiralty *communiqué* on November 24, 1916. This Furness-Withy liner left England for Halifax on October 17, and nothing more was heard from her. In the Berlin official wireless on November 8 it was stated that the ship had been sunk. For a time there was a hope that the 37 members of the crew had been taken on board the submarine, or transferred to some other vessel, but neither of these courses was apparently carried out. As the Admiralty said: "If the crew were forced to take to their boats in the ordinary way it is clear that this must have occurred so far from land, or in such weather conditions, that there was no probability of their reaching the shore," and the *communiqué* added: "The German pledge not to sink vessels 'without saving human lives' has thus once more been disregarded, and another of their submarines has been guilty of constructive murder on the high seas."

In the case of a British steamer sunk a few weeks after the *Rappahannock* there was no doubt about the manner in which members of her crew who were lost met their deaths. On December 29, 1916, the Admiralty issued the following to the Press:

The degree of savagery which the Germans have attained in their submarine policy of sinking merchant ships at sight would appear to have reached its climax in the sinking of the British s.s. *Westminster*, proceeding in ballast from Torre Annunziata (Italy) to Port Said.


On December 14 this vessel was attacked by a German submarine without warning when 180 miles from the nearest land and struck by two torpedoes in quick succession, which killed four men. She sank in four minutes.

This ruthless disregard of the rules of international law was followed by a deliberate attempt to murder the survivors. The officers and crew, while effecting their escape from the sinking ship in boats, were shelled by the submarine at a range of 3,000 yards. The master and chief engineer were killed outright and their boat sunk. The second and third engineers and three of the crew were not picked up and are presumed to have been drowned.

Great Britain, in common with all other civilized nations, regards the sinking without warning of merchant ships with detestation, but in view of the avowed policy of the German Government and their refusal to consider the protests of neutrals, it is recognized that mere protests are unavailing.

The captain of the German submarine must, however, have satisfied himself as to the effectiveness of his two torpedoes and yet proceeded to carry out in cold blood an act of murder which could not possibly be justified by any urgency of war and can only be regarded in the eyes of the world as a further proof of the degradation of German honour.

Following on this vindictive shelling of the helpless survivors of a stricken ship, further cases came to light in January, 1917, of the callous disregard of the Germans for the lives of non-combatant seamen. The loss of the steamships *North Wales* and *Artist* both formed the subject of Admiralty communications to the Press. The former vessel, proceeding in ballast from Hull to Canada, was reported by the German wireless on November 9 as having been torpedoed. Beyond one piece of varnished wood marked "North Wales," found in Sennen Cove, and bodies washed ashore on the Cornish coast, nothing further was heard of her, and it was presumed that the crew took to their boats in the heavy gales raging at that time and were drowned. The British steamship *Artist*, when 48 miles from land, in a heavy easterly gale, was torpedoed by a German submarine on Saturday morning, January 27. In response to her appeal sent by wireless: "S.O.S.; sinking quickly," auxiliary patrol craft proceeded to the spot and searched the vicinity, but found no trace of the vessel or her survivors. Three days later the steamship *Luchana* picked up a boat containing 16 of the survivors. The boat had originally contained 23, but seven had died of wounds and exposure and were buried at sea. The surviving 16 were landed, and of these five were suffering from severe frostbite and one from a broken arm. The crew had been forced to abandon their ship




LIFEBOAT OF THE "ALNWICK CASTLE"
BEACHED AT CORUNNA.

in open boats, in a midwinter gale, and utterly without means of reaching land or succour. Those of them who perished during those three days of bitter exposure were murdered, and, as the Admiralty said, to pretend that anything was done to ensure their safety would be sheer hypocrisy. The pledge given by Germany to the United States not to sink merchant ships without ensuring the safety of the passengers and crews had been broken before, but never

in circumstances of more cold-blooded brutality.

Among the grim records of such an inhuman campaign there were, at any rate, some bright and glorious features, and none more so than the conduct of those on board ships during the attacks of submarines. It was not only the British seamen, moreover, who upheld the high



CAST ADRIFT IN OPEN BOATS.

traditions of their service. Stories of the heroism of passengers, including women, were numerous. On February 5, 1917, the Admiralty published the facts connected with the destruction of the Ellerman liner *City of Birmingham*, a fine 7,498-ton vessel built in 1911. The official report said:

The British steamship *City of Birmingham* was torpedoed without warning on November 27 last by an enemy submarine, when 126 miles from the nearest land. She carried a crew of 145 and 170 passengers, of whom 90 were women and children.

The torpedo struck the ship abreast the after hold, and so heavy was the explosion that the ship at once began to settle by the stern, and one of the lifeboats was blown to pieces. The engines were stopped, and the steam allowed to escape from the boilers, while everybody assembled at their stations for abandoning the ship.

A heavy swell was running, but within ten minutes of the explosion all the boats had been lowered and all the passengers and crew were clear of the ship. In accordance with the British sea tradition the master (Captain W. J. Haughton) remained on board until the ship sank under him. He was picked up half an hour later by one of the boats.

The conduct of the crew and passengers was admirable throughout. The master reports that the women took their place in the boats "as calmly as if they were going down to their meals," and when in the boats they began singing. Three hours later the boats were picked up by a hospital ship, and the passengers and crew mustered. It was then found that the ship's doctor, the barman, and two lascars were not among the survivors, and had presumably been drowned.

With the inauguration of the intensified German campaign of what they called "unlimited submarine warfare" as from January 31, 1917—the onslaught which was the culminating factor in influencing the United States to enter the war—instances of German brutality unhappily increased. Seamen from the ships

attacked were turned adrift in very bad weather many miles from the nearest land, and it often happened that they were tossed about with little or no food for days on end, enduring terrible privations. From the steamer *Vedamore*, which was torpedoed and sunk on February 7, 1917, 25 lives were lost. Of this number two, the boatswain and a seaman, died from injuries and exposure in the open boats after the vessel had foundered. There was no warning of any kind, and 38 of the crew of 60 were in their boats for ten hours. In the intensely cold morning all hands suffered, more especially as many of them jumped out of their beds and ran on deck as they stood. Another case of this kind was recorded in *The Times* on March 2, 1917, and had reference to the destruction of the Belfast four-masted barque *Galgorm Castle*, of 1,500 tons, which was homeward bound. She was shelled on February 27, at 4.45 p.m., the shelling continuing until night set in, when the crew, numbering 25 men, with Captain Frampton and his wife, were obliged to leave the vessel in two boats. Among the crew were four Americans. The boat containing the captain, his wife, and ten men, was adrift on the ocean for 13½ hours before being sighted.

What was apparently one of the worst cases, in so far as the distance from land at which it took place was concerned, was that of the *Union Castle* mail steamer *Alnwick Castle*, which was torpedoed without warning on

March 19 in the Atlantic, 320 miles from the nearest land (the Scilly Isles). On the previous day the vessel had rescued the crew of another British ship which had also been torpedoed, and the passengers and crews of both vessels abandoned the *Alnwick Castle* in six boats, one of which landed on the Spanish coast. This boat contained 29 people, including a stewardess and a child. Of this number, eight had died, and the survivors were all suffering from frostbite. One of the most remarkable accounts of the sufferings endured by the people on board this liner was given in the report of the chief officer, Mr. A. H. Blackman, to the *Union Castle* Mail Steamship Company, from which extracts were published in *The Times* on June 18, 1917. Of his boat's company, consisting of 31 people, Mr. Blackman tells of the deaths, among others, of "the storekeeper, who the night before went raving mad and had to be lashed down for the safety of all concerned"; the cattle-man, who "jumped overboard after three frustrated attempts, and was drowned, the wind and the sea, and the enfeebled state of us all making it impossible to save him"; and the deck-boy, who "had been quietly dying all day" before he finally passed away in the evening. As showing to what straits the survivors were reduced by thirst, Mr. Blackman writes: "Although we had occasional showers of rain everything was so saturated with salt that the little we did catch was undrinkable. We even



THE UNION CASTLE LINER "ALNWICK CASTLE."

tried by licking the woodwork (oars, tillers, seats, etc.) to gather up the rain spots, and so moisten our mouths, but the continual spray coming over rendered this of little use. In fact, we actually broke up the water 'breaker' in order to lick the inside of the staves, which we found quite saturated with moisture, and to us delicious." When they were towed into port, two of the crew, who were demented, utterly refused to leave the boat, and had to be forcibly dragged out, while the linen-keeper expired as he was being lifted out.

Although, so far as published reports showed, a ship had never before been sunk so far from land as was the Alnwick Castle, the record of the crimes of the Germans in this respect may be illustrated by the following table:—

Ships Sunk.	Miles from land.
Caithness (38 lives lost)	240
Kariba	230
Rona	212
Franconia (12 lives lost)	195
Silverash	180
Galgate	170
Iolo	155
Bernadette (26 lives lost)	150
Cymric (4 lives lost)	140
Rowanmore	128
City of Birmingham	126
Industry	120
Italiana	112
Lady Ninian (1 life lost)	106

A cadet on board the Alnwick Castle, writing to his relatives at Leicester after arriving at New York, said that what made those on board the vessel most angry was the attitude of the German sailors. The whole crew of the submarine came on deck and stood with their arms folded laughing at the plight of the people from the steamer—a repetition of the scene over two years before when the Falaba was torpedoed.* Of evidence such as this of the manner in which the German seamen missed no chance of increasing the horrible effect of their work there was unfortunately no lack. Witness, for instance, the following extract from the deposition of Mr. Douglas V. Duff, acting fourth officer, taken after the sinking of the steamship Thracia on April 27, 1917, not far from the French coast:—

I was on a capsized boat with the stern blown off about two and a-half to three hours after the ship was sunk. The submarine came near me—at the time (11 p.m.) it was very dark—and asked what ship it was that it had sunk, where was she from, where was she for, what was her cargo, and was I an Englishman?

I answered all the questions.

He then said, "I am going to shoot you." I told him to shoot away.


He then said, "I don't waste powder on any pig of an Englishman," and left me in the boat. In the morning, at 10.30, I was picked up by a French fishing

* Chapter CXI, Vol. VII, p. 140.



THE MISSION OF THE SUBMARINE.

From a German Painting.



RAIDER AND VICTIM.

From a German Painting.

boat, then put by them on the French torpedo-boat Ardent, where I remained for three days, and was then transferred to the Naval Barracks at L'Orient.

Another typical story of German sea war methods was told by the survivors of the British steamer Kildale. But for the good fortune that rescuing vessels were near at hand the facts of this crime might never have become known to the world. While on passage to Malta, the Kildale was torpedoed by a German submarine in the Mediterranean on April 12. Two torpedoes were fired. Both struck the ship. The crew abandoned her as she was sinking, and the submarine then came to the surface and opened fire upon the boats with her gun and rifles. A seaman was killed, and the chief officer, the second engineer, and six others were wounded. Two British patrol boats then approached and opened fire upon the submarine at extreme range, whereupon the submarine dived and was not seen again. From the deliberate shelling of the helpless crew whilst in their boats it would appear that it was the intention of the officer in command of the submarine to murder the Kildale's crew and thus obliterate all traces of his own presence in these waters. Such fiendish work—exterminating by a process of wholesale massacre a shipload of people in hope of gaining a slight military advantage—was but one of the species of outrage which continued to mark the German submarine campaign at the period in

question. Numerous cases occurred in which it was attempted, the merchant vessels first being destroyed by torpedoes, gunfire, or bombs, and the boats with the crew or passengers then being deliberately shelled. In this way it frequently happened that any fresh water or provisions in the boats were spoiled or destroyed, and consequently the shipwrecked people had the possibility of starvation added to their already grave perils.

A gruesome story was told by the few survivors of the British steamship Caithness, which was torpedoed without warning 240 miles from the nearest land on April 19, 1917. The vessel sank very quickly, the master and 20 men being drowned. The remainder, having managed to right a capsized boat, clambered into her, and for no less than 14 days did these poor souls drift on the ocean without any food. At the end of that time only two out of about 20 were left alive. They were picked up in a terrible condition, one survivor, the chief officer, having lost a foot in addition to his other serious injuries. Of the finding of these men an account was given by Captain George Heatley, master of a West Hartlepool steamer, in a letter to his home at Blyth. On May 3 he sighted a steamer's lifeboat, flying a white rag and an oilskin coat, and subsequently went alongside. He found three men living and one dead on board the boat. The living were too weak to lift



THE NEUTRAL.

the dead body overboard. They said, in the course of a recital of their sufferings, that some of their comrades went mad and jumped overboard, and that, after the fifth day adrift, a steamer was sighted, but, instead of picking them up, she steered off and fired several shots, thinking the lifeboat was an enemy submarine. One of the three survivors died on the day of rescue.

That the merchant captains had to exercise the greatest caution in answering calls for help on the high seas, and were often placed in an embarrassing position as to their best course of action, was evident from the snares and disguises tried by the Germans to inveigle them into traps. On January 5, 1917, for example, the Amsterdam *Telegraaf* quoted the statement of an officer of a vessel in an important Dutch line that on a journey from the East Indies he received, while in the Bay of Biscay, an "S.O.S." message, but on rushing to the place indicated he found a German submarine, which was not in distress. The U boat captain expressed his regret that it was a Dutch and not a British vessel which had arrived, adding: "We don't want you to save our souls. We want the British to save our souls." A very sordid and repugnant anthology might be compiled of the remarks addressed at various times to the merchant seamen by their German assailants. A typical specimen was the speech of one of the crew of the submarine which destroyed the steamer *Jupiter* on May 21, 1917, with the loss of 19 lives. To the six survivors this man shouted, "You've no home now, but there's room for you below!" Frequently, too, the alleged reasons given by the Germans for sinking particular ships were ludicrous, in spite of the seriousness of the occasion, as witness the following: "You have brought condensed milk to France instead of to Germany. You shall sink for that—even if you were in neutral waters. We missed you last trip." This was the explanation given by a German submarine commander to the captain of a Dutch ship sunk off the North Hinder Lightship in July, 1917.

Some attention was aroused in America in June, 1917, by the definite statement of Captain Charles E. Pennewell, of Richmond Street, Philadelphia, that German submarine commanders had added kidnapping to their other crimes. Captain Pennewell declared that he had been informed by an American Consul on the African coast that a British

steamship had been sunk off the Straits of Gibraltar by a submarine after the wife and daughter of her captain had been placed on board the submersible. Then, he said, in their presence, the commander of the submarine ordered his men to fire upon the captain and crew of the steamship in their boats. Another instance in which females in a torpedoed vessel were forced by the Germans to go on board the attacking submarine occurred in February, 1917. On or about the 4th of that month the Norwegian ship *Thor II*, a four-masted vessel of 2,144 tons, was sunk by a U boat off the Irish coast. Captain Isak Jacobsen stated on his return to Scandinavia that after his ship was torpedoed his wife and six-year-old daughter were forced to go into the submarine along with himself, and the three of them remained for eight days in the submarine, which during that time sank two British steamers and a British trawler. One of the steamers was loaded with munitions, and as it was sunk without warning the explosion was so sudden and violent that the submarine was severely damaged, and was compelled to return at once for repairs. She passed north of Ireland and Scotland, and on February 12 reached Heligoland, where the Norwegian captain and his family were released and sent to Hamburg. Another vessel sunk by the Germans in spite of the presence on board of the wife of the captain was the Norwegian steamship *Dalmata*, which was destroyed at 6.45 a.m. on February 11, 1917. *Aftenposten*, of Christiania, published an account of the sinking, from the wife of the captain, who had recently been married, and who for the first time was taking a voyage with her husband. She wrote:

A lieutenant on board the submarine politely expressed regret that he was obliged to sink the ship. The crew rowed two lifeboats and towed two other boats containing baggage. Fortunately we had sails, a small cask of water, biscuits, and some other victuals, but no lights. We rowed for the whole of the day and sailed during the night, when it was pitch dark. We were in the middle of the Atlantic, and our signals of distress were not observed and no lights or ships were seen. The sea was extremely heavy, it was piercingly cold, and my two coats and blanket were soaked as the result of the sea washing over the boats.

On Tuesday (February 14) our food and water failed, one man in my boat died from the frost on Tuesday morning, and most of the others were ill. On Wednesday morning there was still no prospect of rescue, and we knew not where we were drifting. Sometimes we were obliged to drop anchor in order to slacken speed. Finally the anchor broke and the two boats in tow containing our property were lost. . . . I lay down in the bottom of our boat prepared to die. My arms and legs were like sticks, and my eyes bloodshot from



U-BOAT COMPELLED BY GUN-FIRE FROM AN ARMED AUXILIARY TO SUBMERGE.

staring. At nine o'clock next morning we came within view of the schooner *Ellen Benzon*, which rescued us. The rough sea prevented her coming alongside, and I was hoisted up by a rope. . . . On arrival at Queens-town I could not get my boots on my swollen feet.

When the Swedish schooner *Dag* was sunk on March 13, 1917, 200 miles west of the Scillies, the captain and his wife, with the crew of eight men, were adrift in the boat for four days and three nights. This was the second case within a week in which a German submarine deliberately abandoned a boat in mid-ocean with a woman alone in the crowded company of men. Even more astounding was the barbarous conduct of the Germans towards a steward and his wife on board the Norwegian steamer *Fjeldi*, the loss of which was reported on May 25, 1917, from Bergen. According to a description in *Tidens Tegn*, the steward

and his wife took to a boat with others from the steamer, when the Germans ordered them to approach the submarine, as the boat was wanted to bring bombs to the Norwegian steamer *Rondane*, which was in the vicinity. The steward and his wife were ordered to go on board the submarine. The entrance was too narrow for them to do so with their lifebelts on; accordingly the latter were taken from them and not given back. The German submarine commander then cross-examined the steward as to the whereabouts of a certain vessel which left Bergen on the same day as the *Fjeldi*. He knew the name, cargo, and destination of three other steamers leaving at the same time, but required details of a fourth. Although pressed, the steward declared that he knew nothing, whereupon he and his wife were



A GERMAN SUBMARINE ON THE HIGH SEAS.

ordered to go outside on the deck of the submarine. The hatches were closed down, and the two left helpless in that perilous position. Soon afterwards a destroyer was observed from the periscope of the submarine, and to the horror of the unfortunate steward and his wife the U boat suddenly dived. Both of them were drawn down a considerable distance by the suction, but on coming to the surface they happily found themselves close to one of the lifeboats of the Fjeldi, and so were picked up. This callous and cruel act of submerging their boat and thereby deliberately throwing people into the sea had been practised before

of them were drowned, when the delay of a very few seconds would have made it possible to save them all, for the trawlers at the moment were many miles away, black dots on the horizon. As Mr. Noyes wrote in regard to this episode: "It seems to be one of many examples of a curious whimsicality that breaks (by way of reaction perhaps) through the systematic soul of the German. He has carried his logic to the point of madness, and perhaps some law of compensation demands that it should be offset by an equally insane capriciousness."

The foregoing, it will be noted, were out-



SAILING SHIP SET ON FIRE IN MID-OCEAN.

by the Germans, as Mr. Alfred Noyes records in his book, "Open Boats," published in the spring of 1917. He refers to the case of the steamer *La Belle France*, sunk on February 1, 1916. When the crew took to the boats one of the latter capsized and some of its occupants were swimming and others clinging to the bottom. The submarine rose to the surface, came alongside, and picked up these men, at the same time calling to another of the boats to come alongside the submarine. But the late occupants of the capsized boat were not permitted to be rescued either by their friends or by the submarine. Four trawlers were seen far away on the horizon, and the submarine, supremely oblivious of the shivering men who had been hauled on to its deck, dived with them all still standing there. Nineteen

rages on neutral subjects. Such were unfortunately of frequent occurrence. A few instances will best show the utter callousness of the German methods in dealing with neutral traders. On December 22, 1916, off Ushant, the Danish steamer *Hroptotz* was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine reported as U 18. A heavy sea was running at the time, but the Germans neither hesitated to cast the Danish sailors adrift in such weather nor did they even allow sufficient time for the boats to get clear. The latter had just been lowered with difficulty when the submarine came rushing up from the opposite side of the steamer, striking the lifeboat as she passed, with the result that the boat was hurled against the steamer's side. The captain was crushed to death against the hull, his head being severed from his body, and

a sailor was so badly injured that he died. Another Danish steamer sunk about this time was the Naesborg, the crew of which were turned adrift some distance from land in stormy weather, with darkness coming on. They asked the submarine to give their lifeboats a tow. This was refused, and the men,

and nights in an open boat. They stated that the Germans stole all the provisions on board, broke open the boxes and cupboards, and looted all valuables. The hardy Norwegian sailors had many and terrible examples of the Germans' brutality about this time, as at other periods of the blockade. The German attitude of utter



THE NORWEGIAN STEAMER "STORSTAD,"
Sunk by a U-boat while carrying relief to the Belgians.

wet through, with nothing to eat, drifted about all through the winter night, being picked up next day by French fishermen.

In the case of another Danish vessel, the Daisy, the plundering proclivity of the Germans was exemplified. The captain of this vessel, giving evidence on April 2, 1917, before the Shipping Court at Copenhagen, in regard to the sinking of the Daisy in the Atlantic three months earlier, said that the Germans packed up provisions, instruments, and other articles before destroying the ship, conveying their booty in eight large sacks to the submarine, and forcing the Danes to assist in the removal. The captain's map of the Bay of Biscay, which was essential for navigating the lifeboat, was seized, as well as nearly all the bread in the lifeboat's lockers.

Another neutral vessel robbed before being sunk about the same time as the Daisy was the Norwegian sailing ship Fremad, from which Captain Hansen and eight men were picked up on April 11, 1917, after spending five days


indifference to the fate of the men in the vessel which might be sunk was typified in the remark of a submarine captain to the skipper of a Dutch trawler which had picked up the crew of the Norwegian barque Telefon, which was sunk by incendiary bombs on April 26, 1917. When stopped the skipper of this trawler, replying to the U boat captain, said he had shipwrecked men aboard. The reply was that if the trawler met any more such men she should let them drift: "It is quite unnecessary to save them," added the German officer. By a happy thought, the Norwegian colony in London entertained in April, 1917, some 500 seamen from Norwegian ships which had been sunk by mine, torpedo, or shell fire, and Commodore Lionel Halsey, Fourth Sea Lord, addressed the men on behalf of the British Admiralty, referring to the bond of brotherhood which had from time immemorial existed among the seamen of all nations until it had been broken by Germany.

The destruction of the Norwegian steamer

Storstad, on March 8, 1917, not only formed a cruel illustration of Germany's contempt for the lives of neutral seamen, but also for the work of the Belgian Relief Commission, and thirdly for their own pledged word. The Storstad, with a cargo of maize, was flying Norwegian colours and the distinguishing marks of a relief ship. She was fired upon at 10 a.m., but unsuccessfully, and the captain ordered the big signboard bearing the words "Belgian Relief Commission" to be shown. Although the Germans could have had no doubt on this point, they torpedoed the Storstad at 10.30, and refused to give a tow to her boats. The crew were thirty-six hours adrift, and some deaths occurred before they were rescued. It was stated that all were neutral subjects. Captain Anderson declared emphatically, on landing at Bantry, that he had in his possession a declaration stamped by the German Consul at Buenos Ayres that the Storstad would be given a "safe conduct" through all waters, that she would not be interfered with in any way by German submarines, and that she complied with the requirements of a Belgian relief ship. The facts of this outrage were so palpable as to be remarkable, even in the records of the U boat war. The Storstad was engaged on a mission of charity. She was a neutral ship with a neutral crew. A special and definite promise of safety had been given to her. The submarine's position allowed no possibility of a mistake as to the ship's character.

Afterwards, when any last lingering doubt as to the vessel's innocence had been removed by questioning the crew, the sinking was completed by gunfire. The Germans declined to tow the crew. In the weather prevailing at the time, to turn men adrift in open boats was calculated murder. It was the murder of men, moreover, whose errand if accomplished would have relieved the pressure upon German food supplies. As the *Westminster Gazette* remarked, "the whole act was not only vindictive, but the work of men who carry hate to the point of madness. We have to deal with the German submarine as we would treat a mad dog."

In the case of the Belgian relief ship *Trevier*, sunk on April 4, 1917, off Scheveningen, a shell was fired as the lifeboat was being lowered, eight men being wounded. This vessel, too, was manned almost entirely by neutrals. In the same week, the Norwegian steamer *Camilla*, with a cargo of corn for the Belgian Relief Commission, was sunk without warning, and nine survivors were landed in Norway after being five days adrift, during which they were exposed to snowstorms and heavy weather. The *Camilla* had been given a "safe conduct" by the Germans in view of the nature of her mission, but it proved worthless. Yet another relief ship sunk in April was the Norwegian *Carnetta*. Despite the fact that this vessel carried papers signed by the German Ambassador at Washington, she was not allowed to proceed when stopped by a U boat in the



A DUTCH STEAMER STRIPED RED AND WHITE IN THE MANNER DICTATED BY GERMANY.



GERMAN BLOCKADE RUNNER DISGUISED AS A SAILING SHIP.

North Sea. The signed papers were shown to the submarine commander, but he refused to acknowledge them, and ordered the crew to leave the ship, which was sunk. The two boats into which the 23 sailors were crowded were not allowed to take any supplies with them. After six days of terrible suffering one of

Unfortunately, such remorse and contrition were extremely exceptional, as the foregoing pages show. Much more usual was the state of mind of the submarine commander who wantonly sunk some ten Dutch fishing luggers at the end of July, 1917. All the fishing craft were within the so-called German "safety



HOW THE BELGIAN RELIEF SHIPS WERE MARKED.

them reached Norway, but not before five of the crew had died of gangrene or starvation. Two more died later. Another neutral steamer whose "safe conduct" was dishonoured was the Norwegian vessel *Vibran*, sunk on May 18, which was likewise in the service of the Belgian Relief Commission. Similarly, the Norwegian-owned steamer *Kongsli*, chartered by the Belgian Relief Commission, was torpedoed while in a locality declared by the Germans to be a safe zone.

That the inhumanity of their proceedings was borne in upon even the German sailors at times was indicated by the following letter, found upon a member of the crew of U 39. This boat, on the morning of February 8, 1917, sank the Norwegian steamer *Ida*, and was herself afterwards sunk in the North Sea. The letter reads:

MY DEAR GOOD PARENTS,—Go to church the first Sunday after you receive these lines from me and thank the good God for having so mercifully watched over and preserved me. I have fallen into the hands of the English, unwounded and whole in body and mind, and have been well treated, quite particularly so by the English naval officers.

It was an extremely sad day for me. First of all in the morning I saw dead on the deck, two poor Norwegians who had unhappily fallen victims to our gunfire. The day will be engraved on my memory in letters of blood, but as for you, dear parents, do not be distressed. The good God who has protected me hitherto will continue to be my aid, and if it should be His will that I should quit this world, I shall know how to die.—With loving greeting, etc.

zone." but they were destroyed without compunction. The skippers of the sunken craft agreed that the commander of the submarine was a lad of about eighteen years of age, utterly irresponsible, and entirely indifferent to the question whether the vessels were inside or outside the 20-mile limit. So little was the latter acknowledged, in fact, that one submarine was found to be without a chart showing the safety zone. Similarly, testimony to the reckless manner in which the German Admiralty conducted the blockade was given by an officer of one of the large Dutch steamship lines, who, in March, 1917, described a conversation he had with a U boat officer. His ship was homeward bound when a German submarine ordered her to stop, and an under-officer came on board to examine the ship's papers. This under-officer was a middle-aged man, formerly mate in a merchant vessel, and therefore familiar with mercantile shipping. He found the papers all in order, and when about to leave in his boat for the submarine he turned to the Dutch officer already mentioned and remarked, "You may think yourselves lucky indeed I was sent to examine your papers." On being asked why, he replied, "Well, we have a wild young commander, only 22 years of age, who usually sinks without any inquiry. Whatever the kind of ship he meets, down she goes."

The last outrage by the U boats which shall be recorded here was one the horror of which must ever leave an indelible stain on the character of German seamen. On July 31, 1917, the British steamer *Belgian Prince* was torpedoed by a German submarine. An official announcement by the Admiralty showed that the crew abandoned the ship in two boats, and were ordered on to the upper deck of the

They were picked up after having been in the water 11 hours. The Admiralty affirmed that the details of this atrocious outrage were supported by the separate affidavits of the three survivors, and, as the official *communiqué* added, "The cold-blooded murder of these men equals, if it does not transcend, the worst crimes which our enemies have committed against humanity."



A NORWEGIAN SHIP FIRED AFTER EXAMINATION.

The German Submarine's boat is seen returning after examining the neutral ship, which was then fired and sunk.

submarine by the German commander. Under his directions the boats were then smashed with axes and the crew of the *Belgian Prince* deprived of their lifebelts. The master was taken below and the hatch closed; the submarine submerged without warning with 43 men standing on her deck. This was the entire crew of the *Belgian Prince*. With the exception of three, all these men were drowned. The three survivors had contrived to retain their lifebelts without the knowledge of the enemy.

The evident intention of the Germans in this cold-blooded murder of helpless seamen was that none should survive to tell the story to the world. As it was, they succeeded in killing no less than 40 men of the *Belgian Prince*. Of the survivors, Thomas Bowman, the chief engineer, a native of Tyneside, who was reported to have been ten times nearly drowned, gave a narrative of his experiences to a correspondent. He

said:—"About eight on Tuesday evening, while 200 miles off land the vessel was torpedoed and we all took to the boats. The submarine approached and destroyed the wireless by shell fire. The submarine ordered the boats to come alongside and called for the skipper. Captain Hassan went aboard and was taken down into the submarine. The rest of us—41—were mustered on the submarine deck. The Germans took the lifebelts from all of us except eight, and outside clothing from all of us. The submarine crew then entered the submarine and closed the hatches, leaving us on deck. Before this the German sailors had taken the oars, balers and gratings from our lifeboats and smashed the boats with an axe. The submarine went about two miles. Suddenly I heard the rush of water, and shouting, 'Look out! She is sinking,' I jumped into the water. Many men went down with the submarine: others swam about. I had a lifebelt. Next morning a boat picked me up after being 11 hours in the water." The deep impression created when this story became known was indicated by a reference to it at the great gathering at the Central Hall, Westminster, of Labour representatives from all parts of the kingdom to consider the question of representation at an International Conference at Stockholm. Speaking in opposition to such representation, Mr. J. Sexton, on behalf of the Liverpool Dockers, said: "To go to Stockholm was to meet men who had not repudiated the brutality of their masters, men whose hands were red with the blood of Captain Fryatt, Nurse Cavell, and the crew of the Belgian Prince. When they had repudiated these crimes, and not before, his objection to meeting them would be gone."

It is easy to imagine the universal feeling of loathing, mixed with anger, engendered by such practices, for which there was no justification. The British submarines in the Baltic and the Sea of Marmora demonstrated conclusively how a blockade of hostile coasts and shipping could be carried on in a clean and humane manner, without risk to the lives of non-combatants. On March 30, 1917, there was published an interesting report, received from the commanding officer of one of the British submarines, which provided testimony to the humanitarian methods of the British Navy, in striking contrast with the inhuman practices of the German Navy. On the morning of March 14 H.M.'s submarine

E—, when proceeding on the surface in the North Sea, sighted two suspicious craft ahead. On approaching them, however, she found them to be ships' boats sailing south, and containing some 30 members of the crew of the Dutch steamship *L. M. Casteig*, which had been torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine, some distance to the northward, over 24 hours previously. After ascertaining



DUTCH FISHING BOAT.

that there were both food and water in the boats, E— took them in tow at once, and proceeded towards the Dutch coast at the greatest possible speed consistent with safety in view of the state of the weather. Some four hours later the Norwegian steamship *Norden* was sighted, and as she showed some natural reluctance about approaching the submarine, not knowing that it was British, the boats containing the Dutch crew cast off the tow and pulled towards her. E— kept the boats in sight until they were seen to have been picked up by the *Norden*, and then proceeded on the course which had been interrupted for her act of mercy.

In the light of all that has been recorded in this chapter, it is instructive to summarise the progress of the policy of unlimited and unmitigated ruthlessness on the part of those responsible for the German submarine war. Needless to say it was entirely a downward progress. The campaign did not attain to its full violence all at once. In the first outbreak, during 1915, there were a great many U boat commanders of the type of Otto Weddigen, who sought to combine with the due execution of the orders of their superiors a consideration



[From a German photograph.]

LOADING A TORPEDO ON A GERMAN SUBMARINE FROM A GUNBOAT.

for human life, which was thought to be characteristic of all seamen. There were also other commanders entirely lacking in any such spirit of chivalry and honour, such as Commander Schmidt, who torpedoed the *Falaba*, and the assailant of the *Lusitania*, who was reported to be Commander Max Valentiner, son of the Dean of Sonderburg Cathedral. But at first the school of the ruthless men did not hold sway. The *Lusitania* outrage was an exception—the method of attack and its attendant circumstances were not usual at the time. As the American Government said in the Note of June 9, 1915, to the German Government, "Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without as much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare."


In the second great onslaught of the U boats, that which began about the late autumn of 1915, and which was largely operative in the Mediterranean, the ruthless conduct of the Germans was more marked. A higher proportion of vessels were sunk without warning or without any adequate time for those on

board to take to the boats, while the latter were turned adrift at ever-increasing distance from land. An official list published on May 12, 1916, by the Admiralty, showed that 37 unarmed British vessels were torpedoed without warning between May 7, 1915, and May 10, 1916, of which six and nine respectively were torpedoed in March and April, 1916, as compared with one each in the previous September, November, and February. The last vessel included in this list was the *Cymric*, which was torpedoed on May 8, 1916. On May 12, 1916, also, the Admiralty issued a second list of 22 neutral merchant vessels which had been torpedoed without warning during the preceding year. This list showed the manner in which, during the campaign in question, the efforts of the U boats had been extended to neutral shipping. Whereas from May 7 to December 31, 1915, only seven neutral vessels were torpedoed without being warned, in March, 1916, eight were so attacked, and in April seven. These figures show the increasing virulence of the blockade at the time. The Germans clearly hoped, by greater violence towards Allied vessels and by extending their efforts to the trade of neutrals, to frighten the sea traders and so set up a state of paralysis among all classes of shipping throughout the world.

It was not until January 31, 1917, that the

German Government declared itself unreservedly on the side of an unrestricted submarine war. Before that date it had always been a question as to which class of submarine commander and which method of attack had the nominal approval of the German Navy Office. For example, the promise made through Count Bernstorff, after the destruction of the *Arabic*, that "liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to

escape or offer resistance," was continually broken, as has been pointed out, yet the German Admiralty did not make a practice of disclaiming responsibility in such cases, but by their silence gave a tacit approval to the conduct of the U boat commanders. Furthermore, by such acts as the shooting of Captain Fryatt, of the *City of Brussels*, they encouraged the advocates of ruthlessness. It was not surprising, therefore, that eventually what was called "unlimited submarine warfare" came to be accepted as the one and only policy.



CAPTAIN TUPPER, OF THE NATIONAL SAILORS' AND FIREMEN'S UNION, SPEAKING ON TOWER HILL.

The Union, under the energetic leadership of Captain Tupper, refused to carry Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., and Mr. Jowett, M.P., to Stockholm and Petrograd.

Knowing the risk of bringing America into the war against them by such a course, the Germans deliberately adopted it, because they hoped to carry the blockade to a successful issue within a limited number of weeks, during which the United States could not effectively participate in the operations. After enumerating the difficulties which already faced the Allies owing to the submarine campaign, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg told the Reichstag that "We firmly hope to bring these difficulties, by means of an unrestricted U boat war, to the point of unbearableness."

Having thus gone "all out" to win in their desperate enterprise, the Berlin authorities at last hoped that their policy of terrorising the world's shipping would be successful. It was a mighty effort, but it failed. The chief rock upon which it split was the indomitable determination of the merchant seamen. They carried on their work as before and met the deadly assaults upon them with coolness, skill and heroic courage. The weekly tables of losses issued by the British Admiralty from February, 1917, onwards showed what a great volume of trade continued to flow to and from the ports of the United Kingdom. Similar tables for the French and Italian merchant navies showed how the Allied seamen had refused to be scared by the brutal character of the attacks upon them. So, too, with the sailors of the neutral countries. The devotion to duty shown by all enabled the trade of the civilized world to be kept going until such a time as the fighting navies could perfect their equipment for dealing with this new menace. Remembering what these gallant officers and men of the Merchant Service had to face, the nature of the perils by which they had been beset since first Germany began to attack peaceful commerce, it is not surprising that their spirit and resolution should be such as were displayed on the occasion of the arrested departure of the delegates to an international peace conference in the summer of 1917. The seamen of the vessel concerned refused to sail with those who

were ready at such a time to discuss the question of peace, for they had learnt in the bitterness of all schools that there could be no peace in the world so long as any power remained in the hands of the pan-Germans to inflict such horrors upon the world as had been enacted during the various stages of the submarine war.

It would be outside the scope of the present chapter to enter into the methods adopted and efforts made to defend ships from attack and suppress the submarine menace. What, however, must never be forgotten is the wonderful pluck and skill exhibited by the merchant seamen when attacked so ruthlessly. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, at the meeting at the Mansion House on July 5, 1917, to inaugurate King George's Fund for Sailors, told two inspiring stories in this connexion, one of which related to the U boat war. The first was about the unarmed steamer *Palm Branch*, which, on November 21, 1916, was attacked by a submarine and hit in several places. A young apprentice, named Harry C. Forest, remained at his post although badly wounded. The ship escaped. Some time later she was given a gun and put to sea again, and in March, 1917, she was once more attacked by two submarines. She put up a fine fight, and not only got away safely but also sank one of the submarines.

Naturally, many more cases in which the merchant seamen displayed their courage and skill in beating off their assailants might be included had it been intended to deal with this phase of the submarine war, but it is sufficient to indicate here, by the case cited by the First Sea Lord, the endurance and dauntless courage which characterized the conduct of the British Mercantile Marine throughout the one-sided struggle. Similarly, it is worth mentioning that the governing bodies of every shipping enterprise in the country, and many private individuals, aware of the facts, testified to the splendid manner in which, time after time, the men who were subjected to attack by the U boats, and had their ships sunk under them, at once signed on again for further service.



CHAPTER CXCVI.

THE ABDICATION OF THE TSAR.

RUSSIA IN 1916—THE STUERMER PREMIERSHIP—GROWTH OF DISCONTENT—M. PROTOPOFF AS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR—MEANING AND HISTORY OF THE AUTOCRACY—CHARACTER OF THE TSAR—WHY THE REVOLUTION FAILED IN 1905-7—THE EMPRESS ALEXANDRA—FORCES BEHIND THE THRONE—RASPUTIN—HIS MURDER—ECONOMIC CHAOS IN RUSSIA—RESPONSIBILITY OF M. PROTOPOFF—THE REVOLUTION, MARCH, 1917—POLICE PROVOCATION—DIARY OF EVENTS IN PETROGRAD—THE ABDICATION OF THE TSAR—DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DYNASTY AND THE OLD RÉGIME—PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE LVOFF—THE DUMA—RECOGNITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BY THE ALLIES.

RUSSIA took the field on a strong note of union between Tsar and people.* During the first stages of the war and until the disastrous retreat of the Russian armies in 1915 had aroused misgivings as to the efficiency of the administration, all parties and classes loyally refrained from political agitation. Failure to support the Army when it was victorious and to compensate for military disasters by internal reforms revived the latent discontent. The supersession of the War Minister, General Sukhomlinoff, in June, 1915, and even the assumption of the supreme command by the Tsar in the following September were regarded as measures that dealt merely with one aspect of the country's need. The demand, as formulated by the constitutional parties both in the Duma and in the Council of Empire, was for a Ministry enjoying the confidence of the people. The Prime Minister, M. Goremykin, who had hitherto opposed an attitude of passive resistance to this demand, prorogued Parliament as soon as the Legislature adopted it. M. Goremykin's *coup* put fresh heart into the bureaucracy and other reactionary elements that had become alarmed by the remarkable

capacity for affairs exhibited by urban and rural authorities in the organisation of the rearward services. The Tsar's resolve that the war should come first was actually construed as an injunction against reform in every sphere. M. Krivoshein, the capable Minister of Agriculture, who at one time had been regarded as the likeliest candidate for the Premiership, resigned, and, after successive Ministerial experiments on the part of M. Goremykin, he was followed into retirement by the Prime Minister himself. This was in January, 1916.

By this time political discontent had been reinforced by economic stringency. The rapid rise in the price of commodities and the scarcity of food and fuel in the great cities, added to the wholesale influx of millions of refugees from the invaded provinces, increased the tension.

The new Premier, M. Stuermer, who is said to have been designated by M. Goremykin, notwithstanding antecedents that were anything but reassuring, succeeded at first in conciliating public sentiment by reassembling the Duma. The Tsar attended the opening ceremony, and the communion between Sovereign and people bade fair to be restored. Under the Tsar's auspices, moreover, and with the very effective co-operation of General Sukhomlinoff's two immediate successors, General Polivanoff and General Shuvaieff, the Russian

* Cf. Vol. VIII. cap. cxxix., in which are presented events in Russia during the first two years of the campaign.

Armies in the summer of 1916 were destined to carry everything before them on the Austrian front in an advance which was arrested in August only by the exigencies of Rumania's intervention and of her subsequent defeat.

The turn of events in the field, which had availed for a time to distract attention from internal problems, served merely to focus criticism more sharply on the administration



PRINCE LVOFF,

Prime Minister of the Provisional Government,
1917.

The approach of autumn and the menace of a hard winter found the problems of transport and supply still unsolved. Discontent became acute and found passionate expression in memorable speeches by politicians so divergent as the Cadet leader, M. Miliukoff, and the Conservative, M. Purishkevitch, in the Duma when Parliament reassembled in November. The demand for responsible government, which had formed the main plank in the platform of the Progressive Bloc, was re-echoed not only by every party but by every class. The baneful influence of "dark forces" discerned behind the Throne lent fierce insistence to the cry. The name even of the Empress Alexandra was drawn into the debate, and her

German origin, allied with the imputed sympathies of the Court, was made the basis for an indictment of the Government as the conscious or unconscious instrument of a pro-German policy. In vain the Ministers of War and of Marine endeavoured to placate the Duma by protesting their full sense of the nation's share in the effective conduct of the campaign. Relations between Parliament and M. Stuermer, who since the retirement of M. Sazonoff in July, 1916, had acted also as Foreign Minister, were broken off. A threatened deadlock was averted by the Prime Minister's resignation at the end of November.

M. Trepoff, an honest but weak official, who, as Minister of Railways, had presided over the completion of the Murman line, succeeded him. After trying for six weeks to conciliate both Crown and Parliament, he, too, resigned.

His successor, Prince Golitzin, who was destined to be the last Prime Minister of the pre-Revolutionary era, was instructed by the Tsar to seek an urgent solution of the economic problem; to rely upon the tried patriotism of the local authorities; and to treat Parliament with the respect and forbearance to which the Government itself was entitled.

The new Prime Minister proclaimed at the outset as his programme: "a united Cabinet and everything for the war." This intention was frustrated by the independent, if not altogether irresponsible, activity of an ambitious politician, M. Protopopoff, who had been appointed Minister of the Interior in October. As a prominent Liberal and a Vice-President of the Duma he had headed the Russian Parliamentary deputation to London, Paris and Rome during the previous spring. In England in particular his public utterances were altogether unexceptionable. On the return journey, however, at Stockholm, he allowed himself to be inveigled into an interview with a German named Warburg, who has been variously described as a diplomatist masquerading as a financial agent and as a financial agent masquerading as a diplomatist. Contradictory accounts of this conversation excited a bitter controversy in the Press, and subsequently found a graver echo in Parliament. The appointment of M. Protopopoff as Minister of the Interior under M. Stuermer was regarded as confirming the worst suspicions as to the tendencies of the administration.

These misgivings were aggravated by an uneasy apprehension that the Stuermers and

Protopopoffs of the day were merely puppets in the unseen hands of mysterious forces at and about the Court. What these forces were M. Miliukoff disclosed in his speech in the Duma in November—shady creatures for the most part, secretaries and hangers-on of Ministers, scheming and servile prelates, and impecunious adventurers of all sorts. The most sinister figure in the group was Gregory Rasputin, the dissolute "holy man," miracle-worker and prayer-monger, who, although neither monk nor friar, had wormed his way from the purlicus of Siberia into the drawing-rooms of Moscow, and thence into the Palace itself, where with varying ups and downs of fortune he had succeeded in maintaining himself for over ten years as the accredited successor of the monk Heliodore.

Warning after warning reached Rasputin, but he refused to heed them; at the close of the year he fell the victim of a Palace plot, in the house and, as it is said, by the hand of the Tsar's nephew by marriage, the younger Prince



GENERAL POLIVANOFF,
War Minister in 1915.

Yussupoff. But the death of this charlatan brought no relief to the sorely-vexed nation.

M. Protopopoff enforced with unexampled rigour the censorship exercised by the Ministry of the Interior, and began to exhibit every intention of inaugurating a policy of his own. Outlawed by Parliament and by his own party as a renegade, he seems to have determined to rely upon his executive power and to impose a purely departmental solution of the transport and supply problem. The Duma, kept in suspense from week to week, became restive under the strain: even Ministers, including

the new Foreign Minister, M. Pokrovsky, rebelled against a system which threatened to make their own work impossible, and they successively resigned or took indefinite leave.

The process of dissolution spread, and by the time the Duma was at last convened at the end of February bread riots were breaking out in Petrograd and the workmen engaged in war



GENERAL SHUVAIEFF,
War Minister in 1916.

industries struck in sympathy. That, with vast supplies available all over the country, the people should find themselves on the verge of starvation seemed to warrant the masses in raising the cry of treason. The roar of the multitude penetrated into the inmost recesses of the Duma Palace, and the House, which had listened with impatience to the non-committal platitudes of a new Minister of Agriculture, promptly adopted a resolution transferring the control of supplies from the Government to the municipalities and other local authorities. The Government replied by dissolving Parliament, which, however, continued to sit, in view of events in the capital, where Protopopoff's police was vainly attempting to provoke the mob with machine gun fire. When the military were called upon to assist them the troops went over to the people and turned on the police.

The Tsar, who was at the Imperial Headquarters at the front, refused, on the information before him, to parley with an impenitent



CROWD IN FRONT OF THE DUMA BUILDING.

Parliament, a mutinous soldiery, and a mob of strikers. The President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, telegraphed to the Tsar a last appeal which remained unanswered. On March 13 General Ivanoff was appointed military dictator to deal with the rising, but he was unable to reach the capital with his escort of Knights of St. George. All over Russia there was revolution. On March 15 M. Gutchkoff and M. Shulgin, as commissaries of Parliament, received from the Tsar in the Imperial train at Pskoff, halfway between Petrograd and Riga, the Act by which he abdicated his own rights and those of his son Alexis to the Throne.

The Revolution seemed complete, and Prince Lvoff, the President of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, which had rendered most important services in connexion with supplies for the Army, inaugurated the new era as the first Prime Minister of Revolutionary Russia.

Russia, it has been said, is never more to be feared than when she has just been defeated. She possesses in a marked degree the little-understood Asiatic quality of resilience. The Crimean war threw Russia back from Europe on to Asia; the Japanese war threw her back again on to Europe; and the Great War threw her back on to herself. That is the outward manifestation of these outstanding events in

modern Russian history. Their internal reaction has been less clearly discerned. The Crimean war was followed by the emancipation of the serfs; the Japanese war was followed by the general strike, mutinies, and counter-movements of 1905-1906; and the end of the Great War, so long drawn-out, was anticipated by the overthrow of the autocracy.

The Great War and its attendant circumstances for Russia unquestionably hastened this consummation, but the end was in itself inevitable. Moreover, as one of the profoundest students of Russian conditions has observed, at no period of its history could the autocracy have been displaced without violence.* If it be true that the autocracy owed its existence primarily to the multiplicity of the races by which its seat of power was surrounded, and secondarily to the multiplicity of the races over which it ruled, it is not surprising that in the process of welding these disparate elements the highest importance should have been attached to the principle of unity. Cohesion was necessary in order to enable the Russians to resist the pressure of Tartar, Pole and Swede; and unity was necessary in order to overcome internal divisions after the external menace had passed. "This conception of

* James Mavor, "Economic History of Russia," Vol. II. pp. 6, 7.

the cardinal importance of unanimity with its implications may be regarded as the principal feature which distinguishes Russian political ideas from those of Western Europe."

It was in conformity with this central idea that M. Pobiedonostzeff, scholar, theologian and tutor of Tsars, developed his conception of political power as the "manifestation of a unique will, without which no government is possible." To him "the Parliamentary comedy" was "the supreme political lie that dominates our age." The institution of Parliament he condemned as one of the greatest of human delusions. "It is terrible," he wrote, "to think of our condition if destiny had sent us that fatal gift—an All-Russian Parliament! But that will never be."* In other words, as Prince Gortchakoff admitted a year or two before his death, the dominant apprehension was that the grant of a constitution and the creation of a legislature would inevitably provoke centrifugal tendencies.

So long as every manifestation of the "general will" could be suppressed, the "unique will," pleading the necessity for unification, could

* M. Pobiedonostzeff was Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880 until 1905, and exercised a commanding influence on Russian internal policy during that period. He died in 1907, at the age of 80.

remain supreme. In one of its aspects, as Professor Mavor points out, the history of Russia is the history of the growth of autocracy under these conditions.

The "inflexible will" of the Tsar is the "unique will." He is at once head of the State and of the Church. He is ordained of God to be the arbiter of the destinies of his people. While absolutism is not a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, and while its characteristics in Russia were gradually developed, not without imitation of the models of Byzantium and of Western Europe prior to the eighteenth century, the fundamental idea of it was not out of harmony with the principle of unity which was deeply rooted in the Russian mind as a social necessity of the first order. The difficulty which the Slavs and their allies experienced in making themselves masters of the vast region which they were colonising thus led perhaps inevitably under the conditions of the time, internal and external, to absolutism.

Deficient as they were in knowledge of the social and political development of contemporary France and England, and of the impossibility of the permanent re-establishment of arbitrary power in the West, successive Russian Tsars, from Alexander I. (1801-1825) onwards, and most conspicuously Nicholas I. (1825-1855), seem to have looked upon themselves as instruments of Heaven entrusted with the high task of stemming the revolutionary tide. They have conceived the idea that popular government would be fatal to Russia, and they have rightly foreseen that if it were granted to the rest of the world, its advent in Russia could not for long be delayed. While self-interest thus impelled them to observe and even to share in the affairs of countries other than their own, they no doubt honestly conceived that popular government would be as fatal to these countries as they supposed it would be to Russia. Consumed with a desire to play a great rôle in the history of humanity, they threw themselves in 1814, in 1849, and again in



M. RODZIANKO, PRESIDENT OF THE DUMA.



1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN FAMILY AND BODY-GUARD: A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.
1. The Tsar. 2. The Czarévitch. 3. Grand Duchess Olga. 4. Grand Duchess Tatiana. 5. Grand Duchess Marie. 6. Grand Duchess Anastasie

1854, into the struggle against what they conceived to be the spirit of revolution—in 1814 against Napoleon I., in 1849 against Hungary, and in 1854 against Napoleon III.

. . . The Tsars Alexander II., Alexander III., and Nicholas II. have also played a Quixotic part in tilting against windmills. All have been inspired by the desire to exercise and to bequeath unimpaired to their successors sole autocratic power within their own dominions, as well as by ambition to confer the benefits of autocracy upon other nations. There is reason to believe that some of them, in moments of religious exaltation, have regarded themselves as being in very direct relations with the Divine Power and as sharing in its attributes. The touch of fanaticism which this suggests accounts for the vacillation of the "inflexible will," for the general benevolence of intention, for frequent lapses into barbaric cruelty, for the lack of judgment with which successive Tsars have chosen their advisers, and for the ardour with which many of them, notably Alexander III., endeavoured to control every department of Government down to the smallest detail.

The practice just mentioned has been followed by the present Tsar (Nicholas II.), and this circumstance accounts in a large measure for the confusion in which the administration was plunged in the revolutionary years of 1905-1906. When the Tsar held himself responsible for everything, there is little wonder that the people also held him responsible.

. . . Autocracy upon a small scale may conceivably be successful in maintaining "good government"; but the demands of a numerous nation of manifold racial origins, upon an autocrat who is at once priest, soldier, judge, official, and "first policeman," tend to become cumulative and to reach beyond the endurance of the human mind or body on their present plane. An ideal Tsar must not merely be divinely anointed, he must himself be indeed a god.

. . . Up till the recent revolutionary epoch popular recognition of the impossibility of the adequate performance of the traditional rôle of Tsarship, as well as remnants of Cæsar-worship which lingered among the simple rural folk, combined to render the public attitude towards the Tsar one of large tolerance. "The Dear Father does not know our situation, or he would change it," was the popular formula. One sign of the great change which has passed over Russia during recent years is that this formula is recognized to be no longer applicable. The Tsar must know what everyone else knows. He had the power to effect radical changes in the condition of the peasantry; although he has retained this power, he has not exercised it, therefore he is responsible. Although from the peasant point of view the present Tsar (Nicholas II.) is not worse than any, perhaps even better than most, of his predecessors, his failure only proves that autocracy is worn out and must be abolished.

This stage by stage the revolutionary state of mind develops. . . . To the desire for drastic political change must be added the fatalistic habit of thought which is characteristic of the Russian mind; once the necessity of change is realized, it must take place somehow immediately. The practical means of carrying out any change are not really considered, nor is the character of the change itself at all deeply regarded. The means might have to be violent: who might know? The character of it would have to be left to the people to determine: who might know the result? A "Constitutional Assembly" might be convened, and this would reveal "the will of the people." Such was the state of mind of Russia in 1905.

This analysis, which was published shortly before the outbreak of the Great War, shows the lines upon which the mutual attitude of ruler and ruled was advancing until the military

reverses of 1915 and 1916 combined with intolerable economic pressure to precipitate the catastrophe. It is imperative to keep in steady view the changes in the popular conception of the autocracy before the war, in order to avoid the error of supposing that even a more uncompromising "Russificator" than Nicholas II. could indefinitely have postponed a catastrophe which was almost predestined.

Nicholas II., when he ascended the Throne in 1894, at the age of twenty-six, prayed like his fathers before him that "in his high service as Tsar and Judge of the Russian Empire" he might be helped so to order all to the good of his people and the glory of God, that at the Day of Judgment he might answer without shame. In 1913, on the occasion of the Romanoff Tercentenary, an authorized Russian biography of Nicholas II. described the painstaking thoroughness with which he made himself acquainted with all the details of each day's affairs. "The Tsar's working day," it was added, "ends, as it begins, with prayer." A constant remark to his officials was: "I like to hear the truth."

Papers which require especial attention the Tsar keeps with him. They are invariably read, and remarks are made on their margin. For example, all reports from governors of provinces are read through, and frequently the more important passages in them are read aloud to the Empress at evening tea. . . .

The Tsar's speeches are always remarkable for their conciseness and clearness, and for the vivid form in which his ideas are expressed.

"I never prepare what I say. But I pray to God and then speak what comes into my mind," the Tsar has often said.*

In his first speech in the very first months of his reign Nicholas II. designated as "senseless dreams" the aspirations of the *Zemstvos*. The day after this rebuff the Tsar was answered by the "Liberals" in the following open letter:—

You have told your mind, and your words will be known to all Russia, to all the civilized world. Until now nobody knew you; since yesterday you became a "definite quantity," and "senseless dreams" are no longer possible on your account. We do not know whether you clearly understand the situation created by your "firm" utterance. But people who do not stand so high above and so far off from actuality can easily comprehend what is their own and your position concerning what is now the state of things in Russia. First of all you are imperfectly informed. No *Zemstvoist* has put the question as you put it, and no voice was raised in any *Zemstvo* assembly against autocracy. . . . The question was only to remove the wall of bureaucracy and court influences which separates the Tsar from Russia; and these were the tendencies which you in your inexperience and lack of knowledge ventured to stamp as "senseless dreams." . . . Unhappily, your un-

* *Tsar Nicholas II.*, by Major-General A. Elchaninov.

fortunate expression is not a mere slip of language; it reflects a deliberate system. Russian society realizes very well that not an ideal autocrat has spoken to them, but a bureaucracy jealous of its omnipotence. January 29 has dispelled that halo which surrounded your young, uncertain appearance in the eyes of many Russians. You yourself raised your hand against your own popularity. But not your popularity alone is now at stake. If autoocracy in word and deed proclaims itself identical with the omnipotence of bureaucracy, if it can exist only so long as society is voiceless, its cause is lost.

It digs its own grave, and soon or late—at any rate, in a future not very remote—it will fall beneath the pressure of living social forces. . . . The alternative you put before society is such that the mere fact of its being clearly formulated and openly proclaimed implies a terrible threat to autoocracy. You challenged the Zemstvos, and with them Russian society, and nothing remains for them now but to choose between progress and faithfulness to autoocracy. Your speech has pro-

Duma, a calm and fruitful session such as will please me and be for the good of our dear Russia."

In the words of the Tsar in March, 1906, "my autoocracy remains as it ever was"—neither diminished nor limited by the convocation of national representatives.

Among some 500 Bills that were annually submitted to the Tsar for sanction few appear to have given him more genuine satisfaction than the Land Acts of 1906, which introduced the conception of individual ownership of property and brought Russian law into conformity with the law of Western Europe. Repeatedly he expressed anxious solicitude for the welfare of



THE WINTER PALACE, PETROGRAD.

voked a feeling of offence and depression; but the living social forces will soon recover from that feeling. Some of them will pass to a peaceful but systematic and conscious struggle for such scope of action as is necessary for them. Others will be made more determined to fight the detestable régime by any means. You first began the struggle; and the struggle will come.*

It was the Tsar's "inflexible will" as Self-Ruler that 20 years later proclaimed the advent of a representative legislature. "It is by the will of God that we hold sway over our people. Before His throne we shall answer for our rule"—so ran the Manifesto of June, 1907. Five years later Nicholas II. closed the Third Duma with the words :—

' I wish you a safe journey to your homes, and to those of you who return to the Fourth

the peasants. He particularly interested himself in the drink question, although his interest remained fruitless until the outbreak of war gave him the opportunity to abolish the vodka monopoly and to free the peasants from the curse of drink.

The failure of the revolutionary movement in 1905-1907 is attributed by Professor Mavor to the irreconcilable attitude of the extremists, who demanded a democracy organized in accordance with their sectarian doctrines. The autoocracy rallied its demoralized forces, stamped on the divided remnants of rebellion, and granted a sort of constitution. While men of the Pobiedonostzeff school professed to fear that Russia would in consequence "fall into sin and relapse into barbarism," Count Witte advocated a form of "democratic autoocracy,"

* Paul Miliukoff, *Russia and its Crisis*, pp. 327, 328.



ON THE NEVA: LOADING ICE FOR STORAGE.

which, by concessions to the peasants and the working classes, should save Russia from the demands of middle-class Liberalism. There is a theory that M. Protopopoff, who was regarded as a renegade by his fellow Liberals, was intent upon reviving some such scheme when the storm broke and swept him away.

It was during the first revolutionary period that Count Witte submitted a secret memorandum to the Emperor, in which he drew an elaborate comparison between bureaucracy and self-government, and sought to prove that the further progress of the latter would inevitably

lead to the downfall of autocratic monarchy. According to Sir Paul Vinogradoff,* Count Witte argued that self-government, even local or provincial, is in its essence a political arrangement, and as such opposed to absolute monarchy. If self-government was to live and to act rationally, it would have to develop into a constitution. If it could not be allowed to do so, it would have to be superseded by a centralized bureaucracy. He implied that Russian bureaucracy would produce a new political type,

* *Self-Government in Russia*, by Paul Vinogradoff, pp. 68-70.



THE IMPERIAL APARTMENTS IN THE PALACE OF TSARSKOE SELO.

unknown to history, and that it would develop into an aristocracy of work and enlightenment. As Count Witte himself said to a deputation of railwaymen during the first general strike in October, 1905: "Remember, under such conditions the Government can fall; but you will destroy all the best forces of the nation. In this way you will play into the hands of



THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS
MIKHAILOVITCH.

the very *bourgeoisie* against whom you are struggling." *

M. Protopopoff's special application of Count Witte's theory appears to have consisted in demagogic proposals amounting to the confiscation of large landed estates, presumably in order to conciliate the peasantry. This at a moment when the nobility, as much as any class, needed conciliation. However this may be, there appears to be no doubt that he was on the look-out for an opportunity of dissolving the Fourth Duma, in order that he might secure the return of a more flexible assembly. As a preliminary, every effort was made to assure a "packed" House in the Council of Empire.

In Court circles, at any rate as late as December, 1916, the comfortable expectation seems to have been entertained that the Tsar would be able, at an appropriate moment, to concede the

demand for responsible government. This stage, it was believed, would be reached automatically, and the desired concession, unlike that of 1905, would be made without pressure.

This view was put forward by the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, the well-known President of the Russian Imperial Historical and Geographical Societies, and a first cousin of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch, in a memorandum which he handed to the Tsar at an interview on November 14. This letter gives the following intimate vision of Nicholas II. as a ruler:

You have frequently proclaimed your will to continue the war to a victorious end. Are you sure that the present condition of the country permits this? Are you well enough acquainted with affairs within the Empire, particularly in Siberia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus? Do you hear the whole truth, or is much concealed? Where is the root of the evil? Let me explain it in a few words.

So long as your manner of choosing Ministers was known to narrow circles, things could muddle along; but when it became a matter of public knowledge and all classes in Russia talked about it, it was senseless to



M. PROTOPOPOFF,
Minister of the Interior, October, 1916—March,
1917.

attempt to continue to govern Russia in this fashion. Often did you tell me you could put faith in no one, and that you were being deceived.

If this is so, then it applies particularly to your wife, who loves you and yet led you into error, being surrounded by evil-minded intimates. You believe in Alexandra Feodorovna. This is natural. But the words she utters are the product of skilful machinations, not of truth. If you are powerless to liberate her from these influences, then, at all events, be on your guard against the constant and systematic influence of intriguers, who are using your wife as their instrument. If your persuasions are unavailing, and I am sure you have repeatedly tried to combat these influences, try other methods to rid yourself of them once for all.

Your first impulse and decision are always remarkably true and to the point. But as soon as other influences

* Quoted by Khrustaloff, *The Council of Labour Delegates*, p. 59; cited by J. Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 487.



THE TAURIS PALACE, THE SEAT OF THE DUMA.

supervene you begin to waver, and your ultimate decisions are not the same. If you could remove the persistent interference of dark forces in all matters, the regeneration of Russia would instantly be advanced and you would regain the confidence of the enormous majority of your subjects, which you have forfeited. Everything will go smoothly. You will find people who, under changed conditions, will agree to work under your personal direction.

During the course of this conversation with the Tsar the Grand Duke spoke of Protopopoff, and asked Nicholas II. whether he was aware that this politician had been palmed off on him by the agency of Rasputin, whom Protopopoff had met at the house of Badmaieff, a charlatan who represented himself as an expert in "Thibetan" medicine and who had a large clientele in Petrograd society. The Tsar, with disarming courtesy, replied that he was aware of these matters. The Emperor took the Grand Duke's memorandum and subsequently read it out to the Empress. When he reached the passage dealing with her influence on her husband, "she seized the letter in a rage and tore it up." On January 13, a fortnight after the murder of Rasputin, the Tsar wrote to the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch: "I order you to leave for your estate for the space of two months. . . . I beg you to do it. I order and I beg—can you make it out?"

Other observers, foreign as well as Russian, who had opportunities of forming a first-hand judgment of Nicholas II., ascribed his hesitancy and apparent irresolution to a constitutional unwillingness to inflict pain and to an early upbringing which has been described as having

been calculated to fit him for almost any other walk of life but that of Tsar of All the Russias. Not even his bitterest enemies ever denied that he possessed in the highest sense the instincts of a gentleman. But the proverbial loneliness of kings fell heavily upon him, and undoubtedly murred his finer qualities.

"The trade" of autocracy, as Professor Mavor has justly remarked, is an exhausting and dangerous business, imposing a severe strain upon the physical constitution and tending to the disturbance of mental equilibrium. Alexander I. and Nicholas I. died, the first at forty-eight and the second at fifty-nine, for want of the will to live. Alexander III., father of Nicholas II., died at forty-nine, a nervous wreck, in close retirement. Yet all these, especially the last, were physically strong men.

The following typical sketch of the Tsar was published in M. Miliukoff's organ *Retch* a few days after the abdication:

A weak and characterless man, easily susceptible to outside influences, Nicholas II. was never able to take a firm and definite decision. After having taken one the Tsar would often have a talk with some person and then take a directly opposite decision. It did not require a great effort to convince Nicholas II. of anything in the world. He listened with particular respect to the opinions of specialists, which latter term, however, he interpreted very narrowly. In his opinion a specialist was always the person who by the will of fate, or of the Tsaritsa, or of Rasputin, stood at the moment at the head of this or that department. The Tsaritsa had an irresistible influence over him. In her presence he never had an opinion of his own. The Tsaritsa usually spoke for him, and he practically agreed with everything she said. No one could understand the secret of that

influence, even the Dowager-Empress being at a loss to account for it. The Tsaritsa would frequently visit Headquarters, and on those occasions her apartments would show light until late into the night. That meant that she was busy with affairs of State, drawing up decrees, making appointments, dismissing Ministers, etc. His weakness of character left its mark on the last days of his reign. Though he took the grave decision to abdicate, he, at the same time, continued to sleep and eat regularly without feeling in the least disturbed in his



THE EMPRESS ALEXANDRA.

mode of life. Only a weak person can easily go back to his old routine after a catastrophe. His wife, on the other hand, was an energetic, independent and imperious character, with great strength of will and void of all scruples. No single Minister could ever be appointed without her approval.

The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, whose intervention appears to have been prompted by the Dowager Empress, was not the only member of the Imperial Family who remonstrated with the Tsar. The former's brother, the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch, likewise told the Emperor "many bitter truths," as also did the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch. Even the Grand Duchess Victoria, wife of the Grand Duke Cyril, approached the Tsar. "What has the Empress to do with politics? She is an army nurse and nothing more," the Tsar is reported to have said to her. Individually and collectively the members of the Imperial Family sought to impress upon the Tsar the growing discontent among the people. So urgent and repeated, indeed, had

their supplications and protests towards the end of 1916 become that their attitude was known to many who, if they had any criticism to offer, regretted that the Grand Dukes had kept silent so long. Nor were the Tsar's kinsmen alone in their warnings. Similar representations were made by one of the Court Chaplains, by the enlightened Minister of Public Instruction, Count Ignatieff; by the Finance Minister, M. Bark; by the Conservative Deputy, M. Purishkevitch; and last, but not least, by the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, who on several occasions, and as late as December, drew the Tsar's attention to the political aspects of the situation.



THE DOWAGER EMPRESS MARIE.

The Empress Alexandra, sister of the Grand Duke of Hesse, was married to the Tsar at the age of 22. The circumstances of her arrival in Russia in 1894 and of her betrothal at the death-bed of Alexander III., and the invidious position brought upon her by the contrast between her reserve and the public activity of the Dowager Empress Marie, appear to have created in her a frame of mind which the repeated disappointment of her hopes of an

her ultimately combined to render morbidly hypersensitive. Some years before the war her medical advisers at Nauheim had diagnosed heart disease. The birth of the Cesarevitch Alexis, nearly 10 years after her marriage, merely relieved one set of anxieties in order to create new reactions and alarms. The assurance of a direct succession appears to have been not altogether welcome to those who since the death of the Tsar's younger brother George in 1899 had urged in vain the formal designation of Alexander III.'s youngest son, Michael, as Cesarevitch.*

Although it is universally admitted that the young Empress was at great pains to acquaint herself with the life and language of her husband's country, the cumulative effect of family and personal anxieties, together with the terror of the first revolutionary era, was to turn her into a recluse. For 10 years before the war the Winter Palace was practically closed. Both society and trade deplored this almost total disappearance of representative functions in the capital, which, as the Romanoff Tercentenary in 1913 showed, were appreciated also by the general public.

The Empress's aloofness even from her own world, for reasons which were in themselves intelligible, did not fail to create a growing impression in certain circles that she disliked Russia and the Russians, and later that she was actively plotting with the Tsar's enemies. When criticism had reached this stage, it was hardly likely to stop and reflect that a mother who had shown herself so fiercely solicitous for her son's security and rights was not likely wittingly to indulge in treasonable practices calculated to endanger his succession. But there were many patriotic Russians like M. Miliukoff, as he showed in his speech in the Duma in November, 1916, who apprehended that in transferring the conduct of foreign affairs from the hands of a Sazonoff to those of a Stuermer the autocracy might have been prompted by excessive solicitude for its own existence and that it might ultimately be tempted to forsake the hard but straight road to victory.

Indeed, it has often been asserted that, while the Emperor was thoroughly anti-German and pro-Ally, the Empress was anti-Ally and pro-German; not so much out of love for the Germans, as because she believed it her mission to maintain absolute monarchy

in Russia for her husband and her son, and thought Germany much less dangerous in this respect than England. She would say that the Germans must be "chastised"; but she was ready, according to this account, to cede a certain amount of territory to them, if she could thereby secure an early peace and save absolutism. In her intense mysticism she



M. MILIUKOFF,
The Cadet Leader and first Foreign Minister
after the Revolution.

believed that God had chosen Russia to be the instrument of great miracles. Hence, in part, the sway which Rasputin exercised over her.

In the eyes of patriotic Russians, who looked to the Throne for a lead, the remote personality of the Empress assumed more and more an alien form. A stranger she was to them, and no particular ill-will was needed for them to identify her with the land of her birth. *Niemka* they called her—*l'Allemande*. Germans, on the other hand, spoke of her, the granddaughter of Queen Victoria as *die Engländerin*. English indeed was spoken familiarly at the Russian Court; the Tsar had had an English tutor and the Empress gave her son his first lessons in English; while English nurses had been an institution in the Russian Imperial Family since the days of the Emperor Paul.*

There were Germans at Court, by name if

* v. *Russian Court Memoirs, 1914-16*, by A Russian.

* Cf. Theodor Schiemann, "*Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I.*," vol. I., p. 181.

not in sympathy—Fredericks, Meyendorf, Grünwald, and the rest; Hofmeister, Jägermeister, Vorschneider, Kammerherr, and a host of others. But so there always had been. As M. Miliukoff himself wrote* ten years before he delivered his indictment in the Duma, any Russian national tradition that had grown up around the autocracy



RASPUTIN.

was broken by no less a person than Peter the Great. Even so, as he added, the autocracy, although based on the principle of unity, was not itself a political principle, but merely a material fact.

During all the four centuries of its existence, autocracy had been changing from an institution inherited from the "forefathers" into a theocratic institution; even further, from a theocratic power on Byzantine lines into a bureaucratic monarchy on European lines; again, from a bureaucratic monarchy into a manifestation of the absolute "general will" of the people; still again, from that absolutism of Hobbes into a mediæval monarchy of Montesquieu, limited by the "intermediate powers" of the nobility and the bourgeoisie; and finally, from this monarchy of mediæval orders—the *Standesmonarchie*—into a national institution sanctioned by the mere fact of its long existence and by the supposed quality of its being immutable.

The mere externals, therefore, of the Court were not the chief barrier between Throne and people. There were forces behind the Throne; not presentable "grey Eminences" but parasites and plunderers, dissolute livers and sordid souls—Manuiloff, Rasputin, Prince An-

dronikoff, and the Metropolitan Pitirim. So "mysterious" were these forces that it has never been made clear whether all of these belonged to the "Court Party" which, in the language of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, "grouped itself about the young Empress."

According to Russian gossip and belief, the occult sciences had for many years found a devotee in the Empress Alexandra, and the vein of mysticism in her nature made her responsive not only to a genuine spiritual appeal, but even to the mediæval imposture with which a good deal of Russian life and thought is tinged. Her elder sister Elizabeth, widow of the Grand Duke Serge, had become a lay abbess at Moscow, and through her the Empress was brought into contact with clerical seers, visionaries, fakirs, and quacks of all sorts. Among these was Gregory Rasputin, who, about ten years before the war, was fashionable in Moscow as a "holy man." There was nothing holy about this illiterate and reprobate peasant beyond the fact that he claimed to have visited the Holy Land.

The secret of the fellow's influence is said to have lain in a certain hypnotic power which made him especially dangerous among women. There was nothing particularly novel about his craft. Half a century before the *Cologne Gazette* related how one of these "holy men," Ivan Iakovlovitch, attracted to himself in the province of Smolensk a crowd of elegant women, "whose ample crinolines rivalled anything to be seen in a German watering-place"; and even after his internment in a madhouse he continued to merit his title as "The Idol of the Ladies."

Rasputin claimed to possess miraculous powers of healing, and it is said that he even induced the Empress to believe that to him was due the recovery of her son from an organic malady. He pretended to "watch over" the Cesarevitch, and it was widely assumed in Russia that the anxiety of the Empress was calmed by the presence of this plausible ruffian.

Rasputin's hold upon the Palace made him appear a desirable tool in the hands of those who had axes of their own to grind. His own boastful vanity confirmed the belief that through him a "Court Camarilla" made and unmade Ministers and ruled All Russia both at home and in the field. The "Camarilla" itself has never been more closely defined than as comprising or representing

* Paul Miliukoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 552-553.

the bureaucratic clique whose existence was bound up with the maintenance of the autocracy. That it included the German and pro German elements who during two centuries had been the pillars of the "Petersburg regime" goes without saying. The appointment of M. Stuermer, not only as Prime Minister but as Minister for Foreign Affairs, was interpreted by anxious patriots as a signal to Berlin. At the end of October, 1916, the Zemstvo Presidents assembled at Moscow declared:

The painful and terrible suspicions, the sinister rumours of treason and of occult forces working for Germany, in order to pave the way for a shameful peace, as the price of the destruction of our national unity—all these apprehensions are transformed into the certainty that an enemy hand is secretly directing the affairs of the nation.

It was noted that in the German Press M. Stuermer's appointment to succeed M. Sazonoff was welcomed on the ground that the new Foreign Minister had exhibited no particular enthusiasm either for the war or for the acquisition of Constantinople. These impressions, M. Miliukoff explained in the Duma, had been gathered from a memorandum submitted in the summer of 1916 to the Tsar by the parties of the Extreme Right, who

urged that, while victory was desirable, it was necessary to bring the war to an end in good time, since otherwise the fruits of victory would be annihilated by revolution. M. Miliukoff added:

This is an *idée fixe*—that a revolution is coming from the Left and that every new member of the Cabinet is bound to prevent it. Everything is sacrificed to this idea—the lofty national enthusiasm for helping in the war, the beginnings of Russian freedom, and also the stability of our relations with our Allies.

... When the authorities try to cause disturbances, such as might later serve as grounds for ending the war, and when the Court party, in the midst of a raging war, attacks the only man who has gained our Allies' respect for honourable conduct, and places in his stead a person of whom one can say everything that I have said—then it is almost impossible to believe that this is folly, and people cannot be blamed for reaching another conclusion.

We have many grounds for being dissatisfied with the Government, but they are all to be traced to its incapacity and ill-will. There lies our most deadly enemy. Victory over this evil thing would signify victory in the whole war. In the name therefore of the millions whom the war has claimed, in the name of the rivers of blood that have flowed, in the name of our struggle to realize our national aims, in the name of our sense of responsibility towards the nation which has sent us here, we promise to fight on until we have attained our aim—a Cabinet that deserves the complete trust of the people.

But neither public warnings nor private entreaties by members of the Imperial family availed to bring about a change. The economic



A RASPUTIN SÉANCE.


situation went from bad to worse and the echoes of it in the Duma were visited by the suspension of the session on December 29. The advice upon which this course was taken was attributed, like every evil of the age, to the sinister influence of Rasputin. The rights of Parliament found champions in a quite unexpected

quarter. Certain younger members of the Imperial family, including the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovitch and Prince Yussupoff, who joined their elders in disapproving of Rasputin's presence at the Palace made up their minds to murder him. In this design they received the active support of M. Purishkevitch, the fiery Bessarabian Deputy, whom the circumstances of the time had converted from a reactionary into a patriot of more Liberal tendencies. In November in the Duma he had denounced with an eloquence equal to that of M. Miliukoff himself the shortcomings of the administration.

The conspirators, who were in the habit of meeting at the Petrograd residence of Prince Yussupoff, frequently invited Rasputin to join the party, and over a bottle of wine, to which the "holy man" was partial, he would describe his share in the conduct of State affairs. On the night of December 29 his conversation, which appears to have been particularly complacent, was cut short by an intimation on the part of his hosts that they had decided that he must die. He was offered the choice between suicide and execution. A revolver



M. PURISHKEVITCH,
The Conservative Deputy, concerned in the murder of Rasputin.



PLAN OF THE CITY OF PETROGRAD.



THE LAST SITTING OF THE DUMA UNDER THE OLD RÉGIME.

was put into his hand, he turned it against one of the conspirators, missed him, and was shot down like a dog. His body was cast into an ice-hole in the Neva, from which it was recovered the following day and conveyed to Tsarskoe Selo, where it was interred in a mortuary chapel in the palace grounds. The conspirators were placed first under domiciliary arrest and then relegated either to the country or to a distant part of the front.

Rasputin and Stuermer had quitted the scene; but their spirit, so the public believed, survived in M. Protopopoff, who had become Minister of the Interior in October and who retained his post under the last two Prime Ministers of the autocracy, M. Trepoff and Prince Golitzin, both of them weak officials of an old school. With egregious self-confidence this ex-Liberal politician, puffed up by his contact with the Court, where he appears to have been regarded as a coming man, imagined that he would be able to override the Duma as easily as he overshadowed the three Prime Ministers under whom he served.

M. Protopopoff had a "plan"; for the Court this was recommendation enough. As for the economic problems of the day, of which, as Minister of the Interior, he sought to assume

control, the Emperor might well have said to him what Alexander II. once said to a Finance Minister of his own: "I always thought that I knew less than any man in Russia about finance; but now I see you are the man!"

At the New Year it was estimated that there was probably sufficient food in Russia to feed the population for two years.* The question was how to distribute it. While in Petrograd even the soldier's ration of rye bread had to be reduced by one-half, thousands of tons of corn were lying stored in elevators at numbers of stations along the main railway lines to the capital. The price of bread had more than doubled, and even so, bread was to be obtained only at irregular intervals and after interminable waiting.

Kosloff, to take a Russian provincial town at random, on one occasion in November was without flour for ten days, although quite half a dozen of the largest flour mills in Russia lie within a 250 miles radius of it.

With a railway system originally organized with regard almost exclusively to the export of grain to Germany, it became daily more difficult to supply Petrograd and Moscow under war conditions. But this difficulty of

* *The Times*, January 29, 1917.

making an inadequate railway system stand the double strain of ordinary distribution and of military requirements could hardly be pleaded as an excuse for a scarcity so universal as that which actually prevailed throughout Russia during the winter.

The scheme such as it was of dealing with the food problem went back to the first weeks of the war, when the Ministry of Agriculture was given the necessary powers and credits for feeding the armies in the field. A special

designed also to assume control of the Military Department of Provisions. Already during 1915 the Ministry of the Interior had ordered the provincial Governors to devote themselves to the food question and to delegate all administrative routine to their assistants. From this time onwards each province had had its own regulations, mostly at variance with its neighbours. Only one rule was universal—that no food might be exported from one province to another without the licence of the Governor



FLOUR SEIZED AT POLICE STATIONS DURING THE REVOLUTION,
and deposited at the Duma building for distribution.

Department of Provisions was created for the purpose. This was divided into two sub-departments, one dealing with meat, fats, and hay; the other with flour, corn, vegetables, and other products. Until July, 1915, its operations were confined to the region east of a line roughly drawn from Petrograd to Nicolaieff on the Black Sea. After that date its operations were extended to the area west of this line, and thenceforward the Department of Provisions bore the whole burden of supplying the armies in the field.

In order to deal with the increasing deficiencies in the supplies for the civilian population, various departmental experiments were tried, and ultimately the Ministry of the Interior attempted to take the matter in hand. Indeed, M. Protopopoff is credited with having

of the province of origin. In each province there were two competing sets of authorities—the delegates of the Ministry of Agriculture, representing the military, and the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, representing civilian interests. Friction arose all along the line; but the former set of officials held an advantage, since they could plead that their claims on behalf of the Army in the field were the more urgent. With each succeeding month the scarcity became more manifest, not only as regards food, but also in the supply of every other commodity.

As Professor J. Y. Simpson, an acute and sympathetic student of contemporary Russian affairs, pointed out,* just because the problem was by no means insoluble, an impression got

* *The Times*, December 29, 1916.

abroad that it was not being handled with all requisite energy. This impression was strengthened when the Minister of the Interior prohibited the holding of a conference summoned by representatives of the Union of Towns to deal with the question. Again the same Minister's refusal to transfer the control of the leather industry to the very efficient Zemstvo Union was interpreted as further proof that he had abjured his earlier Liberal principles. These incidents, together with what was regarded as a suspiciously regular recrudescence of the strike movement, were construed, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of a deliberate attempt on the part of unseen Germanophil forces to produce internal disorganization and discontent, and thus to create an opportunity of raising the question of a separate peace—all this in good time to save the regime. Dis-satisfaction was accentuated by the Rumanian *débâcle*, which Russians were unable to understand, as well as by the German proclamation with regard to Poland.

In unmistakable terms the Duma, the Council of Empire, and the Nobles in Congress recorded their conviction that irresponsible influences in the administration must be eliminated and that a Government which would cooperate with Parliament must be established. On December 29 the Duma was prorogued, and the turn of the year brought no comfort beyond an Imperial Rescript to the new Prime Minister, Prince Golitzin, enjoining relations of mutual respect between Government and Legislature.



BROKEN CHAINS FROM A PETROGRAD PRISON.

The text of this document, which was destined to be the last public manifestation of the autocratic will until the abdication, was as follows :

Having entrusted to you the responsible post of President of the Council of Ministers, I deem it opportune to point out to you the pressing problems the solution of which should be the main object of the Government's attention.

At the present moment, when the tide of the Great War has turned, all the thoughts of all Russians, without distinction of nationality or class, are directed towards the valiant and glorious defenders of our country, who



THE STATE PRISON FIRED



SHOTS FROM A WINDOW AND A STAMPEDE.

with keen expectation are awaiting the decisive encounter with the enemy.

In complete solidarity with our faithful Allies, not entertaining any thought of a conclusion of peace until final victory has been secured, I firmly believe that the Russian people, supporting the burden of war with self-denial, will accomplish their duty to the end, not stopping at any sacrifice.

The natural resources of our country are unending, and there is no danger of their becoming exhausted, as is apparently the case with our enemies.

All the greater is the significance attached to the settlement of the question of supplies, which, under present conditions, is so important and so complicated.

Accordingly I call upon the Government, unified in your person, to devote its attention first and foremost to provisioning my valiant Armies, and behind the firing line to lessening those difficulties connected with supplies which are inevitable in a world war.

I count upon it that the joint labours of the whole Government be concentrated on the realization on a large scale and the development of the measures recently taken towards this end. The question of provisioning the Armies and the civil population demands combined action not only by all the authorities at the front and in the rear but also by all the different Departments united under the control of the Council of Ministers.

Another problem to which I attach supreme importance is the further improvement of transport by railway and waterway. The Council of Ministers should in this connexion work out decisive measures which will assure the full utilization of the means of transport, in order to be able, by the cooperation of all Departments, to furnish our troops in the firing line and behind it with all that they require.

In pointing out these pressing problems for your attention, I express the hope that the activity of the Council of Ministers under your Presidency will meet with the support of the Council of the Empire and of the Duma, united in a unanimous and ardent desire to carry on the war to a victorious finish.

It is furthermore the duty of all persons called upon to serve the State to act with goodwill, uprightness and dignity towards the Legislative Institutions.

In its coming activity in organizing the economic life of the country the Government will find invaluable support in the Zemstvos, which, by their work in time of peace and war, have proved that they piously maintain the shining traditions of my Grandfather of imperishable memory, the Tsar Alexander II.

What value the reactionaries attached to this injunction may be inferred from the following extracts from a memorandum submitted (apparently without protest) to M. Protopopoff in February by the ultra-Conservative "Committee of the Russian Patriotic Union":

With the opening of the Duma the attacks on Ministers are bound to increase in force, since the Duma neglects its legitimate work and is engaged merely in a revolutionary agitation. The sooner it is dismissed the better. The Patriotic Union assures the Government that nobody in the country, except a few politicians and party newspapers, will rise in defence of the dismissed Duma. Any fears that the dismissal of the Duma and the institution of new elections, on the basis of a new law, might lead to popular disaffection are unfounded. The experience of the First Duma proved that the threats of a revolution are empty. There can be no revolution on account of the Duma, since it has no roots in the nation.

The Government need not fear the dismissed Deputies, since, with the loss of their privileges as members, most of them will find their way into the Army, and the military authorities will see to it that they are prevented from doing any mischief.

No doubt future elections will yield a certain percentage of Liberals and even a few Extremists, but, with

a little organization, a moderate majority can easily be secured. At any rate, a Fifth Duma could not be worse than the Fourth. The Union further offers to the Government all the facilities of its widespread organization.

These were the sources from which M. Protopopoff derived his political inspiration. Although he was well aware that in the absence of any measures to relieve the food scarcity, trouble could not be averted, he misrepresented the situation to the Tsar and declared that the police and military measures taken by him, including the arrest of the Labour delegates on M. Gutchkoff's War Industries Committee, had saved the position. The Tsar left for the front under the firm conviction that all cause for anxiety had been removed.

After awaiting for successive periods of postponement the pleasure of the Government, the Duma was convened at the end of February. At the very first sitting M. Miliukoff warned the Government in the most solemn terms against attempting, in the vain hope of securing a fresh lease of life, to challenge the nation to war at home when the external foe was still at the gates. He added :

When the nation finds that, in spite of all its sacrifices, its destinies are being endangered by a clique of incom-

petent and corrupt rulers, then the people become a nation of citizens; they become determined to take their case into their own hands. Gentlemen, we are approaching that point.

It is by no means certain what would have been the reply of the people and of the Army had it been possible to ask them even 10 days before it occurred whether there would be a revolution. But M. Miliukoff was perfectly accurate when he spoke of the whole nation as being in opposition. The situation had seriously deteriorated since the Paris Conference of December, 1904, when the Russian constitutionalists and Socialists met and pledged themselves to co-ordinate their action until the autocracy had been overthrown. This conference had marked the climax of the political movement before the first revolution and had isolated the Government. The accumulated evils and grievances of the last decade cemented afresh a union which in the meantime had spread until it embraced the whole nation.

The Revolution was the work of a week (March 8 to March 15, 1917). Peaceful demonstrations by workmen on February 27 were succeeded by collisions between police and the mob on March 8. By March 12 the people's



THE CROWD IN THE NEVSKY PROSPECT: DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS SHEETS.



HUNTING THE POLICE.

Students and Sailors firing across the Moika Canal.

cause had been espoused by all the troops in the Capital and by March 15 the Tsar had abdicated. Not till March 18 did any connected narrative of events appear in the Russian Press, and, owing to the censorship restrictions, it was not till March 21 that the world learned something of the early events leading up to the Revolution. Events from Monday, March 12, were very graphically described by the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times* in a series of dispatches published on March 16 and following days.

On Wednesday, March 7, there were signs of incipient unrest in Petrograd. Cossack patrols appeared in the streets, but they were not called upon to intervene. On the following

day large crowds appeared in the main thoroughfares. How far these crowds were "genuine" it is difficult to affirm; but certain it is that very early in the proceedings the police ordered workmen to leave work and organized demonstrations of their own. Cavalry patrols were everywhere to be seen; bread shops were wrecked; and there was some desultory firing.

The Government, in so far as it was not a party to these ominous developments, became alarmed and announced in the Duma on the 8th that urgent measures would be taken, in conjunction with the Zemstvos, to bring supplies to the city. On the 9th the Duma discussed the food crisis and declared the situation to be dangerous.



ARRESTED POLICE OFFICERS.

Meanwhile the crowds in the Nevsky and other principal thoroughfares of the Capital were as numerous as ever but quiet, and they even sang patriotic songs. But as time went on, especially on the following day, when there was more looting, the police began to use rifles and the machine guns which Protopopoff had posted in readiness on the housetops. The military, on the other hand, seemed disinclined to use force. From the very first on March 7 and 8 soldiers had been heard to say in lively conversation with civilians: "Begin ;

It was on this day (March 11) that events reached their climax. During the morning it became known that the Duma had been prorogued, that three Guard and several Line Regiments had joined the Parliamentary cause, that machine guns and rifles had been distributed among the people, and that desperate fusillades were proceeding on the Viborg side between insurgents and some of the troops who had remained loyal. These developments found a counterpart in other parts of the city. Early in the day the prisons



THE AMERICAN MISSION TO RUSSIA TRAVELLING IN THE CAR IN WHICH THE TSAR ABDICATED.

The officer on the left is sitting on the table at which the Tsar signed his abdication. The Mission, headed by Senator Koot, visited Petrograd, Moscow, and the Grand Headquarters.

we won't meddle with you." Although some of the troops fired a few rounds, the majority were plainly with the people. On March 10 the troops were confined to barracks with the exception of some Cossacks, who already on the evening of that day went over to the people. On Sunday, March 11, while the Commandant, General Khabaloff, was threatening extreme military rigours against the workmen if they did not return to work, regiment after regiment, Preobrajensky, Litovsky, Volinsky, and the pick of the garrison, joined the crowd.

were captured and those who were detained in them were set free. The Law Courts were occupied, and the Ministry of the Interior, from which M. Protopopoff had fled, and the headquarters of the Commandant were sacked.

The fine weather brought everybody out of doors, and by the afternoon the Nevsky Prospect, one of the finest and longest thoroughfares in Europe, was black with a surging crowd that filled it from the Admiralty at one end to the Moscow station at the other. All warnings not to assemble were disregarded. No Cossacks were visible and only a few detachments of

troops picketed the side streets. The crowd, notwithstanding the events of the week before, was fairly good-humoured, cheering the soldiers and showing resentment only towards the scattered groups of police. Curiosity rather than any definite purpose appeared at the moment to be the chief impulse.

And yet before the very eyes of the crowd,



THE GRAND DUKE MICHAEL,
Nominated by the Tsar as his successor.

quite apart from the troops which were kept in ambush, field telephones were being installed, machine guns were being mounted, and every kind of other warlike preparation was in progress. Even guns, it is said, had been secretly placed on the roofs of houses in readiness for a rising of the population before the Duma reassembled on February 27. In his first speech at the re-opening of Parliament M. Miliukoff complained that gendarmes were being sent back from the front and that the number of police was being increased. "Yesterday," he significantly added, "near the Duma itself you could observe the form of the military disposition of the struggle in the rear. Gentlemen, this is war with the people."

This, then, was the use to which the Minister

of the Interior, M. Protopopoff, had put the "emergency" vote of over £5,000,000 for the police for which he asked Parliament in January. According to a competent observer who witnessed the Revolution :*

The one thing certain is that the Reactionaries, led by the Empress and M. Protopopoff, the Minister of the Interior, were bent upon promoting disturbances in Petrograd and elsewhere. Of this fact there is irrefutable evidence. Not only had a state of famine been deliberately "engineered" in Petrograd and other cities, with the object of provoking disturbances which the Reactionaries were prepared to turn to account as a pretext for the conclusion of a peace favourable to Germany, but M. Protopopoff had appointed a Prefect at Petrograd with instructions to organize disturbances. So generally was the organization of these disturbances known to the police that, when an influential personage reached Petrograd by train on the morning of the day when they were to occur, and finding no conveyance at the station, called upon a policeman to get him a carriage, the policeman replied: "Certainly; it is not yet midday, and it does not begin until 2 o'clock." What "it" meant was apparent when, at the hour appointed, thousands of police agents dressed as workmen appeared in the streets and began to "demonstrate."

At first the people looked on at these demonstrations wonderingly, and took no part in them. It was only when police agents stationed in attics and other points of vantage began to fire upon the genuine crowds that the masses began to react. It should be said that Secret Police agents had previously visited the munition factories and had ordered the men to cease work. In one factory, where the reply was made that the work was being done for the war and could not be stopped, the agents answered that the factory would be dynamited. The workmen then threatened to complain to the Government, and the agents withdrew, laughing significantly.

. . . The people rapidly perceived the nature of the Government plot, and became exasperated when 200 machine guns were discovered in one single deposit. The idea that these machine guns should be kept for use against themselves when regiments at the front were short of such weapons caused the utmost indignation. The police became the objects of popular fury, the police headquarters were stormed and the archives burnt, and the movement became irresistible.

Shortly after three o'clock on this memorable afternoon of March 11 orders were given to the military to clear the Nevsky thoroughfare. A company of a Guard regiment, the Pavlovsky, took up a position near the Sadovaya street, about halfway down the Prospect, and fired several volleys in the direction of the Anitchkoff Palace, the residence of the Empress-Dowager. About 100 persons fell victims to this fire. The snow-covered ground, littered with empty cartridge cases, was reddened all around with blood. Even so no animosity was shown towards the troops; the people merely shouted: "We are sorry for you; you had to do your duty."

Similar scenes were enacted in the equally crowded Champ de Mars, as well as near the

* *The Times*, April 21, 1917.

Moscow station and in the adjacent popular thoroughfares. Here the police had machine guns, and from the roofs and garrets of the surrounding buildings they poured in a murderous fire on the crowd. As evening fell the temper of the people rapidly changed. Soldiers and Cossacks, too, felt that foul play was being resorted to in order to provoke the crowd and the military against each other.

All night powerful searchlights mounted in the Admiralty steeple illuminated the Nevsky Prospect from end to end, while machine guns from the same point of vantage swept the approaches to this stronghold, which was garrisoned by line battalions from Novgorod and covered the Prefecture, where the Ministers for a time took refuge. All day on Monday, long after the old Government had resigned, the struggle continued and it was not until Tuesday afternoon that the Admiralty surrendered. The Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, containing the tombs of the Romanoffs, the Imperial Mint, and the notorious dungeons for political offenders, had already fallen the previous day into the hands of the insurgents, whose ranks were hourly swelled by fresh defections from the armed forces of the old



THE GATES OF THE PALACE AT
TSARSKOE SELO.

The Imperial emblems covered with red flags.

regime. The Fortress, which commands all the bridges and crossings over the Neva, became the headquarters of the revolutionaries.

During the course of Tuesday the whole of



A STREET DEMONSTRATION.



THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Left to right (front row): MM. A. Konovaloff (Commerce and Industry), A. Gutchkoff (War and Marine), N. Nekrasoff (Communications), A. Shingareff (Agriculture), Prince Lvoff (Prime Minister), U. Godneff (Controller of State), M. Terests'henko (Finance), P. Miliukoff (Foreign), Prof. A. Manuiloff (Public Instruction).

the city passed into the hands of the insurgents, and by the end of the day the fires which had been started in various quarters were being got under and efforts were being made to restore the railway services. The postal, telegraph and telephone services were transferred with but little interruption. The Winter Palace, which for a brief interval had been desperately defended by the Guards, and all other public buildings were placed under trustworthy protection.

The City Militia, special constables enrolled by the Municipality, united with the students' organizations and the troops in maintaining order, under the control of district commanders. For several days they continued to hunt down isolated police agents who in the vain hope of succour held out in garrets and on roof-tops and indulged in spasmodic sniping. Civilians, too, hooligans for the most part, added to the confusion by engaging in wild and indiscriminate shooting. These also had to be disarmed. The restoration of normal conditions was carried out with commendable promptitude.

Deplorable incidents were few and far between. One of these was the sacking of the residence of Count Fredericks, Minister of the

Imperial Court, which was stormed by an angry mob. It was thought at first that the adjoining telegraph office was in danger. A detachment of the Preobrajensky arrived in time to save this building, but too late to protect Count Fredericks's family. His aged wife was carried out in a fainting condition from the house which had been set on fire, accompanied by her invalid daughter carrying a favourite dog. The dog was killed and the crippled girl was ill-treated by the drunken mob, which had previously broken into several large bonded liquor warehouses. Both ladies were eventually rescued.

In the fashionable residential Millionay's Street General Knorring, who refused to obey a summons to report himself at the Duma, armed himself and his hall-porter with revolvers and opened fire on the soldiers sent to apprehend him. Two Guardsmen were killed before the general and his servant were shot down. The general's body was dragged round the nearest corner to the quay-side and thrown into the river. A Baron Stackelberg, who is said to have fired at soldiers from his window, was similarly executed.

Countess Kleinmichel, a septuagenarian

grande dame, whose political *salon* was for many years reckoned among the first in Petrograd, was hunted for several days by a mob of soldiers and civilians, who ultimately ran her to earth in the Chinese Legation, where she had sought sanctuary. She was arrested on suspicion of being a German spy. Her intimate social relations with Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador to Russia until the war, and with successive military plenipotentiaries of the Kaiser at the Russian Court, were remembered against her. She was even said to have taken tea at Potsdam with the Emperor William and the Empress Augusta.

With the fall of the Admiralty and the surrender of the Ismailovsky regiment on Tuesday afternoon disappeared the last military resources of the old administration. Without the prompt and almost automatic support of the troops the triumph of the revolution could never have been bought at its moderate price of a few thousand casualties.

In Moscow, too, where a brief upheaval claimed only about half a dozen victims, the soldiers played a conspicuous part. Events here waited upon developments in Petrograd. It was only on March 14 that the troops definitely declared themselves; the arsenal



TAKING DOWN AND BURNING IMPERIAL INSIGNIA.

capitulated that afternoon. The crowning event of the day was the appearance over the city of an aeroplane flying the red flag. By March 16 Moscow was herself again. At Odessa, in the great Volga towns, in the garrisons beyond the Urals, and in remotest Siberia, everywhere the soldiers joined the people. Only from Kronstadt and Helsingfors came news of any real trouble.

The political death-blow to the autocracy was administered by the Duma when, on March 12, in the face of the Imperial Ukase dissolving Parliament, it declared itself in permanent session. On March 11 the President of the House, M. Rodzianko, had addressed to the Tsar at Field Headquarters the following urgent message :

Conditions serious. Anarchy in the capital. Government paralysed. Transport of fuel and provisions has entirely broken down. General discontent is growing. Disorderly firing is proceeding in the streets. Sections of troops are firing on one another. It is necessary to summon quickly persons enjoying the confidence of the country to form a new Government. Delay is impossible. Every delay is fatal. I pray God that a share of the responsibility may not fall on the crowned Head.

This message M. Rodzianko communicated to General Ruzsky and General Brusiloff, the Commanders-in-Chief respectively on the Nor-

thern and South-Western Fronts. The latter replied that he would "do his duty to the country and the Tsar," and the former laconically pledged himself to "fulfil the order."

On Monday morning M. Rodzianko sent another message to Nicholas II., in which he said :

The situation is getting worse. Measures must be taken quickly. The last hour has sounded, when the fate of the country and of the dynasty will be decided.

These appeals were reinforced by an equally impressive telegram addressed to the Tsar by a score of the most influential among the elected members of the Council of Empire, in the course of which they declared :

The maintenance of this old Government in office is tantamount to the complete overthrow of law and order, involving defeat on the battlefield, the end of the dynasty, and the greatest misfortunes for Russia.

We consider that the only way of salvation lies in a complete and final rupture with the past, the immediate convocation of Parliament, and the summoning of a person enjoying the confidence of the nation, who shall form a new Cabinet capable of governing the country in full accord with the representatives of the nation.

The moment on the night of March 12 was serious indeed. Not only was the Revolution at its height, but already there were signs among the revolutionaries themselves of a fateful divergence between the *bourgeois* Parlia-



M. RODZIANKO ADDRESSING SOLDIERS IN THE DUMA BUILDING.



BARRICADE IN THE LITEINY PROSPECT.

mentarians and the more advanced Socialist elements. In the Tauris Palace the latter constituted, or rather resuscitated, the historic Council of Workmen's Delegates, to whom were joined representatives of the troops. To this move the Duma at midnight replied by constituting an Executive Committee composed of MM. Rodzianko, Kerensky, Tehkheidze, Shulgin, Miliukoff, Karauloff, Konovaloff, Dmitriukoff, Rzhovsky, Shidlovsky, Nekrasoff, Vladimir Lvoff and Colonel Engelhardt, who was appointed Commander of the garrison.

Its mission the Duma Committee explained in the following proclamation, issued at 2 a.m. on March 13, under the signature of M. Rodzianko :

The Provisional Committee of the members of the Duma, in view of the serious internal conditions brought about by the measures of the old Government, is obliged to take into its hands the re-establishment of public order. Conscious of the full import of this decision, the Committee expresses its confidence that the people and the Army will aid it in the heavy task of founding a new Government that will correspond with the desires of the nation and will justify its confidence.

The only reply vouchsafed to his Parliament by the Tsar was the appointment on March 13 of General Ivanoff to be dictator. But as all the railways were held by the revolutionaries, he was unable to reach the capital.

The Tsar, upon learning that General Ivanoff would in all probability be unable to fulfil his mission, appears for a moment to have entertained the idea of proceeding to Moscow and of appealing to the heart of Russia. An attempt was indeed made to reach the main lines leading to Moscow, but all of these were found to be blocked, and at Bologoe, halfway between Petrograd and Moscow, the Imperial train turned west across country to Pskoff, halfway between Petrograd and Riga, where General Ruzsky, Commander-in-Chief on the Northern Front, had established his headquarters. Nicholas II., who remained in almost hourly telegraphic communication with the Empress throughout these critical days, had no illusions as to what would be the outcome when he learned that the troops were mutinying. "The revolutionary wave," he said to members of his suite, "will probably sweep away the Monarchy."

Already on March 14 the Tsar seems to have thought of abdication, and his conversations with General Ruzsky, who like the other principal Russian commanders had already been sounded by M. Rodzianko as to his views on the situation, were not calculated to dissuade him from his purpose. By the following



BEFORE THE WINTER PALACE: GRAVE DUG FOR "VICTIMS OF THE REVOLUTION"

day his mind was resolved, and until three o'clock in the afternoon he was prepared to abdicate in favour of his son, the Grand Duke Alexis, and to appoint his own brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, as Regent. Upon reflection later in the day, however, he came to the conclusion that he could not bear to part from his son, and he decided to abdicate in his son's name as well as in his own, and in favour of his brother.

It was in this frame of mind that the two delegates, MM. Gutchkoff and Shulgin, who had been commissioned by Parliament to ascertain the Tsar's intentions, found him when they arrived at Pskoff at ten o'clock that night. Dirty, unkempt, and worn out by their ceaseless vigil for four or five days in the capital, the two commissaries were immediately ushered into the presence of the Emperor, who received them in the Imperial train. In the brightly lighted saloon carriage were Count Fredericks, Minister of the Imperial Court, and an aide-de-camp. The Tsar, who wore the uniform of a Colonel of Caucasian Cossacks, greeted his visitors courteously and shook hands with them. M. Gutchkoff seated himself at a small table beside the Emperor, and General Ruzsky, who entered the carriage at this point, sat down opposite Nicholas II.

M. Gutchkoff opened the conversation; with

his eyes bent on the table, he described the pass at which affairs had arrived, and declared that the only way out was for the Tsar to abdicate in favour of his son. General Ruzsky whispered to M. Shulgin that this course had already been decided. The Tsar confirmed this statement, and then explained how he felt impelled to renounce his son's rights as well. "I am unable to part from him," he added; "I hope you will understand this."

The Tsar's proposal, which was made in a quiet businesslike tone, seems to have taken the commissaries by surprise and they demurred, as they were not authorized to treat on the basis of a variation of the succession. M. Gutchkoff, however, waived the more or less technical objection, in view of the Tsar's manifest feelings on the subject, and M. Shulgin concurred. As the latter pointed out, the inevitable separation between father and son would be liable to create a delicate situation, since the young Tsar would always think of his absent parents, and there might grow up in him a feeling of hostility against the persons who had separated him from them. In addition, it was questionable whether the Grand Duke Michael, as Regent, could take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution on behalf of the young Tsar. Yet such an oath would be absolutely indispensable in the circumstances of the moment. This objection would lapse if the

Grand Duke Michael were to ascend the Throne himself as a constitutional monarch.

In reply to a question by the Tsar as to whether they could assume the responsibility of assuring him that his abdication would restore tranquillity to the country, the commissaries replied that, as far as they could see, there would be no complications.

The conversation had continued for about an hour when the Tsar rose and went into the adjoining carriage in order to sign the Act of Abdication, with which he shortly afterwards returned. Nicholas II. then handed to the commissaries two or three small typewritten sheets bearing the address-mark of the Imperial Headquarters and signed in pencil. The tenor of this historic document, which was in the form of a Manifesto to the Russian people, was as follows :

"We, Nicholas II., by the Grace of God, Emperor of All the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., to all our faithful subjects be it known :

"In the days of a great struggle against a foreign enemy, who has been endeavouring for three years to enslave our country, it pleased God to send Russia a further painful trial.

"Internal troubles threatened to have a fatal effect on the further progress of this obstinate war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of her heroic Army, the happiness of the people, and the whole future of our beloved country

demand that the war should be conducted at all costs to a victorious end.

"The cruel enemy is making his last efforts and the moment is near when our valiant Army, in concert with our glorious Allies, will finally overthrow the enemy.

"In these decisive days in the life of Russia we have thought that we owed to our people the close union and organization of all its forces for the realization of rapid victory ; for which reason, in agreement with the Imperial Duma, we have recognized that it is for the good of the country that we should abdicate the Crown of the Russian State and lay down the Supreme Power.

"Not wishing to separate ourself from our beloved son, we bequeath our heritage to our brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, with our blessing for the future of the Throne of the Russian State.

"We bequeath it to our brother to govern in full union with the national representatives sitting in the Legislative Institutions, and to take his inviolable oath to them in the name of our well-beloved country.

"We call upon all faithful sons of our native land to fulfil their sacred and patriotic duty in obeying the Tsar at the painful moment of national trials, and to aid him, together with the representatives of the nation, to conduct the Russian State in the way of prosperity and glory.

"May God Help Russia."



BURIAL OF THE VICTIMS: THE PROCESSION IN THE NEVSKY PROSPECT.

M Shulgin, in his published account* of the Pskoff interview, says of this document that it was "written in noble and beautiful terms. I felt ashamed of the text which we ourselves had once drafted."

It was at M. Shulgin's request that the Tsar added the words "and to take his inviolable oath" after the phrase "we bequeath it to our brother to govern" in the penultimate paragraph of the Act. After the document had been perused and approved all present shook hands.

The original Act was deposited with General Ruzsky, while the commissaries took with them to Petrograd a typed copy of the document on large sheets. This was likewise signed by the Tsar again in pencil and countersigned by Count Fredericks with a pen. MM. Gutchkoff and Shulgin gave a formal receipt for their copy of the Act.

M. Shulgin sums up his concluding impressions as follows :

I think that at the time the feelings on either side were not unfriendly. I felt almost pity for the man who, at that moment, had redeemed his mistakes by the nobility of ideas which accompanied his abdication from power. To outward seeming the Tsar was perfectly calm and rather friendly than cold.

* v. *The New Europe*, Vol. III., No. 28, p. 59.

On the following day, March 16, in Petrograd, the following "Declaration from the Throne" was made by the Grand Duke Michael :

"A heavy task has been entrusted to me by the will of my brother, who has given me the Imperial Throne at a time of unprecedented war and of domestic strife.

"Animated by the same feelings as the entire nation—namely, that the welfare of the country overshadows all other interests—I am firmly resolved to accept the Supreme Power only if this should be the desire of our great people, who must, by means of a plebiscite, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish the form of Government and the new fundamental laws of the Russian State.

"Invoking God's blessing, I therefore request all citizens of Russia to obey the Provisional Government, set up on the initiative of the Duma and invested with plenary powers, until, within as short a time as possible, the Constituent Assembly, elected on a basis of universal, equal, and secret suffrage, shall express the will of the nation regarding the form of government to be adopted."

It was after a consultation lasting several hours at his residence with the members of the



RESTORING ORDER IN THE STREETS.



BURIAL OF PERSONS KILLED DURING THE REVOLUTION AT TSARSKOE SELO.

Provisional Revolutionary Government which had been formed on March 15, that the Grand Duke Michael announced his intention of awaiting the decision of a National Constituent Assembly as to the future form of government in Russia. M. Kerensky, the new Minister of Justice, warmly commended the Grand Duke.

On March 18 M. Kerensky, as Minister of Justice, lodged the two State Acts, of abdication by the Tsar and of renunciation by the Grand Duke Michael, with the Senate for safe custody and publication. The Senate thanked the Provisional Government for the promptitude with which order had been restored, and M. Kerensky expressed his gratification at having been privileged to entrust these two Acts to the exalted institution established by Peter the Great for the maintenance of law and right.


On March 22 the ex-Tsar, who had left Pskoff on the 16th for Army Headquarters at Mohileff, arrived under arrest, as plain "Nicholas Alexandrovitch Romanoff," at the Palace of Tsarskoe Selo, where the ex-Empress and her family were already detained as prisoners by order of the Provisional Government. There they were destined to remain until the middle of August, when they were removed to Tobolsk, the inhospitable birthplace of Rasputin.

Having thus disposed of the succession

question, the Provisional Government was able to take stock of the situation. The Army leaders had notified the adherence of the troops at the front to the new regime, so that there was nothing to fear from that quarter. In the capital relations between the Duma and the garrison, as well as with the Labour organizations, were secured by the agency of the Council of Delegates, who already during the Revolution had done good service in restraining the more fanatical elements.

The provisional authorities held under arrest at the Tauris Palace and in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul an unprecedented collection of representative statesmen, including half a dozen Prime Ministers, lesser Ministerial fry like M. Protopopoff, officials of all degrees, and a multitude of officers of high rank, among whom was General Sukhomlinoff. Each day brought fresh arrivals at the Duma to make submission to the new order—Grand Dukes by the dozen, politicians in their hundreds, soldiers and marines by battalions.

The part played by the garrison of Petrograd, numbering about 30,000 men, mostly young recruits, had, of course, to be amply recognized. Among the chief points of the new Government's programme, which proclaimed a general amnesty, freedom of speech, association, and opinion, and the substitution of a national



WORKMEN AND SOLDIERS OCCUPYING THE HALL OF THE DUMA BUILDING.

militia for the police, was a pledge that the troops of the garrison should not be disarmed and should be allowed to remain in the capital.

It was at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of March 15, at the very hour when the Tsar at Pskoff was deciding to abdicate in favour of his brother, that the Provisional Government under Prince Lvoff was formed. After negotiations between the Executive Committee of the Duma and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the following Cabinet was proclaimed:—

Prince G. E. Lvoff	..	Premier and Interior.
M. Miliukoff	Foreign Affairs.
M. Gutchkoff	War and Marine.
M. Nekrasoff	Communications.
M. Konvaloff	Commerce.
M. Manuiloff	Education.
M. Terestchenko	Finance.
M. Vl. Lvoff	Holy Synod.
M. Shingareff	Agriculture.
M. Kerensky	Justice.

Prince Lvoff, as President of the Zemstvo Union, symbolized the organized forces of Russia that had been so implacably persecuted under the old administration. M. Miliukoff, the well-known Cadet leader, a secularist Radical of a French type, and a brilliant historian and constitutional lawyer, represented the broader and more sceptical intelligence of New Russia. He was noted as vigorously anti-German and as a convinced upholder of Russia's claim to Constantinople. M. Gutchkoff, business man, traveller, soldier and politician, had in the Duma, of which he was President 10 years ago, undertaken the reconstruction of the Russian Army after the disasters in Manchuria. He stood for the best type of Moscow citizen, as M. Terestchenko, the young Finance Minister, stood for Kieff, where his family owned large sugar interests and where he himself had organized the Labour element on the local industrial committee. MM. Konvaloff, Shingareff, and Nekrasoff were prominent Liberals, and M. Kerensky, although only little over thirty years of age, had already made his mark as leader of the Socialist Toil Party in the Duma.

Among the most important military appointments under the new regime was that of General Alexeieff to succeed as Commander-in-Chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had been designated by the Tsar to resume his old post, which in the altered circumstances he was

unable to retain. General Korniloff was entrusted with the Petrograd command.

Eye-witnesses of the revolution were above all impressed with the extraordinary weakness of the Tsar's hold not only on the army, but also on the people, peasants and workmen alike. He seemed nothing to them, hardly even a name. Nowhere, either in Petrograd or in the Provinces, was regret at his abdication expressed. Where religious scruples were raised by simple folk who did not understand how they should say their prayers when there was no more Tsar, it was explained that the name of the Duma was to be substituted for that of the Tsar.

In almost all the Moscow churches a form of prayer for the Russian State was substituted for the prayers for the Tsar. In a few churches the old ritual was at first preserved, much to the dissatisfaction of the worshippers. An appeal to Makarios, Metropolitan of Moscow, who was in Petrograd at the time, to settle the question elicited the reply: "Pray as you like." Mākarios shortly afterwards accompanied Pitirim, Metropolitan of Petrograd and patron of Rasputin, "into quietude," as relegation to a monastery is termed in Russia.

Bishop Isidore, who had buried Rasputin, shared their fate. M. Vladimir Lvoff, the new Procurator of the Holy Synod, went in person to the Bishop's house and requested him to apply for leave to retire.

When M. Lvoff on March 19 announced to the Holy Synod that the Cæsar-Papacy was at an end, the Imperial throne-chair was removed from its place in the Council Chamber. The Metropolitan Vladimir then greeted the Procurator and declared that the Synod acquiesced in the new régime in Church and State. "It is the will of God." There are some who call in question the sincerity of this acquiescence. The Church, they suggest, as Gortchakoff said of Russia herself, "ne boude pas: elle se recueille." Time will show. As Nietzsche in one of his flashes of intuition observed: "Russia and the Church can wait."

Orthodoxy, according to M. Miliukoff's theory of the Russian Church and its tradition,* has been rather a product than a factor of Russian national life. It was the national type of religion, formed in the intermediate period of Russian religious history, when religious thought was somewhere between its ebb and flood. When this national type of religion was found by the Government not to be on the same

* P. Miliukoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 548-9.

level with the Greek tradition, it was repudiated as being too national. The living thread of tradition was cut, and the Church was transformed into an institution of the State. Peter the Great described his Procurator as "the eye of the Tsar." This formal tradition was forcibly upheld and new traditions were forcibly suppressed. The passing of the autocracy may well be destined profoundly to undermine the Russian ecclesiastical tradition.

Before retiring into the background the Executive Committee of the Duma, under M. Rodzianko, issued on March 20 the following noteworthy appeal to the nation:—

A great event has happened. By one mighty effort the Russian people have overthrown the old order of things. A new free Russia has been born. The great transformation crowns long years of struggle. The Act of October 30, 1905, promised to Russia, under pressure of the awakened popular forces, constitutional liberties, but these promises were not fulfilled. The First Duma, which expressed the people's hopes, was dissolved. The Second Duma met with a similar fate, and the Government, unable to overcome the people's will, decided, by the Act of June 16, 1907, to deprive a portion of the population of its rights to take part in the work of legislation. In the course of nine long years all the rights won by the people were taken away from it one by one. The country was once again thrown into the abyss of arbitrariness and autocracy. All attempts to bring the Government to reason proved fruitless, and the great world-war into which our country was drawn by the enemy found it in a state of moral disorganization, with a Government separated from the people, indifferent to the fate of the country, and sunk in the disgrace of vices of every kind. . . .

The people were obliged to take over the power in the State into their own hands. The unanimous revolutionary impulse of the people, animated by the sense of the importance of the hour, and the resoluteness of the Duma, have created a Provisional Government which deems it to be its sacred and responsible duty to realize the people's aspirations and to lead the country on to the bright road of free civic organization.

The Government is convinced that the spirit of high patriotism which has manifested itself in the fight of the people against the old régime will also inspire our gallant soldiers on the battlefield. On its own part, the Government will exert every effort to provide our Army with all that is required for bringing the war to a victorious end.

The Government will cherish loyally the alliances which unite us with other Powers, and will fulfil to the letter the agreements concluded with the Allies.

While taking measures for the protection of the country from the foreign enemy the Government will, at the same time, consider its first duty to be to open the way to the expression of the people's will as to the form of government, and will call together at the earliest possible moment a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, granting also participation in the elections to the gallant defenders of the country who are now shedding their blood on the battlefields. The Constituent Assembly will issue the fundamental laws which will secure for the country the unshakable foundations of right, equality, and liberty.

On March 19 M. Miliukoff, the new Foreign

Minister, officially informed the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, and the other Allied representatives in Petrograd of the abdication of the Tsar, of the attitude of the Grand Duke Michael, and of the assumption of office by the Provisional Government. He expressed the hope that he would receive the personal support of the representatives of the Allied Powers in strengthening the ties uniting them with Russia. Sir George Buchanan replied and expressed pleasure at opening personal relations with M. Miliukoff for the strengthening of the Alliance.

Immediately after the exchange of these friendly assurances, the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, addressed the following telegram to the head of the Russian Provisional Government, Prince Lvoff:—

"It is with sentiments of the most profound satisfaction that the peoples of Great Britain and of the British Dominions across the seas have learned that their great Ally Russia now stands with the nations which base their institutions upon responsible government.

"Much as we appreciate the loyal and steadfast co-operation which we have received from the late Emperor and the armies of Russia during the past two and a half years, yet I believe that the revolution whereby the Russian people have based their destinies on the sure foundation of freedom is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August, 1914.

"It reveals the fundamental truth that this war is at bottom a struggle for popular government as well as for liberty. It shows that, through the war, the principle of liberty, which is the only sure safeguard of peace in the world, has already won one resounding victory. It is the sure promise that the Prussian military autocracy which began the war, and which is still the only barrier to peace, will itself before long be overthrown.

"Freedom is the condition of peace, and I do not doubt that as a result of the establishment of a stable constitutional Government within their borders the Russian people will be strengthened in their resolve to prosecute this war until the last stronghold of tyranny on the Continent of Europe is destroyed and the free peoples of all lands can unite to secure for themselves and their children the blessings of fraternity and peace."

CHAPTER CXCVII.

THE USE OF AIRCRAFT.

PRE-WAR EXPECTATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS—THE ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE—MACHINES AND ENGINES IN POSSESSION OF THE R.F.C. IN AUGUST, 1914—HOW OUTPUT WAS INCREASED—THE AERIAL PREPAREDNESS OF BELGIUM, OF FRANCE, AND OF GERMANY—THE ALBATROS—THE FOKKER—THE AVIATIK AND OTHER GERMAN MACHINES—GERMAN ENGINES—FRENCH AND ITALIAN AEROPLANES AND ENGINES—WORK OF THE R.F.C.—RECONNAISSANCE—ARTILLERY “SPOTTING”—ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS—LOW FLYING—LONG-RANGE SCOUTING—AIR FIGHTING—THE VALUE OF “STUNTS”—LONG-DISTANCE RAIDS—DARTS—BOMB DROPPING—PHOTOGRAPHY—“CAMOUFLAGE”—WORK OF THE R.N.A.S.—SEAPLANES—“BLIMPS”—COAST PATROL AIRSHIPS—BOMBING OF SUBMARINES—ATTACKS ON ENEMY SHIPS—FOOD CARRYING FOR KUT—THE JUTLÄND BATTLE—SEAPLANE CARRIERS—“CONTACT” AEROPLANES—TYPICAL EXPERIENCES—CASUALTIES—FORMATION FLYING.

ON June, 6, 1913, the Royal Flying Corps, together with its Naval Wing, having been officially in existence for a full year, celebrated the occasion by a dinner in a London restaurant, when the majority of the *personnel* were gathered together in a room of quite moderate size ! At that time not even its own most enthusiastic officers, without actual experience of war, could foresee the enormous influence the new arm would exert in the Field. Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Sykes, then Commandant, Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing), in the course of a paper read before the Aeronautical Society on February 4, 1914, remarked: “The past year has been one of great interest. Safety, speed, strength, weight-carrying powers, climbing, and all-round efficiency have progressed. The burden of our poor General Brown-Jones has indirectly been lightened. But directly, though the height record now stands at over 20,000 feet, the strategic problem of broken roads, railways and bridges remains unaffected. Though an endurance record of over 13,000 miles in 39 consecutive days was carried out last year (by aeroplanes belonging to the

British Army), weary, hungry, pack-carrying infantry are not materially assisted in their efforts to footslog an inch farther through heavy mud or dust. . . . The strain on generals and staff is as much as it was. Even the most brilliant gyrations of ‘loopers’ leave General Brown-Jones cold when grappling with how to beat the enemy.”

It is always interesting to look backwards—in this instance to review the expectations of the military authorities in regard to aeroplanes and their performances. In an official memorandum of February, 1914, the War Office authorities expected, amongst other things, the following from privately designed aeroplanes before they could be accepted for service with the Royal Flying Corps. The light scout aeroplane was to have a fuel capacity of 300 miles and to be a single-seater with a speed-range of between 50 and 85 miles per hour. Five minutes were allowed the machine to reach an altitude of 3,500 feet, and the engine was to be so constructed that it could be started by the pilot unaided. A heavy-type reconnaissance machine had to carry fuel for a flight of 200 miles, have a speed-range of

between 35 and 60 miles per hour, carry pilot and observer, climb 3,500 feet in 10 minutes, be equipped with a wireless telegraphy set, land over a 30-foot vertical obstacle and come to rest within a distance of 100 yards from that obstacle, the wind not being more than 15 m.p.h. The design, also, was to be such that the observer was given a clear and uninterrupted view all round. A heavy-type fighting aeroplane was required to carry fuel for 300 miles, to accommodate pilot and gunner,

from the better-known private factories, and both water- and air-cooled engines, varying between 100 and 160 horse-power, were used. There was no attempt at standardization, for flying was believed to be in its infancy, with many years for experiment and improvement before the new arm would be called on to play its part under actual active service conditions. Not a single one of the seaplanes had a British-built engine, and before there had been time to carry out the repairs necessitated at that



ONE OF THE EARLY B.E. AEROPLANES WHICH WENT OVER TO FRANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

machine-gun and ammunition, to fly at any speed between 45 and 75 m.p.h., to climb 3,500 feet in eight minutes, and to give a clear field of fire in every direction up to 30° from the line of flight.

On July 1, 1914, the Royal Naval Air Service, formerly the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps, came into being as a separate unit of the Imperial Forces. Very soon the new arm had an opportunity of showing its worth, for the Fleet, assembled for a great Test Mobilization in July, was to be inspected by the King, and the seaplanes,* about twenty in number, of the R.N.A.S. intended to fly round the ships. Affairs of State prevented the inspection by the King, but the seaplane programme was carried out in full. The machines used included representative examples

epoch by a very few hours of flying the country was at war.

Meanwhile on Salisbury Plain had been formed the Netheravon concentration camp, where it was proposed that the flying squadrons ordinarily stationed throughout the country should assemble for the annual command manoeuvres. The machines were to be housed in portable canvas hangars, for the authorities intended the pilots and observers, in the course of the manoeuvres, to acquire experience in working with the troops in the field. The infantry and artillery officers also were to improve the occasion by a careful study of the use of aeroplanes in war. The squadrons came from aerodromes in various parts of the country. Some flew over, covering many hundreds of miles in their flight; others arrived more modestly by road in the seclusion

* See page 134.



ROYAL FLYING CORPS CONCENTRATION CAMP ON SALISBURY PLAIN.
Showing the portable canvas hangars.


of army trucks. There were Farman, Sopwith, "B.E.,"* and Avro machines, some of them

* A word of explanation may be given with regard to the initial letters and numbers used for describing aeroplanes designed by the official Royal Aircraft Factory. "B.E." originally stood for "Blériot Experimental," and later for "British Experimental." Progress in design led to the types known as "B.E. 2," "B.E. 2b," "B.E. 2c," and so on. Further development along different lines led to the "B.E. 3" "B.E. 4," etc., to "B.E. 12"—the latest machine of this series to be used in the air fighting in 1917. The "F.E.," originally "Farman Experimental," came to mean "Fighting Experimental." Later constructions tracing back their parentage to this first machine did excellently in the fourth year of war, being known as the series "F.E. 2b and 2d." The "F.E. 8," was an extremely fast, single-seater fighting scout. "R.E." and "S.E." were "Reconnaissance Experimental" and "Scouting Experimental" aeroplanes respectively.

much the worse for wear. A War Office *communiqué* of the day gives an idea of the "Day's Work" at that time. "During the week," it ran, "No. 2 Squadron with aircraft, mechanical transport and personnel, proceeded to Northampton from Lincoln, thence to Oxford. They all arrived at Netheravon on the 30th. . . . No. 3 Squadron: reconnaissance flights were made daily. . . . No. 4 Squadron: the pilots were out practising observation every day. . . . H.Q. Flight: during the week this unit was engaged in experimental work . . . a co-ordinated programme of progressive training has been drawn up by the Officer Commanding the Military Wing.



ERECTING PORTABLE CANVAS HANGARS IN THE DESERT.



ONE OF THE FIRST AEROPLANES TO FLY FROM GERMANY TO ENGLAND.

The programme includes combined aircraft exercises and reconnaissances, mechanical transport convoy work, mobilization practice, and lectures and conferences on military and technical subjects. . . .”

What was an average performance for army aeroplanes at the outbreak of war—for machines that is, having seen some amount of service and not in special trim to pass official tests? About 45 miles an hour was a slow speed, 60 was good, and 80 was very fast. A height of 3,000 feet was enough for almost any purpose other than an attempt at the altitude record; the first German aeroplane to bomb Paris was considered perfectly safe from gun-fire at 3,500 feet, and 10,000 feet was an enormous and quite abnormal height. Anything over 100 miles on a cross-country flight was classed as long-distance flying, and the generality of flights averaged from 30 to 50 miles. The aeroplane that could reach 3,000 feet in 10 minutes was thought a very satisfactory climber.

The Royal Flying Corps went to war with about 82 machines in passably good condition, although, according to the number shown on paper, it had considerably more aeroplanes than this. Mr. W. Joynson-Hicks, M.P., had raised, shortly before, in the House of Commons, some pertinent questions with regard to the machines available for the Corps; many of the accusations levelled by him against the War Office were undoubtedly justified. In the course of his speech Mr. Joynson-Hicks stated that No. 2 Squadron, at Montrose, had two machines which were in the course of reconstruction and five in good flying order. B.E. 273 was condemned as unfit for further flying, and

B.E. 229 was in flying order. B.E. 217 was wrecked completely. There was one Maurice Farman being reconstructed, and another Maurice Farman, which was old, had been smashed very often and was unfit to go to war. The B.E.'s could do only three hours' non-stop flight, as their petrol and oil capacity did not allow for more. B.E. 228 could do only 3½ minutes, B.E. 218 could do eight hours, but had double petrol tanks and therefore could not take a passenger. The two Maurice Farmans could do only 48 miles an hour in dead calm. The average B.E. machine did 71 miles an hour when new, but only 63 miles an hour when over two months old. All the machines at Montrose were fitted with 70 h.p. Renault eight-cylinder engines—a foreign make—and at present there were only three spare engines, which meant that very often a machine was laid up for want of an engine. Broken-down engines were frequently held up because spare parts could not be obtained. At the moment there were five machines ready and fit for flying. Others had temporary engine trouble which could be put right in 48 hours. That made seven machines out of 25 for Squadron 2.

The machines owned by the Royal Flying Corps when it went to war consisted of Henri Farman biplanes (80-h.p. Gnome engines), and Maurice Farman biplanes (70-h.p. Renault engines), B.E. biplanes, some with 80-h.p. Gnomes and others with 70-h.p. Renaults, Caudron biplanes, Short biplanes, fitted, some with 50-h.p., others with 80-h.p., Gnome engines, Blériot monoplanes having 50 or 80 h.p. Gnome engines, 80-h.p. Nieuport monoplanes, Deper-

dussin, monoplanes, 70-h.p. Flanders monoplanes having Renault engines, and one 60-h.p. Antoinette motor fitted in a Martinsyde monoplane. As in the R.N.A.S., not a single machine used a British-built engine.

The British Government had strangely failed to realize the importance of encouraging the experimental work in the production of engines suitable for aircraft which was carried out in this country entirely at private cost in the works of individual manufacturers. Before the war broke out, however, the importance of having a supply of suitable British-built engines had been recognized, the War Office had held an engine competition, and a prize of £5,000 was awarded for the engine which best fulfilled requirements. The German War Office was even slower to appreciate the value of aeroplanes, for most of its hopes and efforts had, until so late as 1912, been concentrated on the Zeppelin and other airships. When, however, it was at last seen that the aeroplane demanded serious consideration, it was a comparatively simple matter for those German firms which had for many years been concentrating on the production of powerful light-weight motors for use in airships to produce suitable engines for aeroplanes. The German War Office was thus able to secure a supply of German-built engines almost from the beginning.

Fortunately for Great Britain and the Allies a number of aeroplane constructors had survived the lean years before 1914, and these

firms, with their own designs for aeroplanes and their manufacturing plants, were of immense value in making up the leeway when war broke out. The majority were building tractor biplanes of 70 to 80 h.p., having seating accommodation for pilot and observer. Where the authorities approved of the private designs offered, orders were placed for deliveries in quantities, and when the manufacturing facilities were such as to allow rapid extension additional contracts were placed for building to official designs. The firms who had been experimentally building engines soon found that the small departments in their factories set aside for the work were inadequate, and the aircraft sections began to absorb the whole. Some of the motor-car firms, especially those having body-building departments, were of exceeding value, for they could undertake the construction of aeroplanes throughout. Coachbuilders became propeller makers, upholsterers found a dozen different jobs on the new work, and in 1917 there were concerns, possessed of world-wide reputation for their cars, which had not built a vehicle for over two years, but were turning out numbers of completed aeroplanes weekly. Soon there were dozens of firms engaged in the making of aircraft parts; in 1915 there were hundreds; in 1917 there were well over a thousand; the parts were assembled in central factories. All sorts of people were engaged in aeroplane supply. A sculptor, employing a score of men in pottery work in 1914, had over 1,000 workers engaged



A HIGH-SPEED SCOUT OF AMERICAN DESIGN.



WOMEN AT WORK ON AEROPLANE WIRES.

in aeroplane-making in the third year of war. A carpenter, without any great financial resources in 1914, obtained War Office contracts for small parts because of his knowledge of timber and its working, and, securing machinery and raw material for his contracts, was soon building a score of very successful fast fighting scouts weekly; it was estimated that by the end of 1917 the number would be doubled, and a capital of well in excess of one million pounds was employed. Aeroplane work found congenial and well-paid employment for tens of thousands of women and girls, who proved particularly suited to the work. They shaped and finished the hundreds of struts and spars needed; they built up the sections—gluing, riveting, screwing and pinning; they sewed the fabric to the wings and tail, and applied the dope which drew it taut and rendered it proof against wind and weather. They painted and polished and, indeed, did practically everything but design the machine and carry out the final air tests. Even acetylene welding operations, which male operators had for long insisted was work to be undertaken only by men, were successfully accomplished, and in the shops where the engines were built women were employed in great numbers. Excellent working conditions, semi-automatic machine tools, precision machinery and gauging instruments, all made possible the increased employment of women on small parts, and, with a minimum of skilled supervision, their output and standard quite equalled those set up by male labour. In this way, by these means, a country unprepared for war and not possessed of more than 100 really efficient aeroplanes built hundreds in the first year of war, thousands in the second, many thousands in the third, and had in view plans for the production of tens of thousands in the fourth.

As for our Allies, the Belgian army in 1914 had about 30 efficient aeroplanes. In the previous year a sum of £20,000 had been voted for the construction of aerodromes and the provision of machines. Of those actually possessed by the army when the Germans invaded the country, it is doubtful if 50 per cent. were fit to take the air on active service. These were mostly of the Farman "pusher" biplane type, fitted with 80 h.p. Gnome engines, and providing accommodation for pilot and observer. The machines soon came to an end under service conditions, although, before this state of affairs was reached, Belgian pilots had

supplied the Allied commanders with valuable information about the disposition and strength of the German forces. The later Belgian aeroplanes were of French design and construction, and were employed in reconnaissance and bombing work on the Western Front. Their pilots successfully cooperated in many of the Allied raids, especially those in the Ostend district.

France, on the other hand, took the field with between 500 and 600 effective aeroplanes, a good auxiliary equipment, and a trained *personnel*. She had a number of airships, serviceable enough in their way but hopelessly outclassed by the German ships. Her naval air service was hardly worth serious consideration, although the few machines in use were the best of their types. The bulk of the French aeroplanes on the outbreak of war were Farmans, the others representing specimen products from most of the successful French factories. Unfortunately, many of these were experimental and no facilities existed for their construction in quantity, while trouble arose through the lack of interchangeability, so that many machines were soon out of service while they waited for the provision of some simple spare part. The history of the growth and development of the French air service during the first three years of war was akin to our own. The Government took over the work of supply, and many hundreds of big and small concerns were set to work to fill up the gaps. The bulk of the French aeroplanes were first engaged on the Eastern Frontier, and their doings received little publicity, either in France or elsewhere. Soon the French frankly admitted that they had underestimated the German pilots, whom they had regarded as of the purely mechanical type, devoid of dash or brilliancy. In this they were not altogether wrong, but the Germans knew exactly what their aeroplanes could do, and their airmen had received very definite instructions regarding their handling of the machines. Also, types had been standardized to avoid delay in making losses good; they had big reserves of pilots and observers trained and in training, together with a sufficient mechanical equipment and *personnel*; probable losses had been estimated and allowed for; and, more important than anything else, the Germans had a clearly defined plan of campaign. In consequence, German pilots refused to be driven from the air by the audacity of



FIGHTING SCOUTS.

the French airmen, and their stolid mentality sent them steadily on with the arranged plan, until the French grasped the fact that, if the enemy was to be beaten in the air, it could only be by aeroplanes superior in design and number. Had the original German scheme for a short, smashing campaign gone through, their air equipment was ample for the purpose. It was simply the prolongation of the war that gave both the Western Allies time to create strong air fleets. German military opinion went astray in thinking that aircraft would make the strategy of previous wars impossible, for it argued that, by exposing the plans and dispositions of the enemy commanders, overwhelming numbers could be thrust through the weakest places, leading to quick and crushing defeat before the defending forces could rally for the attack. The vital factor in a plan conceived along these lines is absolute mastery of the air, which alone can give the attacking force a knowledge of the defences to be overcome, while keeping the enemy in complete ignorance of how and when and where the thrust is to be made. The German armies invading France had not mastery in the air, but merely superiority, and here the plan failed, for, warned by their own aircraft of the German dispositions, the French were able to concentrate on the threatened areas, holding the invaders up until the defence was organized.

Germany took the field with more than 600 two-seated aeroplanes designed throughout for war service. These were of standard types, and manufacturing facilities existed along both her important frontiers for the provision of spare parts and the building of new machines to make good the wastage of war. Every biplane excepting a few special fast scouts was

fitted with bomb-dropping apparatus and camera. Most important of all, the aeroplanes throughout were of German construction, so differing from the British aircraft, which depended on France for their engines and on Germany for their magnetos. There were, in addition to the aeroplanes mentioned, some hundreds of slower units at the aerodromes which were being used for training new pilots and observers. The flying grounds themselves, strategically placed close to the frontiers so that the whole available striking force could be employed against the enemy, were equipped with elaborate lighting systems which enabled the German aeroplanes to indulge in night flying in comparative safety. At upwards of twenty-one stations these illuminated grounds were actually in existence on the outbreak of war, both electric and acetylene lighting systems being used. Careful experimental work had supplied many valuable data about the penetrating power of various lighting systems, colours and lenses, and, while some of the beacons gave a flash of several hundreds of thousand candle-power, that at Weimar—a revolving electric flash—gave 27,000,000. A year later, British pilots, going up to attack invading Zeppelins, met death and injury owing to the primitive and unsatisfactory arrangements for lighting the landing places; petrol flares in buckets were the best we could achieve. In addition to the flashlights on the German aerodromes, thick glass sheets, marked with arrows and concentric rings, let into the ground and illuminated from beneath, enabled the German aviator to make safe direct landings at night; and tested appliances to indicate the direction of the wind, the presence of obstacles and other information of value to

the pilots, were installed and in full working order. It need hardly be said that the German Government immediately took over all aircraft manufacturing plant and facilities when war was declared. It had more than the interest of a sleeping partner both in engine manufacturing and aircraft firms for a long period before that memorable day. In 1912-1914

Germany had bought specimens of every successful aeroplane produced, and her pilots had been afforded much hospitality both in England and France. A number of German and Austrian officers had visited the concentration camp at Netheravon in the month preceding the outbreak of war and had carefully noted our strength in aircraft. Thus the General



BELGIAN "PUSHER" MACHINE FITTED WITH LEWIS GUN.

The illustration shows two noted Belgian pilots, Capt. Jacquet and Lieut. Robins.



ALBATROS BIPLANE.

Staff was well informed of the actual strength of both countries.

The Albatros biplanes, which had been carefully and systematically standardized, were much employed by the German authorities, chiefly as reconnaissance but occasionally as fighting machines. These, in point of fact, were the much discussed "Taube" aeroplanes, the name standing for a type of aeroplane with swept-back wings rather than for any particular make. The army tractor* Albatros was fitted with a 100 h.p. Mercédès engine, its tanks carried petrol for a four hours' continuous flight, it had a speed of 65 to 70 m.p.h., and it could climb at the rate of about 3,000 feet in 10 minutes. Many other types were produced after this first machine had been relegated to the training schools, some of the most important being the 128 h.p. Mercédès-engined "general purpose" biplane, the 170 h.p. bombing machine, and a 200 h.p. light scout with an estimated speed of 125 m.p.h.† The Germans attached greater importance to the trustworthiness of their engines during the early part of the war than the French and the British, and so late as the middle of 1915 the motors on captured aeroplanes, except in matters of minor detail, were substantially the same as the motors of 1913-1914. Particularly was this so with the Mercédès and the Austro-

Daimler engines. In the 128-h.p. "general purpose" aeroplanes a Bosch hand-operated starting magneto was fitted, which, after the propeller was swung to draw a charge of gas into the cylinders, enabled the pilot to start the engine unaided. In front of the observer was a wireless transmitter, current for this being furnished by an independent generator driven by a small windmill. The radiator was of a sectional type which had obvious advantages for aeroplanes in the field needing repairs to the cooling system. On the dashboard in front of the pilot a number of instruments were mounted. They included the magneto engine-starter, two-way switch for changing over to the ordinary magneto when a start had been made, throttle and spark levers, petrol gauge, revolution indicator, manometer, pressure pump, clock and air-speed indicator. The compass was built into the top plane, facing downwards, in a position where it could be seen by both pilot and observer. Contrast this equipment, to which must be added camera and bomb-dropping gear, with that on many English aeroplanes, which were practically devoid of detail equipment, and whose pilots, adding accessories essential to war flying to aeroplanes already under-engined, achieved the so-called "Christmas Tree" machines, and sacrificed speed and climbing power in so doing.

The first of the Fokker aeroplanes illustrated the German idea of providing a fast-climbing light fighting machine of a highly specialized type, able to drive down Allied aeroplanes which interfered with the slower German observation machines. The Fokker plan was

* For the information of the non-technical reader it should be explained that, broadly speaking, aeroplanes may be divided into two main types consisting of "pushers" and "tractors." The former have the propeller behind the wings and the machine is pushed through the air, while the screw of the latter is placed before the wings and draws the craft forward.

† These were the theoretical powers of the motors. In actual performance they fell far short of their ratings.

to climb to a great height and there await the lower-flying aeroplanes of the Allies—a quick dive, a burst of machine-gun fire and, unless the attacked pilot was lucky, his machine went spinning down to the ground. The engine was an 80-h.p. improvement on the Gnome, known in Germany as the Oberursel. Metal plates on the propeller blades, which deflected towards the ground the small proportion of bullets which were intercepted by the blades, enabled the pilots, even of the early Fokkers, to fire through the propeller. Later

armament, so that it became a constant battle of wit, skill in design, and engineering knowledge.

The Aviatik was another aeroplane to do good work for Germany; these had a great speed, ample fuel capacity, were comparatively heavily armed, as things went then, and were fitted with 170 or 220 h.p. Mercedes engines, according to type. Other well-known German aeroplanes were the Halberstadt, a composite copy of Allied aircraft, having engines of 120 and 220 h.p.; the Hansa, 160 h.p. fighting



MAKING PARTS FOR AEROPLANE ENGINES.

designs by this maker, fitted with a 150-h.p. motor, gave a speed of 110 m.p.h. and a "climb" of 7,500 feet in 10 minutes; the wings folded back for convenience in transport, and steel was largely used in the construction. The engine was extravagant in both petrol and oil, and the idea of the speed machine itself was copied from the French "Moranes." When the Allies saw what was needed to defeat the Fokker it was a matter of a few weeks before the type was doomed, and afterwards temporary supremacy in the air belonged to the owners of the machines having advantages in speed or

biplanes; the Luft Verkehrs Gesellschaft (L.V.G.), heavy, armoured craft; the Otto, with 200 h.p. engines; the Rumpler tractor biplanes, which were used by some of the crack German pilots; and the big Gotha twin-engined biplanes which were used in 1916-1917 in the daylight bombing raids on England, accompanied by fast, single-seater fighters, whose work lay in driving down defending aeroplanes.

The most successful of the German and Austrian engines were the Argus, the Austro-Daimler, the Benz, the Maybach—exclusively




FOKKER.

Showing arrangement of propeller and machine-gun.

employed in airships, the Mercédès, and the Oberursel. In passing it may be noted that the latest type of Zeppelin airships in 1917 were reported to be fitted with eight 240 h.p. Maybach motors, to mount 10 machine guns, to be 680 feet in length, and, with a capacity of 2,400,000 cubic feet of gas, to have a useful lift of 28 tons. For all practical purposes Austrian aircraft were ranked with the German, though the Austrian factories could not be ignored in discussing the total aircraft output of the Central Powers.

France, throughout the war, was called upon to supply aeroplanes to Belgium, Rumania, Russia, Italy, and Serbia, and also, for some period, to Great Britain. She used Blériots as reconnaissance, scouting, fighting, bombing, and training craft, ease of control and mechanical trustworthiness being the outstanding features. The Caudron works sent out some excellent heavy craft, notably of the twin-engined type, which were of great service in 1915; these machines were partially armoured and, for the period, heavily armed. French designs, some months after the outbreak of war, were superior to German so far as fighting craft went, for, owing to the tractor screws and the wing disposition, the German machines could fire only to the rear. The synchronization of engine-timing and machine-gun which later made firing through the propeller satisfactory had not then been perfected. Farman aeroplanes of all types were consistently improved during the war, and the French used them in large numbers. The Morane-Saulnier Company specialized in fast craft with the wings arranged high over the pilot's head, giving a clear outlook below and gaining for the design the generic title of "parasols." A series of very fast scouts and fighting monoplanes from this maker gave excellent service. The single-seater Nieuport biplanes, having a 110 h.p.



SYNCHRONIZING MECHANISM, ENABLING THE MACHINE-GUN TO FIRE THROUGH THE PROPELLER WITHOUT STRIKING IT.



[French official photograph.]

MORANE-SAULNIER MONOPLANE,

With wings arranged overhead; known as the "parasol" type.

Clerget engine and a speed well in excess of 100 m.p.h., were very popular with French pilots. The 135 h.p. Voisin biplane, built of steel and fitted with a big Salmson engine, was used as a reconnaissance machine, as a fighter, scout, and bomber. The French produced some very fine engines of both the air-cooled and the water-cooled types, including, among others, the Anzani, Chenu, Clement-Bayard, Clerget, Gnome, Hispano-Suiza, Renault, Le Rhone, and Salmson.

Italian aeroplanes were for the most part copied from French models, but very successful Italian engines were built in the Isotta-Fraschini, Fiat, and other Italian workshops. In the later 1917 offensives against the Austrians some hundreds of machines were used.

The censorship restrictions in regard to the publication of particulars dealing with British aircraft were exceedingly drastic, but, broadly speaking, it would be accurate to assume that by 1917 the output was approximately equal to that of Germany, and, while that country had then speeded up output to very near the possible limit, the British production could still be doubled and trebled, so far as factory producing capacity was concerned. The difficulty lay in the supply of components, such as ball bearings and magnetos, of suitable woods, and of special raw materials. England was at first entirely dependent on France for the supply

of aeroplane engines, but within two months of August, 1914, motors of an approved type were being sent out from our factories. We had no designs, but a Gnome engine was dismantled, and its parts carefully measured; in a week full working drawings had been prepared, and in seven weeks the first engine was on test. The British engines in 1917 were, power for power, quite equal to those of Germany. On the outbreak of war the lightest units per horsepower were the air-cooled rotary engines, which averaged approximately 2 lb. per brake horse power. The various types of water-cooled engines weighed between 3 and 6 lb. per b.h.p., and the 100 b.h.p. Renault weighed 6½ lb. per b.h.p. By 1917 there had been a general reduction in the weight of the water-cooled vertical or V-type engine of from 4.3 lb. per h.p. to 2.6 lb. per h.p. By the end of 1916 a designer had succeeded in producing the most powerful aeroplane engine in the world, a unit having 18 cylinders and developing 475 h.p. In the two years of progressive engine construction and design lighter, stronger and more suitable metals and alloys had been produced, while engine life had been greatly increased, chiefly by improvements in general design and material and in the lubrication systems. Marked economy in fuel and oil consumption had also been effected, and the general trustworthiness increased. The lead in such

matters as these was difficult to maintain, for it was impossible to prevent the very latest productions in aircraft from falling sometimes into the enemy's hands. This happened to all the belligerent Powers, and closely guarded secrets were soon common to all. Thoughtless critics suggested that new and successful machines should be held back until a sufficient number were in hand to exert an appreciable influence on the fighting, but in 1917 the call for more and more machines from every fighting front was so insistent that every new aeroplane

which he had been led to think were opposing him—news that led to a rapid change in the deployment and disposition of our forces. It seems beyond dispute that the historic retreat from Mons which saved the British Expeditionary Force, and the Allied cause itself, was only begun in time as the result of this early news given by the Royal Flying Corps.

In those first anxious months the Allied armies were at a great disadvantage owing to the really efficient scouting and artillery "spotting" work of the enemy aeroplanes.



AEROPLANE ENGINES READY FOR DISPATCH.


was hurried out to the armies in the field as soon as final tests had been passed.

It has already been mentioned that about 80 machines went over to France with the original British Expeditionary Force. The work done by these and the machines which followed, together with later developments of aircraft and their uses in war, may now be considered. The work first demanded by Sir John French and his Divisional Commanders was scouting and reconnaissance, and it is to the everlasting credit of the Royal Flying Corps that one of its officers first brought news to Sir H. Smith-Dorrien that his advanced Division was faced by three German Army Corps supported by strong reserves in place of the three Divisions

which, greatly outnumbering their opponents, sent back hour by hour news of vital importance to the German commanders. In comparison with the methods adopted later the first "spotting" was primitive. Ranges were worked out by the artillery officers in the usual manner, and the aircraft, hovering above the bursting shells, signalled by smoke bombs and coloured lights the fire results. The enemy had also worked out a plan of signalling and sending information by means of aeroplane evolutions; a sharp bank to right or left, a sudden dive, a short tail-slide, all sent news to the batteries in the rear, and, crude as the system was, it was effective for a time. As numbers of faster machines having better wireless sets—a British development—came

from the factories, the first primitive signalling devices became obsolete.

With more efficient aeroplanes came improvements in anti-aircraft guns, shells and range finding. The gunners worked out a new rang-




TESTING AN AEROPLANE ENGINE WITH PROPELLER.

ing system which registered the speed of the "spotting" aeroplane, its flying height and, when its leading dimensions were known—hence the anxiety of all sides to keep every particular of their latest machines from the enemy, and the care of the pilots not to present for any length of time a full head, side or tail view of their machines to the enemy range-finders—its exact range. They were thus enabled to place a shell, at the fourth shot, in very close proximity to the target. The battle between gun and aeroplane continued from the very beginning of the war. Pre-war theory was to the effect that a fast-flying aeroplane was comparatively safe at 3,500 feet, and even very early in 1915, when many improvements in guns and range-finding had been made, 9,000 feet was considered a safe altitude for anything smaller than a Zeppelin airship: 7,000 feet marked the top of the trajectory for rifle and machine-gun bullets, while the heavier weapons were not so mounted as to give the mobility in action needed by the effective anti-aircraft gun. And at 9,000 feet, it was argued, the aeroplane lost much of its value for bomb-dropping, scouting or photographing. The French, for example, when they had succeeded in taking, by means of telephotography, a series of trench pictures, from a height of 6,000 feet, thought that something very like finality had been reached.

Sir John French, reporting a raid against St. Omer, said: "Bombs were dropped from a height of 9,000 feet. This, of course, prevented the airmen from taking deliberate aim at any military objective." Little more than a year later aeroplanes were being hit at between 12,000 and 14,000 feet, bursts at 15,000 feet had been observed, and the fuse of a German anti-aircraft shell marked 7,500 metres (24,600 feet) had been picked up by a British officer. The British public had also been given a number of startling demonstrations showing that effective bombing practice could be made from considerably greater heights than had been anticipated.

In the battle between gun and aeroplane it was left to the Allied pilots to demonstrate that safety from enemy fire is to be had by flying at a height hardly sufficient to clear ground



FINISHING AN AEROPLANE PROPELLER.

obstacles. In ordinary flying the airman seeks safety in height just as the seaman prefers the security of open water in dirty weather, apart, of course, from structural mishap, for in both cases manœuvring power is retained. In mid-ocean the seaman has no fear of rocks or a lee-shore, while the pilot in mid-air has no fear of crashing to the ground before he can get the nose of the machine down to convert forward flight into a gradual downward glide in case of sudden engine failure. On the other hand, if the airman cares to run the risk of mechanical failure when flying low, he at once



A BOMBING MACHINE COMES TO GRIEF: GETTING RID OF THE BOMBS.

becomes comparatively safe from close enemy fire, for he is below the effective range of anti-aircraft guns, and in broken country has flashed across and above the troops he is attacking, reserving the advantage in visibility to himself, before rifle fire can be loosed at him. Nor has a rifle bullet power to bring down an aeroplane unless pilot, petrol tank, or some other vital part be struck—a somewhat remote possibility when the attacker comes into view and is gone almost before a rifle can be lifted to the shoulder, when his approach is heralded by a stream of machine-gun bullets, and when confusion of the enemy is increased by the roar of a powerful engine and the bursting of bombs. Aeroplanes, in fact, have returned safely to their sheds bearing the marks of hundreds of shrapnel and rifle bullets.

But this low flying was a development of the third year of war. A return must be made to the period when the German aeroplanes held for a while superiority in the air. After a time, when the Allied aeroplanes became more numerous, the German plan of "spotting" for the artillery was copied, but soon the enemy received better aircraft armed with quick-firing machine-guns, and as our casualty list grew pilots were forced to take up rifles, pistols, small bombs, and any other suitable weapon which came to hand, as some slight defence against the superior German machines. Under-powered as aeroplanes were to begin with, this additional equipment had its effect on

their already poor powers of climb and speed, and they became still easier prey to enemy aircraft. It was a crucial period, and for a space we could maintain our machines in the air to any useful extent only by sending them up in pairs—the slower unit for scouting, and the faster to patrol overhead and beat off threatened attack. The experience was not without its value, for it demonstrated the need for specialized aeroplanes, each being designed and built with some particular purpose in view. The development of the large aeroplane, heavily armed, armoured, and with an extended cruising capacity, was retarded as a direct consequence, although in 1916 British constructors were producing multi-engined machines, armed with heavy calibre quick-firing guns and having a great flight range and load capacity, which were not surpassed in performance by any enemy production. In the House of Commons, in July, 1915, Mr. Tennant, speaking for the War Office, admitted that his information was to the effect that the Germans were building powerful twin-engined biplanes, but doubted if this type was more efficient than the single-engined unit. By an unfortunate accident, the second of the British machines of this kind to fly to France—a biplane fitted with two 250 h.p. engines and armed with three machine-guns—was landed in a German aerodrome by mistake on the part of an inexperienced pilot.

As long-range, heavy calibre guns came into

use, the employment of aircraft made it profitable for the artillery to shell "blind" positions far to the rear of the enemy lines, and both sides took to "searching" for railheads, ammunition dumps, food convoys, bivouacs, headquarters, and other places of importance. Meanwhile other aeroplanes, having a greater radius of action and a higher speed, devoted themselves to strategic scouting, and sent back valuable information to headquarters about the disposition of the enemy behind the front lines, his strength, railway activities, supply columns and battery positions. Beyond the dropping of an occasional bomb when such an occurrence was calculated to be particularly annoying to the enemy, these aeroplanes were instructed to indulge in air fighting only in the event of actual attack by enemy aircraft, for, obviously, accurate information was of greater value to headquarters than the destruction of an occasional enemy unit.

The need for this strategic information led to the use of "general purpose" machines, in which, to provide a clear view for the observer and an all-round field of fire for the machine-gun, wing surface was cut away, with a corresponding loss of speed, climbing power and general performance. At best this "adapted"

aeroplane was in the nature of compromise, and, as it was soon seen that a second gun was needed and the machines proved their particular value, it became obvious that specially designed units would be more satisfactory. Both sides realized also that other specialized aeroplanes would be required to drive the scouts from the air, and a battle of design began, with most of the advantage on one side. Improvements such as more powerful engines incorporated in the observation machines could always be adopted by the designer of the fighting craft, which, carrying less weight, continued to hold the lead in climb and speed. And at this stage, so far as general opinion went, the possibilities of the aeroplane in warfare ended.

A few far-sighted students of aerial matters had already pointed out that the specialized type of fighting aeroplane, operating in big numbers, would need consideration as a combatant unit pure and simple, but the idea was too fantastic for the ordinary mind. The Germans in particular laughed at the idea of hundreds of aeroplanes fighting with pistol, bomb and machine-gun thousands of feet in the air, and their pilots for many months restricted themselves to obtaining information



ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ON BOARD A DRIFTER.

[Official photograph.]

and preserving their machines. The German, indeed, had his own fixed ideas about how the game of war should be played, and was much disturbed when he found by experience that the French and British pilots preferred to fight according to rules of their own. The Allied airmen tackled their opponents whenever and however they got an opportunity, and there is a well-authenticated story of an Aviatik biplane falling behind the British



GERMAN MACHINE-GUN.

lines because a well-aimed pair of heavy field glasses, hurled from a British machine, took the German pilot squarely between the eyes as the aeroplanes flashed past, wings almost scraping. So frequent did the attacks become, when all that the German airman asked was to be left alone, that the only course left for their designers was to produce specialized fighting machines, each an improvement on its predecessor so far as engine-power, speed, climb and armament went. The preliminaries to the battle of the Somme witnessed the introduction of the fighting aeroplane, operating to a well-considered plan, in considerable numbers. As the Allied-concentration neared finality the fighters went up and swept the German machines and observation balloons from the sky, clearing the way for their observation aircraft, which held their position day by day, reporting the results of the bombardment, and protected by the fighting machines maintaining station thousands of feet above. Yet the fighting machines did not confine their work to hovering over the observation aeroplanes, and often enough they flew over the enemy lines in readiness to dive and bring down a hostile aircraft almost as it "left the

nest." In reply, the Germans developed the "Flying Circus," consisting of a number of fast fighting machines, manned by the best and most experienced pilots, which went about from place to place along the lines, bringing their concentrated strength to bear wherever the Allies had achieved local supremacy.

After some weeks of undisputed Allied aerial supremacy on the Somme, the enemy, fortified by new machines of his own, plucked up courage and again took the air, until battles between fighters became of almost daily occurrence, and the general public grew accustomed to reading such reports as: "*Fifteen enemy and four British machines down.*" A number of combats took place in which large formations were engaged on each side. In the course of the fighting eight German aeroplanes were brought down, and six others were driven down out of control. One enemy machine was shot down by fire from the ground. Four of our machines are missing."

By this time the gun, as the greatest enemy of the aeroplane, had definitely been superseded. The battles of 1917 indicated how the intensity of the fighting between individual aeroplanes had increased. The following is extracted from a General Headquarters Report of July, 1917:

Yesterday morning aerial activity was slight, but from 1 p.m. until dark it became very great. The fighting was intense and the day proved a remarkably successful one for our airmen. The vigorous defensive tactics employed enabled our artillery machines to carry on their work successfully during the day, and made it possible for us to take an unusually large number of photographs. Our bombing machines, moreover, carried out many raids and bombed four of the enemy aerodromes. Some of our machines came down to very low altitudes at a distance of over 40 miles behind the enemy's lines. Fifteen German machines were crashed to the ground, and 16 others driven down out of control. Three of our machines are missing.

On the following day the official report read:

Important railway stations and two hostile aerodromes were bombed by our aeroplanes, and during the day a number of other bombing raids as well as much photographic and artillery work were carried out by us with success. In air fighting 16 German machines were brought down, and 14 others were driven down out of control. In addition two hostile observation balloons were brought down in flames.

Speaking of the airwork during this battle, *The Times* said: "There have been no two successive days of air fighting on such a great scale on the British Front since Sir Douglas Haig launched his attack on both sides of the River Scarpe on April 23. On the day before the attack 22 German aeroplanes and seven kite balloons were brought down, and on the

day of the infantry assault 40 enemy machines shared the same fate. The British loss reported on those two days was six aeroplanes missing."

In war what had become known in the days before 1914 as trick flying resolved itself into the most ordinary everyday proceeding. When a French aviator first went up in a specially strengthened monoplane, and, taking his courage in both hands, demonstrated the correctness of the theories of the experts by looping

risk of fracture. The inherently stable machine, which tended automatically to return to its normal flying attitude, was also further developed, and every aeroplane later than 1915 was stable to the extent that for long periods the pilot could leave the machine to fly itself and devote his attention to machine-gun, bomb-dropping apparatus, or camera. Flying at 10,000 feet a pilot could put the machine into a tail-slide, or stand it on its wing tip, and



[French official photograph.]

A LIGHT MACHINE-GUN OF A KIND MUCH USED BY THE FRENCH AGAINST HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

the loop, the first feeling on the part of the public and of flying-men in general was that the manœuvre was somewhat foolish. Later, because the feat had been proved possible, it was said that no further need existed to repeat it, and lives should not be unnecessarily risked. But in the second, third and fourth years of war no pilot was considered a qualified Army flier unless he had every trick and "stunt" at his fingers' ends. Designers found that, whereas the heavy biplanes with their enormous wingspreads needed to be specially strengthened for trick work, the fast fighting machines, with their greatly restricted wingspread and powerful engines, could perform all manner of evolutions in the air, when handled by a skilled pilot, without

safely leave it to recover. Falling a matter of 1-2,000 feet through the air the machine would come again to an even keel and resume its forward flight. Evolutions which at first were regarded as inevitably involving death to the pilot were deliberately brought about by a few fearless experimenters who had worked out theories of how aeroplanes could be extricated from the dangerous positions. The spinning nose dive, for example, caused the death of many pilots until a British officer deliberately put his machine into this fall and pulled himself out. Soon the feat formed part of the flying education of every Army pilot, and it became of the greatest value in air fighting.

The report of the average British pilot is a



GERMAN SEAPLANE STRANDED ON A DANISH ISLAND.

terse document, and the following well illustrates the extraordinary manœuvres between aeroplanes which took place in the course of everyday fighting in the battles of 1917, and the importance of trick flying :

Lieutenant L. dived on H.A. (hostile aircraft) nearest to him and got in 50 rounds from Lewis gun at 40 yards range. H.A. went down in a spin for 2,000 feet and then flattened out [travelled on a horizontal course], when Lieutenant L. again dived on H.A.'s tail, getting good bursts into H.A. at 50 yards range, when H.A. went down. Another H.A. got on to the tail of Lieutenant L.'s machine while the latter was changing drums, and Lieutenant L. spun for 1,000 feet, followed by H.A. On flattening out Lieutenant L. found H.A. directly above him and used Lewis gun with such effect that H.A. went down out of control and was seen to go down thus for 3,000 feet by Lieutenant L. and Captain B.

Incidentally, it may here be noted that during the battles of the Somme frequent aerial combats took place at between 15,000 and 20,000 feet, while fights at a greater altitude were not uncommon in 1917.

For purpose of comparison, and as showing the steady growth in the use of aircraft, reference may profitably be made to some of the raids undertaken in the first days of the war. A raid was organized against the Zeppelin airship factory at Friedrichshafen by three officers of the R.N.A.S., who, after a two hours' flight during which they were under continuous fire, dived to within a few hundred feet of the sheds and dropped eleven bombs. One airship was destroyed,

damage was done to a second shed, and the hydrogen producing plant was demolished. Two of the machines returned safely. A raid against the airship shed at Düsseldorf was carried out by three pilots who, flying at 6,000 feet, descended to 400 feet before loosing their bombs. The shed escaped injury, however, and a fortnight later the raid was repeated, this time with success, as the Germans themselves admitted, the ship being destroyed together with the shed. A pilot flew from Dunkirk to Cologne, a four hours' flight, and returned safely after dropping a number of bombs on the military railway station there. A big attack on the German warships lying in the neighbourhood of Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven, and the mouth of the Elbe was undertaken by seven officers of the R.N.A.S. Escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together with a number of submarines, the machines started from the vicinity of Heligoland and, while the cruisers engaged two Zeppelin airships which had come out, the British machines avoided the enemy aircraft and submitted the German fleet to a heavy and direct bombardment from the air.

A French official report issued on January 7, 1915, remarked : " Twenty bombs were dropped on the railway station at Metz on Christmas Day, and six on the following day. This was our reply to the raid on Nancy. On Christmas

Day 12 bombs were dropped on a company at Gercourt, four on a bivouac at Dondrien, and 2,000 darts on wagons and infantry at Nam-poel." Later reports spoke of the dropping of many thousands of these darts at different times and places, and although their use was soon discontinued, a short account of their construction will not be misplaced here. They were of hard steel, in shape and size similar to an ordinary graphite pencil, pointed at one end and feathered by milling on the tail to give a cruciform section. In weight they were about one ounce, and, dropped from a height of a few thousand feet, their striking velocity was about four hundred feet per second—sufficient to pierce any steel helmet and to traverse a man's body from head to foot.

Important as these early raids were, their effectiveness was greatly minimized by the fact that formation flying had been little practised and each flier was very largely left to act on his own initiative. In consequence the individual pilot often failed to see the result of his companions' bombs, and, having nothing to guide his aim, after dropping his bombs he would turn and make for his base at

top speed. That so many of these daring airmen lived to return was simply due to the fear they inspired in the Germans, who were so nervous and flustered that they could rarely bring effective fire to bear until, when their courage had returned, the British machines were out of range. The question of formation flying is discussed later. A pilot who had taken part in many of the early raids, since killed, thus described in a private letter his feelings and experiences :

At the mouth of the Scheldt I got clear of some of the clouds and saw Courtney behind and 2,000 ft. above, my machine being then about 5,000 feet only. . . . Over Antwerp there were no clouds. Courtney was about five or six minutes in front and I saw him volplane out of sight. . . . I next saw him very low down, flying away to the coast with shrapnel bursting around him. He came down to under 500 ft. and, being first there, dropped his bombs before he was fired on. I decided to come round in a semi-circle to cross the yards with the wind (the writer was referring to the submarine base at Hoboken, near Antwerp), so as to attain a greater speed. I was 5,500 ft. up and they opened fire on me with shrapnel. I came down to 2,500 ft. and continued my descent at a rate of well over 100 miles an hour. At about 1 000 ft. I loosed my bombs all over the place. The whole way down I was under fire—two anti-aircraft in the yard, guns from the fort on either side, rifle fire, machine-guns and, most weird of all, great bunches of what looked like green rockets, but I think they were flaming bullets. My chief impressions were



AEROPLANE WITH SUPPLIES FOR KUT FLYING OVER SHEIKH SAAD, MESOPOTAMIA.



AEROPLANES PROTECTED WITH MATTING AGAINST THE HEAT OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN SUN.

the great speed, the flaming bullets streaking by, the incessant rattle of the machine-gun and rifle fire, and one or two shells bursting close by, knocking my machine all sideways and pretty nearly deafening me. . . . My eyes must have been sticking out of my head like a shrimp. I banked first on one wing tip and then on the other, now slipping outwards, and now up and now down. . . . I covered, I suppose, getting on for 250 miles. Have not yet heard what damage was done. The C.O. was awfully braced.

Any slight mental exhilaration experienced by the commanding officer was surely, in the circumstances, excusable.

It was soon realized by the officers responsible for the early raids that the most effective results could be obtained only by the use of bombing machines in large numbers, so, in the first twelve months of the war, the fleets grew from one and two units until 30, 40, 50 and more than 60 aeroplanes and seaplanes co-operated. Mostly the raids were organized by the R.N.A.S., and both Belgian and French machines took part. A certain amount of

criticism was levelled against the Admiralty because, for a period of nearly two years after the first effective operations, no raids of any great consequence were undertaken and the Germans were allowed to strengthen their Channel bases practically unmolested. The criticism has no bearing on this history unless advantage of the opportunity be taken to point out that the first raids were undertaken by the machines of the R.N.A.S. simply because the full strength of the R.F.C. was being used elsewhere. Later when the full factory output, in both aeroplanes and seaplanes, was needed for more urgent purposes, no other machines were available for raiding, especially when the R.N.A.S. was instructed to cooperate with the combined Forces in Mesopotamia, where naval aeroplanes carried food into beleaguered Kut, at the Dardanelles, off the coast of Egypt, and in other parts of the world where the British Empire had work in hand. Nor




SEAPLANE RETURNING TO SLIPWAY AT BASRA.

had the machines of the R.N.A.S. any spare time on their hands when, as time went on, they undertook many other specialized tasks, some of which will be mentioned in due course.

Bomb-dropping from aeroplanes had not, before the outbreak of war, received any great amount of attention, although civilian aviators were in the habit of dropping oranges on targets when giving exhibition flights, and officers of the Flying Services were occasionally allowed to indulge semi-privately in the sport. The first bombs were taken up in wooden boxes, packed in sawdust and corkdust to prevent premature explosion. Later they were given handles and slung on hooks screwed into the fuselage. Afterwards they were carried in different positions about the undercarriage, and a primitive release gear was provided which was not an unqualified success because occasionally the bombs failed to clear the structure, and it fell to the observer, at the risk of his neck, to climb out and perform marvellous gymnastic feats in mid-air before a landing could be made without blowing machine and crew to bits. The wise pilot, indeed, saw to it that his full load of bombs was dropped from the machine—whether a suitable target presented itself or not—before landing, but accidents happened none the less. In the third year bomb-release gear had been simplified and made trustworthy, and the pilots made landings with a full load without a thought of premature explosion, while on an expedition it was possible to see at a glance just how many missiles were in hand, how many had been released, and which should be dropped next. A development of the Bowden-wire control system was favoured by designers when working out details of bomb-releasing gear. Curiously enough, the first bombs to be used were very inefficient because makers treated the problem as a development of shell-making, altogether forgetful of the obvious fact that the bomb was not called on to withstand the shock of any bursting charge in a gun barrel, its speed being obtained by gravity in the fall through the air. Investigation showed that, weight for weight, the bomb can be given greater destructive powers than any gun-fired shell, and the knowledge was fully taken advantage of later. Germany demonstrated that not every bomb need be of the high-explosive variety, and treated the world to an exhibition of the powers of the incendiary, the poison-gas, and other types of aircraft missile.

The problem of bomb-dropping from an aeroplane is not so simple as would at first sight appear. Many things, such as height, speed of machine, velocity and direction of wind, size, weight and shape of the bomb used, and other technical details must be considered by the airman. Unlike that of the gun-fired shell, the path of the bomb cannot be controlled to any extent by sighting. The missile leaves the retaining hook at a speed equal to the



[From "Flight."]
 GRAPH SHOWING TRAJECTORIES (neglecting air resistance) OF BODIES DROPPED FROM AN AEROPLANE TRAVELLING AT VARIOUS SPEEDS.

horizontal speed of the aeroplane. At best the margin of error is great, and the best bomb-droppers proved to be those who had a "sense" for the job, despite the fact that in the third year of war very accurate tables had been prepared which gave a bearing from the aeroplane of the spot where the bomb should fall given that the conditions as to wind velocity, speed of machine, height and so forth had been accurately gauged.

To the untrained eye an explosion some thousands of feet below gives the impression of having done great damage, for the smoke and



AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF OSTEND HARBOUR SHOWING THE EFFECTS OF BOMBARDMENT.

Official photograph.

A, shell-hole; B, damaged entrance gates; C, destroyer damaged; D, pier damaged; E, F, shell-holes; G, corner of workshop damaged; H, skylight blown out by explosion inside shed; J, roof collapsed; K, L, shops demolished; M, end of long shed destroyed; N, O, P, shop collapsed; Q, destroyer damaged; R, wreck-
age, probably of a smaller vessel; S, T, damaged wharves; U, jetty damaged; W, wreckage; X, shell-hole in mud; Y, top of submarine shelter depressed;
Z, damaged jetty; XX, YY, damage to floating-dock; ZZ, cambers displaced. 1, oyster preserve; 2, anti-aircraft battery; 3, floating-dock building.
Although the naval bombardment was effected at extreme range, the photograph shows that no dwellings were hit.

dust obscure the view and make accurate observation impossible until some time afterwards when the disturbance has settled down. It was the lack of trained observation powers on the part of the aeroplane pilots that led, in the first period of the war, to reports about destroyed bridges, roads, railheads, and airship sheds which proved to be quite unfounded in fact. According to the German reports, London was destroyed in the second year of war, while quite a number of people who lived in the city had not noticed anything unusual. The Allied statements suggested that few of the German airship sheds had been left standing and the town of Essen had been badly knocked about, though the truth was that the enemy still had many Zeppelin ships and sheds in the fourth year of war, and guns and shells, together with other munitions of war, daily left Essen in a continuous stream. Therefore it was recognized that promiscuous bombing had its sole value in harassing and annoying an enemy whose moral was already strained—the Allied raids on German tactical positions, on roads, railheads, supply columns and munition dumps during the battles of 1916-7, were good examples of this "free-lance" work—and preliminary staff work before any of the big raids began to be carefully organized. In each some definite tactical or strategic purpose was the ruling factor and, because great strides had been made in military and aerial photography, claims of damage done which could not be substantiated by photograph were not readily admitted by headquarters.

The trench pictures published by the Germans showed that the Allies had early secured a decided lead in the use of the camera from the air—reference has been made to the French employment of telephotography from a height of 6,000 feet—and the authorities very wisely forbade publication of any detailed particulars relating to aerial photography, the methods used, the cameras and other apparatus employed, or other information of a similar nature likely to be of assistance to the enemy. At first great things were expected from cameras having semi-automatic plate-changing appliances, but although some measure of success was gained by the use of such attachments their general reliability was not such as to justify extended use. Other methods came into play; amongst these time, mechanical simplicity, and absolute trustworthiness were the leading features, and

the German had, in 1917, still much to learn about military photography. Very broadly speaking, the Allied pictures were obtained by means of long-focus, iron-framed cameras, specially built into the aeroplane. Occasionally, where special need arose, telephotographic lenses were used. The scouting aeroplanes, out on a photographic reconnaissance, flew over the selected area at a given speed and height, while the operator, working to chronometer, made the exposures at predetermined intervals. Plates, owing to the sharper negatives obtained, were used in preference to films. A pull on a lever removed the exposed plate and snapped a new one into position. The negatives allowed of a small overlap which, when the prints were enlarged and pasted together in strip form, gave a complete and continuous picture of the photographed section. Later pictures of the same area showed by comparison any work done by the enemy in the periods between the taking of the photographs, threw up the results of bombardment, and, curiously enough, showed very clearly some things not visible to the human eye. Before a big offensive it became necessary for the attacking side to take many thousands of photographs of the selected area. Profiting by experience, armies in the field became adept in covering up their tracks, for the observer flying overhead soon became skilled in deducing from such things as trodden-down grass leading to a small spinney or to a partially-concealed hole that a new battery or dug-out was in course of construction, and, acting on such information, the guns in the rear were quickly reaching out to destroy the work.

Concealment in warfare has always been something of an art, for against a cunning and observant enemy the ability to cover up the tracks of an army is of supreme value. Encampments, guns and fixed positions generally belonging to troops in the field were, in previous wars, daubed in vivid contrasting primary colours, which had the effect, viewed from a distance, of merging the painted objects in the surrounding landscape. Before aircraft came into use, such things could be examined only through long-range glasses some distance away, and concealment had not been reduced almost to an exact science. Aircraft led to a great development in this art of *camouflage*, as the French called it, and the uninstructed visitor to any of the battle fronts in the year 1917 could have been excused some little

natural astonishment when he found that what at a distance of a few dozen yards seemed to be a small group of shell-splintered poplar trees was in reality a battery of six-inch guns ; and, again, he could hardly be blamed for any slight nervousness when an apparently innocuous haystack began to move, accompanied by a dull rumbling noise, directly towards him. Closer inspection would have shown the haystack to be a "tank." To such a pitch was this art of *camouflage* brought that not even the army officers were fully instructed

purposes, the machines owned by this branch were, if not absolutely, then very nearly, useless. Indeed, until well on into 1915, the pilots of the R.N.A.S. were attacking the docks and harbours of the Germans on the Belgian coast by means of land-going aeroplanes. And simply because this naval arm was equipped with machines quite unsuited to any naval requirement it was found possible to give an amount of aid many miles inland where the enemy could hardly have expected to find R.N.A.S. machines.



CAMOUFLAGE: A CLEVERLY CONCEALED FRENCH 90mm. BATTERY.

as to its devious ways outside their own particular areas. With the usual British *insouciance*, our ammunition dumps were placed openly in exposed Belgian fields in the years 1914-1915, and acres of rolling-stock were collected in the stations and sidings. German bomb-dropping aeroplanes took advantage of this carelessness to teach us several rather drastic lessons, and convinced our commanders of the value of *camouflage*.

At this stage, in order to preserve perspective, it is advisable to return for a space to the Royal Naval Air Service and its doings. It would be no exaggeration to say that, for war

No very great progress had been made in the development of the seaplane by August, 1914, and any improvements effected were made under the stress of war. Eventually seaplanes were resolved into two main types: the flying boat, which had a boat-shape cabin centrally placed below the wings to contain engine, crew, bombs, machine-guns, and other impedimenta ; and a second type, known as the twin-float, wherein two small hydroplane-shaped floats were attached to the undercarriage to take the place of the landing wheels usual on the land-flying aeroplane. In this second machine, pilot and observer were housed in a fuselage which followed in its main outline that



[Italian official photograph.]

AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF A FARM AND TRENCHES BEFORE BOMBARDMENT BY ARTILLERY.

of the land aeroplane ; and attempts were also made to construct an undercarriage which could be fitted with either landing wheels or floats. Both types of seaplane had certain distinct advantages. As the name implies, the machine could alight on and rise from the water just as an aeroplane leaves and returns to the land.

The early raids undertaken by our Flying Services were mostly carried out by the pilots of the R.N.A.S., for the reasons already given. As with the Royal Flying Corps, the

machines used during the first period of war were, to paraphrase slightly, "under-engined, over-manned," and the wonder of the whole thing is that the first units survived and carried out their day's work. Their engines were old, and in need of scrapping more than of repair ; their fabric was soggy, its weatherproofness had gone, and it was impossible to climb to a height giving even a reasonable degree of safety. At the Dardanelles operations the seaplanes reported day by day the location of



[Italian official photograph.]

AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SAME DISTRICT SHOWING EFFECTS OF BOMBARDMENT.

new gun positions and gave valuable information to the mine sweepers about surface mines. The tractor biplanes, fitted with machine-gun and wireless, did excellent "spotting" for the big guns, and one pilot, co-operating with a British ship, enabled four consecutive direct hits from a 14-in. gun to be made on a flour mill at a range of 19,800 yards. Thousands of bombs, weighing anything between 20 and 112 lb., together with a number of exceptionally heavy projectiles, 500 lb. in weight, were dropped on enemy positions. The Allies, in point of fact, during the first three years of war, developed to a very great extent the employment of the aeroplane as a long-range big-gun. Machines surveyed the enemy's position at Suvla, Anzac, and Cape Helles to a distance of 12 miles, over 9,000 yards in depth, and many thousands of photographs were taken. While this work was going on the development of the R.N.A.S. as a real striking force was not being neglected. Seaplane stations, fully equipped with all facilities, were constructed at many places along the coast line, and in course of time numbers of satisfactory machines were being delivered. Machines belonging to the R.N.A.S. "spotted" for the monitors which

were a constant menace to the German positions on the Belgian Coast, and often enough they raided inland. In the third year the German submarine bases on the Belgian Coast were raided daily and nightly. The seaplanes convoyed merchant ships and naval craft, they hunted the U-boat, and flew in the vicinity of the German naval bases. No job was too great and none too small—when machines began to be produced in quantity.

Not only in seaplanes was improvement effected, for as the value of an air service to the Royal Navy was more fully grasped by the Admiralty, striking departures were made in other directions. The "Blimp," for example—a creature consisting of a curious hybrid combination of airship and aeroplane—came into being. Detailed particulars of its construction were kept from the public knowledge, but broadly it may be said that the envelope was about 150 feet in length. To it was attached a fuselage—including engine and geared-down propeller, with seating capacity for pilot and observer—of one of the later B.E.-type aeroplanes; the fuel tanks gave a cruising capacity of about 10 hours at a speed of between 35 and 40 m.p.h. The



A COAST-PATROL AIRSHIP.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH.



A "BLIMP."

"Blimps" were fitted with wireless set, machine-gun, bombs, and camera, and by reason of their low cost, reliability, and simple construction, were built in large number. They proved of the greatest service in near-coast patrol work, and, in conjunction with the armed patrol, developed an unerring eye for the enemy submarine lurking in shallow waters. Once detected, the U-boat commander, if wise, surrendered without delay. From the air the submarine boat and the mine can be quite easily seen, at comparatively great depth, although invisible from the level of the water, much as fish, invisible from the bank, are clearly seen by an observer looking from a bridge spanning the stream. This particular optical fact was fully exploited by the various units of the R.N.A.S.

The "Blimp," by reason of its small size and engine power, was, of necessity, a fair-weather vessel, and for sterner work farther out to sea a number of airships, known as the Coast Patrol type—shortly, the "C.P.'s"—were built and put in commission. For perfectly sound reasons the Admiralty resented mention of any detailed constructional particulars of these vessels during the war, but it may be said that their work largely consisted in scouting for submarines in more open water beyond the reach of "Blimps," in locating newly laid mine-

fields, in assisting the armed patrol in its work of containing the German fleet and preventing the escape of armed enemy ships, and, when need arose, in convoying merchant ships. Seaplanes of an ocean-going type, heavily armed, and with a big cruising capacity, were similarly employed. The construction of bigger airships, comparable with the best and most powerful productions of the Germans, was also carried on during the years 1915-1917.

As the war progressed the uses of the seaplane increased, and it became the ambition of every R.N.A.S. pilot to sink a submarine "off his own bat." In August, 1915, Squadron-Commander A. W. Bigsworth, who by an irony of fate was flying a land-going aeroplane, succeeded in destroying a German submarine off Ostend with a well-directed bomb, and, before the end of the third year of war, a number of other U-boats had, as the German *communiqués* put it, "failed to return" for very similar reasons. In pursuance of the definite policy of withholding information likely to be of value to the enemy, no details of these feats were published.

The work of the seaplanes was not confined to the bombing of submarines, for a correspondent of *The Times*, writing from Mitylene in August, 1916, gave particulars of the bombing of a Turkish transport by a British seaplane



LAUNCHING A SEAPLANE FROM THE MOTHER SHIP.

which succeeded in sinking the ship with the whole of the troops aboard it. Both German and British seaplanes were successful in sinking enemy ships by torpedo attack. The machines of the R.N.A.S. regularly took foodstuffs to the weight of some thousands of pounds into beleaguered Kut. A further success of the R.N.A.S. was the discovery of the hidden German cruiser *Königsberg*, whose crew, by hiding the ship amongst the palms well inland along the course of a river and covering the whole superstructure with foliage, hoped to conceal her from the British forces. Searching the coast and the rivers for their prey the aeroplanes located the ship, indicated her position by smoke bombs, and "spotted" for the guns so effectually that the cruiser, battered almost out of recognition, finally sank.

Although statements about the use of Zeppelins at the battle of Jutland differ, there is no doubt that naval aircraft conveyed to Admiral Hipper knowledge of the strength and disposition of Admiral Beatty's squadron and encouraged that enterprising German sailor to close action in the hope of destroying an inferior section—as compared with his own strength—of the British Navy. The German

official *communiqué* stated that: "Airships and aeroplanes materially contributed to the success of the Naval Forces" without specifically mentioning that the success was a retreat! Undoubtedly Zeppelins also conveyed the news of the approach of Admiral Jellicoe's battle fleet, and led to the hasty rush to its gun- and mine-protected home port which saved for Germany some part of her navy. Information about the use of British aircraft in the battle was held back by the Admiralty, but a seaplane conveyed to Admiral Jellicoe knowledge of the progress of the fight and the disposition of the German fleet, while a seaplane-carrying ship was also mentioned for her services in other directions.

In some of the official dispatches during the years 1915-1917 references were made to seaplane-carrying ships, notably the *Ark Royal*, which was employed at the Dardanelles, and which was, in common with other aircraft-carrying ships, a converted vessel, specially fitted to act as a mother ship to seaplanes and aeroplanes. In the House of Commons, in July, 1917, it was stated, in answer to a question, that a specially designed seaplane mother ship, fully equipped with repairing and other

facilities, had been added to the Navy, and that others were in the course of construction and would shortly be commissioned.

A return may now be made to later developments in the use of aircraft against the enemy on land. As trench warfare developed until at last a continuous line of opposing trenches and positions ran practically from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, and as with the passing of time the positions on both sides were strengthened to such an extent that breaking through the line became admittedly impossible without the development of new tactics and weapons, it was recognized, first by the French, that this war was unlike all other wars, and that much previous knowledge had become obsolete. The great German attacks on Verdun marked the last employment of the old-fashioned methods which depended on smashing artillery fire followed up by massed infantry attacks. The scheme failed, as the whole world knows, and, once assured that the German bolt had been shot, the French developed their counter-offensive along new lines. Breaking through when the enemy line was of exceptional depth was judged to be an operation of

which the cost was not compensated by its gains, and the limited offensive was tried in its place with a satisfactory amount of success. Theoretically the scheme was sound, but difficulties arose when the telephone wires were cut by enemy fire, when the signalling units were put out of action either by casualties or because their signals could not be seen through the smoke and dust of the bursting shells, and when the enemy's strength was unexpectedly great and the attacking infantry was held up locally.

The new limited offensive demoralized the Germans for a period, but the plan of attack was soon seen through by the enemy commanders, who took steps to render it ineffective. Taking advantage of their exceedingly strong defensive positions and dug-outs, they allowed the French barrage to lift to the second and third lines and then, worming out from the deep dug-outs, impervious to the heaviest shell fire, the German infantry, armed with portable machine-guns, poured a devastating fire into the attacking infantry. It was then recognized by the Allied commanders that the cost of this new limited offensive would prove excessive unless constant



THE SEAPLANE'S RETURN.

The pilot superintending the hoisting operations.



[Official photograph.]

OBSERVATION BALLOON SEEN FROM BELOW.

touch were kept between the advancing troops and the guns in the rear. The aeroplanes, as in so many other cases, pointed the way out, and the daring and skill of the Allied pilots made the scheme a success. When the great offensives of 1917 were undertaken the Allied aeroplanes had beforehand obtained undisputed local supremacy, and the "contact" aeroplanes, as they came to be called, swept along the bombarded trenches at a perilously low height above the line of bursting shells, signalling to the guns the effect of the bombardment.

As the infantry went "over the top" and crossed "No Man's Land" to the first line of the enemy trenches, the "contact" aeroplanes, swooping above the battle line, signalled information of the progress made. Where the attack was held up by machine-guns which had survived the preliminary bombardment, a wireless message, giving range and position—

already carefully noted on the maps plotted from the pictures taken from the reconnaissance and photographing aeroplanes, whereon every small detail in the enemy defences had been numbered and registered—brought concentrated heavy shell-fire on the stubborn point, while the attacking infantry temporarily took whatever cover was available. A special dispatch to *The Times*, dated August 2, 1917, gave an excellent account of this work. In a paragraph headed "Our Swallow Airmen," the correspondent wrote :

In my dispatch yesterday I told how the bad weather and the thickness of the air had robbed us on the day of battle of the advantages of aeroplane observation, though in spite of everything our men had flown out and, descending below the clouds, fired on the enemy infantry in the trenches. Later information shows that, notwithstanding the bad conditions, they did splendid work. The lowness of the clouds compelled most of the flying to be done at heights below 500 ft. Much of it was below 200 ft., and in many cases individual machines went much lower. By thus working close to the ground, almost like swallows on a wet day, they were able to keep contact with our advancing infantry and did an immense amount of valuable work, though constantly under machine-gun and rifle fire. In all their fighting against hostile machines and men and guns on the ground, our flying men used on the one day over 11,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, besides some revolver ammunition.

The German prisoners captured in the Allied offensives of 1917 were especially bitter about the work of their artillery and airmen. A letter to his parents, taken from a prisoner captured in the Arras battle, is particularly illuminating. He had written :

These British airmen are the very devil, for they come down to our trenches and almost enter our dug-outs, bombing and machine-gunning and seeming to take the greatest pleasure in doing so, and quite regardless of our rifle fire. We should not be at all surprised at any time to know that they had found a way of flying right through our dug-outs, and we have no peace from them night or day. Very different from our German airmen, who spend their time pinning Iron Crosses to their tunics and sitting in *cafés* smoking and telling stories of their own bravery. We would much rather see examples of their bravery than listen to their stories of it.

Before the great battles in 1917, when the German aeroplanes had been beaten from the air and enemy nerves were strung to breaking-point in anticipation of the offensive, the Allied pilots found the greatest delight in flying across country behind the German lines seeking for adventure and often enough finding it. Enemy staff cars were attacked by machine-gun from low-flying aeroplanes, troops on the march were scattered, rest camps and billets were bombed, ammunition dumps were set on fire, until the destructive ingenuity of our pilots seemed unending. The following are

typical experiences in the day of the British pilots about the time of the Messines offensive. They are taken from the report of a *Times* correspondent:

Individual narratives are told of the most thrilling description. One man who went off met a German machine below the clouds, and a fight followed which ranged down to within 50 ft. of the ground, when the enemy machine sideslipped and crashed. Another visited an aerodrome and fired into the sheds from a level below their roofs and dived on and silenced a machine-gun which fired on him from the ground.

Another, who went out shortly before five in the morning, began a happy day by first patrolling roads and canals and firing on and scattering any troops he saw. He then visited an aerodrome, which he found asleep, and waked it by dropping a bomb on the shed. The place began to buzz like a hive while he flew round at a height of 30 ft., dropping a bomb now and again on the sheds and firing into them through the doors with his machine-gun. He went off occasionally to change his drums or fix his bomb lever, and each time he came back and flew round again, silencing the machine-guns which opened on him, and once actually bumping the ground while firing into the sheds. Then he went off and chased some officers on horseback and scattered a body of 200 troops. He met two hostile aeroplanes and shot down one, and the other bolted.


He went to see the machine which he had crashed, and finding that a crowd had gathered round it, fired into them and sent them flying. Then he paid another visit to the aerodrome, and afterwards went off and chased a passenger train on the railway with his machine-gun till he ran out of ammunition. Then he turned and jogged home.

Nor were our airmen, scouting behind the enemy lines, content to signal back the positions of the German batteries, for many instances were recorded of the gun crews being shot down by the machine-guns on the aeroplanes, while authenticated cases of heavy guns themselves being placed out of action by direct bomb hit from a height of less than 150 feet were not infrequent. Gunning the enemy in the trenches and on the march had, in 1917, become part of the ordinary flight, and many different ways of harassment and annoyance were thought out.

Reference to another *Times* dispatch best illustrate the work done by British pilots in spotting for the artillery in the course of the big



FRENCH OBSERVATION BALLOON AND ITS PORTABLE HAULAGE APPARATUS.



AN EARLY ASTRA-TORRES AIRSHIP LEAVING HER SHED.

offensive in the Ypres sector of August, 1917. Here it is said :

During the last few days' fighting I have heard several times the statement that in the course of the battle the fire of the German batteries actually grew perceptibly and continuously less as they were put out of action by our guns. This is quite credible. In the course of a single day our guns, guided by our aeroplanes, silenced 73 hostile batteries. Observation showed 21 gun-pits entirely destroyed and 35 others badly damaged. Eighteen explosions of ammunition stores were caused and 15 other fires. These are only the items of air work in a single day of battle, but their influence on the course of victory is obviously enormous.

As the enemy lost his superiority in the air—a fact which the Germans in the trenches did not fail to communicate to the public at home—it became necessary for the German Government to take steps for the purpose of soothing shattered civilian nerves. A statement was published in the Press which, with a warning that exact details up to the end of February, 1915, and for July, 1917, were not then available, so that the figures for "these periods" were not "absolutely trustworthy," gave the following figures of enemy and German aeroplanes shot down during the first three years of war :—

	German.	Enemy.
1914	—	9
1915	91	131
1916	221	784
1917 (to end of July) ..	370	1,374

From August 1, 1914, to July 31, 1915, 72 enemy aeroplanes were shot down, of which 39 fell into German hands; from August 1, 1915, to July 31, 1916, 455 enemy aeroplanes were shot down, of which 267 fell

into German hands; from August 1, 1916, to July 31, 1917, "about" 1,771 enemy aeroplanes were shot down, of which 776 fell into German hands.

In 1915 two enemy captive balloons, so far as is known, were shot down; in 1916, 42; in 1917 to August 1, 142. Three enemy airships were also shot down.

Total aircraft shot down from August 1, 1914, to August 1, 1917, about 2,298 enemy and 682 German aeroplanes, 186 enemy captive balloons, and three airships.

The Times commented on this as follows :

Official figures are not accessible for the purpose of checking the claims made by the Berlin journal in respect of Allied aeroplanes, but it is possible to test, both from official and unofficial sources, the accuracy of the figures given of German losses for at least some portion of the three years. For instance, the *Matin*, whose authority is at least as high on the one side as that of the *Berliner Tageblatt* is on the other, stated on January 1, 1917, that the French brought down 450 German machines in 1916 and the British 250. This figure of 700 compares with the German admission of 221. There is confirmation of this unofficial estimate in the table compiled from the statements in the official *communiqués* of British and French Headquarters which appeared in *The Times* of December 5, 1916, and which showed that, for the six months June to November in that year, 666 German machines were brought, shot, or driven down by the Allies. If we take the year 1917 as it is calculated by the *Tageblatt*—August 1, 1916, to July 31, 1917—the official British and French figures show that 2,076 German machines were sent down—1,325 by the British, 751 by the French. It is not pretended that all these were destroyed, but if we take, merely for May, June, and July, those which were officially stated to have crashed, to have been destroyed, brought down in flames, shot down by gunfire, or captured, we get, instead of the *Tageblatt's* figure of 370 for the whole year, 523 for three months.

In support of *The Times* the following account of what authorities demand before

accepting the claim of a pilot to have "crashed" an enemy machine, is instructive.


When a pilot claims to have crashed an enemy aeroplane he must be able to produce evidence to prove it. He must have seen the machine hit the ground and observed the wreckage. But how is a man fighting at 10,000 feet to follow an enemy machine to ground and investigate, when he is probably being attacked by other enemies in the skies? All claims are carefully scrutinized at some three stages before they are finally admitted and published by the Higher Command, and probably in one-third of the cases where the pilots get credit for having crashed enemy machines the claim is allowed only through the accident of some other airman, flying low at the time, having seen the descent from the clouds above and the actual collision with the earth, or some similar accidental corroborating evidence.

I have also spoken before of the influence of the westerly winds, which are so prevalent here. Fighting nearly always drifts over the enemy's territory, and while he knows all about the machines, whether his or ours, that come down we have only ocular evidence from the skies above and only know that our machines are "missing." During the last few days the influence of these westerly winds has been very great, and yesterday the German flying men were habitually endeavouring to decline combat when near the front lines, and, by slowly retiring, trying to draw our men farther over their own ground, where even a small mishap may prevent our men, against the adverse wind, from regaining our lines.

It is well known that Captain Ball knew he had destroyed over 50 enemy machines, but he had official credit for only 41. He was an extremely modest man, whose claims undoubtedly were under the truth. The same is true in proportion of Captain Bishop, the new air V.C., and of all the other British fliers who have a long list of enemy victims to their credit. It is charac-

teristic of our British way of doing things that we minimize our achievements before the public, and it has this compensation, that the world can count with absolute confidence on any claim whatsoever which our Royal Flying Corps puts forward.

As aeroplanes were increasingly used on bombing expeditions it was soon apparent to the officers of both arms of the service that indiscriminate flying, in which the individual pilot was left largely to his own devices, was as unprofitable as an attack on a fortified position by unled troops, and formation flying was practised in the years 1916-1917 by all the belligerent countries. A study of bird life and various technical considerations showed that the V-shaped formation had definite advantages, especially as the number of machines used in the bombing expeditions increased. The extent of the increase is well shown in the official French *communiqué* which reported that during the week-end of August 18-19, 1917, 111 French aeroplanes had dropped 26,000 lb. of high explosives upon German railheads in the Meuse district. The enemy aeroplane raids against England in the summer of 1917 demonstrated this theory of formation flying to the satisfaction of the German War Office at all events, and, as a curious commentary on



SEAPLANE BEING DELIVERED BY ROAD.



V-FORMATION OF A RAIDING SQUADRON.

British mentality, it may be remarked that the perfect station maintained by the aeroplanes during the raids received almost as much notice as the damage done by the bombs. The leader took the position of honour at the point of the V, the following aeroplanes being strung out on either side and at different heights. This formation was adopted partly to avoid the air currents set up by the other machines, partly that the respective pilots might have a clear view of the leader's bombs and the localities in which they burst, correcting their own aim when necessary, and partly to increase the difficulty of the anti-aircraft gunners below and to give a measure of additional security to the squadron.

Further, this formation held advantages for the defensive against attacking aeroplanes; a clear field of fire in every direction for numbers of guns on the different machines was given, and any attacking aeroplane relying upon one or two

machine-guns was met by a storm of fire from behind, ahead, above and below, from every machine-gun of the invading squadron which could be brought to bear. While the machines forming the outer lines of the V were thus defending the squadron, those flying in the body of the V were freed from attack and could concentrate on their bomb-dropping. A number of single-seater fighting machines, armed with a machine-gun of a comparatively heavy calibre, and possessed of a speed estimated by competent observers at well in excess of 130 m.p.h., accompanied the bombing squadrons. These machines flew well above the bombers and their special duty consisted in driving off aeroplanes sent up for the purpose of engaging the bomb-dropping machines, a duty for which their high speed, their handiness in the air, and their heavy weapons particularly suited them.



CHAPTER CXCVIII.

NEW ZEALAND AND THE WAR.

MILITARY TRAINING BEFORE THE WAR—ORIGIN OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—THE TRAINING SYSTEM EXPLAINED—CAMPS AND PERMANENT BASES—FEATHERSTON—THE IMPORTANCE OF DENTISTS—CANVAS CAMP—THE MAN-POWER PROBLEM—THE MAORIS—THE MILITARY SERVICE ACT OF 1916—THE CAPTURE OF SAMOA—DEPARTURE OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—ARRIVAL IN EGYPT—ZEITOUN CAMP—FIGHTING ON THE CANAL—GALLIPOLI—THE WORK OF THE NEW ZEALANDERS—THE EVACUATION—RETURN TO EGYPT—THE NEW ZEALANDERS IN FRANCE—BATTLE OF THE SOMME—MESSINES—THE BATTLESHIP NEW ZEALAND—NEW ZEALAND CHARITY—DISCHARGED SOLDIERS.

A TRAVELLER who leaves England with the intention of making the longest possible sea voyage without doubling on his tracks cannot go farther afield than New Zealand. It is the most distant British Dominion, if one excepts the newly discovered tracts in the Antarctic. Its very remoteness greatly increased the difficulties of supply and transport for the New Zealand forces in the Great War. But, although the Dominion was so remote, it nevertheless was one of the most actively patriotic of all the oversea dependencies. Nowhere was the "war fever" higher than in New Zealand; nowhere was a force raised more quickly. This fact was largely owing to the excellent system of compulsory military service, introduced some years before, under the ægis of Lord Kitchener. Also, when Colonel Allen, Minister for Defence, visited England some time before the war, he discussed the question of an Expeditionary Force with the Imperial authorities. The scheme, although only tentative, met with a good deal of opposition in some quarters in New Zealand. The wisdom of it was afterwards proved.

Kitchener had been struck at once by the vast possibilities of making New Zealand an

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object lesson for the rest of the Empire in the matter of independent defence. The physique of the men of the Dominion, their conditions of life, the material for mounting irregular cavalry, the vast training grounds available, and, above all, the enthusiasm of the employees and employers, all made it evident that a working scheme could easily be put into operation.

So it was that when war broke out the Dominion had at its command a force ready for intensive training. True, the men had not been long either under discipline or in camp, but they had been given all the *kindergarten* work of war, and were ready for the more advanced stages. The foot soldiers were all in good training, induced partly by the healthy life of the average man in those parts, and partly by the fact that they had all done their military duties with regularity for some years. The mounted men were all from the country, where boys learn to ride soon after they can walk. They were all provided with horses, and all of them knew how to care for their mounts. In a sense every New Zealand mounted rifleman is his own veterinary surgeon, and subsequent events proved that there were no troops who were better able to care for their horses under the most trying conditions.

The artillerymen had all attended long training camps, and had done their compulsory drills for periods varying from three to four years, and they, too, were all horsemasters

Therefore, it followed that when the first announcement was made as to the probability



Haines photo.

MR. W. F. D. MASSEY,
Prime Minister of New Zealand.

of a force being sent from New Zealand to the seat of war, there were thousands of men who were not only willing, but fit and able to be sent to camp and finished off in such a manner that they could be sent to the front within two months at the outside.

The war enthusiasm was tremendous. Since the passing of the compulsory training measure there had always been an anti-conscription body in the Dominion, and the members of this small but noisy fraternity resisted the attempt to put through the measure providing for an Expeditionary Force. Even when this was done, they held a few abortive meetings which were systematically broken up in such a manner that the anti-conscriptionists faded into oblivion. All over the Dominion, in the big seaport towns and in the "back blocks," war meetings were held, and there was a rush to enlist. Employers of big city businesses gave every facility to their staffs, and in the country run-holders, cattlemen and sheep

owners came to the front with offers of horses to mount individual men, troops and even squadrons of mounted rifles. They also gave generous gifts of provisions for the men and fodder for the horses. Volunteer workers amongst the farmers collected hay and oats, and saw it from the stations to the railroads, often many miles distant.

The reception in New Zealand of the news of the British declaration of war on Germany has already been described, and some account has been given of the rapid preparation of the Expeditionary Force.* The chief characteristics of the training system of New Zealand were the early age at which it began, the number of years for which it was in force, and the limit of time devoted to any continuous training in the year. At the age of 12 the scheme embraced junior cadets who served until they were 14. In each year they received 90 hours' physical training and elementary drill. The Education Authorities were responsible for this, but the work was constantly supervised and arranged by the Defence Department. From the age of 14 the boys served as senior cadets directly under the Defence Department. They had a thorough grounding in musketry, small arms drill, physical drill, and such things as elementary military law and camp hygiene. Four whole days were set apart in each year on which they went into the field for manoeuvres, often varied by practical musketry work. There were 24 night drills in the year. Although this arrangement did not permit of any period of continued training, it is evident that it formed more than a ground work for what followed afterwards. At the age of 18 the cadet was absorbed in the Territorial Force, and for seven years he did 16 whole-day drills a year, or their equivalent in half-day or night drills. At the same time not less than eight continuous days were spent in camp; special branches, such as the naval service, artillery, and engineers served for 25 days, and of the 25, not less than 17 must be given up to continuous training on board ship or in camp. The total length of service when the final discharge was attained was 6½ months for infantry and mounted corps, and 8½ for technical corps and special branches. The cost of New Zealand's scheme was estimated at only £500,000. Lord Kitchener, when in New Zealand, was inclined to favour the

* See Vol. I., pp. 145-147, and Vol. II., pp. 262 foll.

methods followed by the West Point Military College, the training ground for officers of the American land forces. He did this advisedly and after much thought, for the democratic conditions in New Zealand made it essential that candidates should be drawn from every station. There was no counterpart in New Zealand to the English public school system, although there were many colleges and boarding schools originally founded on it. Again, there was nothing analogous to Sandhurst or to Woolwich, and it was evident that any officers' training college started in either Australia or New Zealand would have to include in its curriculum more than mere military training.

It was left to Australia to start this officers' training college. Unfortunately New Zealand did not participate, and was content to send her candidates across to Duntroon instead of forming a school of her own. Colonel W. T. Bridges, who afterwards became a general and was killed with the Australian forces at Gallipoli, was an officer who did a great deal to build up Duntroon.

It was soon evident when war broke out that New Zealand would have been well advised to have had her own officers' training school. Everywhere men who were fully competent to serve as officers enlisted as privates. Graduates and students from the Universities, technical men such as engineers, marine, electrical, and mining, whose services would have been

tremendously valuable in the commissioned ranks, enlisted in the first rush and rarely passed the status of non-commissioned officers. When the force was first formed, it so happened that it was the time for the annual camp of the Dominion Territorials and consequently not only were the men still under military charge, but units were in military formation and concentrated in such a manner that they could be much more readily handled. The date of the outbreak of war, as far as the New Zealand force was concerned, was a particularly convenient one. Needless to say, the Territorial Force already had its own officers, but many of these, indeed the greater proportion of senior officers, were men who were not able to leave the Dominion at a moment's notice, and others were too old. Therefore it followed that the officering of the force was a somewhat difficult matter. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force was always a particularly self-contained unit, but undoubtedly much of the backbone of the training system was supplied by permanent officers and non-commissioned officers from the Imperial Forces. Many of the former were forced to stay on in the Dominion when the main body left, for in their hands had been placed all the organization and business of equipment. The non-commissioned officers, many of whom had come out as sergeants from the Imperial Forces, and had been promoted to the rank of sergeant-majors and warrant officers, were in some cases required to



IN TRAINING IN EGYPT: CHARGING TO THE MAORI WAR-CRY.

stay behind also. Others of them came away as company-sergeant-majors, regimental-sergeant-majors, and even platoon sergeants, and undoubtedly the success of the enterprise, the excellent training of the men in the field, and the thoroughness of matters of routine and detail were due to these men, many of whom reverted to the rank of platoon sergeant from warrant station.

With the need for the training of regular reinforcements in New Zealand it became manifest that some new system of camps and

were got out for the formation of a big training camp at Featherston, a small town on the northern side of the Rimutaka Range, the picturesque hills which separate the Hutt Valley from the Wairarapa Plain.

The idea of placing the men there was at first viewed with some disfavour by the residents of the district. The need was urgent, however, and no serious protests were made. The land on which the permanent hutments were erected looks level to the casual observer, but there is a steady fall which makes for adequate drainage. The Public Works Department



[N.Z. official photograph.]

NEW ZEALANDERS AT FORESTRY WORK: SHANTIES BUILT BY THE MEN FOR THEIR OWN OCCUPATION.

permanent bases must be arranged. The decentralized scheme served very well at the beginning of the war when the first force was kept under canvas at the four big centres, two in the North Island and two in the South, but it was evident that it would be much easier if the training staffs were centralized and the local area officers were left to the work of obtaining recruits, and, when the selective draft scheme came into operation of calling up the men who were chosen. Although New Zealand has on the whole an equable climate, and troops can be kept under canvas in the North Island all the year round, the hut system was considered the best and safest, and plans

must take the credit for the expedition with which the project was carried out. In August 1915 the work was commenced, and over 1,000 workmen were sent to the district. Huge orders for durable timber, bricks, water-pipes and roofing had to be placed. Luckily the timber was ready to hand, for there is no better timber grown in the world than in the North Island of New Zealand. The workmen themselves lived in tents for a while, but as the hutments rose they inhabited them by degrees until their work was finished.

There were nearly three hundred buildings in the camp, and it had some miles of streets with every kind of shop that it is possible to

imagine fronting them. There were three billiard rooms with 28 tables, a large picture theatre, an officers' club, five institutes, a canteen 320 feet by 50 feet, 31 buildings set aside for the camp hospital and the offices and surgeries of the Dental Corps, and over 50 administrative and equipment buildings. There were 92 double huts for the men, 16 officers' cubicle huts, 16 dining halls, 6 large and roomy cookhouses, and 20 stables for the accommodation of over 500 horses. Over $3\frac{1}{4}$ million feet of timber was used, and for the building of the hutments and offices 30 tons of nails were required. Nearly 5,000 rolls of patent roofing were needed and the painted surface of the huts was over 50 acres. There were three and a half miles of streets, and all of them were flanked on both sides with footpaths and concrete channeling. Nothing was left to make the camp unpleasant in winter time, and the steam roller and graders were used on all the roads. The main road through the camp, roughly dividing the men's quarters into two, was over a quarter of a mile long and as broad as The Mall. Each big dormitory had its own drying-room where the men's clothes could be put after a day's training in the wet. This in itself was a great saving in time, for the men were then able to go out in all weathers with the certainty of having dry clothes again the next morning. Also the risk of illness from wearing the wet clothes of the day before was obviated.

The 16 dining-halls accommodated 600 men at a sitting. The men were paraded in front of their sleeping quarters and marched to the messes, where they were served with their rations by mess orderlies. This plan was infinitely better than the old one, which necessitated their eating their food in the same rooms in which they slept. Each cookhouse could cook for 1,600 men, so there was a margin left over in case of any extra influx of recruits.

Ordinarily there were always about 8,000 men there, and the strength was maintained very carefully by means of the selective draft system. This system is a territorial one, and any district that has not kept up its quota of reinforcements according to population has a ballot, when men eligible are chosen for that purpose. The same system was used in the United States for the formation of the original force. There were two bath-houses containing 100 showers and there were no restrictions as to their use. The men might bathe at any time they were off duty, and there was always a constant supply



[Official photograph.]

NEW ZEALANDERS AT FORESTRY WORK.

Setting an Axe.


of hot water. In addition to this the Ruamahanga River runs near by and the men were taken to it for bathing parades. As it is the exception to find a New Zealander who cannot swim or who does not spend hours a week in the water, these were very popular, and at times the bush echoed to the shouts of thousands of sunburned men splashing in the long deep reaches of the shingle-bottomed stream.

There were over 30 miles of copper cable in the camp for the conveyance of electric energy and at night there were never less than 3,000 lamps alight.

The Post Office was a wonderful institution, even for a large camp, and it ranked fifth in point of business done in the Dominion. For the year 1916 there were 1,012,380 letters posted and very nearly the same number received. The New Zealand soldier is a great letter-writer and the mail service at the camp had consequently to be a good one.

There was even a motor mail van which did nothing but take matter to and from the Featherston station, where the fast trains took it to Wellington. The value of the money orders issued shows the magnitude of the work done there as well as anything else. In the one year there were orders issued to the value of over £50,000.

Four hundred seats were available at the



COL. SIR JAS. ALLEN, K.C.B.,
New Zealand Defence Minister.

picture theatre and a new programme was screened every evening, including Sundays. One of the billiard rooms had 20 tables and there were very seldom many of them not in use in the off hours. New Zealanders are as a rule very good with the cue, and the game of "snooker" is always a popular one with the men. In Egypt many of them went miles into Cairo and spent their whole afternoons playing either this game or billiards.


There was one set of buildings where the Dental Corps was quartered. The New Zealand Defence authorities long ago saw the necessity for the proper care of soldiers' teeth, and before the Main Expeditionary Force left the Dominion there were dentists in camp with all the units, just as there were doctors. For some reason the proportion of bad teeth among the New Zealand people is high, and it was found that a great deal of the sickness that occurred in

camp could be directly attributed to this fact. The dentists who joined up with the force were given the rank of captains, and for a time were attached to the New Zealand Medical Corps. Latterly, however, they were formed into a unit of their own, and their ranks were constantly growing.

On most of the transports which left the Dominion in 1914 there were dentists. In Egypt, too, the dentists were kept very busy, and afterwards their work was much more than justified when the men went to Gallipoli and their teeth suffered from the hard biscuit and sometimes bad food. At Gallipoli more than one dentist made artificial dentures immediately behind the line, and under shell fire the whole time. A man would often come down the steep paths from the front trenches towards the beach and search out the dentist's dug-out where he would have a filling put in or a tooth taken out. There is an amusing story told of one dentist's mechanic whose immediate superior had gone away to get more stores from Egypt. In the absence of the real dentist a colonel, whose men worshipped and adored him, was seized with toothache, and sought out the non-commissioned officer who was left in charge. The man explained that he was not really a dentist but a mechanic. The colonel impatiently brushed aside the objection and pleaded with the man to take out the troublesome tooth. The non-commissioned officer thereupon took the colonel to his own dug-out and made ready to operate with fear and trembling. In the meantime the men of the patient's battalion had got wind of the business, and gathered quietly but ominously outside the dug-out. Before the dentist's mechanic began the operation a spokesman called him outside and addressed a few words to him. When he returned to the colonel he was visibly unhappy and shaky. "What on earth's the matter with you?" the latter asked, "it's me that should be trembling and not you!" "Well, sir," said the embarrassed mechanic, "there's a bunch of the boys out there, and they say that if I hurt you and you let out as much as a groan they'll settle me." The colonel sat tight during the operation, a most unpleasant one where there was no anæsthetic, and all parties were satisfied.

The Featherston Camp Dental Corps was formed at the end of 1915, and it grew in about two years to a strength of thirteen officers and 39 non-commissioned officers and men. In one

month this department carried out a total of nearly 7,000 operations, including nearly 3,000 fillings, 500 root dressings, 2,000 attendances for dentures, and 559 extractions. It can easily be seen that if any New Zealand soldier



SIR THOMAS MACKENZIE, K.C.M.G.,
High Commissioner for New Zealand.

went to the front with his teeth unseen to it was his own fault.

In the neighbourhood of the camp there were all sorts of trenches and field works copied from the latest models as approved by the Imperial authorities and the men who had seen actual work in Gallipoli, Egypt, or France. There were many of these latter at the camp in the capacity of instructors, and their services were very valuable in a little Dominion where the number of men who had seen actual war before 1914 was exceedingly small.

Across the road from the big hutment area there was an auxiliary camp known as Canvas Camp, where men were sent when there was not sufficient accommodation for them in the other quarters. In this camp, too, the men were given a final training before leaving Featherston for Trentham, the last place at which they stayed before their embarkation. There was also an old camp at Tauherenikau, and this was used mainly for infantry. Specialists such as Artillery, A.S.C., Signallers,

Mounted Rifles and Machine Gunners went to Papawai Canvas Camp where they were given training in their separate branches. There were two rifle ranges there with machine-gun emplacements, and bomb trenches and instruction grounds. There were also mortars of various calibres, such as were being used at the front.

Drafts of 2,000 men were sent away every little while from the Featherston camp, and they marched across the Rimutaka range over The Summit to Trentham, about 15 miles from the capital, Wellington. As a rule when reveille sounded at some time between midnight and one o'clock in the morning, its strains, usually unpopular, were greeted with loud cheers, for there is nothing that heartens men more than the knowledge that they are about to move at last. After a good breakfast at one o'clock the men were given some time to themselves, whilst the final arrangements were being made. Then at three o'clock they



[Official photograph.]
SIR JOSEPH WARD, SIR DOUGLAS HAIG,
AND MR. MASSEY.
Photographed in France.

"humped their swags," to use a colonialism, and stepped out to the music of the camp band. It was rather an impressive march, starting, as it did, in the dark, and it meant a lot to the men who were to go 15,000 miles overseas to fight. Away towards the foothills, swinging along briskly in the cool morning air, the men sang as they went, sometimes for miles at a stretch. Indeed, it seemed a point

of honour to try to sing all the way to The Summit; at least one draft of the reinforcements accomplished this amazing feat. One says amazing feat advisedly, for the road has a grade of sometimes a steady one-in-eight, and the full kit with rifle, entrenching-tool, and rations, does not make the marching any



MAORI BUTCHERS IN CAMP.

easier. The good people of Featherston were always afoot when a draft "went over the Hill," and motor-cars and wagons awaited the troops on The Summit, where every man was given tea and as many sandwiches as he wanted. The Summit was usually reached after four hours and a half of steady uphill marching, so it will be seen that the first part of the trek, at any rate, was not an easy walk. The downhill journey was always easier, and the men stepped out until Trentham Camp, eight miles away, was in sight. It is a good march this, from Featherston to Trentham, and it takes a full 14 hours. It had one good effect, too, and that was in showing which were the men who were now fit for such a task. There were drafts of 2,000 that got to The Summit with a loss of but four men fallen out on the way, and even these joined up afterwards on the way down to the valley.

Few people in England can rightly realise the magnitude of the task that New Zealand set out to accomplish. In the whole of the Dominion there were not many more

than a million inhabitants, and from this total a force of over 80,000 men was recruited. The percentage is an even better one than appears at first glance, for in recruiting from a small colony one is faced with many new difficulties. For instance, there are only a certain number of men in each trade in the Dominion, and there are never too many for requirements. Now, if all the plumbers in the Dominion enlist, or all the coopers, or all the shearers, it is evident that an awkward situation arises. As a matter of fact, though perhaps not in these trades just specified, this is exactly what happened, and certain callings were depleted to a dangerous extent. The shearers, for instance, are all, or nearly all, young men, and all of them have to be fit for their back-straining work. They are also lovers of adventure, and many of them are of a roving disposition. Some of them shear in Australia, and later in the season go to New Zealand, fitting in some months in the Argentine in the same year. They are hardy and used to open-air work and plain food, and make ideal soldiers. In addition, the calling of soldiering attracted them, and many of them joined up in the Mounted Rifles, making some of the best material in that force. In the meantime, the Maoris had to fill their places. In New Zealand, luckily, there are few large sheds where there are not shearing machine plants installed, and it is not so difficult to teach a beginner to use the machine as it is to instruct him how to clip with the blades. Consequently, the shortage of shearers was remedied to some extent.

The Maoris themselves were always willing to fight, and when war broke out they petitioned the Government to let them form a contingent of their own. There was then some doubt as to whether it would be allowed, but when the news of the landing of the Indian troops in France was received in New Zealand, the Maoris took fresh heart, and again put their request to the Defence Department and the Government. The chiefs of the tribes came to the capital to offer the services of the men of their septs, and the latter backed them up with tremendous enthusiasm. The Maori comes of one of the finest fighting stocks in the world, and it is not much more than half a century ago since he was actually keeping at bay British troops of superior force and armament, during long months of terrible bush fighting. In the Maori War the natives showed a wonderful

aptitude for the building of scientific fortifications and stockades, and there are many ruined "pahs" throughout the length and breadth of both islands that show their ingenuity. They built fire trenches identical with those now used in France. They had no barbed wire, but they made palisades of sharpened tree trunks lashed cunningly together. Their trenches had traverses and covered ways of communication. They fought stolidly and well for a long time. A strange thing happened in the early days of 1914, when the chief of the tribe which had been last under arms against the British was the first to convey the wish of his men to serve against the Germans in any part of the world.

Ultimately a Maori contingent was formed, and it went to Egypt and subsequently to Gallipoli. It was thought better that they should be withdrawn from the attacking ranks and, with some of the Mounted Rifles, be formed into a Pioneer unit. One of the chief arguments in favour of such a scheme was the fact that they can dig as can no other troops in the British army. An admiring British general recounted his experiences when he watched the Maoris digging communication trenches on the Somme front under shell fire. "I could almost see the trench going forward across the open," he said, and it was very little of an exaggeration. They are always cheerful, and their humour is of the best. They were lent for a time to the French

Army as pioneers, and when they returned they had collected many words of French to add to an always elastic vocabulary. They are naturally fine linguists, and few, if any, of their young men in the New Zealand contingent were unable to understand English and speak it fluently and well. Many of the men in their ranks had college education, and some of them were barristers, doctors of medicine, and masters and bachelors of arts as well.

When the first Maori contingent was being formed, a deputation of Maori women came to the capital, and asked in all sincerity that they should be allowed to accompany their husbands and brothers and fight with them. They stated, and rightly so, that in the good old days the Maori "wahine" had always fought side by side with her man, and that they would be just as useful with the modern rifle as had been their grandmothers and great grandmothers with the Tower musket and the carbine. Whilst admiring the great spirit of the deputation and the women it represented, the Government was forced to refuse its request.

With the introduction of the Derby scheme in England, the demand for conscription in New Zealand was allowed to hang fire for a while, until the results in England could be seen. The movement in favour of compulsion was always latent, however, and the attitude of the men who would be called up was interesting. There was one instance where a body



MAORIS ON PARADE.

of railwaymen asked the Defence Minister for conscription, and plainly told him that they did not think it fair that they should be asked to volunteer as long as there were men equally eligible waiting and only too ready to fill their positions as soon as they got into khaki. They said they would go willingly if the measure was introduced, but they wanted their rights protected in the way stated

The movement in favour of conscription was entirely spontaneous, and there was no lead from the Government in the way of either propaganda or "poster" campaigns. The New Zealand reinforcements had hitherto been sent to the front at the rate of 1,800 every two months, but the War Council requested at the end of 1915 that this total should be increased to 2,500 a month. This was a substantial increase, and combined with the uneasy feeling with regard to the Dardanelles campaign, it had the effect of giving a fillip to the movement. At that time the War Council had stated that Britain needed 30,000 men every week, and worked out in the same proportion for the respective populations of Britain and New Zealand, the percentages of reinforcements needed by the Dominion and the mother country were almost the same. There were several objections from Labour, and the conference called by the Federation said that there should be no conscription until there was a "conscription of wealth." This was a small and unimportant protest, however, and Mr.

Massey, the Premier, said that he could not recognize the Federation's condemnation as truly representative of the feeling of Labour in the Dominion. Labour opposition in Parliament was not great, and one of the most prominent members of that section stated in the House that Labour had less to fear from conscription than anybody, a statement which followed closely on the lines of the demand made by the railwaymen to the Minister of Defence.

On May 25, 1916, the Military Service Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. It provided for general compulsion, and gave the Government power to select the required quotas either by district or general ballots. Unmarried men, and widowers without children, were to be called up first. This was New Zealand's way of celebrating Empire Day, and a far better way than had ever been thought of before.

On May 31 Colonel Allen moved the second reading of the Bill, and the occasion was taken by a Maori member to rebuke the Labour Federation leaders. He said that conscription of wealth was not a right idea, and that the Maori soldier was fully satisfied with his pay. He hoped to hear less talk about it, or else he was afraid that people would think that white men fought for money, and not for their King. The short speech was greeted with tremendous applause. On June 10 the Bill was passed and an amendment exempting religious objectors was thrown out. The third reading



LANDING AT SAMOA.

was carried by 34 votes to 4 and all the members joined in singing the National Anthem, as they had done when the announcement that war was declared reached them. A week later the Finance Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, announced that New Zealand's share in the war would soon mean an expenditure of £1,000,000 a month. The immediate effect of the new Act was to stimulate recruiting, and men who were not unwilling, but who were holding back because they knew that others were waiting for them to go so that they could slip into their jobs, joined up in hundreds.

The first adventure for New Zealand troops was the capture of German Samoa. Three weeks after the declaration of war, this little expedition was mobilized and it embarked, with mountain guns and a wireless installation on board two of the Union Company's passenger ships in Wellington harbour. Two powerful German men-of-war, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, were still at large in the South Pacific Ocean, and as far as New Caledonia the only escort available was that of three small British cruisers which were then in New Zealand waters. One well-placed shot from either of the German ships would have sent any of these to the bottom.

At the French colony of New Caledonia, amidst ever-memorable scenes, the Expedition was met by the battleship *Australia* and the French cruiser *Montcalm*. It continued its voyage to Fiji, and thence on to the port of Apia in Upolu. This town has great historical and literary interest, for it was the island home for many years of Robert Louis Stevenson. On that soil, German, American, and British blood had been shed in the various rebellions of past years. Out of that port the British warship *Calliope* steamed in the face of a hurricane, while other vessels in the harbour went to the bottom or were thrown bodily up on the reef. The New Zealanders now landed and hauled down the German flag, and on behalf of H.M. King George V. took possession of the island, and also the adjacent island of Savaii. The German governor and the leading German officials, merchants, and planters were taken prisoner and conveyed to New Zealand to be interned on islands in Wellington and Auckland harbours. German Samoa was the first enemy colony to fall in the war. The governor's place was filled by Colonel Logan, the

original commander of the Expeditionary Force.

Needless to say, the places of the German officials, the Customs officers, judges, magistrates, and even the gaolers had to be filled,



COL. LOGAN READING THE PROCLAMATION AT THE OCCUPATION OF SAMOA.

and men were chosen from the ranks of the New Zealand force to take them over. A private became chief justice, another governor of the gaol, and a corporal was made collector of customs. Some of them afterwards voluntarily relinquished these comfortable and well-paid positions to return to the ranks, so that they might proceed to the scene of real fighting in Gallipoli.

Great secrecy was maintained as to the date of departure of the Expeditionary Force. It was concentrated at the four chief towns, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. From these centres the men were sent to the capital at Wellington to be embarked on troopships. These troopships were steamers of various lines of the mercantile marine which had been taken over by the Government and converted into transports. Many of them were passenger ships whose usual run was between



TROOPS EMBARKING AT NELSON, NEW ZEALAND.



DISEMBARKING AT ALEXANDRIA.

British ports and New Zealand or between America, Australia, and the Dominion. Their elaborate fittings were taken down and stowed ashore. In some ships the tables and revolving chairs were removed from the saloon, marble or expensive wood panelling was covered up with rough pine boards, and long lines of wooden tables and benches were put in for the use of the men's mess. The partitions between many of the cabins were broken down, but the bunks were retained, and many others added. In some troopships the men and non-commissioned officers occupied the first-class accommodation of the vessel, and the only sign of the ship's former origin was often to be found in the elaborate bath-rooms, which were left unaltered.

In addition the holds were fitted out with hundreds of bunks, three and four tiers high. The refrigerating holds were in many cases the roomiest places on board, and in some of these a whole company of infantry could be accommodated. Horse boxes were built in all sorts of unexpected places. On one ship they were in the holds, in the well-decks, and on the boat deck.

The preparations for the departure of the troops could not, of course, be kept secret, for there was an army of workmen engaged on the 12 transports. So expeditiously was the work carried out that the whole fleet was ready some few weeks after war broke out. The men were then dispatched from the various ports to Wellington, the concentration centre. The wildest rumours were afloat and great uneasiness prevailed at times owing to the known proximity of the German Pacific Squadron. It was thought that the German cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were in the vicinity of Samoa, a surmise which afterwards proved correct. At length, after many delays, the New Zealand force was ready to sail. The Auckland contingent started first in two troopships, and was to meet the main body out at sea. The main body, however, remained in Wellington, and the Auckland transports, after suffering a certain amount of hardship owing to rough weather at sea, returned hurriedly to harbour. The Government had reason to suspect that the German warships were within striking distance of the Dominion, and, as it was evident that the small escort provided would be no match for their guns, the departure was again postponed.

When the troops finally left they were

escorted not only by British warships, but by a Japanese battleship, the *Ibuki*. Early one morning towards the end of October, 1914, the long line of transports, all painted a uniform grey, swung out from Wellington harbour. There had been no intimation given to the public that they were leaving, and the majority of the inhabitants of the capital were asleep when the force finally left. The only formal ceremony was the salute given by the forts near Pencarrow Head. There the flag was dipped as each ship passed. The convoy with its 8,000 men crossed the Tasman Sea to Hobart and afterwards made a rendezvous with the Australian fleet at Albany. When the joint fleets continued their journey there were two long lines with 16 ships in each.

The voyage to Colombo was not an uneventful one, for when the transports reached a point some 50 miles from the Cocos Keeling Islands the *Sydney*, one of the escorting cruisers, left them. A few days afterwards, on November 10, every ship in the fleet heard the news that the Australian cruiser had run down the *Emden*, the German commerce destroyer, which had had such a long career of immunity. The Japanese battleship *Ibuki* heard the news of the chase from the *Sydney* by wireless, and immediately unfurled a huge silk battle flag. Her commander asked, perhaps almost begged, to be allowed to assist in chasing the raider, but by this time Captain Glossop's ship had finally accounted for the *Emden*, and the German cruiser was run aground, a battered wreck, on the Cocos Island.

Undoubtedly this victory, the first serious naval operation in which a ship of the Australian Navy had taken part, lifted a great load from the minds of those responsible for the safety of the convoy. Had the luck been with the *Emden*, her brave and chivalrous commander might easily have run into the middle of the long lines of transports at night time and accounted for many of them before being sunk himself. The precautions taken hitherto, the burning of all refuse that otherwise would have been thrown overboard, the strict injunctions as to the lighting of the ships, and other safeguards, were now somewhat relaxed, and the whole flotilla arrived at Aden without mishap.

From Aden they passed up the Red Sea to Suez and so on through the canal. It was here that the Australasian troops saw the first signs of actual warfare, for at that

time the initial preparations for the defence of the canal against Djemal Pasha's threatened invasion were in progress. The banks were lined by Indian troops and men from Great Britain. As the ships went through in the night time voices from the bank enquired curiously who were the men on board, and the reply that they were Australians and New Zealanders was greeted all the way along with great enthusiasm. At Port Said, at the other end of the canal, the transports anchored to

whole long voyage of seven weeks very few of them died. Indeed, on some of the transports where it was possible, coconut matting had been laid on the decks and when weather conditions permitted the horses were exercised every day. The overseas soldiers' knowledge of veterinary work helped a great deal in reducing the death rate, and the men were untiring in their attention towards their mounts. The effect of a seven weeks' voyage on a horse, kept for the whole time on its feet, is a very



[Elliott & Fry photo.]

MAJOR-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B.,
Commanding an Army Corps.

coal, and it was there that the first actual and official intimation reached the men as to their destination, for they were told that they were to disembark and proceed to Cairo.

There was one particularly impressive ceremony as the ships left Port-Said. The crew of a French warship was gathered on the fore-castle, and as the New Zealand and Australian convoy passed they sang the "Marseillaise." The salutation was returned and the 30,000 Australasian soldiers responded with the British National Anthem. The troops arrived at Alexandria on December 4, and the work of disembarkation commenced immediately. Many of the ships carried some hundreds of horses, but so thorough had been the arrangements for their welfare, and so untiring were the efforts of the men themselves, that during the



[Elliott & Fry photo.]

MAJOR-GEN. SIR A. H. RUSSELL,
Commanding New Zealanders in France.

trying one. Their legs invariably swell, and it is only by continuous grooming and massage that it is possible to keep them fit at all. At Alexandria the men disembarked and kits and stores were got off within two days of arrival. The horses were walked down the inclined gangways almost as soon as the vessels tied up to the quay. The same afternoon the first troop trains left the seaport for Cairo, and late that evening, in the dark, the New Zealanders marched into Zeitoun Camp, about a mile from Heliopolis. The next day the work of setting up camp commenced, and before the week was ended the serious training of all arms had commenced.

In New Zealand the men of the force had been subjected to a training which they thought was severe enough, but the time

there had been too short to allow of many long route marches or attack practices. The work had mostly been confined to physical drill, bayonet exercise, and small arms exercises. Now, in Egypt, they got the first taste of the really strenuous side of soldiering in war-time. The packs of their Webb equipment were arranged methodically, and ammunition was served out. When fully dressed for a route march, each man's impedimenta weighed well over 50 lb., and it was no easy load to carry on the long desert marches over the soft sand. Most of these marches were made along the Suez road through the new town of Heliopolis. Sometimes the divisions started in the early morning, just as the sun was coming up over the desert hills. At that hour it was cool, and the start, with the subsequent march, was pleasant enough for at least an hour. After that, however, the Egyptian sun blazed down on the open road, the sand became so hot that one's feet were burnt through thick boots, rifle barrels were hot to the touch, and it was a sheer impossibility to march with a buttoned tunic.

Often these long treks culminated in an attack practice which took place sometimes twelve miles from camp. On such occasions the order was sometimes given out that water bottles must not be touched until the word was given from the head of the column. Those who have never experienced an Egyptian summer find it difficult to realise the extra-



[Bassano photo.]

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. E. JOHNSTON,
C.B.**

Killed in action.

ordinary thirst one acquires on these long treks over the desert. There were only four men who marched in comfort, and those were the four at the very head of the column. Every succeeding four trudged along in a cloud of fine white dust, which settled on hair, eyebrows and faces. The tongue and mouth became



NEW ZEALAND ARTILLERY AT ZEITOUN.

parched, and as the usual field ration consisted of bread and cheese, one's thirst by the end of the day was phenomenal. Ambulances accompanied the columns, and although many of these marches were undertaken in a temperature of well over a hundred in the shade, wherever the shade was to be found, it is safe to say that less than one half per cent. from each company ever fell out on the march.

The camp at Zeitoun grew amazingly. Enterprising Greeks, Egyptians, and Levantines contracted for the running of various canteens and restaurants. All of these were accommodated in big marquees, and it is little wonder that the wet canteen did probably the best business. English beer was sold there, but as the hot weather came and the temperature rose the price of drink rose accordingly, until obvious discontent was manifested with the management. Forcible protests had their effect, and the price dropped again. The wet canteen was an entirely new idea for the New Zealand soldier. In the Dominion no liquor of any kind is allowed to be sold in the camps or in any of the military cantonments. Indeed, protests were made by some well meaning but misguided people at home when it was heard that liquor was being sold to the troops in Egypt. The experiment was entirely justified, for in a few weeks it became evident that it was much better to supply good beer to the men in the precincts of the camp than to allow them to go farther afield and drink the extraordinary concoctions that are to be found in most bars in Cairo.

The Zeitoun camp was erected on an ancient burial ground. Indeed, the whole of the surrounding country had great historic interest. From Heliopolis to Matarieh there were obvious evidences of the old civilization. This tract was once the site of the ancient city of On, and the graves and sepulchral chambers were many of them interesting fields for exploration. In their off time many of the New Zealanders spent their hours with an entrenching tool, digging in the sand or excavating at the bottom of the masonry shafts which were dotted all over the desert. Scarabs, blue pottery beads, and other relics were frequently found. Astute Egyptians "salted" these deposits, and for a few piastres they were willing to lead you to a grave where most excellent scarabs were to be found. If you paid the money and accompanied the guide, half-an-hour's not very strenuous digging would probably bring to light a dozen or more scarabs, which if taken to a dealer would cause amusement to one party and discomfiture to the other. These objects were made by the bushel in Austria and Germany before the war, and were palmed off on the unwary in this and other equally well-considered ways.

While in Egypt the New Zealanders were given enough leave to enable them to see a great deal of Cairo and the surrounding country. Trips were even arranged up the Nile, to Luxor, and many of the men availed themselves of the facilities offered by the Egyptian State Railway.

With the advent of this huge Colonial force



NEW ZEALAND MOTOR AMBULANCES AT HELIOPOLIS.



NEW ZEALANDERS LEAVING CAIRO FOR THE CANAL.

came a number of surprises for various people in Egypt. For a little while after their arrival it was distinctly stated that such hotels as Shepherd's and the Continental would be out of bounds except for commissioned officers. The men of both the Australian and New Zealand forces greatly resented this prohibition. Such rules had never been imposed on them in their own country. Also they knew that they had the money to spend at such places. The pay of the New Zealand soldier, as a private, was 5s. a day, and as many of them were men with private means they took no notice of the attempted restriction. Crowds of privates and non-commissioned officers invaded the bigger hotels, and in a matter of a few weeks the authorities responsible for the mandate realized their mistake, and the proprietors of the hostelrys saw new and large avenues of profit opened up for them.

Most of the training of the New Zealand troops was carried out in the desert some miles from Heliopolis, and the native inhabitants of Cairo, amongst whom there had been a certain unrest, seldom saw the forces working in mass. It was arranged that they should be given an opportunity of seeing the overseas troops, and a march through Cairo was arranged. Hitherto the natives had only seen the men of the British regiments, and they could easily account for their coming to Egypt. They were at a loss, however, to understand from whence came these Southerners. Nor could they

account for their physique. The march took place on December 23, 1914, and for the better part of a day without cessation the troops streamed through the main streets of Cairo, on through the Mouski and the old quarter, to the music of their own bands. The sight was a most imposing one, but its effect on the Egyptians was extraordinary. Any military display usually attracts them, but this exhibition of armed force did not please them so much. That it had a good effect was evident to the authorities, and the lesson received was the means of curing many of the more active malcontents and propagandists. In the old quarter of Cairo the troops marched four abreast through streets so narrow that even a donkey in the roadway held up the column. The Egyptians sitting in their shops, the coppersmiths, the saddlers, the carpet-sellers, indeed all the tradespeople and craftsmen, betrayed little interest in the spectacle. Marching near the head of the column one could see that some of them did not even raise their eyes from their work, and that those who did look up betrayed a sulky anger rather than any interest.

It was at Zeitoun that the word "Anzac" was invented. Whilst the New Zealand troops were in training there they were joined by other units of the Australian force from Mena camp near the Pyramids. This additional force encamped at the Aerodrome at Heliopolis and were placed under the command of General



ANZAC DAY IN LONDON: NEW ZEALANDERS ON THE MARCH TO WESTMINSTER ABBEY.

April 25, 1916—the anniversary of the landing of the “Anzac” troops in Gallipoli—was celebrated by a memorial service in Westminster Abbey, attended by the King and Queen and a great number of survivors of the campaign.

Godley. Their addition brought the strength of both bodies up to that of an army corps, and it was necessary to have some convenient title which could be adopted for signalling and general purposes. The full title of the corps, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, was much too cumbersome, and a clerk in one of the headquarters offices hit upon the word "Anzac," formed from the initial letters of the full title, as the most convenient designation.

At the beginning of February, 1915, rumours of a move of some sort began to spread round the camp. The infantry of the New Zealand division were the first to leave Zeitoun. All spare kit was packed and stored in the quartermasters' marquees and every man saw to his actual field equipment. The infantry entrained at Pont de Koubeeh station for Ismailia, where they again detrained. Ismailia is the town on Lake Timsah about half way between Suez and Port Said. The canal here broadens out into a great salt-water lake. Rumours in Ismailia were even more rife than in Cairo, and it was evident that Djemal Pasha's long threatened attack on the great and important waterway was in train. At Kantara and out from El Ferdan there had been patrol encounters with the advance forces of the Turkish army. Our aeroplanes had discovered large units of the invading force coming from the direction of El Arish, and it was more or less evident that a conjoint attack would be made at several points at once.

The New Zealand infantry brigade went into camp below Ismailia station and for some time they were kept hard at work doing the same training to which they had become accustomed in Cairo. Every little while news came to hand as to the movements of the Turkish forces. Espionage was undoubtedly common, and desert Arabs more than once crossed the canal westward bringing with them news of Djemal's force.

Early one morning definite news arrived, and the New Zealanders proceeded to El Ferdan Gare, a point some six miles north of Ismailia. At this station there was a Gurkha post manned by two double companies under Colonel Boisragon, V.C. They were dug in securely on the eastern or Turkish side of the canal, and some of the New Zealanders were sent across to bivouac there for the night. A Gurkha patrol had that morning surprised a Turkish cavalry vedette and had succeeded in

scattering it and bringing in one prisoner. From the high ground on the western bank of the canal the movements of the enemy could now be plainly seen. A camel train loaded with engineering impedimenta appeared over the crest of a distant hill, only to be lost sight of again in one of the numerous nullahs which abound in that district. Nevertheless, artillery fire was opened on the spot and it was subsequently found that it was successful, to some extent at least. These isolated posts along the canal were strongly and ingeniously fortified with barbed wire entanglements and trip wires to which were attached flares and Verey lights. The Gurkhas themselves, and indeed all the other Indian troops along the canal, were tremendously keen for action.

On the evening of February 1, 1915, as the two platoons of the Canterbury (N.Z.) Infantry were making arrangements to cross the canal to strengthen the post of the 2/10th Gurkhas on the eastern bank, the first shot of the attack was fired. H.M. sloop Clio, moored to the bank some miles up the canal, steamed down to a point about 800 yards below the Canal Gare of El Ferdan. Aeroplane reconnaissance had revealed the Turkish forces on the high hills about a mile and a half out from the post, and the Clio registered with a few preliminary shots. A few minutes later she settled down to steady firing, and the shells could be seen bursting on the desert near the Turkish emplacements, which had been "spotted" earlier in the day. The New Zealanders were gathered below a bank at the back of the Gare when the first retaliatory shot came from the Turks. At first it sounded as if the driving band of one of the Clio's shells had come loose and was ricocheting over the desert. This impression did not last more than a few seconds, however, for the first shell landed within a few yards of the railway station. A second came nearer the waiting infantry, and a third and a fourth lobbed straight into the big Canal Station building. It was evident that the Turks were ranging on this building, and it must be said that their shooting was remarkably good for the extreme range at which they were firing.

This shelling did little more harm than to interrupt several games of cards and scare a Levantine telegraph operator into a state of tremendous excitability. He immediately approached the headquarters staff, requisitioning for sheet iron, sand bags, and a shovel.



ANZAC DAY IN LONDON.

Left to right: General Sir Newton Moore, General Sir William Birdwood, and Major-General Richardson (Officer Commanding New Zealand Forces in England) on their way to Westminster Abbey.

These were supplied to him, and when daylight came in the morning he was nowhere to be seen. He had dug himself deep into the earth, and had taken all his instruments with him. Any messages to be sent had to be taken underground, for he would not emerge as long as there was a Turk within miles of the canal.

The New Zealanders were ferried across the canal by the men of the Gurkha regiment. It was their first baptism of fire, and it could not have been a better or milder one. It was the first time since the South African war that a New Zealand force had been under fire of any description, and it is safe to say that that evening will not be forgotten for a long time by those who were fortunate enough to be present at El Ferdan. The New Zealanders slept that night at the Gurkha post behind the entrenchments, but the attack did not develop until the next night, when Turkish infantry advanced to the canal bank, about a hundred yards south of the post. They fired volley after volley into the Canal Gate building and peppered the railway station. When the first volley came a number of New Zealanders were standing on top of the bank, and as the bullets

whistled over their heads they ducked in the way that every man does when he is first under rifle fire. Afterwards for many months they were to get so used to the Turkish rifle fire at Gallipoli that they were often made to take cover with difficulty.

It was evident that the attacking force thought that the Canal Building was fortified. As a matter of fact it was not. The Turks missed the Gurkha post entirely, and it was difficult for the men there to fire without a certainty of hitting the New Zealanders, who were by this time back again on the west bank. The firing went on for about an hour, and during that time coloured flares and lights could be seen out in the desert along the invaders' front. These lights seemed to denote the position of different units, and when the battlefield was searched afterwards flags of corresponding colours were found. In the morning there was nothing to be seen of the small force which had come right up to the canal bank. There were numerous paper cartridge boxes, clips, and remains of food, and farther out in the desert the Gurkha patrols found many rounds of ammunition and some

officers' equipment in a position which had been shelled severely by the Clio and the 19th Territorial Lancashire battery. This attack was little more than a feint, but it might have been a dangerous one if the High Turkish Command had chosen to make it in force. There was the railway to be cut, and the water pipes which supplied the troops all along the bank. When the shelling started the Indian troops were set to dig in this pipe line, and in a remarkably short time it was covered with some feet of sand, and proof against anything but a direct hit.

In the morning of the next day two platoons of the Auckland Infantry relieved the Canterbury men, and the latter marched back to Ismailia in a howling Hamsin wind. The sand was blowing in clouds across the desert from the Turkish side of the canal, and it was impossible, marching along the railway line, to see more than a few sleepers ahead. The march seemed an interminable one to the men, but camp was reached at last. All the time there came down on the sand-laden wind the sound of heavy gun-fire, and it was evident that the battle was still in progress somewhere to the south. This was the case, for the Turks

had chosen to advance that morning with the Hamsin blowing at their backs. Aeroplane reconnaissance was impossible for a while, for the desert was covered with a swirling cloud of stinging sand, under cover of which the troops could move unseen. It transpired that the actual attack had taken place that morning on the Toussoum-Deversoir line at the northern end of the Great Bitter Lake. Two other platoons of the Canterbury Infantry had been there to take an active part in the attack, and it was at Toussoum that the New Zealand force suffered its first casualties in the war. One private died of wounds, and a company sergeant-major was hit in the shoulder by the nose-cap of a Turkish shell fired from a long range.

The actual attack dates from the night of February 2, when the 25th Turkish Division began its advance towards the Ferry Post at Ismailia and Toussoum. They actually reached the canal at about 3 a.m., preceded by the bridging companies and engineers. The New Zealanders entrenched on the opposite side of the canal saw indistinct forms moving about on the eastern bank. Far out in the desert coloured lights and signal rockets were being



GALLIPOLI DAY AT THE NEW ZEALAND HEADQUARTERS IN ENGLAND. General Sir William Birdwood decorating Sergeant Tavender with the Distinguished Conduct Medal, Sir Thomas Mackenzie, High Commissioner for New Zealand, is on the left.

fired at intervals, and it was obvious that the movement against the canal was this time a serious one. A little farther south, at Serapeum, more pontoons and rafts made from oil cans were carried to the edge of the canal. The formation of the canal bank and the terrain for some miles back was utterly unfavourable for the Turkish advance. At Toussoum, where the actual attack took place, the bank was high and in places rather precipitous. Loose, soft sand had first to be traversed before the pontoons on their heavy wagons could be brought to the water's edge. Undoubtedly the operation of launching of pontoons had not been fully considered by the invaders. The boats themselves were about 30 feet long and 6 feet wide, with a draft when fully loaded with men of perhaps two feet. They were made of galvanized iron, and fitted with thwarts and rowlocks, the latter being padded with slips of cloth so that they might be rowed noiselessly. There was no provision made to keep them afloat in the event of their being perforated by rifle or shell fire, and consequently when they were first launched in the water the New Zealanders and the Indian troops on the bank opened up machine-gun and rifle fire which had the effect of swamping nearly

all of the pontoons. None of them got across.

In the early light of dawn the Turks could be seen entrenched, if the word is permissible, behind small head-cover mounds hastily scraped up with their German entrenching tools. They were in several parallel lines beginning at the canal bank and reaching back for perhaps a mile. These lines of infantry made excellent targets for the warships in Lake Timsah, and even for the torpedo boat No. 043. This craft, small as she was, was too long to be able to turn in the canal, consequently she dashed between the two big lakes, and each time she passed the Turkish positions raked them with fire from her three-pounder gun and her 45 maxims. The New Zealanders witnessed one interesting incident which took place in front of their position. The officer in charge of the torpedo-boat saw some Turkish pontoons lying neglected on the bank. He decided that it would be a good idea to go ashore and blow them up, and to this end manned a dinghy and rowed to the bank. Assisted by a petty officer, he laid a charge in each pontoon, but before igniting the fuse he went to the top of the bank to survey the desert beyond. All



Official photograph.

SORTING OUT TURKISH PRISONERS AT EL ARISH.



FETCHING WATER.

this was in plain view of the New Zealanders who, although they were unable to warn him, could see that he was marching straight towards an occupied Turkish trench. Whether it was that the Turks were too astonished to fire, or that they suspected some stratagem, will probably never be known, but the fact remains that the naval party was down off the high bank and running along the flat beach before the enemy riflemen could collect themselves sufficiently to fire. The officer and his men rowed back to their craft under a perfect hail of machine-gun and rifle fire.

In the meantime, the New Zealanders had found that their position was not a particularly good one, and they decided to shift towards a belt of pines farther south. They moved across the open within 100 yards of the nearest Turkish riflemen, and took up their new station without a single casualty. This incident, and others during the day, went to show that the Turks invariably fired high. Turkish batteries on the hill Katayib el Kheil put in very good shooting, but never once found the artillery which was concentrated on them. In Lake Timsah the *Requin*, a French battleship with 10·8-in. guns, enfiladed the lines of Turkish infantrymen, and sought out the con-

centrated forces farther back in the desert. The *Swiftsure* was engaged in the same work. A desultory rifle fire was kept up for some time, but by early afternoon it had died down entirely. The warships in Timsah were still firing spasmodically, and patrols were sent out from the Ferry Post and from Toussoum. These reported that the Turkish forces had broken off action definitely, and were going north again after having abandoned much of their impedimenta. New Zealanders going over the battlefield that afternoon found some hundreds of Turkish dead. Lying amongst these was one German officer, and documents on his person showed that he was a Major von dem Hagen, attached to Djemal's staff. He had certainly been a very gallant man, and more than once he was in evidence on the canal bank. Indeed, it was within a hundred yards of the canal that he was killed and buried. A small wooden cross made from the pole of a battered Turkish waggon was set up over his grave. Indian fatigue parties scoured the battlefield and buried the many dead. Shallow graves were made into which the bodies were put, but the Hamsin that was still blowing made the work useless, and it had to be done again later in the week. The whole of the desert from Sera-



[N.Z. official photograph.]

A NURSES' GARDEN-PARTY AT A NEW ZEALAND OFFICERS' HOSPITAL IN FRANCE.

peum up to Timsah was littered with rifles, bayonets, cartridge boxes, and all the debris of a routed force.

Hundreds of boots were strewn all over the desert. Apparently the Turkish infantry when they attacked had removed their boots. Why they did so was not known at the time, but it was said afterwards that one of the reasons was that they were unused to them, and after the long march, with their goal in view, had decided that they were unnecessary. Information from prisoners at the time went to show that orders had actually been given that the storming troops who were to cross in the pontoons were in any case to go barefooted, so that their boots would not make a noise on the iron bottoms of the boats. There were many pontoons which never reached the water. Others got part way across, and were sunk by concentrated machine-gun fire. The torpedo-boat mentioned above blew great holes in others lying on the bank, and the only Turks who crossed were two men who swam over, and for a few days hid themselves near Ismailia. The whole of this operation was carried out with only two casualties to the New Zealand force. Beside the body of the dead German officer, von dem Hagen, were found a white flag and staff. The flag was about 2 feet square, and had rings on one side of it, so that it could be threaded on the stick. There have been many conjectures as to the use of this flag, and in fairness to the dead enemy officer it

might be said that similar flags of different colours were found at various parts of the line, and, as has been stated, these colours corresponded with the colours of the signal rockets used at night on the same sectors. On the night of the attack at Toussoum white rockets were fired. The German officer had a white flag and this seems to indicate that there was no idea of using it for purposes of surrender, as was more than once stated. The Punjabis and pioneer troops of the General Reserve took part in this attack, and the Indian troops on the eastern bank of the canal received the surrender of 6 officers and 251 men. The New Zealanders were the only white infantry engaged in any of these actions, although Australian engineers did splendid work in throwing bridges across the canal. The next morning a reconnaissance was sent out along the line of the Turkish retreat. Yeomanry and Imperial Service Cavalry guarded the flanks, and the infantry of the New Zealand force marched steadily in the direction of Katia and Gebel Habita. When about 6 miles out from the Ferry Post, the cavalry scouts discovered large bodies of the enemy bivouacked in a nullah. This force evinced an inclination to fight again, and, as it largely out-numbered the troops of the reconnaissance party, the latter did one of the quickest marches on record back to the canal.

It could hardly be believed that this was Djemal Pasha's great attack. The whole affair

from the point of view of the defenders had seemed so tame, but without question it was the long threatened invasion that was intended. Captured orders found on German and Turkish officers were illuminating and droll in their construction. One of these orders started by detailing men, the sick and unfit, to look after spare kit, such as overcoats and bedding, before the attack started. It gave the order of the attacking troops, mentioning regiments by name and number, and it stated with delightful optimism that no shot was to be fired on the eastern or Turkish bank of the canal. Officers of companies were to examine the rifles of their men to see that they were unloaded. It then continued: "On reaching the western or enemy bank of the canal, rifles will be charged, and any parties of the enemy met with will be dispersed." Unfortunately, parties of the enemy were met with on the eastern bank, and the brushing aside programme was thus upset. The same order actually stated that there would be German warships to assist the invading force in Lake Timsah. Undoubtedly this had deceived the men of the attacking troops—who were for the most part a rabble of tired, ill-equipped, thirsty, and half-starved soldiers. That evening, as they huddled together under

guard in the New Zealand camp near Ismailia station, their condition was so obviously miserable that they were given food, cigarettes, and warm drink by their captors, attentions which they were at first inclined to doubt. After this attack all question of a serious invasion of Egypt vanished for a time. The defences of the canal which had hitherto been built on the very banks were pushed out into the desert and entirely reorganized.

The New Zealand infantry and the Australians who had arrived too late for the actual fighting entrained again and were sent back to Cairo. Arrived there, they took up their old quarters and continued their training.

The next episode in the history of the New Zealanders was their departure for Gallipoli, and in the first days of April they again struck camp and proceeded to Alexandria, where they went on board the transports waiting at the quay. Some of these ships were captured German liners, such as the *Lützow* and the *Derrfänger*. Unescorted, they steamed from Alexandria up through the eastern Mediterranean to Lemnos, where delay in the equipment of some of the transports necessitated a halt of about a fortnight.



[N.Z. official photograph.]

NEW ZEALAND HOWITZER BATTERY ON THE MARCH.



THE TURK'S COUNTRY.



HEADQUARTERS "DUGOUTS" AT ANZAC.

Mudros harbour in those days presented a wonderful spectacle. There were hundreds of ships of every class, laden with troops of all nationalities and stores of every kind. There were battleships, cruisers, submarines, and torpedo-boat destroyers, British, French, and Russian, anchored in the wonderful harbour. During the fortnight's waiting the men of the New Zealand division were exercised ashore

and given rehearsals of the landing operations from open boats. On April 24 the whole force of transports steamed out of harbour to the music of cheers from the anchored French and British battleships that remained behind. All that night on a glass calm sea they steamed northward, until, just before dawn, they reached the waters lying off the bay that was afterwards to be known as Anzac.

On April 25, in the early morning, while the mist still hung about the slopes of the Peninsula, the actual landing was begun. It has been described in detail many times. Most of the incidents have been thoroughly chronicled, but to those who went ashore afterwards a wonderful spectacle was presented. The still laden troopships anchored close in shore, and from their decks, with the aid of glasses, men could see the advancing waves of khaki-clad infantry rushing from the beach towards the foot hills, or winding slowly up the steep paths towards the positions afterwards known as Quinn's Post, Courtenay's Post, and Walker's Ridge. All the time the bombarding fleet was firing steadily. Every now and again Turkish shells from concealed guns high up above Anzac lobbed uncomfortably near the transport. So close were some of them that the ships had to move farther out. The New Zealanders on that day almost invariably became merged with the Australian battalions. For a while all regimental order was lost, and men from both colonies fought side by side under any officers who happened to be in the vicinity. During the whole of the long eight months at Gallipoli the New Zealand troops fought steadily and well. The men of the Maori contingent, which had been left behind in Cairo, joined them and distinguished themselves in a desperate night attack during August of 1915. The Maoris had been given a difficult objective, and they had been told that their attack was to be carried out as quietly as possible. So thoroughly did they take their instructions to

heart that long after there was any necessity for it; they still fought with the bayonet and the butt of the rifle. Possibly there was some reversion to the manner of warfare of their ancestors, for certain it is that many a Maori that night went into the thick of a *mélée* with his rifle clubbed like the *tiaha* of his ancestors.

The work of the force on Gallipoli is well known and has already been dealt with. The part undertaken by the New Zealanders in the landing, in the fighting at Helles, and in the subsequent trench warfare that developed at Anzac, established their reputation. It was a period of trench warfare in which primitive bombs manufactured by the men themselves from jam tins, filled with various explosives, fuses and scraps of metal, and a very limited number of trench mortars, played a very important part. The mining operations, especially at Quinn's Post, were an interesting feature of the succeeding weeks. The nature of the country on the New Zealanders' front lent itself to digging, and miles of communication trenches and ordinary trenches were dug. These were all dry and clean, and such as would have delighted the inhabitants of the firing line in the wet and muddy wastes of Flanders. Their only drawback was the smell from the decaying bodies buried in their vicinity or lying out in No Man's Land, and the consequent plague of flies that made life a burden and spread disease throughout all ranks. Dysentery and jaundice became epidemic and claimed probably more victims than the Turkish bullets. The heat was intense, and the water bad and



THE DAY AFTER THE STORM: IMBROS.

the food poor. There was one brief spell for the New Zealand troops when they were taken to Lemnos and it had the effect of sending them back fitter men in every way.

There was one small and subsidiary expedition from Anzac in the first week after the landing, but it was one which had far-reaching results. The Turkish shell fire had been very accurate,



STORES ON THE BEACH AT TABLE TOP, GALLIPOLI.

and the hidden field guns lobbed numbers of shells along a zone of sea reaching out perhaps a mile and running the full length of Anzac. It was thought at first that this fire was controlled by guesswork and that the gunners could not see any of their targets. Soon, however, it became evident that there was an observation post somewhere which could command a good view of the tows of boats coming in from the transports or the warships. Search was made, and at Nibrunesi Point earthworks were discovered and figures once or twice seen moving about. A warship attended to the trenches and dugouts, but the figures were seen again, and a further discovery was made when it was found that a telegraph wire led away from the place towards the Turkish main position. As bombardment from the sea did not seem to make any difference to the observers, it was decided to send some of the Canterbury Infantry to clean up the danger-spot. They were taken up early in the morning in a destroyer and landed from open boats at the beach below the point. The surprise was perfect, for the Turk was asleep and had not yet been called on by his headquarters to "spot" for the morning hate. The men tumbled into the dugouts and the trenches and killed and captured the whole detachment. The telephones and other means

of communication were destroyed and the station dugouts demolished by the naval men.

For some time after this the Turkish fire was not as accurate as it had been when their observers sat at the point and sent word back to the batteries as to the fall of every shot along the beach. This little party to go to the point was the first to land to the north of Anzac. The next landing there was made when the Suvla force attempted to cut the Turkish communications and failed.

The Suvla landing followed, with the attacks by the Anzacs and other British troops on Sari Bair and points farther south along the old line. To the New Zealanders fell the honour of gaining the heights of Chunuk Bair—ground that was subsequently lost by another unit. Depleted by their previous losses in battle and weakened by disease, the little force was not altogether in a fit condition for storming such tremendously difficult positions, but it acquitted itself as usual with great credit, and succeeded in gaining and holding the highest point taken by British troops in the whole of the Gallipoli campaign. In the preliminaries of this fighting the Maoris and the mounted men acquitted themselves well, and the latter in particular afterwards did magnificent work in the region of Hill 60 on the left of the Anzac position.

As everyone knows, the Suvla attack failed, and after a good deal of hesitation the abandonment of the whole campaign was decided upon. In the evacuation the New Zealanders had a difficult part to play. They had to retire from the steep heights in the face of an enemy dominating the position and everywhere in close touch on to an open beach that was within range of the enemy field pieces, and even of his machine-gun and rifle fire.

To withdraw under these circumstances was a military manoeuvre of the greatest difficulty and daring. Sir Ian Hamilton had by this time left the Peninsula, and the entire operations were in the hands of General Birdwood. General Sir A. J. Godley, who had Colonel (now General) White as his chief of staff, was in command of the Anzac Corps. General Sir A. H. Russell had taken over General Godley's command of the New Zealanders. Gradually, under cover of the darkness, the force was withdrawn from the trenches till only a few men remained, and by cunning subterfuges a semblance of the usual activity was maintained, the Turks being entirely deceived.



"DUGOUTS" CONSTRUCTED BY WELLINGTON MOUNTED RIFLES.

It was not till the whole Anzac force got clean away that the enemy realized what had happened. Next morning, when the force was well on its way across the *Ægean*, his guns were still busy shelling the abandoned beaches.

At the evacuation the New Zealanders played no small part, and the last troops to leave, nicknamed the *Die-hards*, exercised all their ingenuity in the manufacture of devices




TABLE TOP, GALLIPOLI.

calculated to deceive the enemy. The actual evacuation was gradual, and men were withdrawn from the line a few at a time, until there were only perhaps 100 holding a front which had hitherto been defended by some thousands. Even when the last man had come down to the beach and had embarked, desultory firing was still being carried on from the abandoned position. For days before the actual evacuation the New Zealanders had been testing rough and ready devices which made this possible. In some cases rifles were embedded in the parapet, a string was tied to the trigger, and from this string hung an empty tin can. Above this can was another filled with water, and with a hole in the bottom. The water dripped slowly out, filling the lower tin until the weight of it pulled the trigger of the rifle. These were known as "the Heath-Robinson stunts," but they proved particularly effective. Other devices for delaying the Turkish advance to the beach once the evacuation had been discovered were also thought out. Trip wires attached to mines, tins of provisions with bomb effects, mined paths and trenches, occupied the attention of the engineers for days, and undoubtedly discomfited the Turks when the latter discovered that the birds had flown.

In common with all the wounded of the first few days the New Zealanders had unenviable experiences in getting back to Egypt. Hospital ships were crowded, and auxiliary accommodation had to be arranged for in the same ships that had brought the troops to the Peninsula. One of the captured German liners had over a thousand wounded on board, and she was in no way fitted to be used as a hospital ship. There was a dearth of doctors, anaesthetics and disinfectants, and bandages and other medical stores ran out. The wounded were placed in long lines on the open decks, and the more severely injured men were attended to and fed by the walking cases. Luckily the journey back to Alexandria was not a long one, and few ships took more than 50 hours to



CARRYING SHELLS.

get to the Egyptian port. Once there the men were landed in remarkably quick time, carried by stretcher bearers of the Indian Medical Corps to the waiting Red Crescent trains and rushed to Cairo. In the Egyptian capital news of the heavy casualties had caused some alarm and misgiving. But the European population, and the majority of the natives who were able, did all in their power to make the lot of the wounded men more easy. The number



ANZAC, SHOWING LONG SAP.

of wounded actually received in the first few weeks was many times in excess of the total arranged for. The people of Cairo sent food, bedding and clothing, made bandages, swabs, and dressings, and banded themselves together as an emergency aid detachment for work in the hospitals. It was largely owing to their wonderful work that the death rate in the hospitals was not much greater. A New Zealand hospital was in full working order a few miles from Cairo at Pont de Kubbeh, and the Australians took over the Heliopolis Hotel, one of the biggest hotels in the world. Notwithstanding these arrangements, men of all units had to be sent to the first hospital at which beds were available. The extraordinarily hot weather of the following May, June, and July made hospital work very

difficult for doctors and nurses, and life almost insupportable for the patients themselves. Wounds healed very slowly, operations were dangerous and difficult, and often doubtful of success. The ubiquitous flies made things more objectionable, and it was soon found that the more wounded that could be taken to Malta, or even home to England, the better. The seaport of Alexandria was much more favourable as a hospital base, and the men who were sent there had a better time than those who had to stay in Cairo. Until the evacuation, however, wounded were sent back to Egypt, and before the Peninsula was finally abandoned weather conditions in Cairo had become much more pleasant.

After the evacuation the New Zealand Division again went into camp in Egypt, and



A DUMMY BATTLESHIP AT IMBROS.



TELEGRAPH OFFICE AT ANZAC

the next operation of any magnitude in which they were engaged was the campaign against the Senussi in the Libyan plateau. A unit of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, newly arrived in Egypt, took part in this, and were merged in the Eastern Frontier force, a truly Imperial army, composed of English Yeomanry, South Africans, Australians, New Zealanders, and Indians. This was the first warfare in which the Rifle Brigade had engaged, but they acquitted themselves splendidly. They had been trained to a very high pitch, and were, many of them, men who had even longer training than the original force which went to Gallipoli. Their first serious action came on Christmas Day 1916, when they met the forces of the Grand Senussi at Gebel Medwa, just a few miles south of the little coast town of Mersa Matruh. The enemy fought extraordinarily well, and the day finally ended with a hand-to-hand encounter between the men of the New Zealand Brigade and the Sikhs and the Arabs. The latter were finally driven from the crest of the hill into a rocky valley lined with natural caves. Here the Senussi's men took refuge. Many of them stood at bay in the caves, and the New Zealanders fought a strenuous and difficult action before they were bested. Often the riflemen

had to penetrate the caves at great disadvantage, for they were fired at from the darkness, themselves plain targets up against the light. A great number of camels were captured, many of them laden with merchandise, many head of cattle fell into the hands of the British troops, and more than one New Zealander rode a captured camel on the way home after the action.

The New Zealanders arrived once more in Egypt minus most of their equipment, and encamped in the desert in the canal zone near Lake Timsah. They at once began to refit and train preparatory to taking part in the impending operations against the Turks who were still menacing the Canal Defences. The mounted men got their horses again, and were soon engaged in patrol work in the desert.

Amongst the quaint exploits of the New Zealand mounted troops there is one that surely has few parallels in military history. The incident occurred in the early stages of the campaign against the Turks in the Sinai Peninsula, when the first successful attack was made in the direction of El Arish. The forces engaged were very large, and comprised many mounted New Zealanders. The mounted troops had an important part to play, and together with the Camel Corps and

British and Indian Cavalry and Yeomanry, they scoured the desert for miles in front of the advance. When the actual contact with the enemy took place they formed again in regiments, and the wonderful line they made, miles from end to end and many squadrons deep, will never be forgotten by those who saw it. This phalanx of mounted men marched against the Turkish positions, and the action which

took place has been already recorded. In one sector of the battle front a Turkish machine-gun detachment was giving trouble and there was also constant and troublesome fire from infantry lining a ridge in the same portion of the line. The Mounted Rifles are not cavalry, and their chief asset is their quick mobility. They travel on horseback and fight afoot, and usually when they are required to go into



GENERAL GODLEY AND LT.-COL. HEATON RHODES (NEW ZEALAND COMMISSIONER) IN SHRAPNEL GULLY, GALLIPOLI.

action the horses are held by the number three of each four some distance in the rear. On this occasion, however, an officer of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles conceived a great idea. The Turks were lining the ridge above his men and the ground leading up to their position was at an easy slope. He gave the order to fix bayonets on horseback, and the whole yelling squadron charged the Turks with their rifles held lance-wise. The manoeuvre was an emphatic success, and those of the enemy that were not bayoneted gave themselves up only too willingly. Instances of this sort are rare, but it seems to bear out what Sir Ian Hamilton once said in New Zealand about these mounted men. "There is nothing that I should like better," he said, "than to lead them against European infantry over reasonably broken ground."

In Egypt there was a complete reorganization of the First Anzac Force, and towards its completion the news that the Australians and New Zealanders were about to proceed to France was jointly acclaimed. Both officers and men were delighted with the prospects of fighting against the real enemy on the Western Front.

The transport of the expedition across the sea for the fourth time was accomplished without the slightest hitch. Troopship after troopship poured out men, guns and horses at Marseilles, and the men marched through the streets of the French town and entrained amidst scenes of great enthusiasm. They found themselves in Flanders, and General Birdwood and his staff came with the first Anzacs. General Godley remained and followed close on his heels with what afterwards became the second Anzac Corps.

After a short spell in the back area the New Zealanders went into the trenches at Armentières, and quickly transformed that sector of the long battle line in France into a scene of turmoil such as it had not known for many a long day. The artillery became busy, the infantry improved the trenches and dugouts and proved themselves adepts in the art of modern raiding then in process of development. They quickly got the German snipers down, and in all the arts of war practised on the Western Front in those days proved themselves more than a match for the German foe.

The first big operation in France in which New Zealand troops took an important part



BRIGADIER-GENERAL BROWN INSPECTING NEW ZEALANDERS IN FRANCE.

was the Somme offensive of 1916. The capture of the German lines from near Delville Wood to beyond Flers in September 1916 was an operation which earned these troops much praise from Sir Douglas Haig. The taking of Messines, in June, 1917, under the higher command of General Plumer, was perhaps the most methodical offensive of the war up to that time; it was the New Zealanders who took Messines village.

The New Zealand Forces lost two generals in the fighting in France, Brigadier-General C. H. J. Brown, D.S.O., and Brigadier-General Francis Earl Johnston, C.B. The former was killed at the battle of Messines by a shell which burst low overhead and killed him instantly. His loss was greatly felt, for he was thought very highly of by the higher commands and by his men. His funeral was a simple and a touching ceremony. The General's two sons, both in the New Zealand force, stood bare-headed at his grave in the Flanders cemetery where he was buried within sound of the guns. When the notes of the Last Post had died away the officers and men present went back to their work again in and behind the front line.

General Johnston was killed on August 8. He also met his death instantaneously, as the result of a shot from a concealed German sniper. He was the eldest son of the Hon. Charles Johnston, Speaker of the Legislative Council. He was born in 1871 and belonged to the North Staffordshire Regiment. He saw service with the Dongola Expedition in 1896, receiving the medal with clasp, and in the South African War, when he was given both King's and Queen's medals with five clasps, and mentioned in dispatches twice. He was appointed to the command of the first New Zealand Infantry Brigade when it left New Zealand, and at Gallipoli and afterwards in Egypt and England did valuable work. In 1915 he was made a Commander of the Bath.

By the middle of 1917 the organization, strength and *moral* of the New Zealand force after three years of war were higher than ever before. General Richardson, C.M.G., who was appointed to control the administration of the large camps and hospitals in England, organized them on lines of his own, which proved extraordinarily successful. Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.M.G., took over the command of the force in France, General Chaytor that of the troops still in Egypt. The administra-

tion of the whole Expeditionary Force was handed over to Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Godley, K.C.B., who sailed with it from New Zealand, and was given command of an army corps

Everything that could possibly be done to keep up the efficiency and *moral* of the men on the Western front was done. The artillery of the Dominion troops acquired great efficiency, and the medical service received much commendation. The training undergone behind the lines in keeping the men fit, and the special work undertaken in preparation for operations played no small part in subsequent successes in the field.

The force had scarcely got into the trenches in France, before divisional canteens, a cinema, and a divisional theatre were in full swing. The New Zealand Pierrots, almost all amateurs, with an excellent orchestra, earned a reputation amongst other units than their own. They played to crowded houses on week-days and Sundays, and the admission fee of half a franc for men and one franc for officers, helped materially to swell the canteen funds. On the eve of the battle of Messines, this concert party played in a theatre in a battered town, into which the German 5.9 shells were landing, and over which our own shells were speeding to far beyond the German front line. The baths through which thousands of men passed every week were in the same village, and not many days later they were completely destroyed by enemy shell fire. Fortunately, not many men were using them at the time, and the casualties were lighter than they might have been. Two of the regimental bands had their instruments destroyed by shellfire.

Horse shows were held under the very eyes of the enemy, and officers' chargers were ridden past the judges and limbered wagons rumbled round the ring to the music not only of the brass bands, but of British and German guns. An amusing communication was received from the Flying Corps after the first of these horse shows. It appears that a German 'plane had sighted the crowds and had thought that some concentration of troops was taking place. Following his report, the enemy artillery put in some very heavy work and generally upset the men in the front line. The Flying Corps sent a laconic message which said, "For God's sake stop holding horse shows."

A large number of French women were engaged in a big washing and mending estab-

ishment and there were bootmaking and even watch-repairing shops in the unit. Sports meetings attracted hundreds of competitors and thousands of spectators, the swimming sports especially proving popular. The Rugby football team had an unbeaten record. The Maori fifteen took a day off while they were digging in the guns for the French army, and inflicted a crushing defeat on a team from a Welsh division which had some famous players in its ranks.

The hospital ships from the Dominion ran regularly on their 12,000 mile journeys, and a stationary hospital that originally lost all its equipment and several of its nurses and other personnel as the result of the launching of an enemy torpedo subsequently did most valuable work, first at Salonika, and later at Amiens. Its quarters in France were daily pounded by German heavy shells and bombarded by enemy airmen.

Although she cannot be called a New Zealand vessel, the battleship *New Zealand*, which was bought by the Dominion Government and presented to the Imperial service, was always looked upon by New Zealanders as in part their property. When, in 1913, she paid a visit to New Zealand, Captain Halsey, afterwards Fourth Sea Lord, was in command. He was presented with several gifts by representative Maori chiefs, including a green-stone tiki and a feather mat and piupiu, or flax kilt. The *New Zealand* was very actively engaged in the Dogger Bank battle, and it was a quaint thought which impelled the Captain to wear these gifts in the conning-tower during the action. At the best of times, the conning tower is hot and stuffy, but Captain Halsey kept on the feather mat and kilt throughout the whole action. His ship inflicted great damage on the enemy, and the men of the crew as well as the officers were tremendously impressed with the luck which the Maori gifts had brought them. Captain Halsey left the *New Zealand* to join Admiral Jellicoe's staff, and another captain was appointed in his stead. Then came the battle of Jutland, and the new commander was informed what was expected of him. Officers and crew insisted that he also should wear these mats and the tiki, and the captain, nothing loth, and perhaps with something of

the superstition of most sailors, climbed into the conning tower with the ceremonial garments of a Maori chieftan over his blue serge uniform. Again the *New Zealand* had phenomenal luck. She received no serious hits, but gave many hard knocks. It was the rule that these gifts should be handed on from Captain to Captain, and the chances of any new commander's going into action without this rustling kilt and gorgeous feather cloak were small. The story of the use to which they were put was told to the chiefs in New Zealand, and by them to the men of their tribes. At least, in their minds, there was not the slightest doubt that what they call "mana" and what the Navy man calls "joss" was attached to them in an extraordinary degree.

There was another small cruiser which the New Zealand Government acquired as a training ship, but she had her guns removed from her in 1916, but before that time did valuable work in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The training ship *Arahura*, in Wellington harbour, supplied many boys for the Navy and the armed Mercantile Marine, and her acquisition and fitting out as a Naval school were more than justified.

There was still a great deal of money in New Zealand during the war, and the donations to charity were perhaps on a larger scale per head of population than in any part of the Empire. New Zealand contributed £15,000 per month to the relief of Belgium, this from a population of just over 1,000,000. The people of the Dominion contributed spontaneously £2,000,000 (or an average of £2 per head) up to the end of 1916, for the relief of sick and wounded soldiers.

Early in the war the New Zealand Government saw the necessity for finding employment for the discharged soldiers by means of land settlement. Arrangements were made for placing at least 5,000 of them on their own holdings. Land was set aside, the men were given financial assistance, agricultural implements, seeds and stock. Before the end of 1916, there were men in the Dominion, returned unfit for further active service, who were already showing a profit on their farming of the Government grant.

CHAPTER CXCIX.

DUTCH NEUTRALITY: 1914-1917.

THE FEAR OF WAR IN 1914—THE DUTCH FRONTIER—MILITARY PRECAUTIONS AND MOBILIZATION—A "STATE OF WAR"—CONTRABAND AND DUTCH SUPPLIES—THE RHINE ACTS—THE NETHERLANDS OVERSEA TRUST—SMUGGLING—THE GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR—OUTRAGES ON DUTCH SHIPPING—THE MARIA—THE MEDEA—THE BANDOENG—THE TUBANTIA—THE BERKELSTROOM—THE BLOMMERSDIJK—ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS GERMAN LAWLESSNESS—DUTCH INTERNMENT CAMPS—GERMAN AIRCRAFT OVER DUTCH TERRITORY—THE BELGIAN DEPORTEES—GERMAN PROPAGANDA—ECONOMIC PROBLEMS—TRADE AND THE BLOCKADE—FOOD DIFFICULTIES—INDUSTRY AND FINANCE—CONDITIONAL PROSPERITY.

THE position of the Netherlands at the outbreak of the war was one of extreme difficulty, the geographical situation of the country rendering it peculiarly liable to entanglement in the conflict. A glance at the map will show that the whole of the Netherlands eastern frontier, from Groningen in the north to the southern extremity of Limburg in the south, lies open to invasion from Germany. Moreover, as soon as Belgium was occupied by the Germans, the Belgian frontiers of the Dutch provinces of Zeeland, North Brabant, and Limburg were exposed to the same danger. Up to the time of the war the Dutch thought little of such a contingency. The assassination of Francis Ferdinand, however, compelled attention to the possibility of international complications, and when matters moved rapidly to a crisis the situation was viewed with consternation. Holland is a country with proud naval and military traditions. Her attachment to freedom is proverbial. She could not therefore look on unconcerned when the territory and liberties of her southern neighbour were violated. Moreover, the possibility of Holland herself being drawn into the war, a development which it was desired above all things to avoid, created the greatest alarm among the population.

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Queen Wilhelmina, whose devotion to duty and personal interest in affairs of State were those of a model sovereign, was at her country residence, Het Loo, when the crisis occurred. Her Majesty, evidently desiring to be in close touch with her advisers, travelled on July 27 to The Hague. On the same day the first conference of Ministers took place. The Ministry consisted of nine members, of whom M. P. W. A. Cort van der Linden, Minister of the Interior, was President of the Council, Jhr. Dr. John Loudon was Foreign Minister, Major-General Bosboom Minister for War, and M. J. J. Rambonnet Minister of Marine. The Ministers immediately took measures in view of the danger of war. The discharge of time-expired men from the landweer was postponed as well as the drafting of men from the militia into the landweer. Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Snijders was appointed commander of land and sea forces, the rank of general being conferred on him about the same time. On July 30 the landweer frontier and coast guards were called up.

On the same day a Royal resolution was passed suspending a Royal resolution of October 30, 1909, which regulated the admission of warships of foreign Powers to Dutch territorial waters. The resolution of July 30, the object of which was to safeguard Dutch

neutrality, provided that during the time that the earlier resolution should be inoperative warships or ships assimilated to them of foreign Powers should not be admitted to Dutch territorial waters. Such territorial waters were stated to comprise coastal waters for a distance of three nautical miles, and in the case of inlets a distance of three miles from a line drawn across the river at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 miles. According to this provision, the Dutch territorial waters



QUEEN WILHELMINA.

include the mouths of the Scheldt, Meuse, Lek, Waal, and Rhine. Two and a half years later, when the German submarine war in all its ruthlessness had been proclaimed, the resolution of July 30 was seen to have unexpected importance, for it was in virtue of its provisions that armed merchantmen of the United States, at that time not one of the belligerents, were refused access to Dutch waters.

These preliminary measures were followed on July 31 by a general mobilization. In the early afternoon of that day a Royal

command was issued calling on "all men belonging to the militia and landweer to come up speedily" owing to danger of war. It produced a panic which for the time being paralysed the peaceful activities of the nation. Many people, acting as if the country were already besieged, laid in large stocks of provisions. The mobilization was successfully effected in three to four days, and reflected credit on the military authorities and all concerned. The consequences of the withdrawal from civil life, however, of large numbers of the most useful men in the community at once made themselves felt. Railway traffic was almost suspended, and work in many industries ceased altogether. Anxiety lest prices of provisions, which, indeed, in the first days rose to an alarming height, should produce famine was general, and was accompanied by fear of unemployment with consequent loss of wages. For a few weeks there was great interruption in transport. Such perishable goods as eggs, tomatoes, grapes, and peaches could be bought for a fifth of their normal prices, while many kinds of vegetables were given away or left by the farmers to rot, as it would not pay to take them to market.

The Second Chamber met on August 3. The politicians of the Netherlands in general are animated by sentiments as diverse as those of corresponding parties elsewhere. Not less impressed, however, than the masses of the population by the gravity of the situation, they rallied round the Government, showing themselves able to sink party differences and to unite in asserting the nation's preparedness to defend its independence to the utmost.

Holland declared her intention to remain neutral, and the population recovered its customary calmness when it saw the prompt measures taken by the Government and the support which the latter received from Parliament. The President of the Council was fortunate in having at his side M. Treub, the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, by general admission one of the ablest statesmen in Holland. Thanks largely to the exertions of M. Treub, who subsequently became Minister of Finance, confidence was soon restored and the dislocation of the nation's economic life in great measure overcome or prevented.

By August 5 some parts of Holland had already been placed in a "state of war," and on August 10, when the Germans had made



M. P. W. A. CORT VAN DER LINDEN,
Minister of the Interior.

progress in Belgium, a "state of war" was proclaimed in the southern provinces of Limburg, North Brabant, and Zeeland, as well as in a part of Gelderland. On August 29 various frontier communities near Belgium were placed in a "state of siege"* and on September 8 the mouths of rivers were declared to be in a "state of siege," while a "state of siege" was also proclaimed in all the frontier communities as well as in those lying on the sea coast. This placed the postal service, the telegraph, and telephone in the hands of the military authorities. Various naval measures were also adopted. The channels between the Wadden Islands, north of the Zuiderzee, were barred by mines. Mines were also placed in the Scheldt, but a channel

* In the case of a "state of war" authority passes largely from civil into military hands, though the military must still discuss matters with the civil authority. The "state of siege" goes considerably farther.

was left open for merchant vessels in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1839. The ships taken through this channel were piloted by Dutch pilots. In September, 1914, the treaty of 1839 had an important bearing in relation to Antwerp, when the British authorities desired to remove 50 German and Austrian vessels. Permission to do this was refused, a similar refusal being subsequently given to the request of the Germans that they might take vessels out. In spite of this refusal, the Germans attempted to get some vessels through the Scheldt, but these were interned.

One immediate effect of the war was the paralysis of the shipping activities of Rotterdam, where the docks were soon in a state of stagnation. Thousands of ships with forests of masts made this usually busy port present



DR. JOHN LOUDON,
Foreign Minister.

an appearance of idleness never seen before in its history.

No sooner had the war broken out than the question of contraband arose. Among the most important contraband articles are breadstuffs. As Holland herself can only produce supplies for a very limited time she was threatened with starvation if all breadstuffs were prevented from reaching her ports. On the other hand, if they were not so prevented there was the



HOLLAND AND HER FRONTIERS.

danger that they might be sent to Germany and Austria. Several neutrals, to show their good faith, promised that their subjects should not forward contraband commodities. A peculiar difficulty arose, however, so far as Holland was concerned, since, while her Government undertook that breadstuffs should not be sent to belligerents, and ensured this by purchasing such supplies as reached the country, it was faced by the Rhine Acts. In virtue of these Acts Holland was obliged to allow passage through to Germany by the Rhine of such consignments as arrived on a through bill of lading or on the order of a merchant declaring that they were in

transit, or on proof by document of the transit. The Rhine Acts bound Holland. Had she not observed them she might have been regarded as unfaithful to her declaration of neutrality, with the consequent danger that Germany would regard her action as justifying war. The Allies were therefore compelled to intercept suspected cargoes before they entered Dutch territorial waters. Otherwise the Dutch Government would not be able to prevent goods arriving under the Rhine Acts from being sent to Germany. It was feared in Holland that the whole oversea trade of the country would be brought to a standstill. A number



GRAIN ON THE WAY TO WAREHOUSES AT SLOTEN, NEAR AMSTERDAM.

of Dutch ships were held up by the British and French authorities.


Demands for advice and assistance were received from all quarters by the Committee for Netherlands Trade, which had established itself on September 21, 1914, under the presidency of M. C. J. K. van Aalst. The committee conceived the idea of establishing a company to which Dutch traders could consign their imports and which would give a trustworthy guarantee to foreign Governments that the imports should not benefit the enemy. It was hoped, therefore, that these Governments would have no difficulty in allowing the goods thus consigned to pass through to Holland. This plan matured and the Netherlands Oversea Trust Company, generally known as the N.O.T., assumed very important proportions. It cannot be said that it was entirely successful. Loud complaints were made early in its history of violations of the undertakings entered into. The system of guarantees and fines was not proof against the high prices offered for certain commodities by the Germans, who as a part of

the consideration for the purchase were quite ready to pay the fines imposed by the Trust. Large quantities of goods were smuggled over the Dutch frontier by land and by water, but the methods of smugglers being essentially devious and secret it was difficult to trace their supplies to their source. Heavy fines were inflicted by the N.O.T. from time to time, and that body itself admitted, in speaking of the system of checking practised by it, that "the initiated have to their sorrow assured us with great emphasis that this checking is not superfluous." The sentence speaks volumes.

Smuggling was no new thing in Holland. It was extensively practised in Napoleon's days. In answer to a complaint of the smuggling practices of the Dutch made by Napoleon to his brother Louis, the latter replied, "Sire, comment voulez-vous empêcher la peau de transpirer?" The saying was often recalled during the war. At the outset, when imports began to fall off, smuggling was carried on openly, in broad daylight, but later, repeated complaints having been made, greater control was exer-



LOADING GRAIN FROM THE BARGES ON WAGGONS AT SLOTEN.



DR. M. W. F. TREUB,
Minister of Agriculture and afterwards of Finance.

cised, and this illicit traffic was then carried on under cover of darkness in woods and along unfrequented paths. In the last quarter of 1916 11,000 persons were punished for smuggling offences. This was at a time when, as the punishments themselves show, measures had been taken to combat the abuse. What its proportions must have been during the earlier stages of the war, when the supervision of the frontiers was extremely lax, can only be conjectured. As a conviction for smuggling was not locally regarded as carrying with it a moral stigma, the regulations of the authorities were without the support of public opinion. The smuggling proclivities of the people increased with the prices, which rose to many times the former value of the commodities in demand. These were principally rubber, wool, worsted, silk, oil, soap, butter, coffee, flour and bread. At one time cows and horses were also smuggled across the frontier.

One of the first to expose the traffic in contraband was the Amsterdam newspaper, *De Telegraaf*, which forced the matter on public attention and by constant agitation was largely instrumental in moving the authorities to action. Notwithstanding all measures, however, smuggling continued throughout the war, though it was somewhat reduced in extent by two factors in addition to the action of the Dutch Government. One of these was the intensification of

German submarine warfare, which, by hampering oversea traffic, prevented imports into Holland, and thereby necessarily diminished the quantity of commodities available for surreptitious export to Germany; the other was the more stringent application of the Entente blockade. By degrees it was found necessary to limit the supplies allowed to reach Holland from overseas to the quantities needed for her domestic consumption. Even these, in many cases, were destroyed by German submarines.

The Dutch, being a maritime nation, naturally watched with great anxiety the developments of the war as they affected their shipping interests. Although, as will be shown later, Dutch shipping prospered greatly in consequence of the war, as soon as hostilities broke out Dutch navigation encountered all the



M. C. J. K. VAN AALST,
Chairman of the Netherlands Oversea Trust
Committee.

dangers due to the presence of mines and other risks incidental to naval warfare. The long list of Dutch ships lost and damaged until the end of January, 1917, tells its own tale. Some of these ran on mines, but in many cases the vessels were destroyed by the Germans. It is necessary, in order to convey a fair idea of German naval methods as they affected Holland, to give some notable examples of the action of the Germans taken from official Dutch records, the more so as nothing during the war aroused public opinion in Holland more strongly. When

these incidents occurred they almost monopolised the attention of the nation, while the deep feeling created by them was reflected in Parliament and the Press.

The Dutch steamer *Maria*, with a cargo of wheat from the United States to Belfast and Dublin, was sunk on September 21, 1914, by the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, after the crew had

increased when, on February 4, 1915, the waters round England, Scotland and Ireland, including the Channel, were proclaimed a "war area" by Germany. This was the beginning of the ruthless submarine war. Germany announced her intention of destroying, on and after February 18, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the region indicated "without its



THE CREW OF THE MEDEA AT DOVER.

been placed on board the German transport ship *Crefeld*. Although the Dutch Government protested against the sinking as contrary to international law, the protest was not productive of any satisfaction from the Germans. Foodstuffs, being conditional contraband, are liable to seizure if there is evidence to show that they are destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government Department of the enemy State. In the case of the *Maria* the vessel was sunk without the Germans having ascertained whether the grain was destined for the British Government or armed forces. The British Government therefore felt that they would be justified in adopting measures of reprisal, if necessary, by declaring foodstuffs to be absolute contraband.

The dangers to Dutch shipping were greatly

being always possible to divert from the crews and passengers the dangers thereby threatening them."

The Germans alleged that the British Government had abused neutral flags and that neutral ships would therefore be exposed to danger if they entered the region in question, since they might be mistaken for enemy ships.

The Dutch Government, in its reply, made a strong protest against the proclamation. It pointed out that when, on November 3, 1914, a proclamation was made by the British Admiralty declaring the whole North Sea to be a military zone where navigation would be exposed to grave dangers, the Netherlands Government had protested against this as contrary to international law. It added, however, that up to that date, February 12,



GERMAN SUBMARINE BOUGHT BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.

1915, the British decree had in no way affected Dutch navigation. Now that the German Government came forward with its new proclamation, the Netherlands Government once more claimed its right to free navigation in the free sea. It maintained that abuse of a neutral flag, against which the Dutch Government had protested, could not diminish the responsibility of the German Government, since the examination of the vessel before seizure and destruction was a duty which no belligerent could evade. "If it happened that a Dutch vessel became the

victim of a mistake on the part of the German forces, the responsibility for it would fall on the Imperial [German] Government." In the following month a case occurred which attracted much attention, as illustrating the arbitrary action of German submarine commanders. On March 25, 1915, the Dutch vessel *Medea*, on the way from Valencia to London, was sunk by a German submarine, U 28, near Beachy Head, after the crew had had time to save themselves in the boats. The vessel was exclusively laden with oranges and tangerines. The submarine towed the two boats for a quarter of an hour and then left the occupants to their fate. The case was brought before the Prize Court at Hamburg, which justified the action of the submarine commander, but declared that ship and cargo were not seizable, and that the owners were entitled to compensation. This decision was reversed on appeal. The German Government considered that the Declaration of London gave it the right to sink neutral prizes laden with contraband. The Dutch Government held firmly to its standpoint that the destruction of a neutral prize was in all circumstances an illegal act and that the prescription of the Declaration of London allowing, by way of exception, destruction of neutral prizes, could not be regarded as established international law. It also maintained its opinion that even according to the prescriptions of the Declaration of London invoked by the German Government to justify the action of its Navy, the destruction of the *Medea* was illegitimate. Its offer to submit the case to international arbitration was rejected by the German Government.



A CAPTURED GERMAN MINE

In this, as in other cases, there was a conflict of testimony between the submarine captain

and the Dutch captain. The Netherlands Government preferred to accept the sworn testimony of the latter.

Another incident which gave rise to diplomatic correspondence was the bombardment of the Dutch steamer *Bandoeng*, on June 29, 1916. This vessel was on its way from Sabang to Rotterdam when it was fired on by a German submarine. According to a German Wolff Bureau *communiqué*, the *Bandoeng* was signalled to stop by flags, the signal being given at a great distance. The Dutch Government affirmed that, if that signal was made, it was not observed, the submarine being at the time at the distance of from five to six sea miles. An officer on board the *Bandoeng*, who reported the presence of a submarine to the captain as soon as it appeared on the horizon, was unable to discover any signal or flag. The first shot was fired while he had gone to tell the captain that a submarine was in sight, and was quickly followed by a second and third. After this five more shots followed, eight in all being discharged in 10 minutes. The *Bandoeng* with great difficulty made out a signal to leave the vessel as quickly as possible. This would have justified the submarine commander in supposing the vessel to be an enemy ship. The captain therefore displayed two Dutch flags and proceeding slowly tacked two points in order to approach the submarine without steering straight for her, so as to enable the commander more easily to recognize the neutral character of the ship. While this was being done the five projectiles referred to were discharged, the last bursting very near the ship and causing damage. The Dutch Government, on April 3, expressed its conviction that the precipitate conduct of the captain of the submarine in

question was not conformable to his instructions and its confidence that the German Government would disapprove of that conduct and be disposed to reimburse the cost of the damage done. The German Minister had meantime, on April 1, sent a letter to the Netherlands Foreign Minister declaring that the submarine had given an order to the *Bandoeng* from a great distance to stop and that, instead of doing so, the ship had come at full speed at the submarine, which caused the captain to suppose it was an English vessel under a neutral flag, and that he fired on it for these reasons. With a view to preventing such unfortunate misunderstandings in future, the German Government suggested that Dutch captains should be instructed immediately to conform to signals given to them by the German Navy, and that the danger they ran in steering directly at a submarine should be pointed out to them. Replying on June 28 to the Dutch report submitted on April 3, the German Government threw the blame for the occurrence, which it regretted, on the *Bandoeng*, for which reason it was sorry it could not comply with the Dutch Government's request for compensation for the damage done.

On March 16, 1916, consternation was caused by the news of the torpedoing of the *Tubantia*, the finest vessel of the Royal Holland Lloyd's fleet, and the pride of all Dutchmen, because of her size and her luxurious appointments. She was sunk off the North Hinder lightship while outward bound from Amsterdam to Buenos Aires. Although a denial that the ship was sunk by German instrumentality was immediately made from the German side, the Dutch were convinced that the *Tubantia* had been destroyed by a German submarine. The



DUTCH DESTROYERS BRINGING IN THE BOATS CONTAINING WOUNDED FROM A TORPEDOED DUTCH VESSEL.



THE DUTCH STEAMER COLUMBIA,
Mined or Torpedoed.

Dutch Government itself shared the view that she had been sunk by a torpedo, basing this conviction on the testimony of two witnesses who saw the bubble-track of the projectile before the explosion. The Dutch Government thereupon instructed its representative at Berlin to ask the German Government to inquire as speedily as possible whether a German warship was responsible for the destruction of the ship. The German Government had meantime denied that the disaster was caused by a German torpedo boat, submarine or mine. A similar disclaimer was forthcoming from the Austro-Hungarian Government. The British Government also repudiated responsibility for the disaster. The Dutch Government placed the German Government in possession of the evidence of the officers and crew of the *Tubantia*, which showed that the ship had been struck by a torpedo. When in two of the boats of the *Tubantia* taken up by a Dutch vessel pieces of metal were found, and these, of which one was discovered to bear an impressed mark, were recognized by the Dutch naval authorities as presumably having belonged to a *Schwarzkopf* torpedo, the German Government was informed of this and an appeal was made to it to assist in establishing the identity of the torpedo. A Dutch specialist was sent to Berlin to submit the pieces of metal to the German authorities, and while he was there the result of an investigation by divers was forwarded to him to assist in the inquiry. The result was that the German naval authorities recognized that one of the pieces of metal came from German torpedo No. 2,033, which was discharged without effect on March 6 at a British warship. They denied that it had been fished up again, adding that on the night of March 15-16 no German submarine or other

German warship had been within 10 sea miles of the place where the *Tubantia* was sunk. A report was simultaneously made tending to show that the explosion might have been caused by a drifting torpedo. This explanation, however, did not account for the presence of the bubble-track of the torpedo, which two witnesses testified to having seen, for a drifting torpedo would have caused no bubble-track. Moreover, the original documents on which was based the statement that the torpedo was discharged on March 6 were never submitted to the inspection of the Dutch authorities. In the end, as the matter was not satisfactorily cleared up by the inquiry, the German Government, at the suggestion of the Dutch Government, assented to an international commission of inquiry into the manner by which the *Tubantia* came by her end, but stipulated that the commission should not meet until after the conclusion of peace.


Another fine Dutch vessel, the *Palembang*, was lost on March 18, 1916. No proof of her having been torpedoed was found, but in hardly any case was it established with greater certainty that the torpedoes which sank that ship were fired by a German warship. The Germans did not show any disposition to meet the Dutch Government in regard to an inquiry into this case.

On April 6, 1916, an explosion occurred on board the Dutch steamer *Eemdijk* while on the way from Baltimore to Rotterdam, when the vessel was some five miles south-west of St. Catherine's Point. The *Eemdijk* was towed to Southampton. The crew could not state the cause of the explosion, but fragments of steel and yellow copper were found on board the vessel by the British authorities and examined by the Dutch naval authorities, who came to the conclusion that they were pieces of a torpedo. The facts were laid before the German Government with a request that it would institute an inquiry as to whether the *Eemdijk* had been torpedoed by a German submarine. The German Government later replied that it had caused a minute inquiry to be made into the matter, but that it had not led to the conclusion that the damage was caused by a German torpedo. It declined to subject the pieces of metal found to an investigation, holding that it could not attach any value from the point of view of proof to their presence on the ship when it came into the power of the British authorities, even if they were admitted to

have belonged to a German torpedo. The German Government was approached with a view to the submission of the Eemdijk case to an international commission of inquiry, as was agreed on with regard to the Tubantia. It appeared, however, that nothing was to be expected from the German Government in this respect.

On April 7, 1916, the day following the explosion on the Eemdijk, an explosion occurred on the Rijndijk near St. Mary, Scilly Islands, 20 miles from Bishop Rock. The Rijndijk was on the way to Rotterdam with a cargo of

to sink the vessel. When the crew had left the Berkelstroom one of the submarines proceeded to destroy her, while the other towed the three boats towards the North Hinder lightship. On the approach of a British aeroplane the submarine dived, after having attempted to undo the towing cable, which, however, remained attached to her. By cutting the cable immediately, the crew of the Berkelstroom prevented the boats from being dragged under water. The Dutch Government, in protesting, said that the greater part of the cargo of the Berkelstroom was cardboard,



AMSTERDAM HARBOUR.

wheat from the United States. In the vessel, which was not sunk, pieces of a Whitehead torpedo were found. In this case the German Government, after an inquiry, admitted that the vessel had been struck by a torpedo from a German submarine from a distance of 2,000 metres, adding that the submarine commander had been reprimanded, and that it was prepared to make compensation for the damage done.

On April 24, 1916, the Dutch ship Berkelstroom proceeding from Amsterdam to London was stopped by the German submarine UB 18, the commander of which, after examining the papers, said he would take the vessel to Zeebrugge. After consultation, however, with the commander of another German submarine, which had arrived in the meantime, he decided

which was not contraband, while the rest neither in weight, value, volume nor freight constituted more than half of the cargo. The destruction was therefore undoubtedly illegitimate, both from the standpoint of the Declaration of London and from that of the German rules relating to prizes. It was without any excuse or extenuating circumstances. When the captain of the Berkelstroom protested against the sinking of the ship, pointing out the foregoing facts and offering to throw overboard everything susceptible of being considered contraband, the commander of the UB 18 replied, as the captain and second officer of the Berkelstroom swore, that *all* merchandise conveyed towards England was contraband and that *every* vessel proceeding towards that country would be sunk. In reply the German Government refused to admit

the justice of the Netherlands protest, referred to the case of the sinking of the *Medea*, and declared that the sinking of neutral vessels in the conditions foreseen by the Declaration of London was perfectly justified. It denied on the testimony of its two submarine captains the statement attributed to one of them by the captain of the *Berkelstroom* above quoted, and declared that "it was improbable, as it would have been perfectly contrary to the explicit instructions given by the German maritime authorities and to the manner in which German naval forces make war." The Dutch Government maintained its attitude and declared its

however, "If, with regard to the pretended remark of the commandant of the submarine, the Dutch Government believes it ought to base its opinion exclusively on the depositions of the captain and the second officer of the *Berkelstroom*, that is a view which the German Government could not adopt. It believes, quite contrary to this, that it must hold above all to the reports made by the commandant of the submarine in the exercise of his functions, which he is bound by oath to fulfil."

The repeated German denials of the accuracy of the statements of Dutch captains did not create a good impression in Holland, where it



HON. SIR ALAN JOHNSTONE, G.C.V.O.,
British Minister at The Hague,
1910-16.



[Elliott & Fry.]
SIR WALTER TOWNLEY, K.C.M.G.
succeeded Sir Alan Johnstone as British Minister
at The Hague.

belief in the sworn testimony of the captain and second officer of the *Berkelstroom*.

The German Government replied to the Dutch Government that in its opinion the legality or illegality of the sinking of the *Berkelstroom* depended solely on whether the contraband by its value formed more than half the cargo. It added that the decision of this question belonged in the first place to the jurisdiction of the German prize court which was seized of the matter. The German Government would therefore await the judgment of that court, and reserve to itself the right to return to the matter. It added,

was not forgotten that in March, 1916, very persistent reports were rife that two members of the directorate of the Holland-Amerika line, when visiting Hamburg shortly before on shipping business, were informed by Herr Ballin that Germany's policy was to prevent all traffic between the United Kingdom and European countries, whether neutral or not. These reports were denied by Herr Ballin at the time, but subsequent events proved their accuracy.

Moreover, when the Dutch steamer *Blom mersdijk*, with wheat for the Dutch Government, and other cargo consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust, was sunk on October 8,

1916, while on her way from America to Rotterdam viâ Kirkwall, the captain of the German submarine committing this act declared, according to the statement of the captain of the Blommersdijk, that he would sink every vessel proceeding to England. This was communicated to the German Government, which once more replied that there must be a mistake, and that the commander of the submarine declared he had not said anything of the kind. Public opinion in Holland was greatly incensed by the sinking of the Blommersdijk, and the German Government, apparently recognizing the injury done to the German cause by this occurrence, promptly agreed to make good the damage. It did not, however, censure or disavow the action of its submarine commander.

At this time there was an agitation in Germany in favour of more ruthless submarine warfare. The first campaign of recklessness in 1915 had been more or less effectively countered by British measures, but in February, 1916, the Germans made renewed threats, based on their growing belief in the increasing efficacy of the submarine. The recrudescence of violence by German submarine commanders in the months immediately following these renewed threats is illustrated by the attacks on Dutch shipping mentioned above. There was, however, again a subsidence in submarine activity due to the intervention in April, 1916, of President Wilson in the Sussex case. By July, however, German confidence in sub-



DR. R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN,
Dutch Minister in London.

marine warfare began to grow stronger and the agitation for its ruthless prosecution more vehement, while the risks of a rupture with the United States were regarded in some quarters as less serious than those attending the non-employment of all the means of warfare available to bring the Entente Powers to sub-



GERMAN SUBMARINE INTERNED IN HOLLAND.



DUTCH VESSEL PAINTED AS REQUIRED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

mission. It was while this agitation was in full progress that the *Blommersdijk* was sunk.

Two months later, on December 12, 1916, the German "peace offer" was made. It did not meet with acceptance, and it was followed by the third phase of submarine activity. This was prefaced on January 31, 1917, by a Note from the German Minister at The Hague, Herr Rosen, to the Dutch Foreign Minister, stating that for 2½ years England had made an illicit use of her naval power, with the criminal aim of subjecting Germany by starvation.* She had also by her desire for domination accumulated evils on the world with contempt for the most sacred laws of humanity, for the protests of the neutrals, which were gravely affected, and even for the tacit desire for peace of her own peoples and of those of her Allies. The German Government could not assume the responsibility of not employing all means to hasten the end of the war. The German Government, in order to serve humanity in an exalted sense and not itself to commit a great fault in the eyes of its own people, must take advantage of all weapons to prosecute the

struggle forced upon it for the defence of its existence. It therefore saw itself obliged to remove the restrictions thus far imposed on the conduct of warfare at sea. It announced the new prohibited area, and the exceptional decision made in the interest of passengers and postal traffic from Holland to England between Flushing and Southwold, with an indication as to how the ships maintaining this service should be distinguished.

M. Loudon replied on February 7, 1917, pointing out that while, by the German measures announced, a free way remained in the North Sea for Dutch shipping, in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, on the other hand, passage was completely barred between Port Said and the course from Gibraltar to Greece, so that the way to the Indies, so important in the interests of Holland as a colonial Power, was cut off. He recalled the Note of November 16, 1914, addressed to the British Minister against the designation of the North Sea as a military zone; and the memorandum of February 12, 1915, against the declaration by the German Government of a great part of the North Sea and the Channel as a war area. Where both the above-mentioned cases gave occasion for a protest from the Dutch Government it felt itself obliged with the more

* Herr von Kühlmann, before the war Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, became German Minister at The Hague in March, 1915: he was succeeded in November, 1916, by Herr Rosen.

reason to protest with the utmost energy against a system not only extended to much wider regions, but also comprising the intentional attack on neutral ships whatever their cargo or destination, and without distinguishing whether their presence in the region indicated was voluntary or due to circumstances independent of their will. Even if the German Government stamped the measures it had just taken with the name of blockade, the destruction without mercy of neutral ships proceeding to or leaving a neutral port was contrary to the law of nations, which only recognized *confiscation* and not *destruction* of vessels which tried to force the blockade. Moreover, the term blockade, which the German Government had rightly avoided employing, clearly could not apply to the immense extent of sea comprised in each of the two zones of military operations indicated in the memorandum: It could do so all the less that, from the point of view of international law, the blockade was directed solely against traffic to ports of the adversary, and in no way against direct navigation between two neutral countries. The German Navy had received orders to destroy in the zones mentioned all ships which it might meet, without making the slightest distinction between those going to or leaving an enemy port

and those travelling between two neutral ports without touching an enemy port. The Netherlands Government, faithful to the principle which it had constantly upheld during the war, could only see in the destruction of neutral ships by belligerents a violation of the established law of nations, to say nothing of the violation of the laws of humanity if it took place regardless of the safety of those on board. The responsibility for the eventual destruction of Dutch ships in the regions in question and for the loss of life thereby occasioned would fall on the German Government. Its responsibility would be particularly heavy in the cases to be foreseen, wherein these ships would be obliged to enter the zone of danger by compulsion on the part of warships of the enemy which exercised the right of search.

Similar correspondence passed between the Netherlands and the Austro-Hungarian Government. The protest, however, did not prevent the extreme measures decided on by the Central Powers, and the ruthless submarine warfare with all its attendant horrors became a constant feature of German naval operations.

Another matter which gave rise to diplomatic correspondence was the question of a ship's flag. This was raised in October, 1915. By Article 57 of the Declaration of London the



CLOTHING THE MEN OF THE CRESSY, ABOUKIR AND HOGUE.

neutral or hostile character of a ship is determined by the flag which it is entitled to carry. The British Government issued on October 20, 1915, an Order in Council, the effect of which was to render this article inoperative, and a French Decree having, as the Dutch Government gathered, the same intention was promulgated a few days later. The Netherlands Government protested against this action of the Allied Governments. The matter had a very practical bearing, as on October 30, 1915, the *Hamborn*, flying the Dutch flag,

out by the British Foreign Office that tungsten, vanadium, rubber, and other articles of extreme value both intrinsically and in virtue of their military use might be and actually had been sent in this way, and it was known that Dutch firms were in the habit, before the Allied Governments adopted the line of action which gave rise to the protest, of exporting by these mails to the United States large and valuable consignments of goods of enemy origin, such as furs.

The British Government explained that its action was based on the distinct presence of



DUTCH CHILDREN SINGING TO INTERNED BRITISH SAILORS ACROSS A CANAL.

was requisitioned by the British and taken to Halifax (N.S.). The Dutch Government protested that this was contrary to international law as the flag covered the ship. The shares of the *Hamborn* company, however, were the property of two other Dutch companies, of which the shares were in German hands.

The Netherlands Government protested, among other things, against the treatment of Dutch parcels and letter mails by the British authorities. This was a sore point with the Dutch, whose newspapers contained indignant articles denouncing the British seizure of Dutch mails as arbitrary and illegal. It was pointed

out by the British Foreign Office that tungsten, vanadium, rubber, and other articles of extreme value both intrinsically and in virtue of their military use might be and actually had been sent in this way, and it was known that Dutch firms were in the habit, before the Allied Governments adopted the line of action which gave rise to the protest, of exporting by these mails to the United States large and valuable consignments of goods of enemy origin, such as furs.

Much inconvenience was caused to the Dutch fishing industry by mines, and by the taking of trawlers to Germany or Great Britain, as the case might be, but the wilful destruction of fishing vessels by German submarines caused greater indignation than any of the other hardships.

While the Dutch did not follow the example



GERMAN AIRMEN LAND IN HOLLAND NEAR THE FRONTIER.

of President Wilson in regard to the unrestricted submarine war, which adversely affected Holland more than almost any other Power, the great majority of Dutchmen approved of his action. There can be no doubt, indeed, that the sympathies of many of the Dutch who were not strongly in favour of either group of Powers was forced on to the side of the Entente by the misguided ruthlessness of German submarine commanders.

Dutch experience of submarine warfare began early in the war. On September 22, 1914, three British cruisers, the *Cressy*, the *Hogue*, and the *Aboukir*, were sunk in the North Sea.* Great assistance was rendered by the Dutch in the saving of life on this occasion and much tenderness was shown to the rescued men taken to Dutch ports. A nice question arose out of this incident as to the legal position of the survivors taken to Holland. It was at first assumed that they must be interned, and it would seem that had they been rescued by a Dutch warship this would have been their fate according to the Tenth Geneva Convention (1907). They were, however, rescued not by Dutch warships but by Dutch non-naval vessels—the *Flora* and the *Titan*—the legal position of which was different from that of a Dutch warship. A neutral warship is in a position analogous to that of neutral territory, and shipwrecked, wounded, or sick persons of belligerent nations taken on board

such a warship must not be given up. This, however, does not apply to a neutral merchantman or other vessel. This consideration caused the Dutch Government to release the survivors of the three British cruisers who were landed in Holland by Dutch vessels. The same good fortune did not attend the men of the Naval Brigade who at the time of the fall of Antwerp were forced to make their way to Holland. These men, about 1,560 in number, were interned at Groningen. Thousands of Belgian troops were similarly compelled to cross the Dutch frontier at this time,



BRITISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR WAITING TO BE EXCHANGED AT FLUSHING.

* See Vol. II., p. 15.



THE GERMAN DESTROYER V 69 AT YMUIDEN.

and were also interned. Camps for their accommodation were established at Zeist, Gaasterland, Amersfoort, and Oldebroek. In various places, including Amsterdam, interned men were subsequently usefully employed in various industries. A certain number of Germans who also crossed the frontier were interned at Bergen. As the war proceeded instances occurred of airmen being compelled to alight on Dutch territory. Some of these were British officers, who were also interned for the term of the war.

Although the Belgian frontier was closed, the Dutch residing upon it often had peeps of what went on beyond. At Flushing, for example, the constant attacks by Entente airmen on Zeebrugge were seen in the distance, while firing on the Flanders front could be heard with great distinctness. Large numbers of Belgians crossed the frontiers from time to time, and as the war proceeded prisoners escaped from Germany or Belgium almost daily. The number of German deserters also became so large as to occasion the establishment of an institution at Alkmaar for their benefit.

In the beginning of December, 1915, and in February, 1916, wounded British and German prisoners were exchanged viâ the Netherlands. On both occasions the oversea transport took place by means of a Dutch ship at the expense of the Dutch Government. In March, 1916, however, in view of the increased dangers to shipping in the North Sea, the Dutch Government suspended this service. Subsequently the exchange took place on board of a British hospital ship, and in May, 1916, a new

exchange took place across Netherlands territory with the assistance of the Dutch Red Cross. The German wounded on their arrival at Flushing were immediately transferred to a German hospital train which had brought the British wounded from Germany. The British were cared for at Flushing in railway sheds fitted up as temporary hospitals by the Dutch Red Cross. The expenses, including the feeding of the British wounded, were borne by the Dutch Red Cross. The Dutch Government bore the expenses of the transit across Dutch territory of the wounded of both countries in a German hospital train.

Sometimes the Dutch were called upon to give larger hospitality to wounded men. This happened after the battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916, when wounded of both fleets were brought to Holland; while in January, 1917, a German destroyer, the V 69, was taken to Ymuiden after being badly damaged in a fight with British warships in the North Sea. After repairs she was allowed to leave.

German aerial activity was early noticeable in Holland, as the majority of the Zeppelins which visited England passed the Frisian islands and were observed on their outward journey. Many, on their return, violated Dutch territory, thus giving occasion for protests from the Dutch Government which were met with apologies from the Germans. The attitude adopted towards aircraft by the Dutch Government was that on account of the special character of these engines of war it was its duty to take specially strong action towards them. Foreign airships or aircraft which moved above Dutch territory were to

be fired on, while if they were found on Dutch territory or territorial waters they and their crews were to be interned, as soldiers belonging to belligerents would be interned if they came into Dutch territory. If, however, military airmen were rescued from peril to life by trading vessels in the open sea, the Dutch Government did not see itself justified in interning them.

In August, 1914, a German waterplane came down owing to injury north of the island of Schiermonnikoog. The Germans declared it came down in the sea outside the territorial waters, that it landed in consequence of being driven to the coast of the island, and that marine flying craft were warships and must be so regarded, especially when they moved forward in the water. It therefore considered that this vessel should have been allowed to repair its damage and subsequently leave Netherlands territory. This view was not accepted by the Dutch Government; nor was the attempt of the Germans to secure the release of an airman who had landed on July 10, 1915, with his aeroplane on Dutch territory and been interned. In the latter case the Germans represented that the airman had lost his way and came across the frontier by mistake, as a soldier might do without being interned. The Dutch pointed out the great freedom of action of aeroplanes, and the impossibility of ascertaining, as might be done in the case of a soldier, whether the crossing of the fron-

tier was due to mistake. They therefore maintained their point of view, one consequence of which was that foreign aircraft above Netherlands territory exposed themselves immediately to being fired at by military forces without the obligation being placed on the military authorities of warning them in advance that they were above



CAPTAIN OF THE GERMAN CRUISER "ELBING," RESCUED FROM THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AT YMUIDEN.

neutral territory and giving them an opportunity to withdraw. The Dutch Government drew the attention of the German Government to this fact in the case of the airship L 19, which on February 1, 1916, after having passed



GERMAN WOUNDED FROM V 69 IN THE DUTCH MILITARY HOSPITAL AT AMSTERDAM.

over Dutch territory and been fired on by the Dutch coastguard, appears with its whole crew to have met with mishap in the North Sea. The German Government accused the Dutch of having acted in contravention of international law and of the laws of humanity in firing on the L 19 without warning, when it appeared that that airship had come above Dutch territory in consequence of circumstances beyond its control. The Dutch Government replied that the L 19 did not give any signs of damage or desire to land, that it had been repeatedly warned that it was above neutral

rence, and in those of the 's-Gravenhage and Cornelis expressed regret, while exonerating the airmen.

While Holland was thus by these incidents directly involved in the war and naturally felt her interests very deeply affected by the losses suffered by her shipowners, her attention was constantly attracted by the course of hostilities on land. At the very beginning of the war the advance of the Germans into Belgium was watched with painful interest by the Dutch, who stood in crowds in front of the




CROWD READING THE BULLETINS.

territory, and that the military authorities had observed the laws of humanity so far as this was consistent with their duty to preserve the inviolability of their country.

German airmen repeatedly threw bombs at Dutch vessels flying the Dutch flag. Thus the Zevenbergen, Hibernia, 's-Gravenhage and Cornelis were attacked in this way on March 21, 1915, March 29, 1915, May 12, 1915, July 29, 1915, respectively. Protests were made by the Dutch Government to the German Government, which in the cases of the Zevenbergen and Hibernia disputed the facts, while expressing in the latter case regret for the occur-

places where bulletins were issued, to read the latest news. From the Dutch frontier the people of South Limburg had been able to watch the Germans entering Visé, the little Belgian town through which they marched on Liège. They were therefore near enough to see something of the war in all its horror.

It was said, indeed, that German troops, during their march to Belgium, had crossed Dutch territory near Vaals. This rumour became so persistent as to call for an official denial, which was furnished by the Dutch Government on sworn evidence. Reports rapidly spread through the country of the merciless conduct



A GERMAN AEROPLANE WHICH LANDED BY MISTAKE AT AARDENBURG, JULY 1917.

of the Germans to an unoffending people, and these were supported and amplified by the thousands of fugitives from Belgium who crossed into Holland as soon as the Germans advanced. The story of the refugee Belgians in Holland has already been told* and need not be repeated here. The words of Queen Wilhelmina, there quoted, in her Speech from the Throne on Sept. 15, 1914, bear the best possible testimony to the feelings aroused in the Dutch by the fate of their unfortunate neighbours. The Dutch were also later to see something of the effects of the war on the Germans themselves, for when the blockade of Germany had become severe enough to produce privation in that country large numbers of German children were sent to enjoy the hospitality of Holland.

Many Belgian fugitives went back after the German occupation of Antwerp, being assured that fugitives of military age who returned to Belgium would not be incorporated in the German Army or compelled to work in Germany. This promise was given them after negotiations between the German authorities and the Dutch Government. When at a later date the Germans deported Belgians to Germany under circumstances which provoked universal indignation, they were reminded in November, 1916, of these negotiations by the Dutch Government. The German Government maintained that by this agreement it was meant that only those residents in Antwerp and its

suburbs who had a fixed salary would be admitted to the radius of the fortress. However, the German Government agreed to repatriate from Germany to Belgium those Belgian fugitives who in consequence of the assurance indicated returned from Holland to the Antwerp radius, on condition that the Dutch Government again accepted those of them for whom there was no work in Belgium. This condition was accepted by the Dutch Government.*

Dutch opinion about the war was divided, but there was no division in the sympathy accorded to the Belgians in their distress and heartrending sufferings. Indeed, for some weeks after the war began practically the whole Dutch people was anti-German. The Dutch felt that a great wrong which might have been done to Holland had been done to Belgium, and they resented it as a generous nation necessarily must resent a brutal infraction of the sovereign rights of a sister State. Moreover, the conduct of the Germans throughout the war, the cruel savagery of their methods towards their enemies and their total disregard of every consideration of humanity, added to their system of spies and lies, of both of which Holland had a rich experience, produced a feeling of aversion. The Germans left no stone unturned to influence the Dutch in their favour. They deluged the newspaper offices with free propaganda, telegraphed at great expense from Berlin, and supplied free copies of the Berlin

* See Vol. IV. p. 474.

* See Vol. XII., Chapter CXCIH.



GUARDING A FRONTIER FERRY.

journals. Everything possible was done to spread distrust of the English, who were constantly accused of having designs on the integrity of Holland and of desiring to take possession of the Scheldt. This was carried so far that a panic was created on March 31, 1916, by the reported landing of Entente forces in

Zeeland. The report, which was without any foundation, was circulated by the Germans and spread like wildfire throughout the country. At the beginning of the war the Germans issued a daily paper called *De Toestand* (The Situation). This was published in Dutch. It had little or no success, and in the spring of



SENTRIES ON THE FRONTIER.

1915, when Herr von Kühlmann, formerly Councillor of the German Embassy in London, was appointed Minister to The Hague, the *Toestand* was succeeded by a weekly paper, *De Toekomst* (The Future), which had the support of a number of pro-German Dutch professors, and carried on an open propaganda on behalf of the Central Powers. The Dutch, however, are accustomed to think questions out for themselves in their own way, and when the first burning indignation at the invasion of Belgium had passed away their views concerning the causes of the war grew critical. Many came to the conclusion that all the Great Powers had pursued a policy of expansion which could not result otherwise than in a catastrophe. Moreover, the question of Holland's own interest asserted itself. The Dutch asked themselves how the victory of one or other set of Powers would affect their country, and came to the conclusion that an indecisive issue of the war would serve the interests of Holland more than the triumph of either side. A victory for Germany, it was clearly seen, meant the eventual economic absorption of Holland, with her ports; while increased German influence in Antwerp and on the Scheldt could not fail to be immediately prejudicial to Dutch interests. On the other hand, if England gained an unqualified victory, she would, it was represented in some quarters, demand new rights on the Scheldt, and possibly also a part of the Dutch colonies. Moreover, by degrees, the inconvenience and privations experienced by many of the people in consequence of the war caused them to feel and assert that both sides disregarded the requirements of international law, and from asking who was to blame for the war people came to ask which group committed least inhumanity. During the period here reviewed, which ended before the third outburst of German submarine fury, with its indiscriminate sinking of Dutch merchant and fishing vessels without regard for the fate of their crews, this reproach of inhumanity was in large part levelled mainly at acts injurious to the material interests of the Dutch, which are inseparable from their trading and commercial activities. The necessity to use bread cards and the shortage of coal and certain kinds of food made the poorer people feel the war as a personal inconvenience. Demonstrations in favour of more coal and cheaper food were held in Amsterdam and elsewhere. Business was so variously affected in the Netherlands by the

war as to make the war years an epoch in the country's history. This is apparent from the course of events in all branches of manufacture, trade, commerce and finance.

While the war prejudiced the interests of some large sections of the population, this was by no means universally the case. Reference has been made above to the fall in prices caused at the beginning of the war by the stoppage of transport. As soon, however, as traffic to England and Germany was reopened, thus admitting of export, prices rose steadily, until after two and a half years of war agricultural produce could not be purchased in the country itself at less than double or treble its ordinary cost. This stimulated industries connected with luxuries. Indeed, the large profits made by many farmers, occasional traders, and others caused the revival of several industries. The goldsmiths and silversmiths, in particular, flourished exceedingly, while the revenue from standard marks duty on gold and silver ware reached in December, 1915, a sum never before attained.

The Dutch colonies produce enormous quantities of tobacco, rubber, cinchona, sugar, tea, petroleum and other commodities requiring for their transport a merchant fleet far exceeding the requirements of the small home population of under 7 millions. At the same time, Holland is largely dependent for metal wares and textiles on manufacturing countries with rich mineral resources. She is also partly or entirely dependent on other countries for cereals, fertilizers, coal, iron and timber. In exchange for these and other necessaries she exports agricultural and dairy produce, such as potatoes, vegetables of all kinds, butter, cheese, condensed milk, and the fish caught by its hundreds of deep sea trawlers. She also does a profitable trade in exporting horses and cattle, of which she breeds far more than she can use.

Owing to her unfortunate position within the blockaded area Holland was ground between the upper and the nether millstone of the belligerents, as far as supplies from foreign countries were concerned. The Entente group of Powers commanded the supply of cereals and oilseeds, without which the country could not subsist, while the Central Powers practically controlled its coal and iron supplies. In the first year of the war the Germans, who looked upon victory with a very large indemnity as merely a question of months, made urgent demands on the home-grown foodstuffs of the

Netherlands. Prices consequently rose enormously. At the same time the blockade was causing supplies from overseas, even those from the Dutch colonies, to arrive slowly. Later on, indeed, these supplies were practically restricted to the needs of the country. This was necessary because, although, after two years of war, few or none of the imports actually reached the Central Powers, Dutch farmers were doing an enormous trade with the enemy in crops raised by means of fertilizers, and in cattle and dairy produce, poultry and eggs, which would never have come into existence at all but for the

permitting no more food and forage to reach Holland than was actually required for the due support of her population. The result was an apparent shortage in the first place of bread. The word apparent is used advisedly, for the distribution and rationing measures taken by the Government were all induced by a fear of eventual shortage. The same applies to materials other than foodstuffs imported from overseas, and many industries suffered from shortage of raw materials such as cotton, wool, hides, and metals. Though several of these are chiefly produced in the Dutch colonies



FOOD DEMONSTRATION IN AMSTERDAM.

grain waste, cattle cake and similar foods upon which the live stock were fed and which could not reach Holland except by sea.

The Dutch Government soon realized the dangers of the position, but were at first satisfied with preventing the direct export of foodstuffs or the raw produce for making them, such as oil-bearing seeds, copra for margarine, and so forth, that had been imported through the blockade. Gradually, however, the blockade policy, in view of the undiminished quantities of foodstuffs sent across the frontier, openly or clandestinely, was so altered that the indirect supply to the enemy was prevented as far as possible. This could only be done by

the quantity permitted to reach the home country through the blockade was carefully rationed, and, in the case of rubber, even stopped altogether, as the stock was considered ample for the normal requirements of the Netherlands. A number of industries were brought to a standstill by lack of materials. The famous earthenware factory, "The Sphinx," at Maastricht, for instance, was forced to shut down for some time because it could not obtain the necessary clay from Fowey, in Cornwall. A number of manufacturers of jute-sacking discharged their hands because they could not get sufficient raw jute to keep them fully employed, and

similarly, rope manufacturers were forced to stop work for lack of hemp. It must not be forgotten, of course, that these industries manufactured in normal times far more than the Netherlands could consume. In the ship-building and engineering industries activity was reduced by supplies being partially stopped by Germany, practically no steel having been exported to Holland from that country since the autumn of 1916.

On the other hand, however, Netherlands industries were given a start which would serve them in good stead after the war. A strong

people and even to the actual manufacturers if the keen wind of competition had not been tempered by the effects of the British blockade during the experimental periods. Various industries consequently were able to steal a march on Germany and Austria. Holland was able to supply foreign markets with goods manufactured in the Netherlands, which, before the war, had been in many cases the monopoly of Germany and Austria. Thus the manufacture was begun, or extended, of aniline oil and dyes, incandescent mantles, push buttons, glass tiles, glass bulbs for electric



FOOD SEIZED BY THE POLICE,

wall of protection was thrown up for them by the British regulations which prohibited the export through Holland of articles of German or Austrian manufacture or even goods manufactured in Holland containing a certain percentage of their value of enemy origin. In the first months of the war this was fixed at 50 per cent., and then reduced to 25 per cent., and on April 2, 1917, it was to be diminished to 5 per cent.

These regulations threw the various Dutch industries with a foreign market very much on their own resources. They would, indeed, never have surmounted the difficulties of making things entirely strange to the work-

lamps, nitric acid, argon, charcoal, rubber articles and a number of other things of minor importance. In the case of biscuits, Holland learned during the war to compete with British manufacturers whose products had previously been preferred.

Another unexpected result of the trade measures applied by the Entente Powers was that the trade commission agents were largely turned into dealers on their own account—in the first place because the agent soon realized that, with the enormous demand for all kinds of goods at rising prices, not only was there no risk, but there was a splendid opportunity of making handsome profits on anything he

could have in stock for immediate delivery ; and, secondly, because the British and Allied manufacturers were not allowed to sell to agents without knowing the ultimate destination of the goods.

The import trade—and later on even the export trade to the Colonies—of the Netherlands was entirely dominated after January 1, 1915, by the Netherlands Oversea Trust Company, to which reference has already been made. The prosperity of many traders was such that the Dutch Government was able to recover a portion of the expenditure necessitated by the war from the so-called war profits. It imposed a tax of 10 per cent. on the first Fl. 2,500 (the first Fl. 1,000 being exempted), and 30 per cent. on any sum more than Fl. 2,500 earned in excess of the taxpayer's pre-war income, the first Fl. 2,000 being in this case exempted. This was only one of the many national, provincial and municipal forms of new taxation by which the public bodies tried to cover their enormous expenditure due to the crisis.

Agriculture, cattle breeding and fisheries are the traditional pursuits of the people of Holland. Dutch cheese has long been famous, while Dutch butter before the war became a

serious competitor of Danish butter. The war caused an enormous increase in the production and a corresponding increase in the exports of these articles. Germany accounted for most of the increased export, while there was a large falling off in the quantity supplied to Great Britain.

Fresh fruit was sent in large quantities to the London and Hull markets before the war, but there was a great falling off owing to the long delays and uncertain shipping across the North Sea. Besides, the elimination of risks, the better prices and, above all, the ready cash of the Germans and Austrians were too attractive, and the majority of dealers did not hesitate to sell their goods to the Germans, who were also large purchasers of vegetables, both fresh and in brine, and specially of fish. Deep-sea fish had been caught, since the phenomenal development of Ymuiden as a fishing port during the last 25 years, in too large quantities to be consumed locally. The prosperity of this North Sea fishing port, some 12 hours and less by rail from Berlin, Hanover, Munich and other large German centres, was naturally augmented by the scarcity of all kinds of food in the Central Empires, and the preserving of fish in ice, and



SENDING OUT BREAD CARDS.



WAITING TO PURCHASE COAL.

by salting and curing, made it possible to distribute it evenly over immense distances. Whole trainloads were even dispatched as far as the occupied parts of Russian Poland and the southern districts of Austria.

This enormous demand naturally increased the value of the fish brought to market at Ymuiden. In 1913 the value of fish sold at Government Fish Market there was Fl. 6,995,785, in 1915 it had increased to Fl. 17,887,709, and in 1916 to Fl. 36,602,555, or about six times the value of the catch in normal years. The bulk of the fish went to Germany.

The flower bulb trade and the plant forcing industry—the latter is almost as much an industry as iron and steel, judging by the numerous chimney stacks which rise from the towns and districts entirely devoted to it—were among the interests most affected by the war. In the first few months of war the growers, and especially the flower shops, suffered heavy losses because the Dutch public bought less, and the lengthy and uncertain traffic across the North Sea did not permit of exports to any large extent. This state of things, as far as Holland herself was concerned, soon passed, and in the spring of 1915 the Dutch growers threw themselves with great energy into the export of bulbs and plants to England, America, and even to Russia, in spite of the difficulties of shipment. Gradually, however, the restrictions on the importation of foreign bulbs into Great Britain and the greatly reduced shipping to oversea countries



TAKING HOME THEIR PURCHASE.

prevented the bulb growers from disposing of their products at favourable prices. The growers, who had in their hands hundreds of tons of bulbs, chiefly hyacinths and tulips, tried many ways of turning them to profit. More or less successful experiments were made to manufacture bread, cattle food, alcohol, and fertilizers from bulbs, but the growers only secured a fraction of their value as flower bulbs, and they ultimately turned their attention largely to other and more profitable produce.

Holland always exported a considerable portion of her potatoes or potato products, such as potato-flour (dextrine), glucose, and alcohol. The export increased enormously

during the war owing to the scarcity of supplies in Germany and Austria. A man who had had no particular business before the war was asked what quantity of potatoes he had exported in 1916. He replied that to one firm in Vienna he had forwarded 7,500 tons. In other words, fifteen long trains of 50 ten-ton



GENERAL C. J. SNIJDEERS,
Dutch Commander-in-Chief, and
REAR-ADMIRAL SMIT,

in command of the mouths of the Meuse and Scheldt.

wagons had been dispatched by a man who did not know anything about the business, but simply bought on the market with practically no limit.

This was possible for Austria, but Germany soon saw the advantage of establishing a central organization for the purchase of foodstuffs from neutral countries, and opened a branch office in Holland to regulate the quantities and prices of all kinds of foodstuffs purchased in Holland. Without going into details, it may be said that, what with their inquisitorial methods and making terms by withholding indispensable accessory articles such as salt, tin plates, etc., the Germans succeeded in obtaining all they could afford to

buy and pay for at, for war time, reasonable prices. The credit for this policy was generally given to the astute Herr von Kühlmann, then German Minister at The Hague.

In the autumn of 1916 the Dutch suddenly learned that, owing to the continuous export, they would have a shortage of potatoes. In the spring of 1917 the Minister of Agriculture, M. Posthuma, was called upon to explain how his Department could have permitted such quantities of potatoes or their products to be sent out of the country as to leave the nation comparatively unprovided with potatoes, which, with bread, form the main food of the working classes. He showed in some detail how difficult it had been to take stock of what the country could grow, and that exports had to be permitted for economic reasons up to a certain amount, based on the production of former years, and how, finally, the summer had been wet and cold and the crop had consequently been far smaller than it had been for many years before. He hoped that with some care and the substitution of rice the country would carry on until the early potatoes arrived. The fear of a potato famine caused the people to strain every effort to prevent it, and everyone able to do so set about planting potatoes and other vegetables. Municipal corporations, landowners, and large employers placed small plots of land at the disposal of their townfolk or workpeople, in some cases giving them seed potatoes for cultivation. The newspapers published a daily or weekly article with some such heading as "Sow and Plant," "Gardening for the General," "How to Grow Vegetables." It might almost be said, indeed, that gardening suddenly became the national hobby.

With a few unimportant exceptions the various Dutch industries profited greatly by the war. It is obvious that where an army of nearly 500,000 men had to be fed, clothed and equipped, while the contiguous countries were too much occupied with fitting out their own armies to be able to supply warlike material, the £80,000 a day spent by the Government on the Army and Navy mostly went to support, and in some cases to create, home industries. The cotton and woollen textile mills of Enschedé, Helmond and Tilburg (the Dutch Manchester, Leeds and Bradford) received heavy orders during the first year and a half of the war, in spite of the large imports of textiles from England and America. Nor was it only the Army that required cloth;

dealers foresaw that if the supply of raw cotton were in any way obstructed there would be a serious shortage, and those who could collected large stocks. This proved to be a most profitable speculation, for until August, 1916, when the export of cotton textiles from Holland was prohibited, German buyers overran the country and bought up cotton goods at almost any price. A large milliner at Amsterdam who had just received 200 pieces of white cotton from the manufacturers, intended to sell them, at an ample profit, at 50 cents (10d.) a metre, when an individual with a pronounced German accent entered his shop and inquired if the shopkeeper had any white cotton for sale. The dealer, realising the kind of man he had to deal with, after some discussion, agreed to sell him the lot at 80 cents (1s. 4d.) per metre. The bargain being struck, the buyer was asked to sign a guarantee that the stuff would not leave the country, and deposit a banker's security. As the dealer expected, the prospective buyer (and obviously exporter) left the premises using strong language in the German tongue. He was not seen again! These methods naturally met with a considerable amount of success, and after the goods had passed through five, six, and even more hands it was impossible to distinguish so-called

"free" goods, which could be exported, from N.O.T. goods, export of which was forbidden. It is a remarkable fact, however, that within a few months after the prohibition to export cotton had been promulgated the textile mills ran short of work, and a number of them were forced to shut down or work half-time.

Amsterdam, the capital of the Netherlands, is the world's principal centre of diamond cutting and polishing. Its many diamond workers suffered a good deal for a time, for the diamond trade and industry were completely paralysed during the first six months of the war. The war profits in the United States, however, soon caused an increasing demand for diamonds, the result being that the trade and industry quickly revived and even enjoyed more prosperity than usual; although the rose diamond branch of the industry suffered during the whole of the war. Diamonds are so small and of such great value, and can, moreover, be so easily secreted about the person, that it was found necessary, in order to prevent what are called industrial diamonds from reaching the enemy, to organize and regulate the supply of rough diamonds, which are mainly of South African origin and reached Amsterdam by way of London. For this purpose committees of experts were appointed in Lon-



DUTCH INFANTRY.

don and Amsterdam. The London committee was to some extent advisory to the Government with regard to policy and kept in constant touch with the various departments; while that at Amsterdam controlled the distribution and verified the disposal of the rough diamonds among the manufacturers, and their sale when polished. It performed these duties under the immediate supervision of the British Consul at Amsterdam.

The fact that the Germans still possessed large quantities of German South-West African diamonds which they caused to be polished by the diamonds workers who had remained at Antwerp required the minute examination of every parcel of stones that left Holland in order, if possible, to prevent the Germans from obtaining credit in America by means of these diamonds. Although certain quantities of diamonds were shipped to the United States in German submarines, the clandestine transmission of diamonds from unapproved firms or to unapproved destinations was, for all practical purposes, stopped by the labours of these committees.

The Dutch sugar plantation companies of the Dutch East Indies benefited enormously

by the stoppage of supplies of beet sugar to Great Britain from the Continent owing to the war. Large stocks of cane sugar in the East Indies were purchased with accompanying increase in price, which was reflected in the shares of some of the companies being more than doubled. Before the war Holland exported comparatively large quantities of beet-root sugar to Great Britain, but the Dutch Government restricted the exports, in the country's own interest, to about 40 per cent.

Cocoa, owing to its value as a food and its relatively small volume, was one of the first things which the German commissariat seized upon as food for troops in the field. The demand in Holland for cocoa powder was at first so great that from eight to ten times the usual prices were offered for immediate delivery. Not satisfied with such profits, the middlemen (mostly persons of no commercial standing, without capital, frequently working men unemployed owing to the war) even bought up cocoa-waste and ground cocoa-shell powder which they sold as cocoa powder. This was made possible by the avidity and reckless purchasing of the German buyers during the first year of the war. They paid cash against



ROUTE MARCH OF INTERNED BRITISH MARINES UNDER STRONG GUARD.



INTERNED MEN GARDENING AT HARDERWIJK.

documents and asked no questions. Under these circumstances cocoa-waste, used at other times only as cattle food and costing about 6s. 6d. per cwt., fetched at one period as much as £4 per cwt. The stocks of cocoa powder in Holland were soon exhausted, whereupon Germany and Austria, especially Austria, bought raw cocoa heavily. They were unfortunately able to buy considerable quantities, because it was the practice of most manufacturers to keep a year's stock of raw material on hand and contract for delivery at even longer periods. The peculiar position was thereby created that two kinds of cocoa were available on the market, namely, "N.O.T. Cocoa" and "N.O.T. free cocoa," the latter kind being 10 to 20 per cent. higher in price than the former, because it could be sold to Germany, that country being prepared to pay more for goods which could be freely exported from Holland. This distinction was even observed through the process of manufacture to cocoa powder and chocolate, and the finished product was similarly differentiated. The same occurred with all possible kinds of commodities and only ceased when the export of the goods was entirely prohibited.

It thus came about that before the blockade,

or at least before the restriction of imports into Holland could properly take effect, several thousand tons of raw cocoa had been exported to the Central Powers. About a year to 18 months after the outbreak of war the stocks of raw cocoa in Holland had entirely disappeared, the result being that much unemployment was caused in certain factories. There was no actual shortage for home consumption, because Holland only requires about 8 per cent. to 10 per cent. of her production, and after two and a half years of war the blockade succeeded in reducing the quantities of cocoa imported into Holland to limits which enabled this highly developed industry to supply the country itself, and, to a certain extent, the Allies, with cocoa powder without permitting any to be exported to our enemies.

Tobacco, of which the Dutch East Indies supply enormous quantities to the world market, proved during the war that it was no longer, as was still generally thought, a luxury, but a necessity. Although the better class of leaf tobacco, used almost exclusively for the outer cover of cigars, fetched much lower prices than was expected, the commoner kinds of tobacco were readily sold at unprecedented figures, owing to the enormous demand for cheap cigars



SEARCHING A CAR ON THE DUTCH FRONTIER.

for troops in the field in both belligerent camps. This enabled old stocks, some of which had lain in warehouses for 10 years and more, to be sold out at very acceptable prices. No amount of description, however, could show the profits of the tobacco planters and traders so well as the figures representing the total value of the tobaccos imported direct into Holland from the Dutch East Indies. In 1913 crop imports were Fl.74,505,000, those of 1914 Fl.85,140,000, and those of 1915 Fl.145,125,000.

In spite of the mountains of tobacco which these figures represent, the stocks were so exhausted by export that in 1916 the Dutch cigar factories could not purchase enough tobacco to keep their hands employed, and the Government was obliged to take measures to prevent raw tobacco being exported before the home industries were provided with adequate stocks to prevent unemployment until the next crop arrived. Tobacco was not always consigned to the N.O.T., probably because our blockade authorities did not consider tobacco to be a help to the military resources of our enemies. In fact, towards the end of 1916 Germany prohibited the importation of tobacco without licence.

The history of the other and somewhat less important branches of import trade, such as coffee, copra, hides and leather, cinchona bark, tin, timber and so forth, more or less runs parallel to that broadly outlined of the commodities mentioned above. A slump occurred during the first few months of the war owing to the crisis and the general belief that the war would shortly be over. This was succeeded by an enormous demand and consequent large export due to the realization that the war would last longer than was at first expected. This second period lasted from January, 1915, until the early part of 1916, and was characterized by record prices on all hands. It was followed by the gradual closing of the frontiers by the Dutch Government for the direct or indirect export of all kinds of imported goods, this step being chiefly rendered necessary by the more stringent application of our blockade. The consequence was that after 2½ years of war the country, as far as foodstuffs from overseas were concerned, had just sufficient supplies to prevent the population from feeling the effects of war beyond having to pay extraordinarily high prices for the products owing to the comparatively small stocks in the country, which, however, enabled the dealers to

make war profits in spite of the reduced imports.

The Netherlands Oversea Trust Company really originated in the desire of the great Dutch shipping companies to keep their lines working in spite of the blockade. They reaped a golden harvest by their foresight, and all of them made war profits. This was due to the dependence of Holland on oversea products, and to her fortunate position in possessing a fleet able to keep the country provided with foodstuffs and other necessaries. She was thereby saved from much suffering, for had she been dependent on foreign shipping she would certainly have had to pay far higher freights and possibly would not have been able to buy shipping space at any price. The great demand for tonnage stimulated the employment of sailing vessels, while steamers built 15 years before the war and almost written off were sold for several times as much as they cost. In the first year of the war Holland sold several ships to foreign owners, and the sale of shipping was beginning to assume alarming proportions when the Government intervened and prevented it altogether. The profits of shipping

companies increased something like threefold during the war, while a great stimulus was given to shipbuilding both to home and foreign orders

As was shown in dealing with the destruction of Dutch ships by the Germans, shipowners also had their troubles: the constant danger which their ships and crews ran owing to Germany's submarine activity and mines; the consequent exorbitant rates of insurance against war and other risks, which in certain cases was even a quarter of the value of the ship for a single voyage across the North Sea; the increasing wages demanded by the crews; the great cost of coal, not to speak of the difficulty in obtaining it; and the long delays in various ports—probably the most costly matter of all. Early in 1915 the lines of steamships to the East Indies were informed that they would no longer be allowed to use the Suez Canal, owing to military operations in those regions. This announcement proved to be premature, and the steamers continued to pass through the Canal until the uncertainty of obtaining coal at Suez or Aden and the dangers of the Mediterranean induced the companies,



STORAGE OF ARMS OF THE BELLIGERENTS: BELGIAN INTERNED SOLDIERS KEEPING THEM CLEAN AND IN ORDER.

towards the end of 1915, to send their ships to the Indies via the Cape of Good Hope. Though this did not actually cost the companies any more (the extra cost of coal being about the same as the Canal dues), the ships took three or four weeks longer to reach their destination, so that fewer voyages could be made with the same number of vessels.

The control of the Dutch railways was immediately after the outbreak of war taken over by the Government. As this had already been provided for by law many years before, the only difference was that no trains were allowed to run without the permission of the

much to the fore. The foreign trade in time of peace financed from Amsterdam is important owing to the enormous value of the East Indian produce, though naturally a large proportion of this was formerly financed through London because of the more stable rates of exchange of the pound sterling. Owing, however, to the gigantic expenditure of all belligerent States in neutral countries, the rates of exchange of the currencies of all belligerents were upset. Shortly after the outbreak of war, when the whole world was still indebted to England, the Dutch rate rose as high as Fl.12.85 for a pound sterling. After a few months



INSIDE THE CAMP OF THE INTERNED BRITISH MARINES.

Minister of War, and a certain amount of rolling stock was held constantly at the disposal of the military authorities. Otherwise the staffs and methods of the railway systems remained unchanged.

The railways also profited by the war, chiefly owing to the large transport of troops for the Government and the constant travelling of the soldiers to and from their homes and their stations. In spite of there being almost no transit traffic, the companies made large profits on their goods traffic, probably owing to the increased exports from Holland and the higher freight which the companies charged. The railways suffered from the shortage of coal; the number of passenger trains and their speed were reduced and the passenger fares were raised.

The war brought Amsterdam, and hence Holland, as a secondary financial centre, very

England's expenditure in foreign countries began to tell on her exchange, and the rate gradually fell until in 1915 it reached about Fl.10.40 per pound, representing a loss to England of more than 13 per cent. This great decline was chiefly caused by the heavy purchases of East Indian sugar to which reference has already been made; it ran into many millions of pounds sterling. All this money could not, of course, at once be remitted to Holland in gold, and various means were devised of postponing the actual payment of the bills of exchange.

This was not the case with England alone; the rate of exchange of practically all countries gradually showed a disagio *vis-à-vis* of Holland, the inevitable result of a country's exports having a greater value than its imports; in other words, of the balance of trade being in

its favour. This was abnormally increased by the sale of the stocks of all kinds which are always available in a country in normal times. As explained above, these stocks were gradually exhausted, having been sold at excellent prices. The dealers and manufacturers, instead of having several months' stocks of raw materials on hand, were later in possession of an excessive amount of liquid funds which they feared to invest since they might require them at any moment. This state of affairs produced an apparent excess of money in Holland. All of this was not, of course, newly-acquired wealth. Indeed, the difficulty of investing money in easily realizable securities led part of the public to hoard its money in the form of bank notes, thereby using them as an investment, although they bore no interest—a fact which illustrates the effect of the war on Holland's financial relations with foreign countries.

That the mercantile wealth of the country was largely turned to gold is clearly seen from the enormous stocks of gold in the vaults of the Netherlands Bank, the Dutch Bank of Issue, which keeps the gold as counter-value to its note circulation. The average stock of gold and the metallic surplus (balance after 20 per cent. of the nominal value of the bank's obligations, including bank notes, has been reserved against them, which before the war was 40 per cent.), was as follows :

	Gold stock in millions.	Metallic surplus in millions.
April, 1914	F. 170	F. 40
„ 1915	„ 293	„ 187
„ 1916	„ 525	„ 377

By the end of 1916 the gold stock had still further increased. If the population of the Netherlands is taken at 7,000,000, which is an overestimate, the gold in the Netherlands Bank would represent considerably over 6,000,000 sterling per million of the population. This is merely to show the enormous amount of gold concentrated at the bank.

In the opening weeks of the war there was a panic and a general run on the banks, due to the sudden fear of war. The people held back their ready cash, or withdrew it from the bank and prepared for immediate flight in case Holland should be drawn into the war. So great a shortage of small change, particularly among the working classes, was thereby occasioned that both the Government and local authorities were obliged to take prompt measures to relieve the resulting distress by making a paper currency for small amounts.



DR. ROSEN,
German Minister at The Hague, 1916.

Within a week of the outbreak of war the Government had printed and distributed paper notes of a nominal value of Fl.1.00, Fl.2.50, and Fl.5.00, which, as they were payable with silver, were called silver bonds. The larger cities, the Provincial Governments, and even large industrial concerns, issued all kinds of provisional paper currency for sums even as small as 10 cents (2d.) to enable them to pay their employees in coin small enough to buy the necessaries of life, for the banks could not meet the extraordinary demand for subsidiary coin. After two and a half years of war only the Government silver bonds remained.

Between April 1, 1914, and April 1, 1917, some Fl.37,000,000 of silver coin passed into circulation, and the temporary issue of silver bonds had to be increased from Fl.25,000,000 to Fl.40,000,000, all of which was above the normal circulation. From this it will be realized that the Dutch even after two and a half years of war had not quite got over their fear of a crisis and were hoarding up small cash. Part of this greater circulation was also due to the higher degree of prosperity prevailing in almost all classes of the population. A rise in the wage standard naturally required more silver coin to meet the circulation demands.

The crisis in the money market at the beginning of the war was also felt in another way. It is the general custom of tradespeople in Holland, not to deposit their liquid funds in a bank, but to invest them in monthly loans through their stockbroker, who lends again on change against sound security. This enables the investor to withdraw his money or to leave it for a further period of one month, as he may choose, at the end of each month.

The system would be excellent if the security had a constant and immediately realizable value, but in times of crisis it is exceedingly dangerous because the middlemen, who simply act as brokers in placing the loan, are entirely powerless to enforce repayment if the security has fallen in value. This was, indeed, the most serious phase of the financial crisis in Holland; the borrowers could not realize their securities because no one wanted to invest, the brokers or middlemen could not enforce payment, and the lenders, with many other people besides, deemed themselves utterly ruined, as they would certainly have been if the tide of war had crossed the frontier at the moment.

Desperate ills require desperate remedies. Harsh measures were necessary, and were immediately forthcoming. The Stock Exchange was closed, so that no one could sell out in a panic and thereby ruin himself and perhaps his clients. The Netherlands Bank, together with a number of leading bankers, formed a syndicate to advance to brokers a certain proportion of the value of the securities, enabling the middlemen to some extent to meet their engagements. Further advances were gradually made until more or less normal values had returned and enabled the borrowers to realize, or at any rate to consolidate, their positions.

These critical moments were almost forgotten later. War profits and their accom-

panying high dividends followed, pouring in their turn an abundance of ready money on the market. Bankers made unprecedented profits, partly due to the increased turnovers and the enhanced value of all their holdings, and also in no small degree to the enormous volume of guarantees given to the N.O.T. on behalf of their clients, for which they charged 1 per cent. per annum, without necessarily advancing the money. In fact, it was generally given on the banker's knowledge of his client rather than against any security the latter might give.

These huge profits naturally produced an exceptional activity in the banking world. There was scarcely a bank of any size which did not issue fresh capital during 1916, the total fresh issues amounting to more than 54,000,000 florins (£4,500,000). The extraordinarily flourishing state of banking in Holland also led to what one might call an epidemic of amalgamation. A race for the absorption of the smaller provincial bankers into the larger banking corporations took place; the most venerable of banks joined in the race, but few of the soundest and oldest of independent private banks in the provinces withstood the generous offers made by the absorbing banks.

From this sketch of conditions in Holland during the first two and a half years of the war it will be seen that, while the country had many difficulties to encounter, it adapted itself in a remarkable way to new and strange conditions, and that if some sections, mainly the poorer classes, of the population in certain trades and callings suffered from the effects of high prices and lack of employment, the country as a whole enjoyed unexampled prosperity. The menace of war, however, was ever present to it during this period, and robbed the country of some of the sweetness of its unexpected good fortune.



CHAPTER CC.

SWISS NEUTRALITY, 1914-1917.

SWITZERLAND'S POSITION AMONG THE NATIONS—THE ARMY—MOBILIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS—DECLARATIONS OF NEUTRALITY—FRONTIER INCIDENTS—GERMAN-SWISS AND FRENCH-SWISS OPINION—HERR SPITTELER'S SPEECH—GRADUAL CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION—SWISS DISLIKE OF MILITARISM—METHODS OF THE GENERAL STAFF: THE ARREST OF "TIMES" CORRESPONDENTS; THE AFFAIR OF THE TWO COLONELS—BRITISH MINISTERS IN SWITZERLAND—FEDERAL COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT WILSON—SWISS PROTEST AGAINST INTENSIFIED BLOCKADE—M. RITTER'S ACTION IN WASHINGTON—THE HOFFMANN-GRIMM AFFAIR—HERR STEGEMANN—THE ECONOMIC SITUATION: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "S.S.S."; THE "FIDUCIARY BUREAU"; COAL AND COTTON; SWISS-GERMAN AGREEMENT; SMUGGLING—THE FINANCIAL SITUATION: VARIOUS LOANS—SWISS GOOD WORKS: REFUGEES, "RAPATRIÉS"; "EVACUÉS"; THE "MISSING"; VISITS TO PRISON CAMPS; MEDICAL AID TO BELLIGERENTS; "GRANDS BLESSÉS"; "INTERNÉS"—PROTESTS BY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AGAINST GERMAN INHUMANITY.

OF all the small countries of Europe which were not immediately involved, Switzerland, owing to her geographical position, had most reason to be alarmed by the outbreak of the war. On the one hand, she was the next-door neighbour of three belligerents, to whom a fourth, Italy, was to be added in May, 1915. It was true that her perpetual neutrality and the inviolability of her territory had been guaranteed by the Treaty of 1815. But, then, so also had those of Belgium by the Treaty of 1839. In presence of a guaranteeing Power for whom treaties were but as scraps of paper, what reason was there to hope that Switzerland would be spared the fate of Belgium, if a passage through her territory should suit the military convenience of the German Great General Staff? On the other hand, Switzerland, alone of all European States except Serbia, had no access to the sea. For a great part of her food, all her coal and many of her raw materials she was dependent on the friendship and transport facilities of her neighbours. What would

become of her people and her industries if, through the exigencies of the war, the supply of these manifold necessaries should be cut off?

Against these fears was set the hope that Switzerland's traditional position as the Good Samaritan of the nations, a centre of recreation, an asylum of the oppressed, might continue to protect her from being involved in the struggle raging without. She offered no menace to her neighbours. She had no ambition but to live, like Belgium, in peaceful industry, welcoming to her lakes and mountains an ever-increasing flow of visitors of all nations in search of lovely scenery and health-giving air.

But Switzerland, unlike Belgium until very shortly before the war, had for centuries realized that, in order to maintain a country's independence, something more was needed than reliance either on the plighted word of States or on the natural feelings of human sympathy. It is the "strong man armed" who "keepeth the house," and when the strong men in a country are few in comparison with neighbouring hosts it behoves every able-bodied male to

fit himself to defend her. The Swiss hated war on principle. They were as anti-militarist as any democracy in the world. But necessity made them the first people in Europe to adopt universal compulsory military service.

Every able-bodied man in Switzerland is liable to military service from his 20th to the end of his 48th year. The only exemptions are those of the members of the Federal Council,



HERR EDMOND SCHULTHESS,
President of the Swiss Confederation, 1917.

certain members of the High Court, medical men, and officials connected with hospitals, prisons and the postal and telegraph services. There is no escape from service on the ground of being the only son of a widowed mother, still less on that of being a "conscientious objector." Those excused or rejected pay in lieu of service a tax of five shillings, with an additional income-tax of about fourpence in the pound, which goes into the army budget. The first 12 years' service (11 for the cavalry) are performed in what is known as the *Auszug* or *Elite*, the next 8 years (12 for the cavalry) in the *Landwehr*, and the remainder in the *Landsturm*. Service in the army is preceded by compulsory gymnastic training in all the schools and by a large amount of voluntary gymnastics, drill and shooting. Every man keeps his rifle and equipment at home—which tends, among other things, greatly to quicken

mobilization. The composition and organization of the army are thoroughly modern and complete. The country is divided into six divisional districts, each under the command of a colonel. There is only one general in the Swiss army, the commander-in-chief. The force available at the outbreak of the war was nearly 300,000 men, including some 60,000 of the organized *Landsturm*.

On August 3, 1914, the Federal Assembly, consisting of the two Parliamentary Chambers (the State Council of 44 members, and the National Council of 189), sitting together, having declared the firm resolution of the Confederation "to maintain its neutrality in the imminent war," conferred unlimited plenary powers on the Federal Council, or Cabinet of seven, "to take all measures necessary for the safety, integrity and neutrality of Switzerland, for safeguarding the country's credit and economic interests, and, in particular, for assuring the supply of food for the people."*

Acting with exemplary promptitude, the Federal Council had already, on the previous day, ordered the mobilization of the army. By the middle of May, 1917, the mobilization, together with the increase in fortifications, guns and munitions soon found desirable, had cost the country about £24,000,000. When it is considered that the cost of defence in peacetime had been only about £1,800,000 a year (although even that sum was a remarkably large proportion of the annual total expenditure of about £4,000,000), it will be seen how seriously Switzerland was affected by the mere preparations for the military defence of her neutrality. As time went on, three of the six divisions were demobilized in turn, but even so the withdrawal of many thousands of active men from the labouring population proved a considerable interference with the normal life of the country. A good deal of dissatisfaction began, after a while, to prevail in certain parts of the army with what the men considered the unduly long periods during which they were summoned to the frontier, as also with regard to the alleged undue severity and improper conduct of certain officers. In June, 1917, General Wille, the commander-in-chief, addressed a letter to the members of the Federal Assembly in which he recalled the fact that the Swiss never had approved of long periods of

* At irregular intervals the Federal Council issued so-called "neutrality reports" to the Federal Assembly, describing how it had used these plenary powers.

service, and explained that it was not surprising that, the country no longer appearing to be in danger of invasion, the patriotic impulse of August, 1914, should have been succeeded by a sense of weariness. He admitted that some officers and non-commissioned officers were not up to the mark, but reminded the Assembly that the Swiss army was, after all, only a militia. He added the suggestion that the dissatisfaction with superiors was largely due to external political influences, which he strongly deprecated. The fact is that the management of a purely civilian army, uninspired, as were those of the belligerents, with a desire to conquer, required the exercise of an amount of tact which is not always displayed even by professional officers.

On August 4, the Federal Council, issued the following declaration of neutrality :—

In view of the war which has just broken out between several European Powers, the Swiss Confederation, inspired by its secular traditions, is firmly resolved to depart in no respect from the principles of neutrality so dear to the Swiss people, which correspond so well with its aspirations, with its internal organization, and with its position with regard to other States, which has been formally recognized by the Powers signatory of the treaties of 1815.


In virtue of the special mandate just issued to it by the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council formally declares that in the course of the coming war the Swiss Confederation will maintain and defend by all the means at its disposal its neutrality and the inviolability of its territory, as recognized by the treaties of 1815; it will itself observe the strictest neutrality with regard to the belligerent States.

A paragraph was devoted to maintaining the right of Switzerland to occupy, in case of necessity, certain parts of Savoy, of which the neutrality had been contemplated by the Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815) and the Treaty of Turin (March 24, 1860); the Federal Council added that it would endeavour to come to an understanding on this point with the French Government, and concluded by announcing its firm conviction that this declaration would be favourably received by the belligerent Powers as well as by the remaining Powers signatory of the treaties of 1815 "as the expression of the traditional attachment of the Swiss people to the idea of neutrality and as the loyal affirmation of the consequences resulting for the Swiss Confederation from the treaties of 1815."

The German and French Governments had already spontaneously declared their intention of scrupulously respecting Swiss neu-



ON THE GERMAN-SWISS FRONTIER NEAR BASEL (BALE).



SWITZERLAND AND HER FRONTIERS.

trality during the coming war. In reply to the declaration of the Federal Council, the German Minister declared, on behalf of his Government :—

The Imperial Government has taken note of this declaration with sincere satisfaction and relies on the Confederation's repelling, thanks to its strong army and the steadfast will of the Swiss people, any violation of its neutrality.

The Imperial Government renews on this occasion the solemn assurance already given to the Federal Council before the opening of hostilities that the German Empire will scrupulously respect the neutrality of Switzerland. The relations of sincere confidence which have always existed between the two neighbouring countries are a guarantee that during the war also they will continue to be what they have always been.

The French Government, for its part, replied (August 8) that, so far as it was concerned, it would not fail scrupulously to observe the treaty provisions regarding the neutrality of the Swiss Confederation. As for the Savoy question, the French Government took the view that, under the Act of Acceptation of the Treaty of Vienna, dated August 12, 1815, a preliminary agreement with France as to the conditions of any intervention on the part of Switzerland was necessary. The Federal Council replied (August 26) that, while it still maintained that, under the very Act of August 12, 1815, invoked by the French Government, the Swiss right to occupy Savoy, if necessary, did not depend on "the perfect conclusion of preliminary agreements" between the two Governments, it did not think it worth while to go more deeply into the matter at that moment. With this the French Government, while maintaining its own point of view, agreed.

Although neither a belligerent (at that time) nor a Power signatory of the Treaty of Paris, Italy replied to the declaration of the Federal Council that the King's Government was ever inspired by the principles consecrated by that treaty and was firmly resolved to continue to observe that attitude. On coming into the war, Italy confirmed her confidence in Switzerland's neutral intentions.

Notwithstanding these divers professions of neutrality on the part of foreign Powers, the use of aircraft, with all its uncertainties, subjected Switzerland, as was only to be expected from the cartographical position of the country and the close proximity of the belligerents, to a large number of aerial "frontier incidents," all presumably accidental, during the course of the war. Early in August, 1914, the Swiss Government announced that it adopted the

principle of territoriality *usque ad coelum*. In pursuance of this principle the Swiss troops fired at all aircraft passing overhead and the Swiss Government protested on each occasion. Apologies, before or after enquiry, habitually followed. In the case of British airmen who flew over Swiss territory on the way to Friedrichshafen and back in November, 1914, the British Government, while expressing its keen regrets and declaring that the airmen had



A GERMAN TRENCH CUT RIGHT UP TO THE SWISS FRONTIER.

been formally instructed to respect the Swiss frontier, made at the same time the reservation that these expressions of regret must not be considered as recognition of the existence of a sovereignty of the air; to which the Federal Council replied by maintaining its claim to this sovereignty. Up to May 15, 1916, 24 cases of violation of the frontier had been reported; of these, the Germans were certainly guilty of 14, the French of six, and the English and Italians of one each. Numerous other cases occurred later—so numerous, in fact, that, though they came at length almost to be accepted by the general public as part of the ordinary routine of war, they raised once more the highly interesting speculation as to how, with the development of aerial navigation, the police and customs control of the air would have to be organized in time of peace.

On October 17, 1915, a German pilot, instructed to destroy the French railway lines near the Swiss frontier, apparently mistook the line and dropped eight bombs near the station of Chaux-de-Fonds, wounding four persons and doing considerable damage. On March 31, 1916, two German aeroplanes dropped four

bombs on Porrentruy, but caused no great harm. Again, on April 24, 1917, two bombs were dropped on Porrentruy by a French machine, of which one fell on the house of a watchmaker, slightly injuring three persons, and the other fell in an open space. In various cases, airmen landed in Switzerland, owing either to their having lost their way or to



M. GIUSEPPE MOTTA,
President of the Swiss Confederation in 1915.

“engine trouble,” and were duly interned. All these incidents were provisionally adjusted, where the offence could be brought home, by apologies and offers to pay compensation for damages, if any.

The Federal Council followed up its declaration by an appeal to the Swiss people, in which it set forth the duties of neutrals. In order to understand the difficulty which confronted the people in the performance of these duties, the following considerations must be borne in mind.

In addition to the ordinary internal political differences of opinion which in the smaller European countries tend to acquire an exceptional importance in the affairs of everyday life, the Swiss population had numerous other reasons for a division of sympathies. There are in Switzerland two main distinct political and social atmospheres, corresponding to the two

chief racial divisions of the country. (The attitude of the Italian Swiss, some 300,000 in number, was similar, at first, to that of the French cantons, and, of course, when Italy came into the war, was pro-Italian.) The language of more than two-thirds of the population is German, and four years before the war there were 220,000 foreign German residents as well. The inhabitants of German Switzerland were closely connected with Germany, not only by the common language, of which, indeed, they speak their own dialect, but by business and family ties. Above all, they had German coal in their stoves, German cloth on their backs, German proprietors in their shops, German professors in their Universities, German *Kultur* in their minds, and German brains and German money in their newspapers. Since Germany became a nation, the German Swiss had watched its rise with growing admiration, looking upon it rather as an industrial and scientific than as a military progress. They were intimate with their relations and proud of what they had done. Reading the German newspapers, and being flooded with German propaganda, they were naturally at first inclined to accept the German point of view. They thought of Germany as being attacked on all sides and fighting for her existence against a ring of enemies whom she not only held at bay but drove triumphantly before her. The early German successes were, indeed, extremely impressive, and, as in other neutral countries, the Allies of the Entente were many months late in the Swiss field with their own propaganda. Even when attempts were made to counteract the German campaign of lies and to place German “triumphs” in their proper perspective, the slowness and inadequacy of the methods adopted greatly detracted from their value. The French, however, did work in this connexion which, to judge by the indignation of the German Press, was more than usually effective.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was similarly seen by the German Swiss through German spectacles. The fellow-feeling that they might have been expected to have for Serbia was swallowed up by the belief that Germany and Austria were waging war in order to kill Russian “Tsarism.” Their historic sympathy for France was outweighed by their modern relations with Germany. Against England they had no particular feeling, except, perhaps, faint traces of the dislike resulting

from the misunderstanding of the Boer War.

The attitude of the German-Swiss Press, with one or two notable exceptions, such as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, which was elaborately neutral throughout, was at first definitely pro-German. Some of the newspapers had undoubtedly been "bought," partly in order that their views might be reproduced in Germany as "neutral opinion"; others employed writers with strong pro-German sympathies; others, again, honestly believed that Germany was going to win and wanted to be on the winning side.

The French-Swiss, on the other hand, numbering some 795,000 out of the total population of 4,000,000, were naturally anti-German, though they, too, suffered at first from a lack of truthful information. Their Press was always strenuously pro-Entente. From French-Swiss writers came some of the most effective denunciations of German enormities, and it was among the French-Swiss especially that Switzerland's failure to protest officially against the violation of Belgium and other deeds of iniquity left the deepest sense of shame.

These acute divergencies of opinion, in the midst of the early tension of the war, led naturally in many cases to an outspoken expression of sympathies which, however legitimate in the individual among his friends, tended not only to divide the country within

but to menace its good relations without. By October, 1914, matters had reached such a pitch that the Federal Council thought it necessary to address a second appeal to the Swiss people, reminding them of their neutrality, exhorting them to greater reserve, and inviting the Press to moderate its language; two newspapers were suspended and five others were warned.

A very salutary impression, from the point of view of the unity of the country, resulted from a lecture delivered on December 14, at Zurich, by Carl Spitteler, the septuagenarian poet of Lucerne. He bade his audience remember that, while the peoples lying outside the frontiers were neighbours, those living inside the country were brothers. The difference between them was that, "while even the best neighbour may in certain circumstances shoot at us with cannon, a brother fights on our side."

We must be conscious [he said] that the political brother stands nearer to us than the best neighbour and racial relative. . . . We should feel harmonious although not undivided. . . . Without doubt, the one right thing for us neutrals would be to keep at a proper distance from all sides alike. That is, indeed, the opinion of every Swiss. But it is easier said than done. . . . Still more closely than the Western Swiss with France is the German Swiss connected with Germany in the whole realm of *Kultur*, among other things in art and literature. . . . Countless ties of business relationships, of spiritual agreement, of friendship, have been formed—a beautiful condition of harmony which made us quite forget, during the long period of peace, that there is anything like a frontier between Germany and German Switzerland.



BERNE,

With the Eiger, Mönch and Jungfrau in the distance.



M. BEAU,
French Ambassador in Switzerland.

For his part, continued Herr Spitteler, Germany was his spiritual home. He had thousands of friends there; in France he travelled as "a solitary nobody, surrounded by cold, suspicious strangers." But, he added, Swiss troops lined *all* the frontiers. Why?

Because, as a matter of fact, the whole experience of the history of the world may be condensed into one single sentence: "Every State robs as much as it can—with pauses for digestion and fits of weakness which are called peace." . . . For all the hearty friendship which connects us in private life with thousands of German subjects, for all the solidarity which we piously feel with the German spiritual life, for all the familiarity which, from our common language, charms us at home we must take up no other position towards political Germany, the German Empire, than towards any other States—the position of neutral restraint at a friendly and neighbourly distance on this side of the frontier.

Speaking of German propaganda, Herr Spitteler unkindly remarked:—

In order to save our neutral souls, propaganda documents pour into our homes—most of them pitched too high, frequently written in a tone of command, sometimes quite frenzied. The more learned they are, the more rabid. Things of this kind miss their mark. There is little attraction about an invitation if one gets the impression, in reading it, that the gentleman who wrote it would like to eat one up. . . . The thousands and thousands of spiritual influences which day by day from Germany, like a "good" Nile, cover our country with a fertilizing flood ought in war time only to be enjoyed filtered. A belligerent Press is not at all elevating literature. . . . Is it absolutely necessary to poison with ink the bloody wounds of war?

As for France, added Herr Spitteler, her Republic, democracy, freedom, tolerance, used

to mean everything in Europe. Why should they be accounted almost nothing to-day? And as for England:

Against the English, as you know, the Germans cherish at present a quite special hate. For this quite special hate they have quite special grounds, which we have not. On the contrary, we owe quite special thanks to England. For more than once England has stood by to protect us when we were in great danger. England is not, indeed, the only friend of Switzerland, but she is the most trustworthy.

In an eloquent peroration, Herr Spitteler said:—

When a funeral procession goes by, what do you do? You take your hat off. As spectators of a tragedy in the theatre, what do you feel? Emotion and devoutness. And how do you behave? You keep still, in moved, humble, serious silence. Isn't that the first thing to learn? Well, a favourable exception on the part of Fate has permitted us, at the frightful tragedy now unrolling itself in Europe, to sit among the spectators. On the stage is sorrow, behind the scenes is murder. Wherever you listen with your hearts, to left or right, you hear sobbing, and the sobs and lamentations sound alike in all nations, for there is no difference of speech. Well, then, in presence of this mass of international suffering, let us fill our hearts with silent emotion and our souls with devoutness, and offer to all our tribute of respect.

This speech, remarkable alike for its matter and for the moment chosen for its delivery, represented, in fact, the true feelings of the Swiss people, as they came to assert themselves. It need hardly be said that it made the Pan-Germans extremely angry, and the professorial propaganda-writers condemned it



BARON VON ROMBERG,
German Minister in Switzerland.

bitterly. But as the war became an institution, and especially as the best instincts of the Swiss found vent in the multitudinous works of philanthropy which are described in later pages, the divergency of opinion between the two great sections of the people became less marked. Unity, as will be seen later, was in due course to be restored by some painful incidents of an international character. Meanwhile, Swiss public opinion may be said to have settled down more or less on the following lines:—

The war was universally hated on various grounds. First, there was the anxiety lest Switzerland should be "starved," which took

spend money abroad. As for the result of the war, as has already been indicated, most at first expected, and many feared, although few hoped, that Germany and her Allies would win. But even by the middle of 1915, the private opinions of the German-Swiss people revealed themselves in many striking ways. When, for instance, Sir Henry Angst, the British Consul-General at Zurich, distributed to all who wished to have them the British White Book, the manifesto of the Oxford professors, Mr. Lloyd George's Queen's Hall speech, and other literature presenting the English case, he received hundreds of letters, mostly written in German, thanking him for the step which he



ITALIANS RETURNING FROM BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR ARRIVE HUNGRY AND TIRED AT BASEL (BÂLE).

the place of the earlier fear of being directly involved in the war. Then, there was a genuine sympathy with the sufferings of the belligerents, both military and civilian, which were brought home in an impressive form by the passage of trainloads of severely wounded soldiers and of homeless old men, women, and children, as also by the presence of crippled *internés* of divers nations. Then, like the comparatively unimportant restrictions on peace habits, the prolonged mobilization of the Swiss army was unpopular. Lastly, in the very important hotel-keeping industry, there was undoubtedly a feeling that, if the war continued, the industry would suffer afterwards by the inability of citizens of belligerent States to

had taken. They came from schoolmasters, artisans, labourers, peasants, and all classes of German Swiss society; almost without exception they protested against the flood of lies with which Germany had tried to poison Swiss public opinion and maintained that democratic England was, and always had been, industrially and politically Switzerland's best friend. Towards the end of the third year of war, the conviction came to prevail, even among the German-Swiss, that Germany could not win. Then there remained to them chiefly the hope that neither side would be too badly beaten, while the French-Swiss, for their part, grew daily more confident of the ultimate decisive victory of the Entente.

The Germans before the war were no more personally popular in Switzerland than elsewhere, and their methods of "peaceful penetration" had aroused the dislike of various classes. The German workman and German commercial traveller undersold their Swiss competitors. The well-to-do German tripper,



GENERAL U. WILLE,
Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army.

who had taken the place of the English visitor in some Swiss hotels, was a larger, as well as a grosser, feeder, and a more niggardly spender. The German financier had a fondness for getting hold of Swiss money and investing it in German concerns such as the Baghdad Railway. The young German professor had a way of employing the Swiss University career, not only as a convenient stepping-stone to academic success in Germany, but as an opportunity for disseminating in Switzerland the ideals of the Fatherland. Again, whether the country were ultimately invaded or not, it was well known that Switzerland was a hot-bed of spies. Prince Bülow had his headquarters at Lucerne, and the

activities of German agents, both official and clandestine, were notorious. Propaganda of the spectacular kind lost its power to charm, and ended by doing the Germans more harm than good. The exhibition of the cinematograph film recording the exploits of the raider Möwe merely made the Bernese sad and angry at the thought of the loss of so much valuable property, and disgusted at the characteristic bad taste which interpolated scenes of hilarity, speech-making and gymnastics between each harrowing sinking of a beautiful ship. For these and other reasons to be mentioned later, Germany steadily lost prestige in Switzerland.

Switzerland, indeed, hated the war, but then she hates all wars. This does not mean that she would not strain every nerve to fight for her independence; the measures which she took to defend her neutrality are sufficient evidence to the contrary. It means that she dislikes militarism in all its forms. She was to be confirmed in this traditional dislike by some of the proceedings of her own General Staff.

At the outbreak of war, the Federal Assembly duly elected a General out of the list of colonels who in peace time are the senior officers of the Army. For some reason, the first choice of the Chambers, Colonel Sprecher, was set aside, and Colonel Wille was appointed General and Commander-in-Chief for the duration of the war, with power to select his General Staff, who were ordinarily chosen by the Federal Council. The virtual effect of these measures was to create a military oligarchy, and the General Staff proceeded to enjoy this unaccustomed opportunity of magnifying their office. Whether or not it be true, as was alleged, that Germany brought pressure to bear in the direction of the appointment of General Wille, it was natural enough that, being inspired with German military ideas, some of the German-Swiss Staff should be inclined to display favour towards German methods and be influenced by pro-German tendencies.

In January, 1916, two correspondents of *The Times*, Mr. Gerald Campbell and M. Lamure, were in Delémont, a small town about half-way between Basel and Delle, and six miles from the Alsace-Swiss frontier. Eleven months previously they had been forbidden by the General Staff to reside there, though they were left at liberty to visit the place in daytime. In view of the fact that since August, 1915, a Prussian engineer had taken up his abode in the town, and had been appointed official photo-

grapher to the 4th Division of the Swiss Army, with facilities denied even to Swiss officers under the rank of lieutenant-colonel, except when on duty. Mr. Campbell concluded that the objection to the presence of foreigners at Delémont no longer existed. Early in the morning of January 7, the correspondents were arrested, examined on a charge of espionage, taken to Berne, and released on parole. M. Lamure was accused of nothing. Thereupon the military police, acting under the instructions of the General Staff, who afterwards explained that it was another Mr. Campbell who had been behaving suspiciously, determined to discover some inculpatory evidence. While Mr. Campbell himself, in spite of his parole, was cast into prison for over 48 hours, and M. Lamure was confined to hospital, their rooms were industriously searched. Even after they had been released—thanks to the decided action of the Federal Council, the British Minister and the French Ambassador—the power of the General Staff was great enough to detain them a further two days in Berne under parole, and Mr. Campbell was finally examined nearly 48 hours after the General Staff had finally decided that they had not a particle of evidence against him.

In December, 1915, Colonel de Wattenwyl,

Chief of the Intelligence Department, was in charge of the service of the Western Front, while Colonel Egli, sub-chief of the Staff of the Army, was in charge of the Eastern Front. The two worked independently, and on their own responsibility. In the course of their duty they drew up daily a report for the use of the General Staff and certain of the Federal authorities. On February 28 and 29, 1916, they were tried for having, "since the spring of 1915," communicated these reports to the German and Austrian Military Attachés, Major von Bismarck and Lieut.-Colonel von Einem, and "further for having communicated to a Military Attaché of the same group of belligerent Powers foreign documents exchanged between official persons abroad and between foreign official persons in Switzerland and their home Government. Code messages exchanged between "the military authorities of Petrograd, London, Copenhagen, and Stockholm" were intercepted at Berne, and deciphered in the Intelligence Department by a Dr. Langie, son of a Polish refugee of 1860, who, in an anonymous letter, revealed his discovery of the cipher to an Attaché interested. The Colonels contended that they had been obliged, for the good of their country, to obtain information from foreign Attachés by giving something in



GENEVA, FROM THE BRUNSWICK MONUMENT.

exchange, but that these reports, which the Attachés received for their communications, were not secret, and contained nothing of importance, and that the General Staff had received more information than it had given. Colonel Egli, in reply to a question by the judge as to whether he would have supplied the same information to the Attachés of the Entente if they had asked for it, replied, "Yes, if they gave us something in return." It was further urged that only one of the intercepted tele-


inquiry produced a profound commotion, not to say dissatisfaction and alarm, throughout Switzerland. On the occasion of the Emperor William's birthday (January 27, 1916), a large crowd at Lausanne tore down the German flag hoisted over the German consulate. It was not that the people questioned the patriotism of Colonel Sprecher, Chief of the Staff, who had defended his colleague on grounds of very unequal validity, of the two colonels themselves, who had both in the past done valuable



LADY GRANT DUFF.

grams had been deciphered, and that it had not been communicated to anybody. The Court acquitted the colonels on the ground that their communication of the General Staff bulletin to the German and Austrian Attachés, although improper, was not criminal, as the officers had acted in good faith. The other charge broke down. The next day, the General, this time in agreement with, and in the presence of, the Federal Council, sentenced them each to 20 days' close arrest, and to be placed on the unemployed list.

This "affair of two colonels," as it was called, had begun in December, 1915, when, as the result of an investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, they were removed from the General Staff. One of them, however, was simultaneously advanced to the command of a very important fortress. The second



[Elliott and Fry, photo.]

SIR EVELYN GRANT DUFF, K.C.M.G.,
British Minister in Switzerland, 1913-1916.

service for the Swiss Army, or of the tribunal which acquitted them on somewhat technical grounds. But they were shocked at the display in their midst of a militarism for which the end justified the means—a thing utterly abhorrent to the ideals of justice and freedom on which the constitutional government of Switzerland had been based through all its proud history.

In September, 1916, Mr. (now Sir) Evelyn Grant Duff, who had been British Minister in Berne since May, 1913, returned to England. A banquet was given in his honour by the Federal Council, a compliment especially well deserved in view of the slanders circulated about him earlier in the war in quarters inspired by Germany. It was largely due to his untiring efforts that the spirit of friendliness and understanding between Switzerland

and England increased as time went on in spite of unceasing attempts on the part of Germany to sow dissension. Mrs. Grant Duff had done admirable work in founding the British Section of the Bureau de Secours aux Prisonniers de Guerre, to the parcels of bread and other comforts sent by which many British prisoners of war may be said to have owed their lives. The new Minister was Sir Horace Rumbold, Bart., who at the outbreak of the war had been Counsellor of Embassy in Berlin.



SIR HORACE RUMBOLD, Bart., K.C.M.G.,
British Minister in Switzerland, 1916.

It will be remembered that President Wilson's remarkable Peace Note of December 20, 1916, was followed on December 23 by a Note to the belligerents in which the Swiss Federal Council declared* that it had got into touch with the President "as long as five weeks" previously, and that Switzerland seized with joy the opportunity to support his efforts, being "ready to aid with all her feeble strength in putting an end to the sufferings of war which she sees going on every day—the interned, the seriously wounded, and the repatriated. . . . She would consider it a happy duty to work even in the most modest measure towards the *rapprochement* of the nations at war and the establishment of a lasting peace." This Note took the Swiss people by surprise. They

regarded it as a serious thing that "the oldest democracy in the world" should have been kept in the dark as to negotiations of this kind and secretly committed to what appeared to be an attempt to intervene between the belligerents. They were later to become more familiar with the methods of Herr Hoffmann, their Minister for Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile the Allies, while very justly praising Switzerland's philanthropic efforts in other directions, —replied that they had already explained their



LADY RUMBOLD.

attitude—or, in other words, saw no advantage in discussing the matter.

A few weeks later (February, 1917) President Wilson invited neutrals to follow the example of the United States and break off diplomatic relations with Germany. This was a very different matter from what the Swiss Note had contemplated for Switzerland, and the Federal Council had little difficulty in deciding that it would be incompatible with the Swiss declaration of neutrality of August 4, 1914. The Federal Council took occasion to draw President Wilson's attention to the peculiar geographical position of Switzerland, who would, it held, certainly become a theatre of war if she abandoned her neutrality. Painful, therefore, as the blockade announced by Germany would render the Swiss economic

* See Vol. XI, Chapter CLXXX, page 482.



PATROL IN THE MOUNTAINS.

position, and "however much the effective application of the blockade might injure the principles of international law," the Federal Council could not see its way to accept President Wilson's suggestion. In a simultaneous Note to Germany the Federal Government described the intensified blockade as "a grave infringement of the right of peaceful trade which, in conformity with the principles of international law, appertains to Switzerland as a neutral State," and added :

The Federal Government is therefore obliged to protest strongly against and to make every reservation as regards the blockade announced by the Imperial Government, inasmuch as its application would injure the recognized rights of neutrals under the general

principles of international law. In particular, should the effective application of the blockade appear to be incomplete, the Federal Council makes beforehand all reservations as to its rights if it should happen that the means adopted by Germany and her Allies result in the destruction of Swiss citizens or property.

In 1917, two events filled Switzerland once more with a sense that she was being led by her representatives into a position perilously resembling interference with matters belonging to a sphere into which she had no desire whatever to enter. When Count Bernstorff, on February 3, was handed his passports in Washington (see Vol. 13, chapter CXCIV, page 6) M. Ritter, the Swiss Minister, took charge of German interests. (As time went on the frequent recurrence of the entry into the war against Germany of fresh belligerents threw upon the Swiss diplomatic representatives abroad, who in many cases assumed the burden of their interests, a great and unaccustomed responsibility.) On February 12, the State Department announced that M. Ritter had orally suggested that Germany was willing to negotiate with the United States, formally or informally, "provided that the commercial blockade against England was not interfered with." At the State Department's request M. Ritter put the statement in writing. The memorandum was worded as follows :

The Swiss Government has been requested by the German Government to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England be not broken thereby.

The United States replied suitably. Germany must first withdraw her submarine decree and live up to the assurances given after the Sussex outrage.

What part had M. Ritter played in the affair ? The German Government announced,




A SWISS OUTPOST ON SKIS.

in its official version, that "a telegram from the Swiss Minister in Washington was transmitted to Germany by Switzerland. In this the Minister offered, if Germany agreed, to enter into negotiations with the United States Government regarding the declaration of a barred area, as the danger of war between Germany and the United States might thus be diminished. The Swiss Government was then requested to inform its Minister in Washington that Germany, as before, was ready to negotiate, . . . etc." Suspicion was naturally aroused that M. Ritter had been "got at" by American pacifists and pro-German agents, and it was believed in the United States that his memorandum was inspired less by the expectation of initiating fruitful negotiations than by the hope of confronting the President with a divided public opinion and of committing him, in some way or other, to a "German peace." When the plot failed, Germany, with characteristic dishonesty, attempted to throw upon M. Ritter's shoulders the responsibility for having inaugurated the overtures which had resulted so humiliatingly for her. There seems no doubt that M. Ritter was prompted to take the step he did by pro-Germans in Washington. Count Bernstorff being debarred from communication, the Swiss Minister, as the person charged with German interests in the United States, conceived it to be his duty to act as a telephone. His action may be said to have implied, in itself, no personal interest, still less any meddling on the part of the Swiss Government. M. Ritter may have been more sinned against than sinning. But, in the circumstances, it was, at all events, a very unfortunate occurrence, and provoked much unfavourable comment among all sections of Swiss opinion. M. Ritter was subsequently appointed to fill the newly created post of Swiss Minister at The Hague.

The other regrettable incident of 1917 was that known as the Hoffmann-Grimm affair. Herr Hoffmann was Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs. Grimm was a German-Swiss Socialist Deputy and the promoter of a pacifist conference at Zimmerwald (September 1915). Having obtained the consent of the German authorities to traverse Germany, in company with some 40 Russian exiles on their way home after the Revolution, he had arrived in Petrograd, where he was doing his best to promote the peace so ardently desired by Germany. On June 18 a Reuter message

from Petrograd announced that the Provisional Government had learnt "from an unimpeachable source" that Grimm had received from Herr Hoffmann a communication which, to all intents and purposes, was identical with



HERR ARTHUR HOFFMANN,
President of the Swiss Confederation in 1914.

that admittedly sent by Herr Hoffmann, which is given below. The Provisional Government added that, learning of this document, it had charged the Socialist Ministers Tseretelli and Skobelev to invite Grimm to explain. Grimm had thereupon handed to the Ministers a document in which he sought to prove that he had had no communication, direct or indirect, on the subject of peace negotiations, and that the above-mentioned telegram was an endeavour on the part of Germany to profit by his stay in Russia to re-establish the international Socialist bonds and a general peace in the interest of the German Government; further, that when in Berne, while waiting for his passport to be *visé*, he had avoided all political conversations and all contact with the German Majority Socialists; and, finally, that, as a Socialist, he could not be the intermediary for Imperialistic peace projects between Governments. MM. Tseretelli and Skobelev found these explanations unsatisfactory, and the Provisional Government requested Grimm to leave Russia, which he had done.

What apparently had really happened was



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this. Grimm had desired, in the course of his activities, to know authoritatively the sort of peace terms which were in Germany's mind. He therefore persuaded M. Odier, the Swiss Minister in Petrograd, to send Herr Hoffmann the following telegram. Its wording should be carefully noted, for no accurate English translation has hitherto been published :—

National Councillor Grimm, who is at present in Petrograd, begs us to communicate to Federal Councillor Hoffmann the following telegram :—

"Need of peace is universally prevalent. A conclusion of peace is urgent necessity from political, economic, and military point of view. Recognition of this fact prevails in authoritative circles. France is making hindrances and England impediments. The negotiations are proceeding (*schweben gegenwärtig*) and the prospects are favourable. In the next few days new and stronger pressure is to be expected. The only possible and most dangerous disturbance of all negotiations would be that which would result from a German offensive in the East. If this disturbance does not take place, a solution will be possible in a comparatively short time.

"Part of the peace policy of the new Government is an international conference summoned by the Council of Workmen. The realization of this conference may be taken as assured, if the Governments make no difficulties about passports. All countries have agreed to take part. Inform me, if possible, as to the war aims, known to you, of the Governments, for the negotiations would be thereby facilitated. I am remaining about 10 days longer in Petrograd."

Herr Hoffmann, evidently thinking that Grimm was referring solely to the question of a separate peace with Russia, replied, on

June 3, in cipher to the Swiss Minister in Petrograd as follows :—

Federal Councillor Hoffmann authorizes you to make to Grimm the following verbal communications :—

"Germany will undertake no offensive so long as friendly understanding with Russia appears possible. From repeated conversations with prominent personages, we have conviction that Germany aims at honourable peace for both sides with Russia, with future close trade and economic relations and financial support for reconstruction of Russia. No interference in Russia's internal affairs; friendly understanding with regard to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, their national character being taken into consideration. Restitution of occupied territory in exchange for restitution by Russia of occupied territory to Austria. Am convinced that Germany and her Allies would immediately enter into peace negotiations at the desire of Russia's Allies. With regard to the war aims on this side I refer to statement in *North-German Gazette*, in which [in] fundamental agreement with Asquith as to the question of annexations, it is asserted that Germany desires no extensions of territory with view to aggrandisement or of political and economical extension of power."

This telegram, by some means which were obscure, was deciphered, and was published at Stockholm in *Socialdemokraten*, the organ of Mr. Branting, the Swedish Socialist leader. Although Grimm, as has been seen, never received it, he was expelled from Petrograd as a German agent, and *The Times* described Herr Hoffmann's share in the transaction as "scarcely distinguishable from an unneutral step taken by a member of the Swiss Govern-



CHÂTEAU D'OEX.

ment," and as "an international incident that requires the promptest investigation."

The publication of Herr Hoffmann's telegram and the comment of the Entente Press filled Switzerland with an intense feeling of alarm, which, as the facts became more fully known, gave place to an equally intense feeling of indignation and shame. The alarm was due to the fear lest Switzerland's position in regard to supplies, already a matter of painful negotiation, should be imperilled; the indignation and shame were due to the discovery that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of an essentially democratic country, who had always professed his determination to maintain Swiss neutrality at all costs, had been proved guilty of committing, of his own initiative and unknown to his colleagues, an act of "secret diplomacy," and of highly questionable neutrality. In the existing state of war tension, it is not surprising that this event, one of the most remarkable and deplorable in Swiss political history, should have produced widespread consternation. Fortunately, Switzerland again rose to the occasion. With one or two unimportant exceptions the entire press of the country unsparingly condemned Herr Hoffmann's conduct. The *Bund*, the organ most closely connected with the Swiss Government, while denying emphatically that Herr Hoffmann

had acted as "a German agent," admitted that his action had been all wrong, and declared that Switzerland must do nothing that could present the slightest appearance of an attempt to detach Russia from the Pact of London, that the case of M. Ritter should have been a warning to Herr Hoffmann, and that Herr Hoffmann's only course was immediate resignation. It added:

The Swiss people do not wish their leaders to meddle with outside affairs, whether militarily or diplomatically, and especially when this meddling tends in practice to the favouring of one of the belligerents. It is contrary to our democratic sentiment that secret missions should intervene in our relations with foreign countries.

The Socialist group of the National Council entirely repudiated Grimm's action. The Russian Government forbade the use of cipher between the Swiss Legation and Berne, and M. Odier was recalled to give a personal explanation of the part which he had played in the affair.

Without waiting for the public outcry, Herr Hoffmann tendered his resignation as a member of the Federal Council in the following letter:

The unauthorized publication of a ciphered dispatch which I sent to the Swiss Minister in Petrograd to National Councillor Grimm at that place, and in which I set forth my conception of the peace conditions of the Central Powers with regard to Russia and in reference to the other Allies, has created a situation which may become disastrous for the internal political and external



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relations of the country. No one will doubt that, in taking this step of my own motion and my responsibility, I sought solely the promotion of peace, and with it the interests of the country. But I cannot bear the thought that, at this time of extreme political tension and agitation, my further activity on the Federal Council should become a source of distrust, disunion and instability and should thereby cause harm to my beloved Fatherland. I beg you therefore to accept my resignation as a member of the Federal Council.

After the reading of Herr Hoffmann's letter to the National Council, Herr Schulthess, President of the Confederation, hastened to declare that the Federal Council had had no knowledge of his step and that, if it had been consulted by Herr Hoffmann, it would have

begged him to give up his intention. The President added a tribute to the energy and devotion of the retiring Councillor, as to the purity of whose sentiments, he said, there was no doubt—he had only wished to act in the interests of the country. The National Council approved both Herr Hoffmann's resignation and the declaration of the Federal Council.

Perhaps the most probable explanation of the whole matter was that of the *Basler Nachrichten*, which suggested that Herr Hoffmann had been "bounced" (*überraumpelt*) into his rash act by Grimm's request for information,



BASEL AND THE NEW BRIDGE.

and, being sincerely desirous of doing what he could towards peace, had merely suffered from an excess of zeal. Herr Hoffmann himself strenuously denied that he had had any previous arrangement with Grimm. While Grimm, for his part, had "bounced" the Swiss Legation by representing himself as having been authorized by Herr Hoffmann to use the cipher for sending him news about the situation in Russia, Herr Hoffmann maintained that he had merely told Grimm to apply to the Legation if he got into difficulties. Opinions differed as to how far Herr Hoffmann was under direct Ger-

and self-will. His colleagues being overwhelmed with the work of their own departments, and being unwilling or unable to interfere with this dictatorial Minister, the conduct of the Department of Foreign Affairs had soon become his sole personal concern. He had grown accustomed to think that he could do everything himself without consulting his colleagues. In this instance—as it seemed, entirely "off his own bat"—he did what even his friends admitted to be an amazingly foolish thing.

In any case there can be no doubt that



ON THE GERMAN-SWISS FRONTIER.

man influence. It was notorious that he was visited daily by Herr von Romberg, the German Minister. On the other hand, he was believed to have latterly found these visits extremely oppressive. His father was a naturalized German, so that in any case the possibility of a favourable leaning towards German views was not excluded. But, although many traced the influence of Germany in the "affair of the two colonels," the proceedings of the Swiss Minister in Washington, and the sending of Grimm himself to Petrograd, dispassionate observers found it unnecessary to attach any sinister explanation to this particular incident. There was nothing in his version of the German terms that he could not have been expected to know merely from being Minister for Foreign Affairs. The fact was that Herr Hoffmann, who had been President of the Swiss Confederation in 1914, was a man of great energy

German influence in Switzerland received from the Hoffmann affair a serious setback. At Geneva, after a popular meeting of several thousand persons, a crowd of youths attacked the German Consulate, smashed the windows, and tore down the coat of arms. If we can imagine the discovery of a secret correspondence between a British Foreign Secretary and some insignificant Socialist pacifist of notorious German sympathies, we can realize how great was the shock to the feelings of the non-Socialist Swiss. But with Herr Hoffmann's resignation, and with the general public repudiation of his action, the affair was settled by the country itself without any suggestion of external pressure.

Meanwhile M. Gustave Ador, the universally respected President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, took Herr Hoffmann's place on the Federal Council.

An event of minor importance in 1917 though not without significance, was the rejection of the proposal of the Faculty of Philosophy of Berne University to nominate Herr Stegemann, military critic of the *Bund*, as professor of military history at the University. The reasons given were that Herr Stegemann had never served in a combatant army, and that he was too recently naturalized to be given this important post. Whether these were the true reasons or not, the action of the Council was thoroughly in accordance with the best Swiss opinion, for Herr Stegemann (familiarly known as "Strategemann," and a typical "military correspondent") had never concealed his sympathies with the Power of which he had so recently been a subject, and his appointment to the professorship would inevitably have increased just that German tendency in Swiss military thought of which true Swiss patriots had long realized the danger for their country.

Fully alive to the difficulties in which, owing to Switzerland's geographical position and her large dependence on the outer world for food and raw materials, the country would

be placed in time of war, the Swiss Government had, with remarkable foresight, taken steps many months before the war came to meet them. In the spring of 1914 an arrangement was come to with France for securing, in the event of war, a regular supply of foodstuffs through the Mediterranean ports of Marseilles and Cete. At the same time it was agreed with Germany that, in the event of war, stocks of corn destined to Switzerland which might happen to be lying in Germany should not be seized, and that there should be no interference with the delivery to Switzerland either of this corn or of coal.

These agreements proved invaluable, for when the war came there was a large quantity of corn for Switzerland in Germany. The Federal Government bought it all, and more than 3,200 truck loads were brought up the Rhine into Switzerland; the rest was stopped by Great Britain on its way by sea to Rotterdam. But while the route via Rotterdam and the Rhine was thus closed, the Italian Government agreed to keep open the route through Genoa. As the agreements with France and Germany only gave facilities for corn destined for the Swiss Government—in other words, the Swiss army and population—




VOLUNTARY WORKERS OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR AGENCY AT GENEVA.

and as corn destined for the Government was less likely to be sequestered by the maritime Powers than that destined for private importers, the Government automatically acquired a kind of monopoly. In order to secure the advantage of any private imports of corn, it guaranteed that all corn, by whomsoever imported, should be consumed in Switzerland. In other words, it absolutely forbade the export of corn from the country. By a regulation of August 24, 1914, millers were only allowed to produce wholemeal. No one was allowed to lay in more than a month's provision of flour. The cantons were given the right to fix, if necessary, maximum prices.

In spite of these and many other measures, the question of the supply not only of food but of all other commodities from abroad soon became very serious. Generally speaking, the export of everything was prohibited, with exceptions which might be authorized for special reasons by the State. The principle of the supply of munitions by a neutral to belligerents being recognized by the Hague Convention, a portion of the Swiss manufacturing industry was devoted to this purpose with marked success. It was commonly said, for example, that the Swiss watchmakers made the best shell-fuses in the world. But with the development of the theory of conditional contraband and of stricter measures of search and sequestration, it soon became clear that, if Switzerland's industrial life were not to be strangled, it would be necessary to establish a commercial trust, with similar functions to those discharged in Holland by the Netherlands Oversea Trust.* Being as dependent on the Central Powers for coal and iron as she was on the Entente for necessary foodstuffs, Switzerland found herself between hammer and anvil. Early in the war Germany invented the system of "economic exchanges" as a means of putting pressure on neutral countries. Germany forbade the export of certain goods, not because they were needed at home but because they were wanted by neutrals. This prohibition was waived in individual cases, provided the neutral country in question sanctioned the export of articles required by Germany. Whereas Holland refused to recognize this system, the Swiss Government sought to adapt it with its dealings with Germany, but unfortunately the Swiss commodities used by Germany were comparatively few, whereas Switzerland had hitherto

been dependent on Germany and Austria for coal, sugar, potash, hematite and other very important articles. Germany, moreover, held up even postal parcels for Switzerland until the "compensations," as they were called, which she needed were granted. In exchange for Austro-German supplies, Switzerland bar-



M. GUSTAVE ADOR,
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Herr Hoffmann's successor on the Federal Council.

tered, among other things, cheese and condensed milk, tar, calcium carbide and ferro-silicon.

But not content with receiving the home products of Switzerland, Germany and Austria proceeded to demand in exchange commodities such as rice, sulphur, and cotton, which Switzerland could only obtain from the Allies, and threatened to cut off Swiss supplies unless Switzerland obtained for her these very articles. Switzerland was thus placed in a very awkward position. It was at first hoped to find a solution of the difficulty by the negotiations which led to the establishment, at the suggestion of Great Britain, of the "Swiss Society of Economic Surveillance" (commonly known as the S.S.S.), together with the institution of a system of rationing. The object of the rationing system, which at first applied only to the more important commodities and was gradually extended, was to ensure that Switzerland should receive from the Allies

* See Vol. 13, Chapter CXCI, page 185.



GENEVA: REPATRIATED CIVILIANS TAKEN TO A SCHOOLHOUSE FOR REFRESHMENTS.

only that amount of her staple imports, such as cotton and wheat, which she required for her own consumption, while the S.S.S. at the same time provided a responsible body to which practically all Swiss imports, and not merely rationed goods, had to be consigned. A large proportion of the German-Swiss public strongly objected to any such scheme, which, in their opinion, would interfere with the sovereign rights of Switzerland. These attacks indeed often, and naturally, proceeded from purely German sources. On June 18, 1915, Herr Hoffmann thus explained the Swiss point of view :—

Our industry, extensive and varied as it is, is entirely dependent on the world's markets. It is therefore impossible to close our doors completely to one or other group of belligerents. If our industry is to live, it must be able to re-export into all countries the articles which it has manufactured with the raw materials supplied by one or other of the belligerents. And when by the force of circumstances we have only been able to obtain these raw materials by means of compensations we ought to be allowed to import all that we lack in exchange for all the articles that we can dispose of, whether these articles are of native production or whether, owing to the scantiness of our territories, they are the result of raw materials imported from elsewhere and worked up by our industries.

These views naturally did not altogether suit the Allied intentions to blockade the Central

Powers and for some months negotiations were at a standstill. On August 9, however, the *Tagwacht*, the Berne Socialist organ, revealed the fact that Germany was exercising all the while, under an agreement with the Federal Council, a direct control over goods imported into Switzerland from Germany. Swiss public opinion was, as usual, much excited by the revelation of this "secret diplomacy." It may have been a mere coincidence that a few days later the circulation of the *Tagwacht* was forbidden in Germany, but in any case the negotiations with the Allied Powers were resumed. They were stimulated, so far as the Swiss Government was concerned, by the foundation at Geneva, Zurich and elsewhere, of private import trusts which were prepared to give the Allies the required guarantees that none of the goods which they were permitted to receive would reach the Central Powers. On September 22, 1915, the Federal Council bowed to the necessity of the case and approved the creation of the S.S.S.

In a long report the Federal Council thus explained the situation to the public :—

Internal trade between neutrals and belligerents is subject to no restrictions. The neutral is not even

obliged to prevent the export or transit of arms, munitions and any other thing of use to a belligerent. As for the import of goods by sea, the mere fact that a neutral vessel is carrying conditional contraband originating in a neutral country and destined to another neutral country does not justify the sequestration of these goods. This is the ground on which the Federal Council took its stand from the beginning. But the events of the war made it clear that Switzerland must accommodate herself to the altered circumstances. From this situation arose a compromise between the interests which Switzerland has in the freest possible exercise of her own industry, the free employment of her own products, and the right to dispose against compensations of a limited quantity of imported goods and the interest of the Allied Governments to prevent so far as possible the supplying of the Central Powers. The only possible solution lay in the sphere of neutral concessions.

The duties of the S.S.S. were, roughly speaking, to see that goods imported from the Allies or through the Allied blockade were consumed in Switzerland, to keep an eye on the frontier, and to procure for and distribute to Swiss firms the various commodities needed for their consumption or manufacture. An elaborate system of guarantees was devised as a check upon the infringement of the rules. The membership was not to exceed 15 persons, who had all to be of Swiss nationality and approved by the Federal Council. After a period of friction and fault-finding on the part of Swiss

importers, who complained that the methods of the S.S.S. hampered them in the legitimate pursuit of their business, the organization worked well and was regarded with confidence by the Powers which had to do business with it. The S.S.S. quickly became an essential and very effective organ of the Allied blockade, by loyally carrying out the duties imposed upon it by international treaty. At the same time it is impossible to exaggerate the benefits which it conferred on Switzerland by enabling her industrial life to continue in the centre of a ring of belligerents—a result due in no small degree to the upright and sympathetic personality of its director, M. Grobet-Roussy.

Simultaneously with the creation of the S.S.S., negotiations between the Swiss Government and the Central Powers led to the formation of the "Fiduciary Bureau" (*Treuhandstelle*) for the exchange of goods between Germany and Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. This institution acted as intermediary between the German exporters and the Swiss importers. The object was to secure that German and Austrian goods, of which the general export was prohibited but which were allowed to be



INTERNED FRENCH SOLDIERS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURAL WORK AT BRIENZ.

imported into Switzerland, should be employed or consumed exclusively in that country.

But it soon appeared that the original and fundamental difficulty of Switzerland's position had by no means been removed. It is important to bear in mind that this difficulty was created solely and entirely by Germany's continued insistence, under threats of cutting off the supplies of coal and iron essential to Switzerland, that she should perform the unneutral service of acting as a forwarding agent to Germany of goods received through the Allied blockade. This was the kind of pressure which, in April, 1916, led the Federal Government to request the Allied Governments to allow it to use, if necessary, as "compensations" the goods, consisting mainly of food-stuffs, forage, lubricating oil, raw cotton and cotton fabrics, deposited in Switzerland on account of Germany and Austria-Hungary, of which the export was prohibited. It also drew the attention of the Allied Governments to Switzerland's lack of cotton, linen and woollen goods, which were normally obtained for the most part from Germany. Germany had issued more than 4,000 licences to export these goods into Switzerland on condition that she received in return a corresponding amount of the raw materials employed in their manufacture. The Federal Council therefore

asked the Allied Governments to allow these raw materials to be sent into Germany in order to get out of Germany the manufactured articles. In a reply of June 19, the Allied Governments, while strongly objecting to the idea, declared themselves prepared to negotiate in the matter of compensations. Meanwhile the German Government on June 8 had declared that the quantity of goods which it allowed to be exported into Switzerland must depend upon Switzerland's enabling Germany to keep up these exports by sending her the products necessary for the maintenance of the population engaged in their manufacture, as well as those required for their manufacture itself. The German Government would only continue to send goods into Switzerland on condition that Switzerland sent into Germany the goods which she held on deposit for Germany. The Note added that Germany had already supplied Switzerland in this compensation business with goods to the value of 16,500,000 francs and suggested that this debt might be liquidated by the export into Germany of the German goods in Switzerland. The Swiss Government received this Note with pained surprise, and explained that it could not adopt the German proposal without seriously failing in its engagements to the Entente Powers. Its surprise was all the more keen from the fact that the



LUCERNE: THE KAPELBRÜCKE AND WASSERTURM.



BADLY WOUNDED MEN LEAVING THE STATION AT LYONS.

German Government declared that, if the export of goods were not granted, it would have, after the expiry of a fortnight, to hold the goods intended for Switzerland and send them elsewhere. On July 3 Germany replied with characteristic brutality that Switzerland had not kept her promises, and repeated that Switzerland would not receive the goods from her unless she supplied without delay sufficient "compensations." In other words Switzerland was presented by her powerful neighbour with the alternative of either being industrially ruined or tearing up her treaty obligations as a "scrap of paper." Future historians will determine the exact proportions in which bluff and blackmail were compounded in this typical threat.

Negotiations took place in Paris with the Allies, who maintained their objections to "compensations." The position was painful for both parties. Hitherto the Allies had provided Switzerland (besides other commodities) with various foodstuffs and Germany had provided her with coal, in each case on the understanding that they should not be re-exported to enemy countries. The Allies were willing to continue the arrangement. The Germans were not. By their Note to the Federal Government Switzerland was driven to go to the Allies hat in hand in order to ask

their permission to send Germany cotton, which would naturally be used for the manufacture of explosives, at the risk of having her corn supply cut off if she delivered the cotton without permission. The Allies, on the other hand, were in the position of having to choose between letting Germany have the cotton, thus impairing the blockade, and depriving the people of a neutral State with whom they were on the friendliest terms of their coal, or even of their daily bread.

Ultimately Switzerland found herself forced to make an arrangement with Germany whereby Germany was to supply her with 253,000 tons of coal a month and with all the iron and steel that she needed. Each of the contracting parties agreed to authorize the export, to an amount settled in advance, of its own products and manufactured articles in so far as it had no absolute need of them itself and in so far as they were not subject to previous engagements. With regard to the goods stored in Switzerland on German account, for which a licence for export could not be granted, the Swiss Government agreed to abstain from laying hands on them and to restore them to Germany at the end of the war. This agreement lasted until April 30, 1917, when it was renewed until July 31, 1917, and was then prolonged until April 30, 1918, with a reduction of the monthly

amount to 200,000 tons of coal and 19,000 tons of iron and steel. For this amount of coal Switzerland agreed to grant Germany a monthly credit of £800,000. Owing to such reasons as lack of rolling stock, of train-oil and of labour, Germany's monthly supply of coal seldom failed to fall short of the proper amount, sometimes by as much as 54,000 tons.



REPATRIATED LEAVING ZURICH.

Complaints were also rife both as to the quality of the iron and the quantity of the potatoes supplied under the agreements.

The shortage of coal led to various reductions both in railway services and street lighting. On the other hand, the congestion on French railways and at French ports compelled the Federal Government to put the population on allowances of rice and sugar, to enact two meatless days a week and take other steps to enforce economy in consumption. One by one all important commodities, from petrol to milk, came under Government control. Early in 1917 Switzerland was further hit by the intensification of German submarine warfare; and the prospect of a further limitation of supplies due to the entry of the United States into the war gave rise to some anxiety. But on June 1 the President of the Confederation was able to declare that Switzerland had concluded with both groups of belligerents agreements which, although they did not guarantee supplies for Switzerland, would nevertheless influence her position favourably at least for some time to come, and that all questions under discussion between Switzerland and the Allies had been amicably settled. He added:

I do not believe the news published in certain newspapers that the United States will limit or prohibit exports to Switzerland, and it seems quite inconceivable

that our great sister Republic would do anything to render difficult or impossible the existence of Switzerland. There is no reason for America to adopt such a policy, because all our imports from America are imported by way of countries allied to America and are subject to a special agreement concluded with that group of belligerents concerning our food supplies. Switzerland loyally maintains her pledges, and I protest solemnly against the reproach unjustly addressed to Switzerland that, contrary to her promises, she uses food imported from France or Italy or America in order to sell it to Germany or Austria. I can still state with satisfaction that the Governments of England, France and Italy recognize without reserve the complete loyalty of Switzerland and the absolute rectitude of Swiss policy in this respect.

Herr Schulthess was certainly justified in protesting against the idea, common enough at one period among the Allies, that Switzerland was "feeding Germany." It is true that she sent Germany, as she had a perfect right to do, in return for Germany's coal some 30,000 head of cattle a year and such other of her own products as she could spare. But when all was said and done, the quantities were small in comparison with Germany's needs, and the S.S.S., working in harmony with the Swiss Government and customs officials, kept a sharp look-out, in the national interest, for infringements of the rules. There was at the same time a considerable amount of well-organized smuggling, which tended rapidly to increase as Germany's needs became greater. In 1914 the number of cases detected in the Schaffhausen district alone had been only 42; in 1915 it rose to 977; in 1916 to 4,509; and in the first half of 1917 to 8,049.

In Switzerland, as in other countries, the alarm of war led to a hasty buying up of provisions and a run on the banks. In some places there was a general panic. The Budget for 1914 showed a deficit of £901,324,* not including the cost of mobilization, which at the end of the year amounted to £4,355,644. On August 12 a first loan of £1,200,000 (5 per cent. at 99) was issued, repayable on February 26, 1917, and was over-subscribed by nearly £480,000. This was followed, on October 22, by a long-term 5 per cent. loan of £2,000,000 at par, which was over-subscribed by upwards of £5,000,000. On March 1, 1915, a loan of £5,000,000, repayable in thirds after one, three and five years, was contracted in the United States in order to pay for corn already bought there and to buy more. A third "mobilization" loan was issued on

* For simplicity in calculation, £1 is taken throughout as equal to 25 francs.

July 7, 1915, this time of £4,000,000 at 96½, the rate of interest being 4½ per cent., and repayment being divided into 30 equal annuities from 1926 to 1955; it was over-subscribed by £3,623,212. On January 26, 1916, a further 4½ per cent. £4,000,000 loan was issued at 97½, repayable on February 15, 1921, and was over-subscribed by £996,358. A fifth "mobilization" loan on June 10 (£4,000,000 4½ per cent. at 97), repayable in 10 years, produced subscriptions amounting to £6,065,644. On January 9, 1917, a sixth internal loan (£4,000,000 at 96, with interest 4½ per cent.) was issued, subscribers to the first loan (August 12, 1914) being entitled to convert into this loan, which was repayable at par in 1932. The conversions amounted to £885,764 and the subscriptions to the new loan to £5,566,184.

With the one or two notable exceptions which have already been described, and which revived in Switzerland an acute sense of the danger surrounding her, the history of the country during the first three years of war was, for the outer world, devoid of spectacular interest. Switzerland might almost, from the international point of view, be described as "happy" in having "no history." But in another sense she was happy in having a history

surpassing that of any other neutral country—a record of noble and disinterested work for the sick, the wounded and the distressed whom the fortune of war brought within her reach. Blessed beyond words by having been spared the violence of the enemy, and touched to the heart by the sufferings of the immediate victims of the war, she devoted herself from the first, while mobilizing her army against any possible invader, to offering her thanks to Heaven by developing to the utmost the work of the Good Samaritan.

It is needless here to enlarge upon the various works of philanthropy set on foot for the benefit of Swiss troops and their families, and for the relief of necessitous Swiss in belligerent countries. These found their parallel elsewhere and present no especial features of interest. The claim to gratitude which Switzerland will always possess in the eyes of the world is that based upon the work done, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva, by the Swiss Red Cross and innumerable private Swiss organizations, for the civilian refugees, the "missing," the exchanged prisoners, the sick and wounded *internés*. So vast was the scope of the activities called into play that it is impossible to attempt to describe them all in



LUGANO.



PAPER MONEY ISSUED BY FRENCH COMMUNES
 into which the Germans forced the people to exchange their French currency.

detail.* But the instances given are typical of the spirit of true goodness of heart which suffused the whole Swiss people, without distinction of races, and which shone brightly in the midst of all the gloom and horrors of the war.

the men of various nations recalled to the colours, immediately followed by an excited mass of tourists caught holiday-making abroad. After these came the unfortunate civilians expelled from enemy countries. Over the frontier they poured into Switzerland, carrying or wheeling in hand carts their hastily gathered effects. On August 2 and 3 about 2,500 persons came in from France. Among them were babies only a few hours old, some of them born on the road. Some of the people had not eaten for 48 hours. The inhabitants of Boncourt, filled with compassion, gave them all the food they could. The Italians came mostly through Bâle, some 12,000 in number. Owing to the mobilization of the Swiss Army there was a lack of rolling stock, and many of them had to wait for some days before they could continue their journey. Bâle was almost overwhelmed by them, but with its traditional hospitality rose generously to the occasion. The refugees were lodged in halls about the town, the inhabitants fed them, the boy scouts carried their baggage, the troops escorted them in parties of a thousand to the train. Both in the hot weather and in the wet which followed the sufferings of the poorly clad people were intense. More than 20,000 refugees crossed the



The opening days of the war saw Switzerland invaded by a cosmopolitan crowd of a very different kind from that which had frequented her pleasant places in time of peace. First came

* Much invaluable information on the subject will be found in the pages of *La Suisse pendant la Guerre*, by Professor Max Turmann (Paris: Perrin et Cie), and of *Les Oeuvres suisses de Charité pendant la Guerre*, by Pastor E. Nagel (Neuchâtel: Basin-Clottu), to which we acknowledge our indebtedness.



Lake of Constance. The people of Romanshorn supplied them with food, but several babies died. At Zurich extraordinary scenes were witnessed—for the Italians became excited and clamoured for bread. During the month of August more than 100,000 Italians passed through Chiasso into Italy.

The plight of the Belgian refugees, not unnaturally, aroused especial pity. This is how M. Benjamin Vallotton describes the scene at a Swiss railway station in the book* which expresses better than any other the feeling in

and orphans, and the movement spread over the whole country. The poorest classes of the Swiss saved their mites, children gave up their Christmas presents, men even went without their tobacco. But the plan of "boarding-out" the Belgians proved not only very expensive but, owing to the idiosyncrasies of the refugees, extremely unsatisfactory to both parties. The Belgians were therefore grouped together and were much happier in consequence. Belgian orphans, mainly from Ypres, Furnes and Poperinghe, were given education, and



LADIES OF THE GENEVA RED CROSS AND SOME EVACUATED CIVILIANS.

French Switzerland at the outbreak of the war:

At the first moment, you are seized with a stupor which glues you to the spot, arms dangling, mouth open, eyes staring, as giddy as if you had fallen on your head. And suddenly the blood flows back from the heart, inflames your cheeks, runs down your arms into your hands and makes them active. . . . Then the crowd, as one man, rushed forward. All the hampers, all the baskets, all the bags, all the nets, all the parcels were opened, and there took place on the platform, in the train, a bombardment of shirts, trousers, waistcoats, rolls, oranges, sausages, dolls, plush bears, chocolate, sweets, flannels, hats, shoes, buttons, cigars, papers, pipes. One laughed, nervously. One said things which stuck in one's throat.

A committee was formed at Lausanne to provide accommodation for Belgian widows

* "Ce qu'en pense Potterat." (Lausanne: F. Rouge & Cie.)

for the most part responded to the care lavished upon them. Even in 1917 convoys of children were received at Lausanne from the ruined villages of Belgium.

Meanwhile an organization was set on foot for dealing with the civilians interned in France, Germany and Austria. On September 22, 1914, the President of the Confederation was able to announce that France and Germany had consented to the exchange, through Switzerland, of men under 18 and over 50 (these ages were subsequently altered to 17 and 60 respectively), women and children. A "Bureau suisse de rapatriement des internés civils" was opened at Berne, with local committees elsewhere. The work performed by this organization in



AT THE INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST "BUREAU D'INFORMATIONS" AT LAUSANNE.

providing comforts and in answering inquiries as to the missing was magnificent. Not only were the *rapatriés* duly restored to their own countries but the sick among them were kept for a while in the hope of improving their health. Between October 24, 1914, and March 5, 1915, 10,845 French, 7,650 Germans and 1,980 Austrians and Hungarians had passed through Switzerland on their way home. Their railway transport had cost £8,500, which was repaid by their respective States. Upwards of £2,160, mainly derived from voluntary Swiss contributions, had been spent on caring for them, not including the innumerable gifts of clothes, etc., offered by private individuals. No words can describe the devotion and self-sacrifice displayed by the local bands of ladies who wore themselves out by their indefatigable exertions in this noble work. The only daughter of the mayor of Sahaffhausen died as the result of illness contracted from weeks of labour for the *rapatriés*. It need hardly be said that, as time went on, the distribution of comforts, at first almost overwhelming to the recipients from its spontaneous abundance, became perfectly organized.

Another great field of activity upon which

the Swiss entered was the search for "missing" civilians and soldiers. Various committees, among them the Red Cross at Geneva, the "Bureau pour la recherche des disparus" at Zurich, the "Bureau international féministe d'informations" at Lausanne, the "Comité pour otages de guerre" at Bâle, the "Union internationale des amis de la jeune fille" at Neuchatel, and others, devoted themselves with astonishing success to this laborious undertaking. By the end of December, 1915, for example, the Lausanne committee had discovered 34,000 missing persons, and enabled their families to communicate with them. Between October, 15, 1914, and June 30, 1916, the "Agence internationale de secours et de renseignements en faveur des prisonniers de guerre," founded by the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva, had given information to 470,399 families, had interviewed 78,713 callers, had on its index 2,000,000 cards relating to the Allies and 1,000,000 relating to Germans, and had transmitted £79,760 and 30,441,836 parcels, including 776,505 from Geneva. Some idea of the labour involved in this work may be gathered from the fact that by September, 1916, there were already no fewer than 6,000

prisoners of war of the name of Martin. The Swiss Post Office during the month of March, 1917, forwarded daily to prisoners an average of more than 420,000 letters and postcards and 80,000 registered parcels, besides thousands of unregistered parcels and postal orders.

In the spring of 1915 there set in another flood—the *evacués*, or French civilians, from the occupied districts of France. Having been torn from their homes, which had in many cases ceased to exist, they had been interned in Belgium, and were now to be restored to their native land. They consisted, naturally, of old men and women and children, and their plight was in some ways more deplorable than that of any of their predecessors. Sometimes the women had with them children, not their own, who had been thrust into their arms by inadvertence in their flight. A correspondent of *The Times* who witnessed the arrival of the 476th train at Zurich in July, 1917, when upwards of 230,000 of *rapatriés* and *evacués* had passed through, described the incident as one of the most pathetic which he had met during the war. The train that day contained 77 old men, 280 women, 75 children, 40 babies under four, and four dogs. Their homes had been in the neighbourhood of Reims, but since their removal from them they had been

living at Namur. They had brought with them all they possessed in the world bundled up in a rug. Escorted by young women in snowy white, those who could walk—and many walked stiffly enough after their two days and nights in the train—were taken to the large refreshment halls and fed. Then, while the babies were washed and clad by half a dozen young Zurich ladies, their elders were led across the street to the precincts of the Museum, and there supplied with all kinds of clothes. The correspondent added :

While the people sat waiting their turn they showed me the *bons communaux* which, with the exception, I think, of 50 francs, are the only form in which they were allowed to possess money. Their original French money—in some cases a considerable sum, being the savings of a lifetime—they had been obliged to change, first, into German marks, and then from marks into these pitiable tickets, mostly of one franc denomination, "repayable two years after the signature of peace" by the communes which issued them and in which alone they had any value at all. . . .

After the people had been clothed they returned to the platform, where they washed in basins, and then took their seats. . . . Girls distributed chocolate, postcards, and little presents, and a party of the Landsturm who had been on duty for the three hours during which the visit lasted sang a hymn. The train steamed out amid a chorus of "*Merci, Merci!*" and we waved and turned away, taking care not to look into each other's face.

At all the stations where the trains stopped food was distributed, school children sang



ONE OF THE OFFICES OF THE PRISONERS-OF-WAR AGENCY IN GENEVA.



COLONEL CHARLES BOHNY,
Doctor-in-Chief of the Swiss Red Cross.

hymns of patriotism and hope, and a band of spectators welcomed the passengers with sympathetic cheers. It is marvellous to think that this went on day after day and week after week for years.

Swiss delegates formed part of the commissions appointed to visit prison camps in the various belligerent countries and did invaluable work in improving conditions in many cases. Nor must mention be omitted of the Swiss doctors who, in the face of appalling difficulties, worked among the wounded in Montenegro and Serbia or of the Swiss nurses who joined the staffs of hospitals in France, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Further, the universities played their part in promoting the intellectual interests of student prisoners of war.

In the autumn of 1914 the Federal Council, at the instance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, suggested to the French and German Governments that prisoners in the hands of either Power who were so severely wounded as to be incapable of further service in the war should be exchanged through Switzerland. The proposal was well received, but considerable difficulties arose as to the details of its execution. At the beginning of 1915 the Pope intervened with a similar proposal to various Powers, thereby doubtless helping forward the acceptance of the original

scheme. On January 11, 1915, Switzerland placed at the disposal of the belligerents the services of the Swiss Red Cross and the use of Swiss hospital trains, and at the end of February an agreement between France and Germany was reached. The first *grands blessés*, as they were called, were exchanged at the beginning of the following month, and by the end of August 8,668 French and 2,343 German wounded prisoners had been exchanged through Switzerland. Swiss doctors formed part of the medical commissions which examined the wounded before their release, and the transport and attendance was admirably carried out under the direction of Colonel Bohny, doctor-in-chief of the Swiss Red Cross. The manner



MME. BOHNY,
Who collaborates with her husband in Red Cross work.

in which the Swiss received these unhappy victims of the war may be gathered from the following extract from a letter written by a French soldier on March 13, 1915 :

I reached Paris at last, pretty tired as you may imagine—two days and two nights of travelling, almost without sleep. We have been very well received everywhere, but no country can equal Switzerland in that respect. It was not a reception nor a triumph; it was a madness which the people showed towards us. I will give you a short account of this journey. We passed the frontier about 9 o'clock; at last we are in free Switzerland! At Zurich we were well received, as also at Berne, but the police did not let the people come up



ARRIVAL AT GENEVA OF A TRAINLOAD OF REPATRIATED CIVILIANS.

close to our carriages. At Fribourg, Lausanne and Geneva, although it was 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock or 4 o'clock in the morning, thousands of people joyfully greeted us and gave us all sorts of things through the carriage windows (cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, chocolate, all sorts of fruit, flowers, postcards, etc.). In my carriage alone, after we had drunk, eaten and taken everything we liked, there remained four great sacks a yard high; we could hardly walk or lie down in our compartment; you cannot form an idea of this reception of the mutilated of the campaign 1914-1915.

The warmth of this reception, although in time its manifestations became better organized, continued unabated even when sad familiarity had taken off the edge of the early excitement. The passage of these trains, sometimes—as the principle of the exchange of *grands blessés* was accepted by other Powers—each containing parties of soldiers of different nationalities, formed an interesting study from the point of view of the mentalities and manners of the various belligerents. Thus, for example, it was possible to note, in the course of an evening or two, the nimble wit of the French, the rough jocularity of the English, the mocking humour of the Belgians, the dignified charm of the Serbs. All were as happy as their condition permitted them to be; all, even the poor “lying-down cases” who could hardly move a finger, showed their gratitude; to all alike, to whichever side they belonged, the Swiss were compassionate and full of loving kindness. By February 2, 1916, 140 French officers and 8,024 men and 41 German

officers and 2,155 men had passed through Switzerland.

Hundreds of Italian, Austrian and Hungarian invalid prisoners also passed through on their way home, as did upwards of 8,000 members of the French and German army medical services.

No sooner was the system of the exchange of *grands blessés* set to work than the Swiss Government embarked upon the question of internment. The prisoners now to be considered were those who, though incapable of further active service, were still capable of garrison or clerical duties. It was proposed in the first instance to intern only prisoners suffering from tuberculosis, for whom the mountain air of Switzerland offered the best possible chance of recovery. There was to be no question of parole, but the Governments were to bind themselves to return to Switzerland any prisoners who escaped, and in any case not to employ them for military purposes. The French Government accepted the proposal in April, but Germany raised difficulties, demanding that the interned should be militarily guarded—a condition which, for obvious reasons, it was impossible for Switzerland to fulfil—and objecting to the returning of those who escaped. At this point the Pope again intervened (May 1, 1915) with the suggestion that, not only the tuberculous and invalid, in the strict sense of the word, but all categories



WOUNDED MEN ON THEIR JOURNEY THROUGH SWITZERLAND LADEN WITH FLOWERS AND GIFTS.

of sick and wounded, both officers and men, except those suffering from contagious diseases, should be interned in Switzerland. The suggestion was supported by the Federal Government, and after much discussion of categories and other details an agreement was reached, the Emperor William announcing that he accepted the principle of internment "to please the Pope." All prisoners included in the established categories (at first 12 in number, but afterwards increased to 20) were susceptible of internment, without regard to the numerical proportion of interned of each State—although Germany long stood out for a head for head and rank for rank arrangement. A preliminary selection was to be made in the prison camps by Swiss commissions, each consisting of two doctors, in collaboration with the local doctors. The prisoners thus chosen were to be sent to a place of assembly and there re-examined by fresh commissions, each composed of two Swiss military doctors, three military doctors and a delegate of the Minister of War of the captor country. A memorandum by Colonel Hauser, Surgeon-General of the Swiss army, laid it down that prisoners rejected at this second examination were not to be sent back to their ordinary camps, but to special camps for further observation. Swiss religious societies undertook to look after the spiritual welfare

of the interned, and numerous private relief societies were formed to care for their material needs.

On January 26, 1916, a first instalment of 100 French tuberculous prisoners and one officer from Germany arrived at the sanatorium of Leysin, while 100 similar German prisoners from France proceeded to Davos. During the next month 983 French (106 officers) and also 364 Germans (5 officers) arrived in Switzerland and were distributed, the French to Montana and Leysin, Montreux and its neighbourhood, and the Bernese Oberland, and the Germans to Davos and the Lake of Lucerne. By May, 1917, there were interned in Switzerland 418 German officers and 7,335 non-commissioned officers and men and 695 French officers and 12,953 non-commissioned officers and men. There were also interned 819 German and 2,087 French invalid civilians—for a similar agreement to that affecting the military prisoners was come to in their case. Such of these civilians as were prepared to pay for their board and lodging were merely obliged to live within a certain area and to report themselves at intervals; the rest were kept at the charge of their respective countries, wore an armlet, and came under the same regulations as the military interned.

The Franco-German agreement having been

successfully achieved, the Swiss Government made a similar offer to the British, Belgian, Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments. The British Government on March 25, 1916, invited the German Government to adopt the principle of internment already sanctioned in the agreement with France, but it was not until the beginning of May that the German Government consented.* There still remained transport and other difficulties to be overcome, but on May 30 a first detachment of 304 British prisoners (32 officers) reached Château d'Oex, to be followed 24 hours later by 150

Fribourg, Lausanne, Montreux, and Château d'Oex thousands upon thousands of people crowded the platforms, pelting the soldiers with flowers and pressing into their hands every conceivable present, useful and useless. The prisoners were astounded that, from end to end of the country, multitudes should sit up half the night, or leave their beds in the small hours, in order to extend the right hand of brotherly fellow-feeling to a few hundred war-worn fighting men with whom they had no sort of connexion either of blood or alliance. It is difficult to express in moderate terms what



ARRIVAL OF GERMAN INTERNED PRISONERS AT BUOCHS.

more. On August 12, a fresh contingent of 394 men and 37 officers arrived, of whom 347 men and 29 officers took up their abode at Mürren. By May, 1917, there were interned in Switzerland 122 British officers, 1,749 non-commissioned officers and men and four civilians.

As in the case of the French interned, the arrival of the British in Switzerland aroused enormous enthusiasm among the people. No Englishman can read of their reception without emotion. From the moment they crossed the frontier their welcome was almost overwhelming. The cheering began within sight of the German sentries. At Kreuzlingen, Zurich, Olten, Berne,

those days of sympathy meant to the men who experienced them.

The Belgians also profited by the internment system, and by May, 1917, there were in Switzerland 86 officers, 1,439 non-commissioned officers and men and 406 civilians. The total number of interned French, Germans, British and Belgians at that date was 28,367.

All these officers and men, being at the same time prisoners of war and invalids, were under the authority of the Swiss army medical service.

In November, 1916, the Federal Council, observing that "neutrality is not indifference,"

* See Vol. XII., chapter CLXXXVII, p. 256.

instructed the Swiss Minister in Berlin to call the attention of the Imperial Chancellor to the unfavourable impression which had been made on Swiss public opinion by the wholesale deportation of Belgians.

On April 14, 1917, the International Committee of the Red Cross, which on July 12, 1916, had issued to all the world an eloquent protest against the practice of reprisals on prisoners of war, addressed the German Government protesting against the declaration of January 29 in which Germany announced her intention of treating hospital ships, bearing the marks of the Red Cross, as vessels of war and attacking and sinking them as such, both in the North Sea and in a defined area of the Channel. The International Committee recalled the cases of the hospital ships *Britannic*, sunk on November 21, 1916, and *Asturia*, sunk on March 20, 1917, and added :

In attacking hospital ships, one is attacking, not combatants, but defenceless people—wounded, mutilated or incapacitated by bullets, women devoting themselves to a work of help and charity, and men whose equipment is intended not to take the lives of their adversaries, but, on the contrary, is capable of saving those lives and relieving to some extent their sufferings.

Every hospital ship which is furnished with the exterior marks laid down by the international conventions and the employment of which has been regularly notified to the belligerents, has the benefit of a legal presumption and ought to be respected by the belligerents.

The Committee further drew the attention of the German Government to the rights of control and visit conferred by Article 4 of the Hague Convention, and boldly declared that


in no case had a belligerent the right to expose to death the whole of the wounded and their attendants on board even a ship which he might believe to be partly devoted to military objects.

The *Asturia* seems to have been torpedoed without anyone troubling about either its character or its destination.

Even admitting the correctness of the facts on which Germany bases the justification of her declaration, the International Committee holds that nothing can excuse the torpedoing of a hospital ship.

Hence, considering the declaration of January 29 as being in disagreement with the international conventions, it expresses the desire that this declaration be not enforced in future.

It need hardly be said that this protest had no effect on the German Government, nor is it probable that the International Committee expected that it would. The fact, however, that it did protest remains for ever to its credit. The protest led to a typical outburst from an ultra-German Swiss newspaper, which repeated the German arguments in favour of sinking hospital ships in prohibited areas, and protested, for its part, against this unnecessary provocative *Protestiererei* from French Switzerland, expressing the hope that the Federal Council would forbid in future "these private notes to foreign belligerents." It is unnecessary to inquire how far its fears lest action of this kind should embroil Switzerland with foreign Powers were sincere, or how far the result of inter-racial jealousy. In any case, they were obviously either ridiculous, or, more probably, merely German propaganda.



CHAPTER CCI.

THE CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD.


SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA IN SUMMER OF 1916—REORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT AFTER LOSS OF KUT—RIVER TRANSPORT—HOSPITAL SHIPS—RAILWAYS—SUFFICIENCY OF TROOPS—STRATEGY OF GENERAL MAUDE'S ADVANCE—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—THE OPERATIONS ON THE TIGRIS—ASSAULT OF SANNA-I-YAT—RECAPTURE OF KUT—FURTHER ADVANCE—THE NAVY'S PART—FALL OF BAGHDAD, MARCH, 1917—MAUDE'S PROCLAMATION—A QUIET SUMMER—RESULTS OF THIRD PHASE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

BEFORE describing the campaign which ended in the occupation of Baghdad by the British it seems desirable to examine briefly the general military position in Asia at the beginning of this campaign, for the operations in Mesopotamia were more or less closely connected with operations in other parts of the continent.

When the campaign opened, in the early summer of 1916, the Allies had no enemy in the Far East. From the Pacific Ocean to India the whole of Eastern Asia was held without dispute by them or by neutral nations. In Western Asia they had one great opponent, Turkey. The Turks were aided by the advice of the German Government, by the professional skill of some German officers attached to their forces in the field, and by supplies of German money and munitions of war. They were also strengthened by the support of various Asiatic tribes and populations over whom they had a measure of influence, such as the Arabs of Mesopotamia. But, speaking broadly, the Turks stood alone in Asia, where no German or Austrian troops were acting with them. They had been fighting on four fronts: against the Russians in Armenia, against both Russians and British in Persia, against the British in Mesopotamia and on the borders of Egypt. The Persian and Mesopotamian fronts were closely connected. They formed, so to speak,

the centre of the great Turkish line of battle in Asia, which stretched in a semi-circle from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; and the columns fighting upon these two fronts were both immediately based on Baghdad. The Persian front was also connected with the Armenian front, the Turkish left. The Mesopotamian front was separated by a vast desert from the Egyptian front, the Turkish right; but the forces on both of them had a common ultimate base in Asia Minor. Indeed, Asia Minor was the real base for all four fronts. The Turks therefore, though hampered to some extent by great distances and imperfect communications, could throw their weight from one central point upon any of the four fronts, as might seem desirable. The Allies on the contrary were acting from the outside of the great semi-circle inwards.

Former chapters traced the course of their operations on all four fronts. As to the Armenian front it may be said in a few words that the Russians had begun with striking successes, but that in the early summer of 1916 their advance seemed for the time to have come to an end. On the Egyptian front too the Turks had been roughly handled and driven back, but the prospect of a decisive advance on the part of the British forces seemed doubtful. With regard to the two central fronts, Chapter CLXXVI. showed that after the outbreak of



BAGHDAD.

war Persia, already in great confusion from internal troubles, had been made the field for German intrigues, and Turkish military action, against the interests of Russia and England; but that by the early part of 1916 the enemy forces had mostly been driven out, and that the condition of the country was improving. Chapter CLVIII. described how during the same period of the war British troops had landed in Mesopotamia, and gradually pushed inland along the three river routes of the Karun, Tigris and Euphrates until they were in possession of a large Turkish province, from which a force under General Townshend had then advanced to capture Baghdad, but had been checked and pressed back to Kut. Chapter CXCL. showed how General Townshend's force had been besieged in Kut for five months and eventually compelled to surrender, after three desperate attempts had been made to relieve it by the rest of the British troops in Mesopotamia. The same chapter gave an account of the great losses and sufferings inflicted upon these troops owing to their defective equipment in transport, artillery, medical establishment, and other necessaries. The proceedings of a Royal Commission appointed to enquire into this matter were explained, and a summary was given of the grave report submitted by the Commission. The narrative closed with a few words showing that during the year which had elapsed between the surrender of General Townshend and the Commission report the British advance in Mesopotamia had been resumed and Baghdad had been captured. The present chapter will describe the measures taken to reorganize the British forces in Mesopotamia during the year 1916, and will give a narrative of the successful advance on Baghdad.

It will be remembered that while the first phase of the war in Mesopotamia, November, 1914, to December, 1915, was a phase of widely extended operations on three lines, the military operations during the second phase, January 1, 1916, to April 30, 1916, were practically confined to one line, that of the Tigris; and to a very short stretch of the river, the 70 miles or so of its course immediately below Kut. It may be observed here that during the third phase of the war, now to be described, almost the whole of the fighting was again on the Tigris line. A much longer stretch of the river was involved: some 25 miles of its course

below Kut and about 250 above Kut*; but the campaign was practically limited to the Tigris valley. This phase of the war lasted from May, 1916, to the autumn of 1917.

It opened auspiciously. A Russian force which was driving the Turks out of Northern Persia had now reached a point only 200 miles from the Tigris; and on May 20 a patrol of about 100 Russian cavalry, detached from this



BAGHDAD: TOMB OF SIT-I-ZOBEIDA,
Wife of Haroun-al-Raschid.

force, suddenly rode into the British camp at Ali el Gherbi. They had made a most adventurous march over difficult mountain country, and their arrival was very welcome, for it seemed to show that there was a prospect of the Russian and British forces from the two fronts being before long in close cooperation on Turkish territory. It was also historically interesting, for Englishmen and Russians had not served together in the field since the days of Napoleon, though they had served together at sea. The advance of the Russians from Persia was naturally as unwelcome to the Turks as it was welcome to the British; and perhaps in consequence of it the enemy now decided to evacuate his positions on the south of the Tigris at Es Sinn, which the British had twice unsuccessfully attacked during their efforts to relieve Kut. On May 20, the day on which the Russian detachment rode in, and within a month of the fall of Kut, General Gorringe was able to report that the south bank of the river was now practically clear of Turks as far as the Hai stream, of which mention was made in Chapter CXCL. The result of this retirement

* The distance by road was about half the distance along the windings of the river.

was that for the future the Turks, though still holding strong entrenched lines on the north bank down to Sanna-i-Yat, 15 miles or so below Kut, were flanked almost throughout this length by the British force on the south bank—a dangerous position for the Turks if the British had been strong enough not only to contain them in front but to strike across the



A TURKISH MACHINE GUN POSITION IN A DATE-PALM OUTSIDE KUT.

river at their line of communications. As a matter of fact the British were not strong enough at the moment to make any serious attack of the kind, or even to occupy all the positions evacuated; but it was obvious that whenever they might become so the full possession of the south bank would be of great advantage to them. The British Commander determined therefore to secure all he could on this side consistently with his difficulties in feeding his troops by land carriage, the navigation of the river being denied to him by the Turks on the north bank, and meanwhile to increase his fighting strength as much as possible with a view to an attack in the future.

As shown in the chapter describing the unsuccessful operations for the relief of Kut, the

British force on the Tigris required strengthening not only in numbers but in organization and equipment of various kinds—in heavy guns, in aeroplanes, and above all in transport, especially river transport, without which a larger numerical force could not be moved up, or supplied with food, ammunition, and all that is required for modern war. To the thorough reorganization and equipment of the force, therefore, the military authorities settled down, and the summer and autumn of 1916 were spent in unceasing effort for this end. As is always the case in Mesopotamia, the heat during the summer months was intense, the thermometer often rising to 120° in the shade, so that both the troops and the various services at work on their behalf suffered severely; but the General commanding in Mesopotamia, Sir Percy Lake, elaborated a careful scheme for re-shaping the whole military position, and in spite of all disadvantages of climate the work went on at high pressure without intermission. He was fully supported by the War Office in England, and by the Government of India.

It has been said that the special need of the force was river transport. To quote the Report of the Royal Commission, the shortage of river transport was "the foundation of all the troubles in Mesopotamia." It seems necessary, for a clear understanding of the campaign which followed, to dwell upon this point, and to explain in some detail the very creditable thoroughness and success with which the problem was worked out. As every reader of this History will have understood, the war in Mesopotamia was from the outset a river war, and no part of it was more essentially a river war than the operations in the Tigris valley which, beginning with General Townshend's advance to Amara in June, 1915, ended in the capture of Baghdad nearly two years later. These operations were throughout dependent upon the Tigris. To successive British forces advancing inland on this line the ever-lengthening stream in their rear was the main artery through which flowed the life blood of the army. Troops, equipment, food and supplies of all kinds, including medical stores, had all to be conveyed by the river craft, which had also to bring down sick and wounded and prisoners of war to the base. Lack of river transport was largely responsible for the initial check at Ctesiphon, and for the subsequent breakdown of the medical service which inflicted such sufferings upon the troops.



TROOPS TRANSPORTED BY RIVER.

Lack of river transport, again, was the main cause of the failure to relieve Kut and of the consequent surrender of 9,000 British troops. It was urgently necessary, if such calamities were to be avoided for the future, that the deficiency should be made good. This was clearly recognized by General Lake.

He had written in his dispatch of August 12, 1916 :—

“The difficulty experienced in pushing up reinforcements, supplies, and munitions of war to the front seriously affected the operations.

“The number of steamers available in January, 1916, for river transport purposes was practically the same as when in June, 1915, the first advance up the Tigris took place. Additional river craft had from time to time been demanded, as augmentations to the force in Mesopotamia were decided upon, but owing to the peculiar conditions which vessels intended for the intricate navigation of the Tigris have to satisfy the provision of these vessels was a difficult problem, necessarily entailing long delays, and the supply was never able



SUPPLIES FOR THE GUNBOATS.

to keep pace with the requirements of the force.

"In consequence of this it was never possible during the period now under report either to concentrate at the Tigris front the whole of the forces available in the country or to equip such forces as could be concentrated there with

heat of the Mesopotamian summer. Sir George Buchanan's staff suffered also, but much good work was done. General Lake wrote:—"Owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining certain stores and equipment from India and Burma, and to sickness among the supervising staff, the work of developing the port of



MAKING A NEW PIER AT BASRA : PILE-DRIVING BY MAN-POWER.

sufficient transport to make them mobile and enable them to operate freely at any distance from the river."

Feeling so strongly the importance of this question, General Lake, immediately after the fall of Kut, set on foot such measures as were locally possible to improve the state of affairs. The river transport, then under the Royal Indian Marine, was developed, the strength of the Department being rapidly increased by something like 700 per cent., and a great number of native labourers being engaged. Moreover, a distinguished engineer, Sir George Buchanan, C.I.E., was appointed Director-General of Port Administration and River Conservancy, and was able to afford valuable aid to the overdriven officers of the Indian Marine, who suffered severely from sickness brought on by the great

Basra, and of dredging and improving water communications generally, was at first delayed. It is now, however, well in hand, and the results already achieved are sufficient to show that the projected measures will have far-reaching effect on the business of the port and our all-important river communications."

But in July, 1916, the War Office formally assumed the direction of the Mesopotamian transport service, which up to that time had been under the control of the India Office. This step marks the real beginning of the revolution which was effected in the transport service—a revolution to which the subsequent success of the Baghdad campaign was largely if not mainly due.

To quote a dispatch by General Maude:—"The newly formed Inland Water Transport

Directorate had first to fill its ranks and then develop its organization and provide for its many indispensable requirements; but the personnel, making light of these very real obstacles to rapid progress, worked unceasingly, with the result that night and day an endless chain of river craft passed up and down the river, thereby securing the maintenance of the troops at the front." How great the number of river craft speedily became may be judged from the words used by Mr. Bonar Law during the Debate on the Address in February, 1917. After describing the military operations in Mesopotamia up to that time he said:—"But there is another side to this picture which is equally pleasing. It shows, I think, that if mistakes are made—and in a war like this, going into it as we went into it, many mistakes can hardly be called mistakes, though the results are bad—if mistakes are made, we as a nation know how to repair them. That has been done here. There are now no complaints about supplies of any kind, and some indication of what has been done during the last six months will be found in the fact that the traffic up the Tigris during January was almost ten times as great as it was during July, when the House was finding how unsatisfactory the position was."

A few days later Mr. Forster, Financial Secretary to the War Office, spoke as follows:—"Great expansion has also taken place in inland water transport, ships, barges, tugs, wharves, quays, warehouses, everything that is required

for increasing the operation of the inland water transport service on all our fronts. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, when moving the vote of credit, referred to the enormous increase in the up-river traffic in Mesopotamia. He reminded us then that the up-river traffic of January, as compared with last July, has increased by 1,000 per cent." And Mr. McKenna, touching upon the same subject, said:—"In relation to one of these campaigns, that in Mesopotamia, I am sure the Committee would wish to express their appreciation of the work recently done by the War Office. The campaign caused so much anxiety in this House that a Commission was appointed to enquire into its origin and progress. There were undoubtedly grave troubles, both in respect to the supply service and the hospital service. I am told to-day that since the administration of these services was handed over to the Quartermaster-General here, so far from there being any complaint, the transport, supply, and hospital services are as well done as in any campaign in the whole history of the world. That is a great record, of which the War Office may justly be proud. As this question has been again and again raised in this House, and caused adverse criticism of the War Office at the time, surely this House now would wish to thank the War Office for the admirable work they have done."

It will be easily understood that when the time came for military operations on the Tigris to be resumed the condition of the river trans-



HOSPITAL SHIP ON THE TIGRIS.



MAILBOAT NEAR KURNA.

[Official photograph.]

port, both in number and suitability of craft and in facilities for their efficient working, had been completely transformed. Before passing on from the subject it may be well to cite one example of the changes effected. Readers of this History will remember the appalling description given by an Indian medical officer, Major Carter, of the steamer *Medjidieh* as she arrived in Basra, with the sick and wounded lying upon her decks in almost inconceivable conditions of overcrowding and filth and misery. As a contrast to that picture may be presented the following account* of a visit paid by H.M. the King to the headquarters of the Inland Water Transport:—“The King inspected craft, stores, and personnel, visited the occupants of the wards of a new hospital, saw something of

* *The Times*, June 6, 1917.

the everyday life of the camp, chatted with officials and workmen, made a tour of a hospital ship destined for a distant war theatre, and replete with all the latest improvements in ventilation and general equipment, inspected water purifying appliances, ice making, barges, and a host of other details, and expressed the utmost satisfaction and pleasure. Before returning to London the King launched three recently completed craft which had been constructed for the more efficient prosecution of the work of the Department. . . . The general plan of the water transport arrangements was explained to him and the inspection in detail followed. As an example His Majesty was informed of the important part this service played in establishing and maintaining the long line of communication on the advance to



TRANSPORT ON THE TIGRIS.

Baghdad. He displayed especial interest in the appliances for ice making and for ensuring the purity of the water supply. Shallow built boats for river transport and a variety of other craft were inspected."

The substitution of specially built and specially fitted hospital ships for the hastily converted or unconverted transport steamers and cattle boats of 1915 must have been an unspeakable boon not only to the sick and wounded, but to the crews of the vessels, and to the medical officers who toiled with such devotion under the heartbreaking

ample for its requirements, and in full working order. The main cause of all previous difficulties and failures had been effectually removed. This fine achievement reflected much credit upon the War Office and the Department of Inland Water Transport. It afforded also a striking reminder, if any were needed, of the power secured to Great Britain by her command of the sea.

The question of river transport has been treated in some detail because in Mesopotamia it was, as General Lake said, an all-important question; but an account of the measures



BUILDING AN ICE FACTORY AT AMARA.

conditions of the earlier campaigns. The contrast between the hospital ships used in the first two phases of the war and those made ready for the third is only an illustration of the changes which took place in all the aspects of the river transport service. In number, as already shown, the strength of the fleet was immensely increased, and the provision of wharves, quays, warehouses, and other requirements of the kind greatly facilitated the working of the more numerous and better vessels. What proportion of these vessels was available when military operations were resumed it is not possible to say; but it is certain that in December, 1916, when the British force moved forward, the river transport was

taken in 1916 to reorganize and equip the British army in Mesopotamia would not be complete if it did not take notice also of the question of land transport. With regard to this point it will suffice to write briefly. By the end of that year there were three lines of railway running in Mesopotamia. One line ran from Basra to Nasrieh on the Euphrates, another up the Tigris valley from Kurna to Amara, and the third, a light field line, from Sheikh Saad to the foremost position held by the British on the south bank of the river. It has been already pointed out that the advanced position held by the Turks on the north bank, at Sanna-i-Yat, blocked the navigation of the river beyond that point by British steamers. The British troops,

15 miles or so farther up stream, on the south bank, were therefore dependent for their supplies upon land transport, and the light field line from Sheikh Saad, when not interrupted by floods, was doubtless very useful to them. The personnel and material of all these railway lines in Mesopotamia were mainly derived from India. It should be added that besides the railways the force had now a considerable body of live transport. Large numbers of animals had been collected and equipped for land carriage, so that the troops should for the future be free to move in all directions, if the country allowed, with rapidity and comfort. Marshes and sheets of shallow water still presented obstacles to military movements in some of the districts to be crossed; but all that could be done had been done; and it was confidently expected that some means would be found of turning these obstacles. Thus, as regards transport of all kinds, the force on the Tigris was now very differently situated from those which had previously advanced on this line.

It was also very differently situated in regard to the other deficiencies, of numbers and equipment, which had frustrated, or helped to frustrate, the efforts of Generals Aylmer and Goringe to relieve Kut. Those commanders had been under great disadvantages from the impossibility of bringing up and supplying a larger number of troops, and from the want of heavy guns, aeroplanes, and other necessities of modern war. These deficiencies were also made

good during the summer and autumn of 1916; and before the close of the year General Maude, who had succeeded Sir Percy Lake in command of the Mesopotamian forces, found himself at the head of an army sufficient in numbers, thoroughly equipped in all respects, and eager to wipe out the memory of former reverses. He summed up (Dispatch of April 10, 1917) in the following words the work carried out from the end of August up to that time, and the position at the end of it:

Steady progress was made on the lines so carefully designed and developed by my predecessor, Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., to whom my warm thanks are due for the firm foundations which had been laid for the ensuing winter campaign. The growth of Basra as a military port and base continued, and the laying of railways was completed. The subsidence of the floods and the organization of local and imported labour removed obstacles which had hitherto hindered development, although, conversely, the lack of water in the rivers and consequent groundings of river craft gave rise to anxiety from time to time. The Directorate of Inland Water Transport was created, and accessions of men and material arrived from overseas, as well as additional river craft; while the influence of adequate and experienced personnel for the Directorates of Port Administration and Conservancy Works, Railways, Supply and Transport, and Ordnance enabled these services to cope more adequately with their responsibilities in maintaining the field Army. Hospital accommodation was reviewed and still further expanded, whilst the Remount and Veterinary Services were overhauled and reconstituted. Changes were also made in the organization of the Army, the grouping of formations and units was readjusted, and alterations were made in the system of command. The line of communication defences were recast and additional lines of communication units for administrative purposes were provided. Establishments for all units, whether on the various fronts or on the lines of communication, were fixed, whilst the pro-



DISSEMBARKING CAMELS.



[Official photograph.]

THE KURNA-AMARA RAILWAY.

vision of mechanical transport and an increase in animals and vehicles enabled the land transport with the Force to be reconstituted. . . . By the end of November preliminary preparations were well advanced. A steady stream of reinforcements had been moving up the Tigris for some weeks, and drafts were joining their units, making good the wastage of the summer. The troops had shaken off the ill effects of the hot weather, and their war training had improved. Stores, ammunition, and supplies were accumulating rapidly at the front, our communications were assured, and it seemed clear that it was only a matter of days before offensive operations could be justifiably undertaken. Training camps which had been formed at Amara were broken up, and the general concentration upstream of Sheikh Saad was completed.

It may be noticed that during the latter part of October the new Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir Charles Monro, who had succeeded Sir Beauchamp Duff, paid a visit to Mesopotamia and made himself personally acquainted with the needs and difficulties of the force operating in that part of the world. Although the War Office had now taken over from the Government of India the control of the Mesopotamian campaign, General Monro's visit was nevertheless of value in various ways, for the connexion between Mesopotamia and India was still close and intricate.

Before going on to the advance of General Maude's army it is desirable to understand clearly the main object of the campaign, and the grounds upon which this object was selected by the British commander. The general military position of the Turks in Western Asia has already been explained. It has been shown that they were acting on four fronts, that on each of these fronts they had had, on the whole, the worst of the fighting, but not to a decisive extent, and that on the Mesopotamian front they had recently gained a signal success in the capture of Kut and its garrison. This success, naturally enough, had much encouraged


them; and it now seemed that they were resolved, so far at least as their two central fronts were concerned, to resume the offensive. What they meant to do on the Armenian and Egyptian fronts it was impossible to say; but such information as was obtainable appeared to show that their plan for the centre was to hold the British troops on the Tigris, and once more to throw their weight upon Persia, driving back the small Russian and British forces in that country, and threatening not only to raise Persia against the Allies, but to disturb Afghanistan and India. Indeed, soon after the capture of Kut, they had actually crossed the Persian frontier, compelled the advancing Russians to retreat, and taken the important town of Hamadan, 200 miles beyond. There were also indications that while holding on the Tigris the entrenched positions from which the British had failed to dislodge them, they intended to work down the line of the Euphrates against the British left and base in Mesopotamia. Their strength at or in advance of their own immediate base, Baghdad, was not accurately known, but it seemed that they had not an overwhelming number of regular troops, and that their tribal contingents were of no great fighting value. Such were the circumstances which the British commander in Mesopotamia, and the War Office, had to face. Their decision with regard to the two central fronts was that they would not disseminate their Mesopotamian troops in order to meet the enemy's projected offensive in Persia and on the Euphrates, but would instead assume the offensive themselves, and strike a resolute blow with concentrated forces on the line of the Tigris, thus threatening Baghdad, the centre from which the Turkish columns were operating. It was expected that such a

stroke would automatically relieve the pressure on Persia and the Euphrates, and preserve quiet in all the districts for which the British were responsible. This, according to General Maude, was the principle which guided the subsequent operations of the army in Mesopotamia. It remains to show what these operations were.

The precise situation on the Tigris was as follows. General Maude had now on this line a large and thoroughly well-equipped force. On the northern bank of the river this force was facing the Turkish entrenched position at Sanna-i-Yat, from which the British had been three times repulsed. On the southern bank the British were established about 11 miles farther up stream, facing a new entrenched position, to which the Turks had fallen back when they retired from the Es Sinn line in May, 1916. This new position, as will be seen from the accompanying map, consisted of a line which, starting from the Tigris about three miles north-east of Kut, extended to the Hai stream about two miles south of Kut, and crossing the stream there, swept round to the Tigris again at a point about two or three miles behind or west of Kut. The enemy had pontoon bridges over the Tigris and Hai within this position. Further, he occupied

with posts and mounted Arabs the line of the Hai for several miles south of the entrenched position, so that the only part of the position immediately in touch with the British was the eastern part, between the Tigris and Hai. "Strategically," General Maude observed, "we were better situated than the enemy," for on both flanks, to the north and south of the Tigris, the British were secured by difficult country from any attempt to work round them and strike at their communications; while, if they were strong enough for offensive action, they were well placed for striking from the south at the Turkish line of communications behind Sanna-i-Yat. That line, it should be remembered, was the route along the north bank of the Tigris from Sanna-i-Yat to Kut, and thence to Baghdad, a distance of about 115 miles.

In these circumstances the course of action upon which General Maude decided was in principle the same as that adopted by Generals Aylmer and Goringe before Kut fell—namely, while containing the Turks at Sanna-i-Yat, to seize and secure a point on the Hai stream, then to clear the Turkish trench systems remaining on the south bank of the Tigris, and, finally, having worked round Kut by the south, to cross the Tigris at a point as far west as possible and sever the Turkish communications, when



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGHDAD.

any force remaining in Sanna-i-Yat would find its retreat endangered. It was a bold scheme, for during these operations the British force on the south bank of the Tigris would be at a considerable and increasing distance from the force on the north bank facing Sanna-i-Yat. But with plenty of land transport, and a preponderance in numbers, artillery, and air service, the British Commander felt himself strong enough to risk the separation of forces, which indeed his predecessors had risked before without such advantages, and on December 12 the necessary orders were given. A sufficient force, under Lieut.-General A. S. Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., was to hold the enemy on the north bank of the Tigris and to picket and watch the part of the south bank in British possession while the rest of the Army, consisting of the Cavalry and the Infantry Divisions under Lieut.-General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., were to seize by a surprise march, and entrench, a point on the Hai stream below the Turkish position already described.

On the night of December 12-13 General Marshall's force completed its concentration on the south bank as far forward as possible, near the old Turkish line at Es Sinn. Here, on the 13th, General Maude joined him with the Headquarters of the Army, while General Cobbe bombarded the Turkish trenches on the north bank, so as to make the enemy believe that the British contemplated another attack upon Sanna-i-Yat.

On the following night the advance began. From the first everything went as well as possible. The night was cold but fine, and the troops in high spirits at the prospect of meeting the enemy again after long months of bad weather and inaction. The march, thoroughly well managed, was carried out without confusion or delay. Early on the morning of the 14th, just before dawn, Cavalry and Infantry struck the Hai stream at the points selected, six or eight miles south of Kut. The enemy, expecting an attack on the north of the Tigris, was completely surprised, and the stream forming at this season no serious obstacle, the force was soon across it. There was not a foot of water in the bed, and the Turkish outposts made practically no resistance. The seizure of a point on the Hai having thus easily been effected, the force then changed direction to the northward, towards the enemy's entrenched position round Kut, the Infantry marching up the nearer or eastern bank of the stream, and

the Cavalry clearing the further bank. The enemy still gave ground without much fighting, and the British horsemen, passing round Kut by the south, reached, or almost reached, the bank of the Tigris several miles further up the river at the "Shumran Bend." In the meantime two pontoon bridges were thrown across the Hai at Atab, in rear of the British troops, and the



TURKISH TRENCHES AT SANNA-I-YAT.
Photographed after their capture by the British.

passage of the stream was made secure. The surprise march, therefore, had been entirely successful, and General Maude's first object had been attained.

The weather remaining fair, the air service was now able to do useful work. The Turks had a bridge across the Tigris at Shumran, where the Cavalry had approached the river; and on the night of the 14th, disliking the near presence of the British, they proceeded to remove the bridge farther up stream. This was the airmen's opportunity. Flying by moonlight, they caught the Turks in the act of towing away the sections, and dropped a shower of bombs, under which the pontoons broke adrift and were scattered. The enemy was able to re-establish the bridge in a few days, but the

lesson given him was a wholesome one. It was not the first, for, according to the report of a Press correspondent,* "One of our pilots made a great sensation in the Turkish camp the other day when he looped the loop and cartwheeled over Kut in contempt of their 'Archibalds.'" Such a performance naturally impressed the Turk and the Arab. Nor had the pilots confined



[Elliott & Fry, photo.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR A. S. COBBE,
V.C., K.C.B.,

One of the commanders of the forces which took Baghdad.

themselves to "sky-larking." To quote from the same writer :

Effective machine gun fire near the ground in cooperation with our cavalry has been the most remarkable development in the air. Our aeroplanes have become the terror of thieves, raiders, and irregular horse. It is impossible for them to get off with their loot in the morning. No nullahs are deep enough to hide them. Our machines, flying a few feet above ground, scour the whole desert, rake their hiding places with machine gun fire, scatter and pursue their cavalry, spreading panic among their horses, and round up retiring convoys while our cavalry follow up and bring back the spoil. Such was the result of an attempt to raid our camel transport at Sheikh Saad. Of course an action of the kind would be impossible over the enemy's position, but on the line of communications it is most effective. Our flying men have discovered a short way with raiders.

Then, on December 21, the aeroplanes dropped nearly a ton of bombs on the shipping and ammunition dumps at a Turkish advanced base 25 miles west of Kut. They

were extremely useful in Mesopotamia for another reason, that they were not affected by the mirage. From the upper air everything was seen clearly in its real form ; and correct information as to the movements of the enemy could be given to troops on the march or in the field. Western science had overcome the Jinn of the Desert, who for countless centuries had mocked the generations of men with his fantastic illusions. The British army waging war in these "faery lands forlorn" might well rejoice that its mastery of the air had been definitely established before the advance began, and that its airmen were no longer running the gauntlet, hunted by the more powerful machines of the enemy, as they had been during the siege of Kut. In this respect as in all others General Maude had been more fortunate than his predecessors.

The work of the aeroplanes was supplemented by a "sausage" or kite balloon belonging to the Navy. Owing to its small power of elevation this balloon was not wholly superior to the effects of the mirage. "The only difference," Mr. Candler wrote, "is that the elusive shapes shimmer on a more distant horizon. On a hazy day Kut rises and falls like the folds of a concertina." Nevertheless the sausage did useful work, especially in clear weather, and it seems to have afforded at times wholesome diversion for the troops. To quote Mr. Candler again :

One day the uncromely machine was caught in a sudden gust, broke her cable, and was seen to head for the open desert and the south. The event is referred to in the Force as the Balloon Stakes. A horse battery, a squadron of cavalry, a Pioneer regiment, and an aeroplane competed, and the official handicapper could not have arranged the start better. The battery were out for a drill order, the Hussars were cutting grass at a distance, the Pioneers had a forward place on the permanent way, the aeroplane was well away back in the hangars. All claim to have been the first past the post save the Pioneers, who were held up as an escort for the gun section, which halted to cover the "sausage" when she wobbled to earth. However, no escort was needed. The "Buddoos," who had been well "strafed" the day before by an aeroplane, made off at the first approach of this portentous air demon and fled across the Hai. The balloon was rolled up into a surprisingly small bundle by the gunners, and the return was safely accomplished in the teeth of a dust storm, an exceedingly uncomfortable end to what had proved an amusing and novel morning's parade.

During the next few weeks, while General Cobbe continued his demonstrations against Sanna-i-Yat, on the north bank of the Tigris, General Marshall pushed on his attacks upon the enemy's positions on the south bank, pressing the Turks back into their trenches close to the river, and even driving in a wedge

* Mr. Edmund Candler.

to the river itself opposite Kut, so that the enemy's communications along this bank were severed. At the same time the British hold on the Hai was thoroughly consolidated by the building of additional bridges, the construction of roads, and the extension up to the stream of a light railway from the rear. Meanwhile the cavalry were raiding far to the westward, collecting supplies, harassing the Turkish communications, shelling the Turkish bridges over the Tigris, and even attempting, though without success, to bridge the river themselves. All this activity was somewhat hampered by heavy rain during the last week of the year and the first week of January, 1917; for the

along that bank were now interrupted, they could get across by boat from the north bank; and it was soon found that they had been able to maintain, or to prepare secretly, some strong positions. One such position they held even below Kut, on the Khadairi Bend, where the river made a great loop to the northward; and at the beginning of the year it was decided that this position must be taken, for it enabled the enemy to flood the land south of the river, and thus harass the land communications of the force on the Hai. The reduction of the position was entrusted to the troops under General Cobbe. It was not an easy task, for the Turks were in strength, and had three



AN AEROPLANE UNDER REPAIR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

Tigris rose after his manner, and large tracts of country were flooded. This made it difficult to maintain the running of the new railway, and imposed great exertions on the land transport. Nevertheless the seizure of the Hai stream had been of great value in facilitating the British advance, and it had done much to prevent the Turks from carrying out their projected offensive down the Euphrates. The troops on the Hai felt therefore that they had done useful work, and they spent their Christmas merrily, "singing late into the night."

But, satisfactory as all this was, the Turks had by no means given up the intention of opposing the British on the south bank of the Tigris. Although their lateral communications

lines of defence across the loop, connected by trenches, ravines, and sandhills, while their front, a mile and a half in length, had before it a stretch of flat bare ground swept from both sides by guns on the north bank. "The garrison," said General Maude, "had communication with the left bank by means of ferries, which, owing to the conformation of the river bend, were protected from direct rifle and machine gun fire," so long as the third line of defence was held. The operations began on January 5 and lasted for a fortnight, during which there was much digging of trenches under fire in heavy rain, and much hand-to-hand fighting, for the Turks as usual resisted stubbornly and made many strong counter-attacks. But they



AN AEROPLANE STATION ON THE TIGRIS.

were steadily pushed back, the heavy artillery fire wrecking their trenches, and the British troops proving fully their match at close quarters. Englishmen of the Manchesters and other regiments, Sikhs, Mahrattas, Gurkhas, Jats, vied with one another in dash and tenacity; and at last, finding themselves unable to hold their ground any longer, the Turks on the night of January 18-19 retired across the river under cover of rifle and machine gun fire from the north bank.

They had fought really well. The correspondent before quoted, Mr. Candler, gave the following description of this affair:

The Turk in his defence has shown the old Plevna spirit. At Mahomed Abdul Hassan, with his back to the swollen Tigris, no bridge, and only a few coracles and pontoons to depend on for communications, he held his ground stubbornly. Gradually forced back into a narrower area, in which our barrage became more and more concentrated, his trenches pounded into a con-

fused shambles by our guns, he emerged and counter-attacked with the utmost gallantry. And he did not quit until we had driven him into his last ditch.

On our left, an attack on January 9 cleared Kut East mounds and 600 yards of the river front. Here there was some desperate hand-to-hand fighting with bayonet and bombs. A certain regiment of the Indian Army saw red, and translated their vision into fact. Two hundred Turkish dead were found within a radius of 300 yards the next morning.

In the same engagement parties of a British regiment worked up to points in brushwood nullahs between the first and second Turkish lines. Down these nullahs the enemy counter-attacked in overwhelming force and enveloped a British bombing party. There was a thick fog, and the Turks, who had been lying up in the scrub, suddenly loomed out of the mist like a football crowd. Our men were pinned into a trench from which it was difficult to use their rifles, and their Lewis gun jammed with dirt; but the small party hung on, cut off from all supports, and fought to a finish with bomb and bayonet until they were practically exterminated; the Turkish dead found on the spot the next morning outnumbered ours.

A small working party of Pioneers, a mere platoon under a young subaltern, found themselves with a handful of British troops in the crisis of the action.



ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ON AN AMMUNITION BARGE.



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR STANLEY MAUDE, K.C.B.,
In command of the British Forces in Mesopotamia.

They held the breach, built up a block, and bombed the Turk lustily for hours. In the evening we still held this ground, and drove the Turks out of the section of the trench they had captured.

But the Turk was far from beaten. The gallant remnants of the battalions who fought on the 9th had been withdrawn, and fresh troops had been ferried over at night to take their place. At 2 p.m. on the 11th we were preparing for the final scene, when the Turks counter-attacked on both flanks and penetrated our line. They were held up by our rifle and machine-gun fire, and as they broke back, became a target for our guns. They lost heavily, but it was one of the most gallant sorties ever seen.

The remnants of the Turkish force slipped away in their boats and coracles on the night of the 18th-19th. We thought they were digging themselves in deeper. As a matter of fact they were burying their dead. And

in doing so they filled up their trenches, preparing their cemetery and a strategical line of retreat at the same time, so that our infantry had to advance in the morning without cover.

We can afford to bear witness to our enemy's grit; it would be a poor compliment to our fighting men if we did not. As a certain private expressed it: "Until he's got a crump on his cokernut the old Turk doesn't know when he is beat." The Turkish Commander congratulated the troops for their steadfastness in holding their ground. "The Corps Commander kisses the eyes of all ranks and thanks them," was the expressive Eastern phrase, "I, too, kiss all their eyes and thank them."

The Turkish losses had been very heavy. several hundred dead being found in their trenches, and many prisoners captured. The

loss of the British, though considerable, was less, for they advanced deliberately, under protection of a heavy gun fire. The result of this obstinate struggle was that the whole south bank of the Tigris was now definitely cleared of Turks up to their entrenched position round Kut.



GURKHAS IN TRENCH NEAR KUT.

This was a serious blow to the enemy, and a warning of worse things to come; but another warning was now given him which, though less bloody in its form, impressed him perhaps even more deeply. On January 20, the day after the Khadairi Bend was taken, some British aeroplanes succeeded in reaching Baghdad itself, and dropped bombs upon the munition factory in the citadel. It was not known what damage resulted; but the flash of the bombs in the heart of the ancient capital must have been to the Turks like the writing on the wall in Babylon of old, for behind the aeroplanes was the advancing British army.

The Turkish entrenched position round the south of Kut, known as the Hai salient, was now to be reduced. Operations to this end had been begun by General Marshall while General Cobbe was dealing with the Khadairi Bend, and on January 24 the British trenches were within striking distance of the enemy's first line. On January 25 the assault was delivered, and fighting went on until February 5. It was of



(Official photograph.)

GUFA (CORACLE), ON THE TIGRIS.

the same obstinate character as in the last affair. The British pressed steadily forward, supported by a heavy artillery bombardment, but the enemy held an elaborate trench system, strengthened by artillery and machine guns in skilfully concealed places, and he fought with fierce resolution. General Maude's dispatch speaks of "violent hand-to-hand encounters," of bombing and bayonet attacks and repeated counter-attacks, of a gallant charge by the Royal Warwicks across the open, of assaults by the Cheshires, by two Sikh battalions, by the Devons and a Gurkha battalion, of ceaseless work on the part of the Flying Corps, of heavy losses by the enemy in killed and prisoners, and of the capture of arms, ammunition, equipment, and stores. By the morning of February 5 almost the whole position was in British hands, and the Turks on the south bank of the Tigris had fallen back beyond Kut. The town itself, lying on the north bank, was still untaken. Though it could easily have been knocked to pieces by shell fire across the river, this would have done little good, as it would not have enabled the British to get over to the north bank. On that side they were still 15 miles or more distant, facing Sanna-i-Yat, as they had been throughout the year 1916. But the Turkish grip on the south bank was being torn away, mile after mile, and the defenders of Sanna-i-Yat now knew that their line of retreat, for a full day's march, was flanked by a superior British force, and protected only by the river, three or four hundred yards in breadth. Such a protection, though strong, was not so strong as to make them sure of the

safety of the line. It must have been an anxious situation, trying to the stoutest nerves. To their credit be it said, the Turks remained in their forward trenches without a sign of uneasiness, trusting their comrades behind them to hold the long river reaches and prevent their untiring assailants from breaking over in their rear.

Immediately beyond Kut, to the westward, the Tigris forms two irregular horseshoes, the first pointing to the north, the second to the south, so that the whole stretch of river, perhaps eight or nine miles from east to west, is something like a capital S laid on its side—*∩*. The horseshoe nearest Kut, known as the Dahra Bend, was described by General Maude as "bristling with trenches and commanded from across the river on three sides by hostile batteries and machine guns." The Turks held in strength the open end of the horseshoe, 5,500 yards broad, and some ground in front of it, their left resting on the liquorice factory, which, though to the south of the Tigris, had been formerly held by General Townshend as part of the Kut defences. The first thing to be done in the process of tearing away the Turkish grip from

the south bank of the Tigris above Kut was evidently to expel the enemy from the Dahra Bend; and the British troops were now brought into position for this object. They were thus facing north, with the liquorice factory and Kut on their right front, and the point of the second horseshoe, known as the Shumran Bend, on their left front.

The operations began on February 6, and lasted until the 16th, a period of 10 days, during which there was, as usual, very severe fighting. No assault was made on the liquorice factory, as this would have entailed heavy loss, but the building was bombarded until "it was no longer a landmark"; and meanwhile the Turkish advanced lines were attacked at a point farther west. During the assaults which followed, the King's Own, the Worcesters, the Buffs, a Gurkha Battalion, and an Indian Grenadier Battalion distinguished themselves; the Turks were gradually pressed back; and by February 13 they were finally enclosed in the Bend. Then their successive lines were one by one pierced and taken, the advance giving opportunities for dashing attacks by other British and Indian corps, notably the Loyal North Lanca-



INDIANS IN MESOPOTAMIA : SCENE AT A STORE.



PRISONERS.

shires, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the South Wales Borderers, the Buffs, the Dogras, and the Gurkhas. The efforts of the infantry were not more creditable than "the close and ever-present support rendered by the artillery, whose accurate fire was assisted by efficient aeroplane observation." The Turks fought bravely, as always, but they were overmatched, and on February 15 all was practically at an end. The

day's work was described in the following words* :

Our vigorous offensive to-day has cleared the Dahra Loop of the enemy. The Turks driven back on the Tigris have surrendered *en masse*, some 2,000 prisoners have been taken.

At 7 a.m. a small body of infantry rushed the ruins an important point on our left flank, whence the Turks could enfilade our advance. The enemy suffered severely from machine-gun fire in their retirement.

* Mr. Edmund Candler, *The Times*, February 21.



CHESHIRE IN A TRENCH NEAR KUT.

After a bombardment, our infantry swept across the open in irresistible waves, and with few casualties, considering the extent of the ground covered. As we approached the enemy's trench, a group of Turks issued from the centre of the position and gave themselves up. This first surrender was infectious, and was repeated all along the line. Prisoners came forward in a stream, waving white rags. For nearly an hour the procession was continuous. The Turks turned their guns on them, but with little effect. "We do not wish to counter-attack," one of them explained, "You have too many guns," and during the day no serious counter-attack materialized.

The limits of endurance of the enemy had been reached, and we pushed home our advantage. In the afternoon we drove in another attack on the right flank of the position we had taken. The garrison here had witnessed

and the remainder of the garrison left in the loop surrendered. Points of crossing where the troops were being ferried across the Tigris were shelled by our guns day and night.

With the close of this successful day the clear weather broke. Rain fell in torrents. The Turkish prisoners said, "We have been praying for this rain to hinder your advance. Now, at last, it has come too late." At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, our cavalry and infantry cooperating captured a point two miles south-west of our extreme left, securing us a line close to the Massag Nullah.

During the last few days the Turks seemed to recognize that the battle for the right bank of the Tigris west of Kut was lost, and there were indications of a general retirement. On the 12th instant they withdrew their bridge at Shumran.



PRISONERS RESTING ON THE ROAD TO BASRA.

[Official photograph.]

the morning's surrender, and the issue was the same. As our infantry advanced, the Turks threw down their rifles and broke out of the trenches, an unarmed horde. The stream of prisoners who came out to meet the regiment attacking almost outnumbered them. Our troops walked through them as they doubled past, running the gauntlet of their own guns. As they passed our trenches they were a most pacific-looking crowd, and kept up their white rag flapping until they were out of sight. Once free of the British zone they showed relief at being captured, by signs and cheerful gestures. One or two broke into a kind of tripping step not far removed from a dance.

Having carried these trenches, the infantry passed forward to the Tigris bank, thus isolating the Turkish extreme left, which also surrendered. The troops had made the two main attacks in the morning and afternoon, and then proceeded to clear a portion of the bend into which remnants of the enemy had retreated. At 6 p.m. the Turks were holding the rearmost trench on the river bank, and after dark this last foothold was rushed

All through, the cooperation between our gunners and infantry has been splendid, the artillery barrage lifting like a switch as our troops advanced. Our guns have been equally effective as a screen to frontal attacks, in countering hostile batteries, and in covering our bombing parties working up communication trenches.

It was a pleasant picture, very different from those which had to be drawn during the un-availing attempts by insufficient and ill-equipped columns to relieve Kut. The Turkish grip on the south bank of the Tigris had now been torn away for several miles beyond that point, perhaps for an indefinite distance.

The exposed line of communications of the Turks still entrenched at Sanna-i-Yat on the north bank had thus been greatly lengthened,



ARRIVAL OF A HOSPITAL BARGE AT AMARA.

and the strain on the enemy troops strung out along that line to defend the river was becoming more and more severe. Nevertheless the advanced position was still doggedly held, and on that bank the Turks had not gone back a foot since the unsuccessful assaults upon them nearly a year before. Their confidence in the impregnability of the position seemed as strong as ever. But in truth it was for them a dangerous confidence, and the British Commander was in no way concerned to lessen it. On the contrary, the more tenaciously they clung to the advanced trenches the better his chance of finding some weak spot in the long line of the river behind them where he could strike the final blow. He had throughout directed General Cobbe to maintain constant activity on the Sanna-i-Yat front, and now, feeling that the time had come for an attempt to cross the river; he did all he could to draw the attention of the enemy to this quarter, while he prepared for a crossing as far to the west as possible.

General Cobbe was therefore ordered to assault Sanna-i-Yat. The assault, which was delivered on February 17, was not successful, the Turks counter-attacking vigorously, and driving back a body of troops who had effected a lodgment in their trenches; but the enemy's eyes had been effectually attracted to his advanced position, and for the next few days he was kept, by repeated bombardments, in expectation of another assault. Meanwhile General Maude, 25 miles away to the westward,

was selecting his crossing place and making all possible preparations for the rapid bridging of the river. The point selected was the southern point of the Shumran Bend, close to the old site of the Turkish bridge; and here troops, guns, and material were collected under cover of darkness. By February 22 all was ready.

On that day Sanna-i-Yat was again assaulted, the Seaforths and a battalion of Punjabis, afterwards reinforced by an Indian rifle battalion and two frontier regiments, surprising the Turks and capturing their first two lines of trenches. There was hard fighting, and General Maude speaks in his dispatch of "the brilliant tenacity of the Seaforths throughout this day." The same night the crossing of the Tigris was effected. To deceive the enemy, and draw off his troops from the Shumran Bend, feints were made at other points. The Turks were allowed to become aware of elaborate preparations for bridging the river opposite Kut, with the result that they moved infantry and guns into the Kut peninsula, and could not retransfer them to Shumran in time to be of any use. A few miles farther down the river, at Magasis, a detachment of Punjabis, assisted by parties of sappers and miners and of the Sikh Pioneers, made a bold raid across the river, and returned with a captured trench mortar. The real crossing was described by General Maude in the following words:

The site selected for the passage of the Tigris was at

the south end of the Shumran Bend, where the bridge was to be thrown, and three ferrying places were located immediately down-stream of this point. Just before daybreak on the 23rd the three ferries began to work. The first trip at the ferry immediately below the bridge site, where the Norfolks crossed, was a complete surprise, and five machine guns and some 300 prisoners were captured. Two battalions of Gurkhas, who were using the two lower ferries, were met by a staggering fire before they reached the left bank, but in spite of losses in men and pontoons they pressed on gallantly and effected a landing. The two downstream ferries were soon under such heavy machine gun fire that they had to be closed, and all ferrying was subsequently carried on by means of the upstream ferry. By 7.30 a.m. about three companies of the Norfolks and some 150 of the Gurkhas were on the left bank. The enemy's artillery became increasingly active, but was vigorously engaged by ours, and the construction of the bridge commenced. The Norfolks pushed rapidly upstream on the left bank, taking many prisoners, whilst our machine guns on the right bank west of the Shumran Bend, inflicted casualties on those Turks who tried to escape. The Gurkha battalions on the right and centre were meeting with more opposition and their progress was slower. By 3 p.m. all three battalions were established on an east and west line one mile north of the bridge site, and a fourth battalion was being ferried over. The enemy attempted to counter-attack down the centre of the peninsula, and to reinforce along its western edge, but both attempts were foiled by the quickness and accuracy of our artillery. At 4.30 p.m. the bridge was ready for traffic.

By nightfall, as a result of the day's operations, our troops had by their unconquerable valour and determination forced a passage across a river in flood, 340 yards wide, in face of strong opposition, and had secured a position 2,000 yards in depth, covering the bridge head, while ahead of this line our patrols were acting vigorously against the enemy's advanced detachments, who had

suffered heavy losses, including about 700 prisoners taken in all. The infantry of one division were across and another division was ready to follow.

General Maude's dispatch went on :

While the crossing at Shumran was proceeding, Lieut.-General Cobbe had secured the third and fourth lines at Sanna-i-Yat. Bombing parties occupied the fifth later, and work was carried on all night making roads across the maze of trenches for the passage of the artillery and transport.

On the following day the whole of the Sanna-i-Yat position was taken. The Turks had suffered severely in the assault. "Many trenches," says General Maude, "were choked with corpses, and the open ground where counter-attacks had taken place was strewn with them." It had no doubt, to use his words, been a fierce struggle in which the British infantry displayed great gallantry and endurance; but on the last day the Turks doubtless knew that the river defence had fallen behind them, and in this knowledge their own defence apparently collapsed, for General Cobbe seems to have swept over their lines and cleared the whole north bank as far as Kut without much opposition. Thus fell the stronghold which had defied all the efforts of the British for more than a year, and with it fell Kut, which had been in the hands of the Turks ever since the surrender of General Townshend's force.



A HUT FOR DRESSING MINOR CASES AT AMARA.

Directly the Sanna-i-Yat lines had been taken the Naval gunboats, which for so many months had been unable to pass this point, were once more steaming up the river, and the same night a Naval detachment had run up the Union Jack in its old place over the town.

The news of the recapture of Kut had a striking effect. *The Times* said: "British prestige in the Middle East has been brilliantly restored." None but men unacquainted with practical affairs sneer at the word prestige; and undoubtedly the news went far to make up for the loss of reputation involved in the surrender of 9,000 British troops the year before. Nor was the effect confined to the Middle East. The commander of the French armies telegraphed his warm and sincere congratulations on "this splendid feat of arms"; and the defeat of the Turks made a great impression everywhere. Of its immediate practical result upon the course of the war in Asia there could be no question. Within a week the Turkish forces which had invaded Northern Persia were in full retreat for their own border, and the projected Turkish movements on the Euphrates were given up. In fact, the ambitious offensive of the enemy upon this central front in Asia had collapsed like a pricked bladder. The

principle of a concentrated advance on the Tigris had already been justified.

But the recapture of Kut, and even the foiling of the Turkish offensive, was by no means all that the advance contemplated, and the account of General Maude's operations to the westward must now be resumed. On February 24, while General Cobbe's force was marching into Kut, General Maude was striking from Shumran at the Turkish communications. The result may best be told in his own words:

The successful passage of the stream at Shumran on February 23 was rapidly and effectively exploited during the following night, our patrols pushing forward boldly and maintaining close contact with the enemy.

Early on the morning of the 24th the ridge across the neck of the Shumran peninsula was in our hands, and it became evident that the enemy was in full retreat in the direction of Baghela, 24 miles west of Kut-el-Amara. The Turkish depots and stores at many points were in flames, and strong rearguards supported by artillery had been disposed to oppose our advance.

By 8 a.m. a strong force of cavalry had crossed the Tigris, and at once manoeuvred to gain the flank of the Turkish line of retreat. Throughout the day both our cavalry and infantry were heavily engaged, inflicting severe, but as yet unknown, casualties on the enemy.

Throughout the fighting our aeroplane squadrons have cooperated with invaluable results, freely using bombs and machine guns from minimum altitudes.

In the two days' fighting we have captured 1,730 prisoners, including at least one Turkish regimental



SHIPPING TURKISH PRISONERS TO INDIA.



BREAKFAST ON A RIVER TRANSPORT.

commander and four Germans, four field guns, 10 machine guns, three mine throwers, and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition.

As the fighting has now become of an open character, and our forces are disposed on a wide front, it has not yet been possible to ascertain fully the Turkish losses in men and *matériel*.

Thus not only had Kut been retaken but the main Turkish army in Mesopotamia was in rapid retreat, after being expelled with heavy loss from a strong position; and the question was whether that retreat could be converted into a rout, with possible consequences of great importance, including another advance upon Baghdad itself.

On February 25 the answer to this question began to be given. That morning, as the British infantry which had taken the Shumran Bend were preparing to move out of their bivouacs, the Naval gunboats came steaming up the river from Kut, with decks cleared for action. They were pushing forward to join in the pursuit of the retreating enemy, and as they went the infantry lined the bank and cheered. The airmen and the cavalry were already out on the same errand, and before long the Turks began to suffer severely from the combined attacks of these arms, supported or followed by the British guns and foot soldiers. They fought hard at points, under the cover of trenches and ravines, but they lost prisoners and guns, and found it more and more difficult to get away in respectable order. On the 26th the gunboats, going full speed ahead, "came under very heavy fire at the closest range from guns, machine

guns, and rifles," but they pressed on through it past the Turkish rearguard, doing considerable execution among the retreating columns, and capturing several vessels, among them the *Sumana* and H.M.S. *Firefly*, which, as related in a former chapter, had been taken by the Turks during General Townshend's retreat from Ctesiphon. Nevertheless the bulk of the enemy's troops did succeed in getting away with some semblance of cohesion. While they were being pressed from the rear and flanks on this day, a column of all arms tried by a forced march of 18 miles across an arid plain to cut them off farther up the river, but their retreat proved to be too rapid. "Stripping themselves of guns and other encumbrances the Turks just evaded our troops."* On the 27th again the Navy pressed its fiery pursuit, and the cavalry harassed the Turks until after dark, by which time they were "streaming through Azizieh in great confusion." They had been hunted half-way to Baghdad; and the road over which they had come down triumphantly 15 months before, driving before them Townshend's over-matched division, was now strewn with the wreckage of their beaten army. "Since crossing the Tigris," wrote General Maude, "we had captured some 4,000 prisoners, of whom 188 were officers, 39 guns, 22 trench mortars, 11 machine guns, H.M.S. *Firefly*, *Sumana* (recaptured), *Pioneer*, *Basra* and several smaller vessels, besides 10 barges, pontoons, and

* General Maude's dispatch of April 10.



A BRITISH MONITOR ON THE TIGRIS.

other bridging material, quantities of rifles, bayonets, equipment, ammunition, and explosives, vehicles and miscellaneous stores of all kinds. In addition, the enemy threw into the river or otherwise destroyed several guns and much war material."

To supplement the reserved official story, the following extracts from an account* of the pursuit by an eye-witness, written at Azizieh, are valuable :

Our gunboats and cavalry have turned the Turkish retreat into a rout. The Tigris fleet has been waiting fifteen months for this chance. . . . After playing the rôle of heavy garrison artillery they had become cavalry, and their immediate work was to round up and capture the enemy's ships.

Soon after passing Baghela, 46 miles upstream of Kut by river, they came in contact with the Turkish infantry, who lined the river and poured in a heavy fire ; but it was at the Nahr Kellah bend that the Turks made the most desperate efforts to hold up our fleet. The river here turns back on itself in a complete hairpin bend, so that passing vessels are under fire from three sides.

Turkish artillery and machine-gun teams dug themselves in at the apex of the bend, raked the gunboats as they were coming and going, and fired point blank at them as they passed. Our 12-pounder, pompoms, and machine-guns enfiladed the position as the vessels went by, pounding the Turkish trenches at 300 yards. It was a hot corner for us. Both the quartermaster and pilot in the conning tower of one of the monitors were shot dead, and the captain entered just in time to prevent the vessel running full steam ashore. The plating was pitted with bullet holes, shells struck masts, ladders, and rigging, but not a gunboat was sunk. Swinging round the bend at 16 knots the fleet reached a point where the road comes in towards the river, and their machine-guns played havoc with the Turkish transport and gun teams. More enemy guns were abandoned. Our horse artillery got on to them at the same time, and afterwards we found the Turkish dead on the road.

There was every sign of panic and rout—bullocks still alive and unyoked entangled in traces of trench mortar carriages, broken wheels, cast equipment, overturned limbers, hundreds of live shells of various calibres scattered over the country for miles. Either the gunners

had cast off freight to lighten the limbers or they had been too rushed to close up the limber boxes.

Every bend of the road told its tale of confusion and flight. Here there was a field post-office with Turkish money-orders circling round in the wind. There a brand-new Mercedes motor-car held up for want of petrol, cartloads of small-arm ammunition, hats, boots, oil drums ; things destroyed or half-destroyed. Decapitated carcasses of stock which could not keep up with the rout and white columns of smoke ahead told of further destruction. There was enough litter by the road to keep the army in fuel for weeks. Then one saw a whole battery of 12-centimetre field guns with their breech blocks removed but buried too hastily near by and betrayed by an entrenchment tool. . . .

When passing Baghela our fleet had not been fired at from the town, but a returning gunboat, with a crew of 15 all told, captured 150 prisoners. The place yielded a great quantity of bridging material, ordnance stores, ammunition carts, tents, telephone wire, trench mortars, and a number of abandoned guns, lying half in the water on the left bank.

Other prisoners came in here at different points—many of them naked, having been stripped by marauders, who looted or killed the retreating army, and the Turks were afraid to be left without guards.

One column of cavalry was occupied in rounding up prisoners, marking down guns, and finding and collecting enemy wounded. Several wounded British and Indian prisoners, who had been abandoned on the way, were also brought in.

By this time the enemy was moving on a broad front, and as a disorganized rabble, no longer in organized columns of fours. At night the last remnants of an organized rearguard made one more stand at Azizieh, and our cavalry dismounted and attacked them after dark.

On September 21, 1917, was published a report by Captain Wilfrid Nunn, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N., commanding the Tigris Flotilla, which gave further details regarding the part taken by H.M. ships in the pursuit of the Turkish Army. The following were passages from this report :

On the forenoon of February 24 I moved up river with Tarantula, Moth, Mantis, Butterfly, Gadfly, and arrived at Kut-el-Amara at 9.30 p.m., where I landed and hoisted the Union Jack.

The town was deserted and in ruins. Early on the

* Edmund Candler in *The Times*.

morning of the 25th I moved on up river and communicated with our troops near Shumran.

Floating mines had been seen in the river, but were easily avoided.

During the morning I received a message from the Army Commander asking me to cooperate in pursuing the retreating Turkish Army, and I pressed on up river. We were abreast of our leading infantry at about 9.30 a.m. and in sight of the Turkish rearguard, on which we at once opened with rapid fire, inflicting heavy casualties. This the enemy soon returned, opening an accurate fire on us with field batteries and several 5.9 howitzers from a prepared position among the sand hills in the neighbourhood of Imam Mahdi. Our troops were advancing, and some of our field artillery considerably relieved the situation by the rapidity with which they came into action. . . .

The enemy evacuated their position during the night, and we pushed on with the Army in pursuit on the morning of February 26.

It soon became evident that the Turkish Army was much demoralized, and I received a message by W T from General Sir F. S. Maude during the forenoon to push on and inflict as much damage as possible.

We proceeded at full speed in Tarantula, leading Mantis and Moth, H.M. ships Gadfly and Butterfly following at their utmost speed. . . .

The Turks retreating on the left bank were becoming more numerous; they now had our cavalry division in pursuit of them on their right flank and the gunboats on their left.

The enemy were firing at us from three directions, and on approaching Nahr Kollah bend I observed a large body of enemy on the left bank at the head of the loop in the river, and gave orders for all guns to be fired on them.

They proved to be a strong rearguard, and opened on us with field and machine-guns and heavy rifle fire. At this close range there were casualties in all ships, who were all hit many times, but our guns must have caused immense damage to the enemy, as we were at one time firing six-inch guns into them at about 400 to 500 yards.

Besides the Turkish artillery there were a large number of enemy with rifles and machine-guns behind the bend at a range of about 100 yards from the ships.

In the act of turning round the bend shots came from all directions, and casualties of Moth, which came last in the line, were particularly severe.

There were casualties in all three ships, Moth, which was magnificently handled by Lieutenant Commander Charles H. A. Cartwright, who was himself wounded, had three officers wounded—all severely—out of four, and two men killed and 18 wounded, which is about 50 per cent. of her complement.

She was hit eight times by shell—one from ahead hit the fore side of stokehold casing, burst and pierced the port boiler, both front and back, but luckily missed the boiler tubes. The after compartment was holed below the water line, and the upper deck and funnels of all ships riddled with bullets.

The quartermaster and pilot in the conning tower of H.M.S. Mantis were killed, but the prompt action of her captain* saved her from running ashore. I consider that the excellent spirit of the men and skilful handling of the ships by their captains in a difficult and unknown shallow river were most praiseworthy.

We thus passed the enemy rearguard, and large numbers of the retreating Turkish Army were on our starboard beam. I opened rapid fire from all guns

* Commander Bernard Buxton.



GUNS CAPTURED FROM THE TURKS BY GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S FORCE AT KUT IN SEPTEMBER, 1915.

Lost in the surrender in 1916 and re-taken under General Sir Stanley Maude in 1917.



CAPT. WILFRID NUNN, C.M.G.,
In command of the British Flotilla on the
Tigris, 1917.

that would bear (this included heavy and light guns, pompoms, Maxims, and rifles), and at this short range we did enormous execution, the enemy being too demoralized to reply, except in a very few cases.

We were also able to shoot down some of their gun-teams, which they deserted, and several guns thus fell into the hands of our forces when going over this ground.

The vessels ahead were now in easy range, and several

small craft stopped and surrendered, including the armed tug *Sumana*, which we had left at Kut during the siege, and had been captured at the fall of that place. . . .

Darkness now came on, and I considered it inadvisable to go on farther, as we were far ahead of our troops. . . .

We remained in the vicinity the following day, and I sent the *Moth* back to Basra for repairs, and the prizes down river. The advance of our Army continued, and we reached Aziziyah on March 1. Here the Turks had abandoned more guns and again retreated.

It may be observed that the Turks were not more exact in their military bulletins than the Germans—or Napoleon—for the Turkish official report of February 28 was: "No event of importance has occurred on the various fronts."

At Azizieh the pursuit was broken off for the time, "to reorganize our extended line of communications preparatory to a further advance." Much as they had suffered in their retreat, the Turks had not been destroyed as a military body, or so completely routed that it would have been possible to keep them in flight with cavalry and gunboats alone; while for an advance in strength with the whole of the infantry and all the necessaries of modern war some delay was inevitable. General Maude could not afford to risk another Ctesiphon by pushing on with anything less. For a full week, therefore, the advanced troops remained at Azizieh. Then General Cobbe's force had closed up, supplies and ammunition had been collected, and all was ready for a methodical advance.

On March 5 it began. General Marshall's



THE STEAMSHIP BASRA, WITH BARGES ON EITHER SIDE, FULL OF TURKISH WOUNDED CAPTURED BY THE NAVY BETWEEN KUT AND BAGHDAD.

corps was in front, General Cobbe's in support. The leading column made a long day's march, and the cavalry reached Lajj, 25 miles upstream, half-way between Azizieh and Baghdad. Here, says General Maude, "the Turkish rearguard was found in an entrenched position very difficult to locate by reason of a dense dust storm that was blowing, and of a network of *nalas* (ravines) with which the country is intersected. The cavalry was hotly engaged with the enemy in this locality throughout the day, and took some prisoners. A noticeable feature of the day's work was a brilliant charge, mounted, by the Hussars straight into the Turkish trenches. The enemy retreated during

was unoccupied. But on the following day the British advanced guard came into contact with the enemy, and it was found that they were holding the line of the Diala river, which runs into the Tigris from the north at a point about eight miles below Baghdad. The Turks had destroyed the bridge over the Diala, and the ground in front of their position being absolutely flat, with no cover, it was thought better not to attack at once. The force was therefore halted until sunset.

Then followed some severe fighting. The line of the Diala was not held by the Turks in great strength, the bulk of their retreating troops having apparently been posted in



TRANSPORTING RAILWAY ENGINES UP THE TIGRIS.

the night." It was a fine performance. One Hussar regiment, after taking 100 prisoners in a first charge, galloped on, it is said, into a mass of Turks firing from concealed trenches, and tried to ride over them too, some of the men leaping their horses into the trenches and riding along them. Having lost many officers and men killed or wounded, the Hussars retired a short distance; then, leaving their horses, they advanced again, on foot, to save their wounded, who were being stripped and murdered. Many of these were brought off under a heavy fire.

On March 6 the cavalry pushed on through another dust storm, and passed Ctesiphon, the scene of General Townshend's battle. The Turkish position, though strongly entrenched,

entrenched positions on the right bank of the Tigris, to resist an attack upon Baghdad from the south and south-west; but the Diala was nevertheless a formidable obstacle. Its breadth was 120 yards, and the farther bank was "defended by numerous guns and machine guns skilfully sited."* To force a passage in boats was therefore no easy matter, even after nightfall, especially as a bright moon was shining. Two attempts were made, but without success. The first pontoon launched was "riddled by rifle and machine-gun fire." Then five pontoons were launched, under cover of artillery and machine guns, but they were all stopped by a withering fire and floated down stream into the Tigris, where they were after-

*General Maude's dispatch.

wards recovered with a few wounded survivors on board. An unofficial description* of the incident was as follows :

The attack on the night of the 7th was checked, but the quality of courage shown by our men has never been surpassed in war. Immediately the first pontoon was lowered over the ramp, the whole launching party was shot down in a few seconds. It was bright moonlight, and the Turks had concentrated their machine-guns and rifles in the houses on the opposite bank. The second pontoon had got into the middle of the stream when a terrific fusillade was opened on it. The crew of five rowers and ten riflemen were killed, and the boat floated down the stream. A third got nearly across, but was bombed and sank. All the crew were killed, but there was no holding back.

The account of the Diala fight goes on as follows :

On the second night the attempt was pursued with equal gallantry. This time the attack was preceded by a bombardment. Registering by artillery had been impossible on the first day in the speed of the pursuit. It was the barrage that secured us the footing, not the shells, but the dust raised by them. This was so thick that you could not see your hand in front of your face. It formed a curtain behind which ten boats were able to cross. Afterwards, in clear moonlight, when the curtain of dust had lifted, the conditions of the night before were re-established. Succeeding crossing parties were exterminated, and pontoons drifted away, but a footing was secured. The dust served us well. The crew of one boat which lost its way, during the barrage, were untouched, but they did not make the bank in time.



[Official photograph.]

PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE TIGRIS NEAR BAGHDAD.

The orders still held to secure the passage. Crew after crew pushed off to an obvious and certain death. The third crossing party was exterminated in the same way, and the pontoons drifted out to the Tigris to float past our camp in the daylight with their freight of dead. The drafts who went over were raised by volunteers from other battalions in the brigade. These and the sappers on the bank share the honour of the night with the attacking battalion. Nothing stopped them save the loss of the pontoons. A Lancashire man remarked : "It is a bit hot here, let's try higher up," but the gallant fellows were reduced to their last boat. Another regiment, which was to cross higher up, was delayed, as the boats had to be carried nearly a mile across country to the stream. After the failure of the bridge-head passage the second crossing was cancelled, but the men were still gone.

The attempt had been made near the site of the broken Turkish bridge.

Directly the air cleared a machine-gun was opened on them, and the rowers were shot down, and the pontoon drifted back to the shore. A sergeant called to volunteers to get the wounded out of the boat, and a party of 12 men went over the river bank. Every man of them, as well as the crew of the pontoon, was killed.

Some 60 men had got over and these joined up and started bombing along the bank. They were soon heavily pressed by the Turks on both flanks, and found themselves between two woods. Here they discovered a providential natural position. A break in the river bund had been repaired by a new bund built in a half-moon on the landward side. This formed a perfect lunette. The Lancashire men, surrounded on all sides but the river, held it through the night all the next day, and the next night, against repeated and determined attacks.

These attacks were delivered in the dark, or at dawn. The Turks only attacked once in the daylight, as our machine-guns on the other bank swept the ground in front of the position. Twenty yards west of the lunette there was a thin grove of mulberries and palms. The pontoon was most vulnerable on this side, and it was here

* Edmund Candler, *The Times*, March 26, 1917.

that the Turkish counter-attacks were most frequent. Our intense intermittent artillery fire, day and night, on the wood afforded some protection. The whole affair was visible to our troops on the south side, who were able to make themselves heard by shouting. Attempts to get a cable across with a rocket for the passage of ammunition failed. At midnight of the 9th and 10th the Turks were on top of the parapet, but were driven back. One more determined rush would have carried the lunette, but the little garrison, now reduced to 40, kept their heads and maintained cool control of their fire. A corporal was seen searching for loose rounds and emptying the bandoliers of the dead. In the end they were reduced almost to their last clip and one bomb, but we found 100 Turkish dead outside the redoubts when they were relieved at daylight.

The crossing on the night of the 9th-10th was entirely successful. With our cavalry and two columns of infantry working round on the right bank (of the Tigris ?) the Turks were in danger of being cut off, as at Sanna-i-Yat. Before midnight they had withdrawn their machine-guns, leaving only riflemen to dispute the passage. The crossing upstream was a surprise. We slipped through the Turkish guard. He had pickets at both ends of the river salient, where we dropped our pontoons. But he overlooked essential points in it, which offered us dead ground uncovered by posts up and down stream. Consequently our passage here cost us no lives. The other ferry near the bridge was also crossed with slight loss, owing to a diversion upstream.

The Turks, perceiving that their flank was being turned, effected a general retirement of the greater part of their garrison between the two ferries. Some 250 in all, finding us bombing down on both flanks, surrendered. The upper crossing was so unexpected that one Turk was actually bayoneted as he lay covering the opposit

bank with his rifle. By 9.30 on the morning of the 10th the whole brigade had crossed.

This account seems to differ in one or two details from the official story, but it gave a graphic description of a fine feat of arms, and showed incidentally what a formidable obstacle a comparatively small river can be to a pursuing force.

General Maude's dispatch showed that the East Lancashires and Wiltshires were the first across the Diala on the 10th, and that they "linked up with the detachment of the Loyal North Lancashires which had so heroically held its ground there."

General Marshall's force had more fighting after crossing the river, and some hundreds of the enemy were killed; but the Turks now seem to have lost heart. On the night of March 10 they abandoned their last position covering Baghdad on this bank of the Tigris, and it was at once occupied by the British troops.

While this three days' fight was proceeding on the north bank of the Tigris, the cavalry and General Cobbe's force had crossed to the south bank, and moved against the enemy



THE BRIDGE OF BOATS AT BAGHDAD.
The picture shows Turkish artillery crossing.



BAGHDAD: THE JUMA OR MOSQUE OF ABD-EL-KADIR.

troops covering Baghdad on that side. Their advance was much impeded by ravines and water cuts; and the Turks, aided by a gale and blinding dust storm, offered some resistance. But it was not very obstinate, and on March 10 they gave up the attempt to defend Baghdad, retiring past the city towards the north-west. It may be observed here that the left and right banks of the Tigris could no longer be correctly described as the north and south banks, for near Baghdad the river bends upward to the north and the city lies to east and west of it. General Cobbe's force was in touch with the western part of the town.

The British troops had now fought their way to the walls of Baghdad on both banks, and before dawn on March 11 a general advance was ordered. General Cobbe's force at once occupied the Baghdad railway station and adjoining parts of the city on the right bank, while General Marshall pushed on rapidly and entered the part lying on the left bank. There was no display, nothing of the nature of a triumphal entry, but as the victorious troops, dirty and unshaven, tramped in along the unmetalled road, between palm groves and orange gardens, "crowds of Baghdadis came out to meet us—Persians, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Chaldeans, and Christians of divers sects and races. They lined the streets, balconies, and roofs, hurraing and clapping their hands. Groups of school children danced in front of us, shouting and cheering, and the women of the city turned out in their holiday dresses."

While the troops were occupying the city the gunboat flotilla, with minesweepers ahead,

proceeded up the river, General Maude and his Staff going with the flotilla and arriving at the citadel soon after the troops.

So fell Baghdad, the immediate base of Turkish warfare in Persia and Mesopotamia, and one of the most famous cities in all the East. If the recapture of Kut had produced a great effect, it need hardly be said that the fall of Baghdad made an impression vastly greater. In Germany it was described with unusual frankness as "a deplorable event," and on the Bosphorus the news of it was received with something like consternation, while among the Allies and all who sympathized with them it was hailed as a striking victory and an auspicious opening to the campaigns of 1917. Indeed, considering that the Asiatic theatre of war was after all a secondary one, and that the capture of an Asiatic city could hardly have any material bearing on the issue of the European conflict, the weight attached to the British success seemed almost disproportionate. But it must be remembered that the conception of a great advance eastward by way of Turkey in Asia was a fundamental part of the German scheme of world-politics, and that the seizure by Great Britain of the eastern end of the Constantinople-Baghdad railway meant a heavy blow to this scheme. Of course, neither the Turks nor the Germans regarded the disaster as irretrievable. It would have been surprising if they had done so. They doubtless resolved that the British should yet be ejected from Mesopotamia.

However this might be, the British, having taken Baghdad, at once proceeded to con-

solidate their position as far as possible. Their first act on the morning of March 11 was to destroy the German wireless installation, which it was reported "had just been completed at enormous cost. It was one of the most powerful installations of their system, and was in direct communication with Berlin." Possibly the earliest definite information that Baghdad was in British hands arrived at Berlin in this rather startling way. Various measures, political and military, were taken to establish order in the town, to reassure the population of the country, and to guard against any mischief on the part of the beaten Turkish forces. For a fortnight or more before the fall of Baghdad the Turks had systematically plundered its inhabitants. Large sums of money had been extorted from them, and everything of value that was portable had been carried off. "The Turks have taken everything," a Jewish Rabbi said, "even the pigeons on the Mosques are getting thin." And when the last train for Constantinople steamed out of the Baghdad railway station at two o'clock on the morning of March 11, bearing a rush of Turkish passengers, the Kurds and other rabble of the city slums swarmed out to loot the wealthier quarters. For seven hours shops and houses were gutted in all directions, and even the Turkish hospital was not spared. The robbers seized upon "stores, bedding, medicine and drugs. The personnel let in their friends and shared the spoil." Happily the British troops arrived in time to save the patients from being turned out of their beds, and summary steps

were taken to put an end to the general orgy of looting. Very soon the city was in perfect order, and the shops began to open again, the trading classes here as elsewhere showing complete confidence in British justice. Jews, Arabs, Armenians—such of the Armenians as had escaped from recent massacres—all alike seemed unfeignedly glad to be rid of the Turks, who had never been for them anything more than a horde of foreign oppressors. Meanwhile General Maude in his capacity as the "political" chief, issued to the people of the Baghdad Province a proclamation assuring them of the goodwill of the British Government and its Allies, and of their desire for the prosperity of the country.

As an example of the varied work which falls to a British commander in the East, and as an indication of the attitude of the British Government, the proclamation was interesting. It ran as follows :

"TO THE PEOPLE OF BAGHDAD VILAYET.


"In the name of my King, and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows :

"Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task, I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British troops operate, but our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.

"Since the days of Halaka your city and your



BAGHDAD: KHALIL PASHA STREET.
Built by the Turks to commemorate the Capture of Kut.



THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO BAGHDAD.

lands have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunk in desolation, and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

"Since the days of Midhat the Turks have talked of reforms, yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify the vanity of those promises ?

"It is the wish not only of my King and his peoples, but it is also the wish of the great nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science, and art, and when Baghdad city was one of the wonders of the world.

"Between your people and the dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest. For 200 years have the merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country now or in the future, for in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies the British Government cannot risk that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

"But you people of Baghdad, whose commercial prosperity and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized, and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In Hedjaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans, who oppressed them, and proclaimed the Sherif Hussain as their King, and his lordship rules in independence and freedom, and is the ally of the nations who

are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany ; so, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Koweit, Nejd, and Asir.

"Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of Arab freedom, at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the great Powers allied to Great Britain, that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the hope and desire



TURKISH OFFICER PRISONERS.

of the British people and the nations in alliance with them, that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth, and that it shall bind itself together to this end in unity and concord.

"O people of Baghdad ! Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent to Great Britain and her Allies, for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where there is enmity and misgovernment. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may be united with your kinsmen in north, east, south, and west in realizing the aspirations of your race.

"March 19, 1917."

The British subaltern who had for months been hunting the light-fingered "Buddoo" on the line of communications, and had seen what sometimes happened to wounded men, probably had his own views about the noble Arab, and expressed them in picturesque language. But the proclamation no doubt served a useful purpose.

While these arrangements were being made to restore order in Baghdad and to enlist the sympathies of the population, the British troops were pushing on beyond Baghdad in order to drive away the remains of the Turkish forces and make all secure. To the north, up the right bank of the Tigris, the Turks were pursued without delay by a force under General Cobbe, so that their troops might be further disorganized, and that control might be obtained over the river "bunds" or embankments, here as elsewhere an important object. This operation involved "continuous marching and stiff fighting, almost without a break, for two nights and a day," but at a point about 20 miles up the line the Turks made their last stand. They were decisively beaten, the Black Watch and Gurkhas distinguishing themselves by a brilliant charge, and the fugitives straggled away far to the northward. On the other side of the Tigris, up the line of the Diala, another column was sent out to meet the Russian forces coming from Persia, and to cooperate with them in disposing of the Turkish troops which were retiring before them. In this direction there was some severe fighting, the Turks from Persia and those on the left bank of the Tigris combining for an attack on our troops; but they were driven off with heavy loss, and on April 2 the British and Russians joined hands. To the west of Baghdad a third column was sent out to occupy a point on the Euphrates, which here bends in towards the Tigris, and prevent any further trouble on that side. Thus in all directions, for a considerable though uncertain distance, the country round Baghdad was now free of the enemy. General Maude's campaign on the Tigris had come to a close, and a thoroughly successful close.

During the period of that campaign there was practically no fighting upon the two flanks of the Mesopotamian position. At Nasrieh on the Euphrates the local tribes gave some trouble

in the autumn of 1916, but this was promptly and effectually suppressed, 1,200 of the tribesmen being killed or wounded on the only occasion when they made a stand. To the eastward, on the Karun river, nothing important occurred.

It may be added that after the actions above mentioned to the north of Baghdad the Turkish forces in that quarter gave no further trouble of a serious nature. The summer of 1917 passed quietly, and with the summer ended the third phase of the war in Mesopotamia.

It was very creditable to British arms. The second phase, dominated by the necessity for relieving Kut, without delay, at any cost, and by the lack of river transport, had been one record of failure—of gallant but practically hopeless attacks by an insufficient and badly equipped force upon strong entrenched positions; of great and unnecessary suffering inflicted upon British troops by departmental mismanagement; of a long and tenacious, but in the end unsuccessful, defence by a gradually starving garrison; of a surrender which though inevitable sent a whole British Division into captivity, and was deeply humiliating to the pride of the nation. The third phase, on the contrary, had been one of careful and complete preparation; of a confident and almost unchecked advance by an army ample in numbers and thoroughly well found in all respects; of a victory which shattered the enemy's plan for a great offensive; and, at the end, of an undisputed entry into his Asiatic capital. It is true that the British Commander in the later phase, more fortunate than his predecessors, was only called upon to perform a task in which success might fairly be expected; but this in no way lessens the credit due to him and the War Office for a thoroughly good piece of work. It is true, also, that the success obtained had no great influence on the main issue of the war, no decisive influence even on the Asiatic issue. The possibility of a renewed offensive by the Asiatic army of the Turks was still to be apprehended—possibly on the same lines as before. Mesopotamia and Persia had by no means been made permanently secure from Turkish attacks. Still, the campaign was one which gave the nation much cause for satisfaction, and some cause for pride.

CHAPTER CCII.

GREECE AND THE WAR, 1914—16.

HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE—THE CROWN AND THE PROTECTING POWERS—THE BALKAN WARS AND THE ALLIANCE WITH SERBIA—POLICY OF M. VENIZELOS—KING CONSTANTINE'S OPPOSITION—POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY IN 1915—THE REFUSAL TO APPLY THE TREATY WITH SERBIA—PRO-GERMAN MANŒUVRES—SURRENDER OF FORT RUPEL—CRISIS OF JUNE, 1916—ENTENTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONSTANTINE'S MINISTERS—THE NATIONAL DEFENCE MOVEMENT—M. VENIZELOS'S SALONIKA GOVERNMENT—THE ENTENTE STILL HESITATES—ALLIED TROOPS ATTACKED—THE "BATTLE OF ATHENS."

ON the outbreak of war in August, 1914, the position of few countries seemed clearer than that of Greece. Historical, sentimental, economic, and political reasons alike ranged her on the side of the Entente Powers as definitely as they estranged her from that of the Germanic Alliance.

During the dark days of Turkish rule it was from Russia, France, and England that the first hope of deliverance came to the oppressed Greek nation. It was the Government of the Empress Catherine II. that instigated the first attempts at revolution in Greece. When finally, in 1821, the Greek people as a whole rose in rebellion to fight for their independence, it was French and British officers who volunteered to help them in the struggle. Colonel Fabvier led the Greek insurgents in the defence of Athens and the ineffectual invasion of Chios. It was the troops of General Maison which cleared Ibrahim's hordes out of the Peloponnesus. Lord Byron and Lord Cochrane, Sir Richard Church and Captain Hastings are some of the Englishmen who have always been remembered in Greece as champions of the Greek cause in its darkest hour. The Governments of the three Powers, though slow to act owing to their mutual jealousies, can at least claim the credit of concluding the struggle by the destruction of the

Turkish fleet at Navarino. The Protocols of 1827 and 1829 were finally clinched by that of February 3, 1830, which declared that Greece should be an independent State governed by a hereditary monarch. The candidate for the throne finally selected by the three protecting Powers was Prince Otto of Bavaria, a State whose minor importance at the time could satisfy the three Powers that its influence would be no danger to the young monarchy. A treaty was concluded in 1832 by Bavaria with the three Powers, by which Otto became "King of Greece" under their guarantee. The new King brought to Greece an entourage of Bavarian officers and civil servants. They did much to organize and strengthen the young kingdom, but the autocratic and bureaucratic character of King Otto's government soon provoked the democratic instincts of his subjects, and led to the bloodless revolution of 1843 and the granting of a constitution to the Greek nation. For 20 years more Otto ruled over Greece without winning the approval, though in many cases he gained the love, of his subjects. A second revolution, in 1862, deposed him, and the protecting Powers were again called on to find a sovereign. Their final choice was Prince William of Denmark, who assumed the Crown under the guarantee of the three Powers that Greece should henceforth be governed "constitutionally." George I., "King of the

Hellenes," as he significantly styled himself, ruled for 50 years over his adopted country, without, indeed, avoiding either internal troubles or military defeats, but his tact and real affection for his people on more than one occasion saved his throne, and enabled him to leave it greatly strengthened to his son Constantine. On more than one occasion during his reign the three Powers showed their interest in the country whose independence they had established. In 1881 they secured the incorporation of Thessaly in the Greek kingdom. In 1897 they intervened to prevent Turkey exploiting to the full her military victories in the field. In 1898 they granted a loan to the almost bankrupt country. In fact, there was hardly a doubt to any thinking Greek that the future of his country was intimately bound up with friendship with the three protecting Powers.

To them also he was bound by sentimental reasons. With Russia he was linked by the tie of the common Orthodox faith. If Russian designs on Constantinople occasionally came athwart the dream of once more recovering Santa Sofia for the Greek world, yet no Greek could forget that Russia had in the past repeatedly championed his Church and his nation against their Turkish oppressors. For England Greek sympathies were still warmer. In spite of occasional disagreements, such as the famous Don Pacifico incident of 1850, and the fear in later years that British sympathies were unreasonably pro-Turk and pro-Bulgar, there was no Greek but felt that British policy towards Greece was animated by the friendliest feelings and the wish to be just. The cession of the Ionian Islands in 1863 was a convincing proof of British Phil-Hellenism. Moreover, the British traditions of Liberalism and demo-



GREECE AND HER NEIGHBOURS.



ELECTION SCENE IN ATHENS.

cratic institutions were widely spread in Greece, largely owing to the considerable Greek colonies in the United Kingdom and the British Empire. Above all, Greece felt with Britain the common bond that both Powers were predominantly interested in overseas trade and the maintenance of the "Open Door" in the Mediterranean. But Greek enthusiasms were still more centred on France. The tradition of the French Revolution, which had largely inspired the Greek War of Independence, lay at the foundation of Greek constitutional movements in the nineteenth century. French culture was both the most widely spread and the most sympathetic to educated Greeks, and the ready help, alike intellectual and financial, which France was always willing to offer was an earnest of the interest which she felt in upholding a strong Greece.

These historical and sentimental reasons were reinforced by strictly practical ones. Greek merchants whose share in the trade of the Turkish Empire was preponderant had no fear of English and French rivals, whereas they had the greatest reason to dread the influx of German-Jewish agents into the Turkish Empire which German political predominance in the Near East would certainly entail. It had long been clear that it was the design

of the Austro-Hungarian Government to force its way through the Balkans to Salonika. The *rapprochement* between Vienna and Sofia, which after 1908 could no longer be denied, meant that the Germanic Empires must *ipso facto* be suspicious of, and suspected by, the Greek nation. Germany as the ally of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, could not look for, and indeed did not look for, the friendship of Greece. The Entente Powers had not only built up the financial foundations of modern Greece; they had also organized her fighting resources. British naval commissions trained Greek sailors and organized the Greek Navy. French military officers turned the Greek Army into the fine fighting machine it proved itself in 1912 to be. Connexions with the Entente Powers every year became closer and more friendly.

After the Treaty of Bukarest Greece's political orientation became still more definite. In the interest of the equilibrium of the Balkan Peninsula Greece, Serbia, and Rumania had united to check the Imperialist ambitions of Bulgaria, goaded as these were by the diplomatic agents of the Ballplatz. The Peace of Bukarest left Greece in close alliance with Serbia and in almost open alliance with Rumania. The conditions of the alliance with

Serbia must be dealt with in another place, but it was a European axiom that Greek and Serbian policy were closely inter-related. The Treaty of Bukarest had not indeed absolutely cleared up the Balkan question, for, though Bulgarian ambitions had for the moment met with a severe reverse, Greek territorial claims, while recognized by the great Powers, had not been fully admitted by the Porte.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia found M. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, whose meteoric career during the past three years had astonished Europe and filled his own countrymen with enthusiasm, at Munich on the way to Brussels, where he was to meet the Grand Vizier and negotiate the solution of the question of the northern Ægean Islands which were in Greek occupation, but to the definite cession of which the Porte hesitated to agree. M. Venizelos had not the faintest hesitation in deciding what the attitude of Greece must be. He telegraphed at once (July



QUEEN SOPHIE.



EVZONES OF THE ROYAL BODYGUARD.

25) to Athens declaring that Greece's honour and interests alike were bound up with the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium as established by the Treaty of Bukarest, and that his "determination was not to remain with hands folded in face of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia." To M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, he replied, in answer to a question, that Greece intended to fulfil her alliance to Serbia by holding her forces ready to ward off any attack on Serbian territory by Bulgaria. This was the most effectual way of helping Serbia in her hour of peril. M. Venizelos went still farther. He hastened to assure the Entente Governments that he was on their side and that Greece would hold her forces ready to put at their disposal if action in the Balkans were contemplated. For the moment the Entente Cabinets neither contemplated nor desired the extension of operations to the Balkan Peninsula, but they took note of M. Venizelos's offer, and provisional arrangements were made for advantage being taken of it should occasion arise.

The attitude of the Greek Government was no secret to the Greek nation, and was almost universally approved. The number of Germanophiles in Greece was so small as to be almost negligible. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, indeed, Dr. Streit, the grandson of one of King Otto's followers, whom M. Venizelos had taken into his Cabinet in order to avail himself of his abilities as an international

lawyer, was discontented with the attitude taken up by his chief. He hardly attempted to disguise his pro-German sympathies. He discussed unashamedly with M. Theotokis, the Greek Minister in Berlin, the advisability of Greece throwing in her lot with the Central Powers and joining in an attack on Serbia.* Finally he took it on himself to submit to King Constantine on September 6 a memorandum opposing war with Turkey (in case the latter joined the Central Powers), without first informing the Prime Minister. For this action

On the outbreak of war the Emperor William implored his brother-in-law not to throw in his lot with the Serbian "assassins" and even to bring Greece into line with the policy of the Central Powers. Constantine was unwilling, or unable, openly to do this. The terms in which his refusal were couched, however, showed the King's standpoint clearly.

"The Emperor knows," he replied to the invitation, "that my personal sympathies and my political opinions draw me towards him. I can never forget that we owe to him Kavala.



GREEK TROOPS AND FRENCH INSTRUCTORS: AN INSPECTION OF KIT.

he had to pay by resignation. A more debatable case was that of his Royal master. King Constantine, though the son of a Danish father and a Russian mother and connected closely by personal sympathies with the Courts of London and Petrograd, had always somewhat identified himself with the policy of the Central Empires. His consort was the German Emperor's sister, and though her influence over the King has almost certainly been exaggerated, she acted as a medium for intercourse between Athens and Potsdam.

* M. Nicholas Theotokis, Greek Minister in Berlin, was the son of the former Greek Prime Minister, who is frequently mentioned in this chapter.

But after mature reflection I cannot see how I can be of service to him by the immediate mobilization of my army while the Mediterranean is at the mercy of the Anglo-French fleets, which would be able to destroy the Greek fleet and mercantile marine, occupy the islands, and prevent the concentration of my army, which, through the lack of railway communication, can only be made by sea. It is for this reason that I believe neutrality is necessary, a neutrality which would, moreover, be useful to Germany."

Three years passed before this reply was published, and Constantine in the meantime was able to lay claim to the gratitude of the

Entente Powers for having refused the German offer. He was diplomatic enough to pretend to strongly Ententophil feeling and watch the course of events. It is certain that in the first few weeks of the war he was not only acquainted



REAR-ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B.,
Head of the British Naval Mission to Greece.

with, but gave his approval to, the policy of his Prime Minister, and he presided over the Cabinet Council which decided that, while Greece should declare her neutrality, it should be a neutrality "benevolent to the Entente," and that the Greco-Serbian treaty should be kept. Whether this were whole-hearted adhesion to the Entente cause or merely acquiescence in the inevitable, fortified by the hope that Greece's intervention would never be required, could *then* only be guessed.

From Brussels M. Venizelos returned to Bukarest, and there a last attempt was made to settle the question pending between the Turkish and Greek Governments. But the bad faith of the Turkish plenipotentiary, Talaat Bey, who was already involved in intrigues for the formation of a coalition against Serbia in the interests of Germany (a coalition suggested to King Constantine through M. Theotokis by the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow), disgusted the Greek Prime Minister, who broke off the conference with the words: "Greece is too small a country to commit so great an infamy."

For the first six months Greece confined her part in the war to maintaining 120,000 men mobilized on the Bulgarian frontier as a warning to Sofia, and allowing the free transit of munitions by way of Salonika to the hard-pressed Serbians. It was this threat which deterred Bulgaria from taking advantage of the advance of General Potiorek's expeditionary force into Serbia and invading Serbian Macedonia. The heroic efforts made by the Serbian army, culminating in their crushing defeat of the invaders in November, 1914, ended the first phase of the Great War in the Balkans.

A new phase opened with the beginning of the year 1915. Turkey's intervention in October (which, unknown to Entente diplomatists, had been decided on in August, 1914), and the unsuccessful Austrian invasion of Serbia had shown that the Balkan Peninsula could not be excluded from the operations of the European war. In November, 1914, the Powers had approached M. Venizelos with a view to Greece's intervention in support of Serbia. Already in August provisional arrangements for intervention had been made with Admiral Kerr, the head of the British Naval Mission to Greece. Telegrams were exchanged between King George and King Constantine. The latter's shifty attitude, however, provoked a disagreement with his Prime Minister, and M. Venizelos was forced to threaten his resignation in order to bring his sovereign to reason. On January 24, 1915, the suggestion of Greek intervention was repeated, this time coupled with promises of "very important territorial concessions" on the Anatolian coast. Though these were not specified, Sir E. Grey assured the Greek Government that "any proposal it made would be favourably received." Entente diplomacy at the moment entertained great hopes of reconstructing the shattered Balkan Alliance of 1912, conciliating Bulgaria by a modification of the territorial arrangements made by the Peace of Bukarest, and further indemnifying both Bulgaria and Greece at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. M. Venizelos was asked on his part to raise no obstacle to the cession of part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, which it was hoped to obtain from the Serbian Government. No direct territorial concessions were asked from Greece.

In the way of reconstructing this Balkan alliance there were, however, serious obstacles,

Serbia resented the attempt to persuade her to pay territorial blackmail to Bulgaria, who had treacherously attacked her in June, 1913, and was on the point of attacking her again in December, 1914, when the Serbian victory suddenly made that impossible. Serbians felt, too, that to cede Macedonia before they were assured of their legitimate territorial aspirations in Austria-Hungary was both unjust and dangerous. Moreover, Bulgarian demands were by no means confined to Serbian territory. Not only Turkish Thrace (which the Entente was free to offer as bait), but part at least of the Rumanian Dobrudja and Greek Macedonia were coveted by Bulgarian politicians. Yet Bulgarian cooperation with the Entente was a *sine qua non* of Greek intervention. Not only would this put the Entente's military preponderance in the Balkans on a sure basis; it would in itself assure, as no mere declaration of neutrality could, the definite detachment of Bulgaria from the Central Empires and lay the first foundations of a future Balkan federation. M. Venizelos was far-seeing enough to be willing to consent to great sacrifices with this end in view. He immediately urged King Constantine to make up his mind to the sacrifice of the three *Kazas* of Drama, Kavala and Sari-

shaban, which Greece had won in 1913, and to withdraw all opposition to the Serbian cession of a part of Macedonia. In return Greece must insist on the realization of the Entente's offer of Anatolian territories—the area suggested by M. Venizelos stretched from the Troad to Cape Phineka and was 60 times in extent the amount of Macedonian territory to be ceded—and on adequate financial support. The Greek populations of the Macedonian districts in question should be transferred to Greece in return for the transference to Bulgaria of Bulgar populations in Greece. Further, adequate strategic protection should be assured Greece by the cession of the Doiran-Ghevveli district. But, above all, the *sine qua non* of the arrangement was Bulgaria's intervention on the side of the Allies.

This last proved impossible to secure. The Allies were slow to realize the painful fact that the Bulgarian Government was primarily influenced neither by democratic nor by idealistic motives, but by more practical considerations. The belief in German efficiency and German military prowess had firmer roots in the minds of Bulgarian politicians than the idealists of London and Paris and the Slavophiles of Petrograd understood. On July 25, 1914, M.



KING CONSTANTINE AND HIS STAFF.

Theotokis had already "gathered the impression from speaking with von Jagow that Austria must have concluded an agreement with Bulgaria with regard to common action." Bulgarians already appreciated the advantage of military and economic cooperation with "Central Europe" in which they would form an essential link. Macedonia, the Morava valley (linking them territorially with Austria-Hungary) and the Dobrudja they desired not only in themselves but as a means to reviving their tenth-century hegemony of the

of the Dardanelles. The importance of Greek cooperation—naval, military and economic—became increasingly evident. The British and French Governments once more began their overtures to M. Venizelos, again assuring him that Greek claims to Anatolian territory would be recognized in return for Greece's military cooperation. The extent of this cooperation was to be limited to the employment of the Greek fleet and one division (at first Venizelos had suggested one army corps). At that stage of operations even this relatively



TORPEDO BOATS AT PIRÆUS.

Balkan peninsula. It was little use, in their eyes, to receive parts of Macedonia, Thrace and Dobrudja, if by the same settlement of Europe Yugoslav and Rumanian unity should be realized and Bulgaria thereby be confronted with neighbours of greatly superior area and population. Accordingly, while the Bulgarian Government and its willing or unconscious tools, the so-called Russophil parties, encouraged the Entente Powers in their negotiations, that same Government pushed on the conclusion of a considerable loan in Berlin and Vienna. In spite of this startling fact the Russian Government and its Allies continued their blind trust in Bulgarian protestations of friendship. M. Venizelos did not share their delusion. He abandoned his proposals and envisaged a new situation.

A new opportunity for action soon presented itself. In February the Franco-British naval forces began their attempt to force the passage

small assistance would have been valuable. Its moral importance would have been still greater. Venizelos's proposed action resembled that of Cavour during the Crimean War. It would have assured Greece henceforth of a worthy place in the councils of the Allies. At two Crown Councils on March 3 and 5—at which not only Cabinet Ministers but ex-Prime Ministers were present—M. Venizelos strongly advocated intervention on these terms. He reinforced his arguments there by two memoranda he laid before the King, showing in a masterly fashion that an occasion never to be repeated offered itself to Greece. The King seemed to waver. It is doubtful if Russia's veto on the advance of Greek troops on Constantinople in any way affected his decision. What weighed more with him was the strong dissent of the Greek General Staff—at the head of which were General Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxás—from M. Venizelos's plan. They

denied the possibility of forcing the Dardanelles on the plan attempted by the Allies, and declared that only if three Greek divisions were landed at the Gulf of Saros was the operation feasible. But these three divisions they refused to spare from the Bulgarian frontier. Whether or not their advice was given in good



M. RALLIS,
Prime Minister in 1897, 1901-3, and 1909.

faith it is hard to say. King Constantine supported their point of view, and the King and Prime Minister found themselves at a deadlock. On March 6 M. Venizelos resigned. As he afterwards explained, strongly as he disagreed with the King he felt that the latter was in a sense within his rights in deciding on an appeal to the people. The Chamber had been elected in 1912 and its support of Venizelos might perhaps not reflect the real mind of the people either in Old or in New Greece which was hitherto unrepresented. For the moment M. Venizelos retired from public life. He left the Liberal Party in the hands of the ex-Prime Minister Rallis and departed on a tour through Egypt and the Ægean islands.

The veteran Germanophil ex-Premier Theotokis having refused office, the King called to power M. Gounaris, who had some years before been a Minister, and colleague then of M. Theotokis himself, and was an astute and ambitious party politician (from Patras). Gounaris was primarily neither Ententophil nor Germanophil: he had an intense envy of Venizelos and was frankly "on the make." He was careful to include in his Government as Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Zographos, who, during the Albanian crisis, had inspired and presided over the provisional

Greek Government of Northern Epirus. M. Zographos on March 13 telegraphed to Nish that "Greece was always firmly attached to the treaty of alliance with Serbia." Further, the new Cabinet hastened to assure the Entente Powers of its intention to continue the policy adopted by Greece since the outbreak of war, and on April 14 (probably on M. Zographos's initiative) actually proposed intervention. In return for a definite assurance that the Powers would respect and guarantee Greek territorial integrity during and for some years after the war and would define and guarantee Greece's territorial compensations in Asia Minor, M. Gounaris and his colleagues expressed their



M. GOUNARIS,
Prime Minister in 1915.

readiness to embark on military operations in cooperation with the Entente. Their plan, however, drawn up by the Greek General Staff, envisaged an attack on Turkey by land through Thrace. Bulgaria was to be confronted with the choice—either cooperation or benevolent neutrality, or else to be treated as an enemy. It is impossible to say if M. Gounaris made this offer in good faith. It is true that his demands were largely justified by the true state of the situation. Only summary measures could snatch Bulgaria from the embrace of the Central



ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION OF M. VENIZELOS IN CAIRO.

Powers. The promise to maintain Greece's territorial integrity was a necessary guarantee for Greece against her abandonment in the future and exposure to the resentment of the Central Powers. It might have been well if Entente diplomacy had not given as brusque a refusal as it did to M. Gounaris's overtures. London, Paris, and especially Petrograd, however, were still living in the dreamland of reviving the Balkan League by persuasion, and the conciliation of Bulgaria was a necessary part of their plan. With this object in view they

felt bound to refrain from tying their hands by any such promise to Greece, as they thought it possible that in the future Greece might be induced to cede part of Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. Moreover, the thoughts of the Entente diplomatists were now turning more towards Italy, and the hope of securing Italian intervention minimized in their minds the value they had attached to Greek assistance. This being the case, they repulsed M. Gounaris's overtures. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that these overtures were made in good faith. The Greek King and Government were perfectly aware of the views of the Entente Powers and had, therefore, no reason to suppose that their offer would be accepted or that the Entente would take the risk of forcing Bulgaria, whom it believed it could gain, into the hands of the enemy by serving an ultimatum on her such as M. Gounaris favoured. The Greek Government may well have wished to secure themselves from future criticisms on the part of the Protecting Powers by pointing to the fact that they had once offered to intervene, even though their hope of securing the terms they proposed must have been a very frail one.

M. Gounaris was politician enough to be either Ententist or anti-Ententist as served his purpose. Failing, however, to secure the favour of the Entente, which continued to believe in M. Venizelos, he necessarily transferred his affections to the enemy camp. He did not venture to do so openly, for Greek opinion was still overwhelmingly on the side of the Entente, and,



BARON SCHENCK,
Head of the German Propaganda in Greece.

with one or two trifling exceptions, the newspapers continued to support the Entente cause. It was necessary to find some other election cry than the issue of "Germany or the Entente." M. Gounaris hit on the happy idea of declaring that he was as much an interventionist as M. Venizelos, but that he wanted intervention "on fixed terms" such as would secure the future position of Greece, whereas M. Venizelos had "blindly" put Greece at the disposal of the Entente Powers. It was on this basis that the anti-Venizelist politicians went to work in their electioneering campaign to build up a strong rival party to the Liberal. The agents of the German propaganda, headed by the astute Baron Schenck, took advantage of the atmosphere thus created to turn the popular current against intervention. Karl Freiherr Schenck zu Schweinsberg, who had formerly been Krupp's agent in the Balkan Peninsula, had since the beginning of the war turned his attention to the distribution of propaganda news to the Greek Press. He now found a better reception than he had enjoyed hitherto. For party purposes, Greek journalists put themselves at his disposal and lent the columns of their papers to articles which insidiously sought to discredit the good faith and material strength of the

Entente Powers. A strong anti-Ententist atmosphere was thereby created, and this was further helped by two events which occurred about the same time.

King Constantine fell ill, and it was feared that his life was in danger. The anti-Venizelist politicians took advantage of this to awake the sympathies of the people for their "martyr-King," who had been seditiously opposed, and indeed "betrayed," by Venizelos. They put the issue before the electors that he who voted for Venizelos was voting against the King, and thereby drew to support of their cause a large number of simple-minded persons who strongly believed in the Divine Right of their Sovereign. The announcement that King Constantine had recovered largely owing to the bringing of the miraculous *ikon* of the Madonna of Tinos further enhanced his reputation with the people, for it was felt that this Sovereign, who bore the sacred name of the founder and of the last monarch of Constantinople, was indeed under the special favour and protection of Heaven.

On May 23 Italy intervened in the war. Though this to all impartial students of international politics enormously strengthened the Entente's prospects, it was exploited in quite another sense by the anti-Venizelist press.



THE PROCESSION OF THE MIRACULOUS IKON.

During the last three years Italy had lost in Greece the popularity she had once enjoyed. For a long time Italians and Greeks had regarded themselves as sister peoples; Italian volunteers had fought by the side of Greeks in the Greek War of Independence and the Turkish War of 1897. So late as 1908 an Italian scholar could dedicate a book on Greece



THE PARLIAMENT HOUSE, ATHENS.

to "Grecia irredenta." But the occupation of the Dodekanese in 1911 and Italy's hardly disguised intention of remaining there had estranged Greek feeling. Further, Italy had shown herself a most determined opponent of the occupation by Greece of Northern Epirus, the population of which, though largely Albanian by race, is orthodox by religion and, in the main, Greek by education and sympathy. Italian designs on the Ionian Islands were feared, and Greeks were afraid that the Entente Powers, whose victory was not yet in doubt, might now be inclined to favour Italian claims at the expense of Greek. M. Venizelos's solution for this was Greek intervention. The conclusion drawn by the anti-Venizelist press was "distrust of the Protecting Powers who are now allies of Italy."

Partisan feeling also played a considerable part in the electoral campaign. Till the advent of M. Venizelos to power in 1910 politics in Greece had been largely a question of local influence. The old clan feeling still survived strongly in the Peloponnesus; in Athens all

politicians, though mutually jealous of one another, united to oppose the newcomer who had displaced them and thrown them into the shade. While they had no national programme to oppose to his, they could rely on the support of all the place-hunters and party-politicians of the country. As we have seen, they exploited the King's popularity and his illness. Further, they went out of their way to gain important sections of the population by local promises. For instance, in Macedonia, where the population was still largely Turkish in the country and Jewish in Salonika, M. Gounaris and his supporters succeeded in winning the whole non-Greek vote by promising to Turkish landholders that their properties, which had been temporarily confiscated as a reprisal against the expropriation of Greeks in Turkey, would be returned to them. Even the Greeks of Macedonia were largely won to the anti-Venizelist cause by the gross misrepresentation of Venizelos's original proposal that under certain conditions Kavala should be handed over to Bulgaria. A lively electoral campaign was therefore waged, and the result was not as satisfactory to Venizelos as it might have been had the issue between the two parties been a clear one.

The elections took place on June 13, 1915; the result was a Venizelist victory, but not by the majority Venizelos had hoped for. Out of the 316 deputies elected, 180 were returned as Liberals, 4 as Zaimists, and 4 as Independent Venizelists. As against these 188 there was a strong anti-Venizelist minority of 128, of whom 89 declared themselves Gounarists. The ex-Premiers, Theotokis and Rallis, could only muster small parties of 13 and 6 deputies respectively. The ordinary conventions of Parliamentary procedure, of course, required that M. Gounaris should at once resign, as he did not command a majority in the Chamber. This, however, he did not do. It was pretended that the King's illness made it impossible for him to take any part in politics for the moment, and it was therefore necessary to let things go on as they were till he had recovered sufficiently to call a new Government to power. It was during the next two months that the fatal change took place in Greece's foreign policy, which was responsible for the troubles and humiliations of the ensuing two years. Constantine, whatever were his previous views—and this, as has been seen, seemed very doubtful—had now made up his mind that he

could not possibly throw in his lot with the Entente Powers. Though he did not yet hate Venizelos, he had begun to fear him, and he shrewdly saw that his return to power and Greece's intervention in the war on the side of the Entente would reduce the King once again to a second place in the country. Venizelos's rivals, on the other hand, were always careful to play on the King's vanity and autocratic instincts to win his favour, and in any case, owing to their lack of root in the country, were bound in the future to look for support to the Crown. Moreover, the international situation had changed. The Russians were in full retreat; little had been accomplished on the Western Front; the Dardanelles expedi-

tine directly, or through the medium of M. Gounaris's Government, came to a clear understanding both with Germany and Bulgaria. (This naturally did not deter M. Gounaris from telegraphing on August 2 to the Greek Legations abroad that "a Bulgarian attack on Serbia could not leave us indifferent.") M. Radoslavoff did not take the fatal plunge of concluding a treaty with Turkey and a military convention with the Central Powers without being well assured that in attacking Serbia he need not fear the hostility of Greece. This was known in Bukarest before the end of July. Unfortunately the Entente Governments continued their policy of amiable negotiation with Bulgaria. In spite of the



ELECTION SCENE IN ATHENS: MOUNTED GENDARME REGULATING THE CROWD AT A POLLING PLACE.

tion had shown itself to be a failure; and Italian intervention had not accomplished what had been expected. Germany was already preparing for her attack on Serbia, and to so well-informed a person as King Constantine Bulgaria's intentions had never been in doubt. There can no longer be any question that during the month of July King Constan-

fact that Bulgaria had made a territorial arrangement with Turkey (published by *The Times*, July 26), in spite of the fact that German officers were continually arriving in Sofia and co-operating with the Bulgarian General Staff, the Entente Powers continued to regard her as a friend whose assistance might yet be won if only Greece and Serbia could be induced to



GREEK INFANTRY IN ATHENS.

cede some of the territory they had won by the Peace of Bukarest.

On August 3 the Entente Governments called on Greece to agree to the cession of Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria, while they renewed their demands to Serbia to agree to the cession of at least a considerable part of Serbian Macedonia. Coming at such a time such an offer was certain to be rejected and would have been rejected as certainly by a Venizelist as it was by the Gounarist Government. Venizelos, as we have seen, had indeed once contemplated the cession of Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria, but he had done so in return for the promise of very great concessions in Asia Minor, concessions which Italy's intervention made no longer practical politics. He had done so again on the express condition that Bulgaria should actively cooperate on the Entente's side in the war, and it was clear now to every Greek that Bulgaria not only would not join the Entente Powers, but would very soon throw in her lot with the enemy. The cession of Kavala could no longer be contemplated by any Greek. Consequently the only result of the Entente Powers' *démarche* was to distress their sympathisers in Greece and play into the

hands of the German propaganda and anti-Venizelist politicians.

The anti-Venizelist *régime* of the last six months had done its work. Distrust of the Entente Powers had been engendered in the minds of many Greeks. Secret assurances had been given to Bulgaria and her Allies that they could rely on Greek neutrality in all eventualities. There was no longer any danger in Venizelos's return to power, and on August 18 the King summoned him to form a Government. M. Venizelos returned with a Parliamentary majority behind him, resolute to carry on his former policy of friendly cooperation with the Entente Powers, but he returned to find an impossible international situation. To his mind the Serbo-Greek treaty was as binding as it ever had been, but from this view his opponents were now beginning openly to dissent. Up to the month of July they had not dared to give expression to their views on the subject, and indeed had indignantly denied that they were prepared to desert Serbia. But early in September they began to hint, and afterwards clearly to state, in their newspapers that the Serbo-Greek treaty could not bind Greece to action against Bulgaria if the latter were

supported by the Central Powers, since its scope was purely a "Balkan" one. Absurd tales that the Germans were concentrating 800,000 men against Serbia were spread to reinforce this view. At the same time anti-Venizelist politicians and journalists disseminated the story that in return for neutrality the Central Powers promised Greece not only a guarantee of her territorial integrity but even concessions in Albania and Macedonia. On his side M. Venizelos had little encouragement from his natural friends the Entente Powers. The only action of the latter was to continue their pressure upon Serbia and Greece to make concessions of territory to Bulgaria, in spite of the fact that the latter's intentions could no longer be in serious doubt.

Under extreme pressure Serbia consented to the sacrifice of a considerable part of Macedonia, but, unaffected by this, on September 23 Bulgaria announced a general mobilization. M. Venizelos made a prompt reply, for the same evening he induced King Constantine to decree a general mobilization of the Greek army. It appeared that the hour of action had come. The Venizelist papers went wild with joy and the majority of the population showed an enthusiasm for war such as only unique moments call forth. Unfortunately the situation was very different from what it appeared to be. The King and his military advisers had totally different views as to the scope of the mobilization from those of M. Venizelos. When the Chamber met on September 29 the Prime Minister laid before it a masterly survey of the military situation and declared in the strongest terms that the mobilization had been decided on because Greece was bound by her alliance with Serbia to support her in the event of Bulgaria's attack. The Opposition, led by Gounaris, ventured for the first time to declare in the Chamber that the Serbian treaty was no longer binding, and that while mobilization might be approved it could only be applied in defence of the vital interests of the nation and not with a view to assistance to Serbia. By the terms of the treaty Serbia or Greece, as the case might be, was bound to place a certain number of troops (Serbia, 150,000; Greece, 90,000) on the Bulgarian frontier to help its partner. It was obvious that Serbia, attacked as she was by overwhelming Austrian and German forces, could not completely meet this obligation, but M. Venizelos had already taken steps to approach the French and British


Ministers in Athens with a question as to whether they would themselves supply the necessary number of men. Having received assurance that this would be done, he could definitely state that the terms of the intervention would be fulfilled, if not by Serbia herself at least by Serbia's Allies.



GREEK INFANTRYMAN IN FIELD KIT.

On October 3 the Entente Governments, at last awaking to the fact that the Bulgarians were about to fall on Serbia, disembarked small contingents at Salonika. M. Venizelos protested, as he was bound to do under Article 99 of the Greek Constitution, for Bulgaria was not at war with Serbia and consequently Greece had as yet not abandoned her neutrality. At

the same time, as he explained to the Chamber on October 4, he could not but regard with favour the help offered by the Entente Powers to Greece's Ally, Serbia. He reiterated his intention of standing by the Serbian treaty,



[Elliott and Fry, Photo.]

SIR FRANCIS ELLIOT, G.C.M.G.,
British Minister in Athens.

and, while he expressed the hope that this would not lead to war between Greece and the Central Powers, he announced his intention of not being deterred by any threat on their part from fulfilling his duty to Serbia. Though lively attacks were made on him by all the Opposition leaders, the Chamber by 147 to 101 votes approved of his policy. But he had not reckoned with his King. Constantine, as has been seen, had made up his mind that it was neither in Greece's nor his own interest to provoke the enmity of Germany. He summoned his Prime Minister and informed him that he could not approve of the character he had given to the general mobilization and to his readiness to enter on hostilities, if necessary, with the Central Powers; consequently, he must demand his resignation. M. Venizelos gave way. Constitutionally he would have had a perfect right to hold out against the King's decision, for the majority of the Chamber, only recently elected, had endorsed his policy; but, as he afterwards explained,

it was impossible for him to persist in his intentions in face of the hostility of the King and of the General Staff. He could not reckon on the army leaders obeying his orders. He had to face the possibility of civil war if he persisted. As a patriot there was no course open to him but to resign and to hope for better days. Unfortunately, the Entente Powers had not strengthened his position by supplying the troops which might have saved Serbia and changed the whole aspect of the military situation in the Balkans. They had relied on Greece's intervention, whereas, in fact, Greece's intervention was dependent on their own attitude.

At this point we may consider the character of the much quoted Greco-Serbian Treaty and the value of the interpretations given it by opposing parties. In a telegram sent to the Serbian Government by M. Zaimis on October 12, 1915, a week after his assumption of office, Greece's refusal to intervene in the war in reply to Bulgaria's intervention is justified on various grounds. The two chief points are:

(1) That the Treaty of Alliance of June 1, 1913, and the Military Convention concluded between the two General Staffs on the same day had a "purely Balkan character in no way demanding the application of the Treaty in the event of a general outbreak of war," and that from Clause I. of the Treaty and the Military Convention it is clear that "the Contracting Powers had only in view the hypothesis of an isolated attack of Bulgaria against one of them."

(2) M. Zaimis urged, as his second reason for non-intervention, that Serbia had herself recognized by her action that there was no *casus federis*; that Bulgaria's intervention in connection with the Central Powers' offensive against Serbia was merely "an episode of the European War"; and that Serbia, by breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and appealing to the Entente Powers, her European Allies, without a preliminary understanding with her Balkan Ally Greece, had under Clause V. of the Military Convention released Greece from the obligation of intervention.

To these arguments of M. Zaimis other anti-Venizelist speakers and writers added as reasons for their attitude that Serbia was unable to supply 150,000 men on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, as she was bound to do under Clause II. of the Military Convention,

and further that she had in May, 1914, refused to assist Greece at the moment when the latter was threatened with war with Turkey.

The last argument was, in fact, not convincing, for an actual state of war did not arise in May, 1914, and in any case it was untrue that Serbia had refused to assist Greece. On the contrary, she had informed Turkey that she could not remain indifferent to war between Turkey and Greece. Nor was the point made by M. Gounaris that Serbia could not fulfil her obligation to supply 150,000 men of any real value. She was prepared to supply 120,000, and, as M. Venizelos pointed out, the remaining 30,000 were being landed by France and Britain at Salonika. M. Zaimis's two arguments referred to above are, however, more important and demand more detailed consideration.

(1) This argument is disposed of by the text of the two Military Conventions and the accompanying telegrams exchanged between M. Koromilas (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) and M. Alexandropoulos (Greek Minister at Belgrade) during May, 1913. Clause I. of the original Convention, signed on May 14, ran:—

In case of war between Greece and Bulgaria, or between Serbia and Bulgaria, or in case of sudden attack of the Bulgarian Army on the Greek or the Serbian Army, the two Powers Greece and Serbia promise to one another mutual military support—Greece with all her land and sea forces, Serbia with all her land forces.

In the final Military Convention, signed on June 1, there is a significant change:—

In case of war between one of the Allied Powers and a third Power breaking out in the circumstances envisaged by the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of sudden attack of considerable forces—two divisions at least—of the Bulgarian Army on the Greek or the Serbian Army, the two Powers, etc.

The meaning of the change is given in a telegram of May 23 from M. Alexandropoulos to M. Koromilas:—

From a military point of view we (Greece) have no interest—this is only in the Serbians' interest—to extend the Treaty of Alliance not only against Bulgaria, but also against a third Power, for the Serbians have land frontiers and more Powers with whom they can clash, when we shall be obliged to support them, while we can only clash by land with Bulgaria, in which case only the co-operation of Serbia would be of use to us.

The second Convention obviously committed Greece to greater obligations than she had at first accepted or was now eager to accept. But the Bulgarian attack on Greek forces at Mt. Pangheon showed that it was "very risky" (M. Koromilas's phrase) to procrastinate. He writes on May 30 to M. Alexandropoulos that M. Venizelos "in agreement with His Majesty" is sending him a telegram to "come to an agreement and sign, if possible, to-day." The Treaty and Convention were, in fact, signed on June 1.

Clause IV. of the final Convention reinforces the obligations incurred under Clause I. :—

If Serbia is placed in the necessity of defending herself against an attack by another Power than Bul-



A GREEK GUARD ON THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER.

garia, she will be obliged to hasten to the help of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, with a number of troops defined by common agreement at the proper moment between the two General Staffs in a manner corresponding to the general situation and taking into consideration the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia.

Similarly :—

if Greece in the case envisaged by Clause I is placed simultaneously in the necessity of defending herself against an attack by another Power than Bulgaria, she will be obliged to hasten to the help of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, with a number of troops, etc.

Clearly then, as M. Pashitch's Government points out on November 15, 1915, in its reply to M. Zaimis's telegram :—

Both the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance, which guarantees the territorial integrity of each of the Contracting Powers in case of attack, and its contents, in which there is no mention of the Treaty ceasing to have its binding force if Bulgaria remains in alliance with some other Power, show in clear and logical fashion that Greece is obliged to come to the help of Serbia, if she without provocation on her part is attacked by Bulgaria or any other Power.

(2) This specious plea of the Zaimis Government is well answered in the Serbian Government's reply of November 15. This points out that the Bulgarian mobilization was so clearly directed against Serbia and constituted such a danger for her existence that Serbia was forced to break off relations in self-defence. "Serbia did not consult Greece with regard to breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria for the very simple reason that she had no choice and that the breaking off or maintaining of these relations did not depend on her. The breaking off of relations was unavoidable on account of the aggressive attitude of Bulgaria. More-

over, we (the Serbian Government) think that Greece, proclaiming without preliminary understanding with Serbia the general mobilization of her army immediately following on the Bulgarian general mobilization, acted in the same way as Serbia." The reply is a convincing one.

But, in fact, the refusal of the anti-Venizelist Governments to come to Serbia's assistance could not be justified by such quibblings, and subsequent revelations showed that the Germanophil party in Greece had from July, 1914, decided to ignore the Serbian Treaty and to join the Central Powers when a suitable occasion offered. The correspondence exchanged during the first few days of the war between Dr. Streit and the Greek Minister in Berlin, M. Theotokis, never touches the Greco-Serbian Treaty and Greece's obligations under it. Theotokis repeatedly sent messages urging the Greek Government to consider Germany's proposal that Greece should join Bulgaria and Turkey in an attack on Serbia. Streit, it is true, did not consider the plan altogether practicable, but he never urged against it the outrageous immorality of it, but looked on it merely as presenting grave dangers to Greece. The famous telegram of King Constantine to the German Emperor takes the same point of view. It was the Allies' Fleet, not the Treaty of Alliance with Serbia, that prevented the Germanophiles of Athens from throwing in their lot with the Central Powers.



THE GREEK MOBILIZATION: TROOPS IN SALONIKA.



A GREEK MOUNTAIN BATTERY.

On October 5 the King summoned to power M. Zaimis, Governor of the National Bank of Athens, and a public man of no partisan leanings, who had on several occasions at critical moments assumed the reins of power to save his country. In M. Zaimis's Cabinet were included four other ex-Prime Ministers: Theotokis, Stephanos Draghounis, Rallis and Gounaris, all of them violent anti-Venizelists. At the same time M. Venizelos felt that at such a critical moment there was no place for mere party politics, so he promised the new Prime Minister that the Venizelist majority in Parliament would provisionally support him so long as he remained true to his declaration that he would maintain a policy of "benevolent neutrality" towards the Entente, and that he did not regard the Serbo-Greek Treaty as annulled, though in his opinion the *casus fœderis* for intervention had not arisen. Of his benevolent intentions M. Zaimis at first gave every sign, for he allowed the Entente Powers to continue to use Salonika and the Vardar railway for the dispatch of troops to the help of Serbia. The Entente Powers still entertained some hopes that Greek intervention might be purchased, and Sir Edward Grey went so far as to offer to Greece in return for her military assistance the Island of Cyprus. But he was too late: the fate of Serbia was already evident. A large section of opinion in Greece had been estranged from the support of the Entente, and the reservists mobilized were learning from their

officers to believe in the invincibility of the German army and the friendliness of German intentions towards Greece.

Matters did not rest there. M. Zaimis had lost the confidence of the Venizelist majority in the Chamber, and, at the same time, he was hardly the man to carry out the systematic Germanization of Greek opinion. A crisis in the Chamber provoked on November 3 by the offensive attitude of M. Yannakitsas (Minister of War) terminated in a vote of want of confidence in the Government, which was carried by the Venizelist majority. M. Venizelos took advantage of this opportunity to denounce the way in which Ministers sheltered themselves behind the Crown. In a masterly speech he laid before the Chamber his own views as to the character and value of the Serbian Treaty, the necessity in the interests of Greece's future of friendly relations with the Entente Powers, and the only obvious course for Greece at the present moment, alike from interest and duty. M. Zaimis felt that such a heated atmosphere was no place for him. He at once resigned, and the King called to power a more apt tool for the policy he was now contemplating. He summoned M. Skouloudis, a rich banker, who had played little part in politics, but had represented Greece at the London Conference. M. Skouloudis's Cabinet was practically identical with that of his predecessor. His advent to power merely meant that all pretence at accom-



ATHENS: THE ACROPOLIS AND (on the left) THE MODERN TOWN.

modation with the Venizelist majority or with Greece's clear duty to Serbia was at an end. The new Ministers looked to the Crown for moral and material protection. They recognized that it was impossible to work with a Liberal majority in the Chamber against them, and on their advice or with their approval the King proceeded to decree the dissolution of the Chamber, to be followed by new elections. Meanwhile, on November 8, M. Skouloudis had the effrontery to assure the Entente Powers of his firm resolution to maintain Greek foreign policy "on the same fundamental basis on which it has rested since the beginning of the European War." On the same day he assured the Serbian Government of his Government's "sincere friendship" for them, and readiness "to furnish every facility and assistance consonant with our vital interests."

This "sincere friendship" was shown in peculiar ways. Though the new Prime Minister had announced his intention of taking up the same attitude as M. Zaimis over the presence of the Allied troops in Salonika, he hastened to raise difficulties as to the prolonged presence of these troops on Greek soil, and hinted that if driven back over the frontier by the Bulgarians they would be disarmed. This threat he subsequently limited to the Serbian forces, and eventually, with a bad grace, he gave way to the demands of the Entente Powers that free liberty of movement should be allowed to all the Allied troops.

The dissolution of the Chamber was at once decreed, and the new elections were fixed for December 19. The Liberal party for some days hesitated as to whether or not they should take part in them, but on November 21 M. Venizelos, at a meeting of the party, laid before them his views on the subject. He showed them that they could not possibly approve of the legality of the proposed elections, which were in defiance of all Constitutional usage, as the Chamber had only been elected six months before, and there was no reason whatsoever to suppose that it was out of touch with the country. The King had no right to proceed to these new elections merely to suit his own personal whim. Moreover, the elections could be no fair test of the feeling in the country, as between a third and a half of the electors were mobilized and with the colours, and their vote would be unduly influenced or hampered by their military superiors for the advantage of the latter's personal policy. M. Venizelos's advice was complete abstention. His party accepted his decision, and appealed to the electors not to go to the polls. His policy at the time was criticized as a mistake, for it deprived him of any voice in the new Chamber. Subsequent events, however, showed that he was perfectly right, and that, by thinking not of temporary advantages but of unchanged principles, he, in the long run, made his position stronger and unexceptionable.

The result of the election was, in a negative sense, entirely satisfactory to the Liberal leader. Instead of the 720,000 voters who had gone to the poll on June 13, not much over 230,000 on this occasion recorded their votes. In Athens, for instance, only 7,000 voted out of 30,000, in Salonika only 4,000 out of 38,000, and in the Ægean Islands even a smaller proportion.

In the Peloponnese anti-Venizelist currents were stronger. As we have seen, the more countrified parts of Greece had preserved the tradition of strong local feeling; their prominent local politicians were moved by intense jealousy of Venizelos and jumped at the chance of reviving their old political influence. A glance through the names of the candidates returned



THE GREEK ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER 1915: A JEWISH VOTER AT THE MOSQUE OF ST. SOPHIA, IN SALONIKA.

to power shows those of such historic families as Mavromikalis, Koumoundouros, Miaoulis, Trikoupis and many more. All the members of the Government were returned to power. M. Skouloudis himself was not a deputy, but he remained in office. The strongest force in the Government was now M. Gounaris, though he was wise enough not to assume the Premiership and thereby incur the enmity of all his rivals with whom he was united only by the common bond of anti-Venizelism. He remained the most active and most dangerous element in the Cabinet, especially as M. Theotokis, whose

to Greece became as common as they had previously been rare. The Bulgarian occupation of Monastir indeed had aroused some indignation even in anti-Venizelist circles, but the Government soon came to a working arrangement with the Bulgarian authorities by which a neutral zone between the two armies eliminated any danger of "incidents." To the Allied armies of occupation they were increasingly disagreeable.* Subsequent events show that already in March the Greek Government was negotiating with those of Germany and Bulgaria with a view to the occupation of Fort



MEN OF THE REORGANIZED SERBIAN ARMY AT CORFU.

prestige alone could have jeopardized Gounaris's position, died on January 5.

The new Chamber, therefore, which met on January 24, 1916, was practically a Gounarist Chamber. The only other party which could make any pretence to a programme was that formed by M. Ioannis Draghoumis (son of the Minister) and M. Karapanos. Their declared policy was to prepare for intervention, but only when purely Greek interests advised this, and they were as intensely anti-Venizelist as the rest of the deputies.

The "most sincere friendliness" promised by the Skouloudis Government to the Entente began at once to assume strange forms. The King remained in close telegraphic touch with the enemy Courts, and German propaganda was soon in full swing among the troops, the newspaper offices and the country as a whole. Eulogies of German prowess and friendliness

Rupel, the impregnable stronghold that held the entrance of the Struma Valley. In evident connection with these negotiations the Government contracted two loans, each of 40,000,000 marks, with the German Government in January and April respectively. Ostensibly, however, their anti-Entente policy was confined to objections to the military actions of the Allies and to an unwillingness to help them in any way. In April the Greek Government displayed the greatest unwillingness to agree to the passage of Serbian troops from Corfu, where they had been brought by the Allied Powers, through Greece to Salonika, although, as M. Venizelos showed, no possible harm could be caused to the country by this passage. Finally these troops were brought through the Corinth Canal, but it was clear that the Govern-


* Some account of the friction caused by their actions at Salonika has been given in Chapter CLXXXI.

ment, which had shown such hostility to the Entente and to Serbia on this point, could no longer be considered to be in any sense of the word whatsoever an Ally of Serbia, nor could much meaning any longer be attached to the phrase "benevolent neutrality." Moreover, anti-Entente feeling in anti-Venizelist circles was perfectly undeniable. The language of Deputies and even Ministers in the Chamber was most unfriendly. The tone of the press became gradually more extreme and the pro-German intrigues carried on in the army and by prominent civilian officials soon showed that the Government of Athens was practically, if not in name, the enemy of the Entente Powers.

Venizelos did not remain inactive in face of this difficult situation. As he was unrepresented in the Chamber he and his party had to make their voice heard through other means. On March 18 they began the publication of a new weekly paper, the *Kirix* ("Herald"), in which, during the next six months, M. Venizelos expounded the principles of his policy and showed in a most lucid fashion the dangers in which the present Government was involving Greece. A month later the Venizelist party began its campaign in the country by holding two public meetings in Athens and Piræus. The enthusiasm called forth on these occasions made the Government anxious and subsequent Venizelist meetings were broken up. Soon, however, Venizelos put the issue between himself and his opponents to the test by putting up a candidate at the by-election in Chios. The Government did not dare to oppose him, and he was elected practically unanimously. Six days later, on May 7, Venizelos himself stood for election in Mytilene and secured 14,768 out of 15,253 votes recorded. A day or so later he won a still more significant success at Drama. In spite of the fact that the population of this district was largely non-Greek and that the Government had excellent means for rousing anti-Venizelist feeling by bribing the Turkish population and reminding the Greeks of Venizelos's readiness to cede Kavala, the Venizelist candidate was elected in a three-cornered fight, Kavala town voting almost solidly Venizelist.

The Venizelist Press concentrated its attacks on the useless continuation of the mobilization, showing that the Government was not keeping the soldiers with the colours for the object of defending the country, but in order to keep them under their control and to affect their

political opinions. Venizelos therefore demanded that 12 classes should be demobilized and their places taken by new contingents. Not only was the *moral* of the army suffering from inactivity and political intrigue, but the



CORINTH CANAL.

country was being subjected to useless expenditure. The Government, however, had not the least intention of abandoning their best party weapon—the control of the army. The party intrigues among officers gathered in strength and in scope. At the end of April anti-Venizelist papers were already hinting at the formation of a military league in defence of the Crown. Though the Government ostensibly frowned on this, the first seeds of the famous Reservists' Leagues were being sown.

It is obvious that such an army was little use in defence of the country. On May 26 a force of Bulgarians, with a sprinkling of Germans, suddenly presented themselves before Fort Rupel, which Venizelos in 1913 had secured for Greece as a necessary defence of the Struma Valley. A few shots were fired, and then the Greek Commandant asked for an armistice in order to telegraph to Athens. In consequence of the instructions he received the fortress was surrendered and the Greek troops retired. In the Chamber M. Skouloudis represented the incident as an entirely unforeseen one, and declared that the surrender was inevitable in order that Greek neutrality should be maintained. Documents published, however, some months later by the *Patris* showed beyond a doubt that the surrender had, in fact, been considered two months before, and that the intentions of the enemy armies were known to and approved

by the Government of Athens. On May 23 the German and Bulgarian Ministers in Athens had definitely informed M. Skouloudis of the intended invasion. It was obvious that such an action could not but rouse Greek feeling of all parties, and even many of the anti-Venizelists, especially the Macedonians of the group led by I. Draghoumis, protested vehemently in the Chamber against what had happened. General Sarrail, in command of the Allied forces, whose flank was now seriously threatened, found it necessary to proclaim martial law in the zone of occupation, and the Greek Prime Minister sought to deflect attention from the affair of Rupel by insisting on Sarrail's infringement of Greek neutrality.

The relations between Athens and the Entente Powers, however, were now becoming impossible. The latter felt that they could not rely on being safe from attack by the Greek armies in Macedonia when the commanders of the latter were on friendly relations with the Germans and Bulgarians. Similar anti-Entente feeling was expressed by demonstrations in Athens on June 12 when the French and British Legations were assailed by the mob. Prompt action was necessary. A Franco-British naval squadron moved up to

Salamis, and it was rumoured that troops were to be disembarked. On June 21 the Protecting Powers served an ultimatum on the Greek Government. They pointed out in it the Government's connivance at the occupation of Rupel, and its suspicious attitude towards the Entente Powers. Moreover, the Greek Constitution had been trodden underfoot, and thereby the engagements of 1863 had been broken. The Powers, therefore, demanded :

(1) Complete demobilization of the Greek army, and its reduction to a peace footing as soon as possible.

(2) The Ministry's replacement by a Service Cabinet with no political character, and guaranteeing the loyal application of the friendly neutrality Greece had promised to the Entente Powers.

(3) The immediate dissolution of the Chamber, to be followed by new elections as soon as the Constitution allowed and as soon as the general demobilization had restored normal conditions.

(4) The dismissal of various police officials (especially the ultra-Royalist Prefect of Police, Krisopathis) who had encouraged outrages on peaceable citizens and insulting attacks on the Allied Legations.



WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK TROOPS FROM SALONIKA, DECEMBER 1915.



EMBARCATION OF THE GREEK TROOPS AT SALONIKA.

M. Gounaris is alleged to have counselled resistance, but the King, whether or not on the advice of Berlin, decided to bow before the storm. The Government at once resigned, and M. Zaimis was recalled to power—the King's invariable resource when relations with the Entente Powers became too difficult. On June 23 he accepted the ultimatum in its entirety, and six days later a decree of general demobilization was issued. Some of the worst police officials were retired, and there was a lot of talk about the dissolution of the Chamber and the holding of new elections. Unfortunately, however, the inevitable delay required for the demobilization of the army was taken advantage of as an excuse to postpone the dissolution of the Chamber, which, according to the Greek Constitution, must be followed by a general election within six weeks.

M. Zaimis may honestly have tried to carry out the engagements he had taken towards the Entente Powers, but the situation was beyond his power to control. Reservists returning from Macedonia came back more Royalist than the King: they had learnt from their officers that the Germans were invincible, and that the only policy for Greece was friendship with the Central Powers. Moreover, their wearisome inactivity for nine months on the frontier had demoralized them,

and they were told that the mobilization had been due to Venizelos. They dispersed to their homes to create Reservists' Leagues there, the avowed object of which was the defence of the King, and their main aim to prevent the triumph of Venizelos's policy.

There was worse to come. On August 17 the enemy armies, anxious to anticipate Rumania's intervention, suddenly invaded Greece in three groups. On the west they forced back the French and Serbians and occupied Florina, from which, however, they were soon ejected. To the east of the Struma they had against them only Greek troops, and those troops had been demoralized by anti-Venizelos propaganda. Seres was handed over by the orders of General Bairas, and almost everywhere the Greek armies withdrew without fighting.

To this ignoble attitude there were, however, two exceptions. The commander of Fort Phea Petra, Major Kondilis, lost his life in defence of his post. At Seres Colonel Kristodhoulou and a considerable portion of the 6th Division put up a stout fight before retiring. The Bulgarian armies advanced through Eastern Macedonia and were soon in front of Kavala. On September 12, 1916, this seaport, which had been the symbol to Greece of her victory in the second Balkan War and of the Peace of Buka-



KAVALA.

rest, was handed over to the invaders by Colonel Katzopoulos, who capitulated together with a large part of the division under his command. Colonel Kristodhoulou and some 2,000 men with him preferred to make their escape and join the Allied forces at Salonika.

By this means the Athens Government had hoped to render the elections impossible and thereby to keep in existence the Party Chamber elected in the previous December. They also hoped to embarrass the operations of the Entente Powers and force them to withdraw their troops from Salonika. The indignation in Greece was intense. To conciliate the Powers the Government temporarily replaced the Chief of the General Staff, General Dousmanis, who was known as the most pro-German of the pro-German military clique which was really governing the country. His unscrupulous assistant, Metaxas, was also retired.

On August 27 there was a great demonstration in Athens of protest against the Government's surrender of Macedonia. M. Venizelos made a last appeal to the King to dismiss his evil counsellors and put himself at the head of the nation in defence of the national territory. Constantine refused even to receive the deputation which wished to lay this appeal before him. It was the last chance to preserve the unity of the nation. Three days later Lieutenant Tsakonias, at the head of a body of Cretan *gendarmes*, marched to the barracks

of the 11th Division in Salonika and called on them to join a movement for national defence. The majority agreed and Colonel P. Zimvrakakis put himself at the head of the movement. A "Committee of National Defence" was elected and an appeal issued for volunteers.

Meanwhile in Athens the situation became still more tense. On September 1 a strong Franco-British squadron under Admiral Dartige du Fournet anchored off Salamis. On the following day the Powers demanded from the Greek Government the control of posts and telegraphs and the expulsion of enemy agents. Both demands were accepted and a number of the most dangerous German agents were expelled. The Reservists' Leagues, however, organized demonstrations of protest and once again the French Legation in Athens was attacked by the mob. M. Zaimis found it impossible to cope with these Reservists' Leagues, whose activities were encouraged by the military party and the King himself. On September 12 he resigned. The King was puzzled as to a successor: M. Gounaris and his other colleagues of the Skouloudis Government were definitely barred by the Entente Governments. It was necessary, therefore, to find some more colourless person and the King approached M. Dimitrakopoulos, an anti-Venizelist and leader of a small Independent party of Arcadian deputies. M. Dimitrakopoulos coveted power, but found himself unable

to form any Government which could establish relations with the Entente Powers.

On September 16 the King called on M. Kaloyeropoulos, a follower of the late M. Pheotakis, to form a Government. The new Ministry, in which the most important person was M. Karapanos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), consisted mainly of more or less independent anti-Venizelist deputies. It assumed an attitude of apparent friendliness to the Entente Powers and even proposed, under impossible conditions; eventual intervention, which Rumania's recent declaration of war had again made an urgent question.* There was, however, considerable doubt as to whether these

relied on their blind devotion to his person. The die was cast, and it was impossible for Venizelos any longer to consider reconciliation with his King. On September 25 he left by night for Crete, accompanied by Admiral Koundouriotis, Greece's most brilliant sailor and a striking public figure, who had indeed been a member of the Skouloudis Government, but whose sympathies were entirely with the movement of National Defence. On September 27 they published a proclamation to the Greek people declaring that their action was the only way of saving the country and that they had been driven to it by the refusal of the Greek Government to protect the national territories.



EXPULSION OF "UNDESIRABLES" FROM ATHENS.

overtures were made in good faith, and the Entente Governments could not acknowledge the new Ministry, since it was of a political character, and so formed in contravention of the terms of the ultimatum of June 21.

The King's reply to the last appeal of M. Venizelos on August 27 was made on September 20. He harangued 5,000 soldiers of the Army Corps stationed in Athens, congratulated them on their "loyalty," and told them that he

* Only the Minister of the Interior (Loukas Rouplo) —formerly a Venizelist but latterly a violent Entente-phobe—was said to have declared himself categorically against any intervention whatever.

M. Venizelos once again offered the King a last chance of putting himself at the head of the movement, but he warned him if he failed to do so that they would act henceforth without him. From Crete Venizelos and Koundouriotis passed to the other Ægean Islands, and everywhere they set up representatives of the new Provisional Government. Finally they took up their headquarters at Salonika, where they were joined by General Danglis. On October 18 a Cabinet of National Defence was formed by M. Repoulis, responsible to the new triumvirate, Venizelos, Koundouriotis and Danglis.

It was practically a declaration of revolt, a *pronunciamiento* issued by the leaders who really represented the best aspirations of the nation, against the autocratic and self-seeking régime imposed on it by the course of events. M. Venizelos and his companions were, however, forced to go slowly. They had to be careful to give no ground for the unjustifiable accusation brought against them by the lackey press of Athens that they were "traitors" who had "divided the nation." They avoided any declaration of an anti-dynastic character and frankly and truthfully declared that they had

On October 4 M. Kaloyeropouos, stating this as his reason for abandoning power, gave in his resignation to the King. The latter called to office Professor Spiridhon Lambros, of the University of Athens, a distinguished savant who had won a reputation as a writer on Byzantine and other historical questions, but had not hitherto played any part whatever in politics nor was, for example, a deputy. On October 8 Professor Lambros announced the formation of his Cabinet: two of his new colleagues were, like himself, professors; the rest were civil servants, and the only man of any note among



A VENIZELIST DEMONSTRATION IN CRETE.

gone to Salonika in order to put themselves at the head of the movement of National Defence, and that, as the Athens Government refused to protect Greek territories and Greek interests, patriotic Greeks had to take upon themselves the protection of those interests and organize a fighting force in order, with the aid of Greece's age-long friends the Entente Powers, to expel from Greek soil the hereditary foe.

The die was cast. King Constantine, for his part, no longer felt the need for any half-measures or pretence of a wish to intervene on the side of the Entente Powers. There was nothing to be gained by keeping M. Kaloyeropouos in power, for there was no longer any question of Greek intervention. Moreover, the Kaloyeropouos Government did not answer the Powers' requirement of a "Service Cabinet" and failed to secure any recognition from them.

them was the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Zakoostas, formerly Greek Minister at Belgrade. The Greek press of both parties united for a moment to ridicule this "Ministry of Professors" and its chief.

Professor Lambros was, however, to prove himself a very dangerous enemy of the Entente. Seven months later, immediately after his resignation, he unblushingly informed the Germanophil paper *Akropolis* that he took pride in having bluffed and outwitted the Powers. For the moment, however, he and his Government were looked on by Entente diplomatists as so colourless as not to be dangerous. They fulfilled the requirement of a strictly Service Cabinet which had been made, and accordingly on October 10 the Powers accorded their recognition to the new Government and resumed normal relations. This

recognition was accompanied, however, by very exacting demands. Admiral Dartige du Fournet's Note of September 2 had failed to obtain for the Powers the necessary securities they demanded. On October 3, just before the resignation of the Kaloyeropoulos Government, the Admiral, on the authorization of the Entente Ministers at Athens, sent the Greek Government another Note granting them a certain amount of time to hand over to the Allies and expel from Greece certain agents of the German propaganda who were still active in Athens. To this the Kaloyeropoulos Government had replied in a semi-official Note that of these German agents in question some had already been arrested and others, being Greek subjects, could not be arrested or expelled. It was perfectly willing to expel any Germans who were still in Greece.

In reply the Admiral sent a complementary note demanding:

(1) The execution of the Government's promises with regard to the replacement of certain *gendarmarie* officers.

(2) The adoption of immediate and effective measures against the Reservists' Leagues.

(3) The withdrawal of certain officers from the Athens garrison.

(4) The retirement of certain police and *gendarmarie* officials belonging to the notorious anti-Venizelist Corps of Public Safety.

(5) The punishment of police officials who had condoned the attacks on the French Legation.

Five days' grace was allowed the Government to give satisfaction on these points, but before they had expired M. Kaloyeropoulos had been succeeded by Professor Lambros. Before leaving office, however, M. Kaloyeropoulos ordered the arrest of a few of the most notorious German agents; but it was left to the new Government to attempt to satisfy the Entente Powers. The latter were especially disquieted by the suspicious behaviour of the Greek naval and military authorities. The former, at the head of which was Admiral Dousmanis (brother of the notorious Chief of the General Staff), had been carrying out in the Navy a purge of the



M. VENIZELOS (in centre) ADMIRAL KOUNDOURIOTIS and GENERAL DANGLIS.



LANDING OF M. VENIZELOS AND ADMIRAL KOUNDOURIOTIS AT SALONIKA.

Venizelist elements likely to remain faithful to Admiral Koundouriotis. The behaviour of the military authorities seemed still more unfriendly. In spite of the promises that had been made, Greek troops and guns were being sent into Thessaly, and instead of proceeding effectively with the demobilization which had been promised the Athens Government was calling to the colours another 40,000 recruits. The language of the anti-Venizelist press towards the Entente Powers became daily more insulting.

In a further Note which he presented on the evening of October 10 Admiral Dartige du Fournet informed the Greek Government that for the security of the Allied forces he had determined to take over the control of the railway to Larissa, to disarm the Greek warships Averov, Kilkis and Limnos, to take possession of the smaller ships of the Greek Navy, and to occupy and disarm the batteries round Piræus and Salamis. Before this categorical demand the new Government gave way, explaining that it yielded to *force majeure*, and the Admiral carried out his intentions step by step.

The anti-Venizelist press was not slow to greet as champions of the nation the Greek sailors from the requisitioned warships who retired to Athens. To make assurance doubly sure the French Admiral on October 13 further demanded that no Greek citizens should be allowed to carry arms, and that the requisition of all the Thessalian corn for the army should stop.

Though the Lambros Government hastened to agree to every demand that was made on it, it sought by underhand means to prevent their execution. Troops and material of war still passed secretly into Thessaly. On October 18 King Constantine reviewed the sailors from the requisitioned warships and congratulated them on their fervent loyalty, and yet at the same time he maintained a pose of friendliness towards the Entente and sought to continue good personal relations with its diplomatic representatives. To some extent he succeeded, for in Entente countries there was a strong wish to remain on friendly relations, if possible, with the Government of Athens, and this wish was father to the thought that in course of time it would be possible to reconcile M. Venizelos with his King.

A striking example of this point of view was given by the decision of the Conference of Boulogne held on October 20 by representatives of the British and French Governments. The two Powers, indeed, gratefully recognized the assistance that the movement of National Defence could afford them in their Macedonian campaign. They promised to finance the Venizelist army and to advance it the sum of 10 million francs, but they promptly damped the hopes of M. Venizelos's supporters that the Salonika Government would be acknowledged as a Government *de jure* on an equal or superior footing to the Government of Athens; instead they recognized it merely as a *de facto* Government in such parts of Macedonia and the Islands as had already acknowledged

its authority. In spite of the Venizelists' hopes there would seem to be little to quibble at in this policy, for obviously the Allied Governments would feel scruples as to imposing on Greece a Government for which it had not declared. But unfortunately the recognition of the Provisional Government's *de facto* authority in Macedonia was supplemented by the insistence that its rule should not be extended to other parts of Greece. This was the prime cause of the dissatisfaction of the Venizelists with the arrangement which had been made. It was, in fact, a compromise, for the Allies insisted that King Constantine should withdraw from Thessaly the Greek troops which were still there, leaving only a small minimum necessary for the policing of the province. But, even had the Athens Government loyally carried out this condition, the Venizelists would have continued to feel aggrieved. Thessaly stood on a different footing from most provinces of continental Greece. It was still a country of large landed proprietors and peasant tenants; M. Venizelos had promised to undertake agrarian reforms, and for that reason the bulk of the population in Thessaly was strongly on his side. While

the Government could rely on the support of the landholders, Venizelists had no doubt that, if the Thessalians were allowed to choose for themselves, they would by an overwhelming majority, as the election of June 13, 1915, had shown, declare in favour of the movement of National Defence. They therefore resented the restriction imposed on them not to extend their rule to Thessaly. The Athens Government, on the other hand, gave as its reason for delaying the withdrawal of all its troops from Thessaly that there were agrarian disturbances there and that, in the interests of public order, it was necessary to keep troops in the province.

On November 4 matters reached a head. At the frontier town of Ekaterini there was a fight between the Royalist and Venizelist troops which resulted in some loss of life and still more embittered feeling between the two factions. The Protecting Powers thereupon took it upon themselves to insist on the establishment of a neutral zone between the two administrations, and Thessaly was thereby permanently debarred from showing its sympathy with the Venizelist movement.

The Powers continued, indeed, to be hopeful that the re-establishment of friendly rela-



RECEPTION OF M. VENIZELOS IN SALONIKA; GENERAL ZIMVRAKAKIS' SPEECH OF WELCOME.

tions with the Athens Government was still possible. In spite of the ultimatum of June 21, they allowed the illegal Chamber elected in December, 1915, to meet on November 13. Although after one meeting it was promptly adjourned, the Athens Government could feel triumphant that its point of view had been recognized and that the original demand of the Entente Powers might now be regarded as so much bluff. The Powers unfortunately continued their policy of making repeated small demands on Athens, while failing to grapple with the salient fact of the essentially unfriendly character of the Government. On November 17 Admiral Dartige du Fournet served a new Note on the Lambros Government in which he demanded the handing over of 18 field and 16 mountain batteries, 140 machine-guns and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition. Two days later, before an answer had been given, he informed the Legations of the enemy Powers and Athens that all their staffs were to be expelled from Greece within 48 hours. On November 22 the enemy diplomats left without disturbance. On the same day Professor Lambros replied to the French Admiral, offering to hand over a certain number of guns, but refusing the other demands in

the Admiral's Note. The latter replied on November 24, demanding that 10 mountain batteries should be handed over on December 1 and the rest a fortnight later, and declared that these guns were required on the Monastir front. Relations between the Powers and the Athens Government became daily more difficult. The Reservists' Leagues, so far from being dissolved, were increasingly active. Anti-Venizelist disturbances were the order of the day and public officials no longer disguised their hostility for and contempt of the Protecting Powers.

A strikingly different picture was presented by the Provisional Government at Salonika. From the first the Central Powers had regarded this as an open enemy. The ship *Angheliki*, transporting Venizelist volunteers to Salonika, was sunk, almost certainly by a German submarine, on October 29. A similar fate befell the *Kiki Isaia*, employed on the same mission. The Athens Government refused to take up the case, and, indeed, from its point of view with good reason, for as regards foreign policy Salonika was now in fact, if not in name, a distinct State.

On November 24 the Provisional Government declared war on Bulgaria and her Allies.



VENIZELIST VOLUNTEERS FROM CRETE ARRIVE AT SALONIKA.



ENEMY DIPLOMATISTS LEAVE ATHENS.

Volunteers came from all parts of Greece to join the Army of National Defence. Before long there were many thousands under arms, and their numbers would have been still greater had the Royalist authorities not prevented their journey there. They went so far, indeed, as to declare as dismissed from the Greek Army any officers who joined the Venizelist forces.

As a result of the irresoluteness of the Allies' policy, the Athens Government and its supporters were becoming more recalcitrant in their attitude. In the last days of November the activities of the Reservists' Leagues reached their highest point. Open preparations were being made for attacks on the Venizelists of Athens. Fearing a disturbance of public order, Admiral Dartige du Fournet landed 200 French marines to reinforce a small body of troops who had since the events of September garrisoned the Zappeion. Undeterred by this warning the Greek authorities instigated their partisans to continue their anti-Entente policy.

Instead of replying to the ultimatum of November 24, the Greek Government on November 27 addressed a protest to the neutral diplomatists at Athens against the Allies' occupation of the Salamis Straits, their control over certain public services, the expulsion of the enemy Legations from Athens, and their further demands for the surrender of guns and material of war.

Troops were being brought up to Athens and trenches dug on the surrounding hills. Between November 25 and 30 detachments of the

1st, 7th and 34th regiments of the 2nd Division took up position on the Hill of Philopappos, the Pnyx and other points commanding the road from Phalerum to Athens. Other detachments were stationed at points commanding the Athens-Piræus road—some 4,000 men armed with machine-guns. Mountain batteries were placed in strategic positions; the streets of Athens were full of troops; some 8,000 or 9,000 men were at the disposal of the Government. In the vicinity also was the 11th Division, and the 13th Division was brought from Chalcis and placed on the line Levadia-Thebes. All these troops were under the command of Lieut.-General Kallaris, whose assistant was Major-General Papoulas—both fanatical anti-Venizelists. Moreover, the Government on November 29 suddenly issued a decree allowing volunteers to enrol themselves, and thereby added 10,000 men to the forces under their control. In defence of this action they declared that it eliminated any possibility of disturbances on the part of irresponsible persons.

In spite of these significant facts the French Admiral persisted in the blind hope that all would be well. He hoped by a display of force to make the Government agree to his demands. He was under the impression that the King himself was not averse from doing this but preferred to appear to yield to *force majeure* rather than to give willing adhesion to an act which might appear a departure from neutrality. On November 29 the Admiral had a long conversation with the King. He left

under the impression that he could rely on the King's promise that order would be maintained at any cost in Athens and that in no case would the Greek troops fire on any Allied contingents that might be landed.

The Allied representatives had declared through the press that they intended to enforce the acceptance of their demands by measures of a political and economic character, but that they would not employ military force, though they might find it necessary to land troops in

guns. The Allied troops were quite unprepared for any such attack. They at once sought cover and replied as well as they could to the firing, which was promptly taken up by Greek troops and artillery from their different positions. By 11.30 a.m. the battle was in full swing, especially round the Hill of Philopappos. The heavy artillery, however, did not join in till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when it began a bombardment of a French detachment in the Zappeion.



PLAN OF ATHENS.

order to maintain order in the capital. Early on December 1, some 2,000 men, three-quarters of whom were French marines, were disembarked. They marched on Athens in close order along three main roads. In support of the demonstration at 10 o'clock three French destroyers moved up and anchored off Phaliron.

It was just about this hour that the Allied forces, marching on Athens, suddenly found themselves in contact with the Greek troops which had been posted on the surrounding heights. Quite unexpectedly to the French the Greek forces suddenly opened fire with machine-

No preparations had been made for any such contingency. Admiral Dartige du Fournet was in the Zappeion and unable to get in touch either with the Greek authorities or his own troops. At a quarter to five the French destroyers off Phaliron opened fire as a demonstration against the Greek artillery positions, but did little damage. The Ministers of the Entente made an attempt to get to the Palace and see the King. They were unsuccessful, and it was necessary for the bombardment to begin again. About 7 o'clock the French warships fired a few shells in the direction of the Palace and this brought the King to reason. He offered as a



MACHINE GUNS ON THE ACROPOLIS.

compromise to hand over six of the ten batteries that had been demanded. In their perplexity the Allied representatives agreed, and at 2 a.m. on December 2 signed an agreement accepting the proposal. Admiral Dartige du Fournet left the Zappeion at 7 a.m. and returned to his flagship. The contingents under his command had suffered considerable losses. The French had some five officers and 117 men killed, seven officers and about 200 men wounded; one British officer and eight men were killed, three officers and about 40 men wounded; the Italian contingent had also lost some men. The Greek troops on their side had four officers and 50 men killed and about 150 wounded. The climax of humiliation was reached by the return of the Allied contingents. They were marched down to Phaliron escorted by the Greek troops that had treacherously attacked them and handed back practically as prisoners of war to the misled Admiral.

This "defeat" of the Allied armies, as the anti-Venizelist press jubilantly styled it, was the signal for the outbreak of a regular Sicilian Vespers. Early on the morning of December 2 the Greek troops and anti-Venizelist partisans invaded the Venizelist newspaper offices and wrecked them, killing or arresting the staffs of the various papers and looting their property.

Nor did they confine themselves to well-known public men and journalists; they shot and arrested, on the most frivolous pretexts, many hundreds of private citizens, overwhelming their prisoners with insults. The Venizelists' calculation puts the number of men, women and children killed at about 200, while over 1,500 were seized and crammed into improvised prisons. The whole proceeding was characterized by such cold-blooded deliberation that it was obvious that it had been prepared beforehand. In defence of their action the anti-Venizelists subsequently pleaded that they had but taken precautionary measures against the outbreak of a Venizelist rebellion. They declared that the Venizelists had large stores of arms in Athens, and that they had planned to rise and, with the help of the Allied contingents landed, to overthrow the Government and dethrone the King. Not only did investigations show that the Venizelists had no such stores of arms as were alleged; the fact that the massacre of Venizelists began only after the retirement of the Allied troops disposes of the allegation that danger was to be apprehended from a Venizelist rising in connection with the landing. It was proved some months later that the bodies of the Venizelists had been mutilated

and robbed and afterwards hurriedly buried in the hope that the crime would not be discovered.

French and British public opinion was acutely conscious of the humiliation of the Athens reverse. As a leading French publicist—M. Auguste Gauvain—wrote: "In the history of France there is no example of such a humiliation so patiently submitted to." *Punch* expressed the similar feeling in England. In a cartoon called "What England did not 'expect'" it represented Nelson appearing to a wounded bluejacket. He learns he was wounded in "a demonstration at Athens," and asks: "Did our fleet give 'em hell?" "Oh, no! sir," replies the sailor, "I'm told they're neutrals." The "Battle of Athens" was a striking commentary on King Constantine's assurances of "benevolent neutrality." The Royalist newspapers openly exulted in the

thought of "those two greatest, holiest, most glorious days in the whole of the Greek history."

"The rocks of the Acropolis," proclaimed the Reservists' Leagues, "have won back their olden glory. The Greeks of to-day have culled laurels worthy of the past." It was hard for real Greek patriots to have to listen to these boasts without means of replying. The Athens cliques exploited their victory to the full. Venizelism was under the ban. On Christmas Day the ecclesiastical authorities of Athens, forgetful of their sacred calling, lent themselves to a ridiculous ceremony. Led by the Metropolitan of Athens, they pronounced "anathema" on the head of the "traitor" Venizelos. Crowds of hooligans and anti-Venizelist partisans attended and applauded the ceremony. It was a mournful, if ridiculous, illustration of the depths of degradation into which Constantine and his minions had plunged Greece.



CHAPTER CCIII.

THE ABDICATION OF KING CONSTANTINE.

EFFECT OF THE "BATTLE OF ATHENS," DECEMBER, 1916—EXPOSURE OF CONSTANTINE'S HOSTILITY TO THE ENTENTE—THE HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE—ENTENTE DOUBTS AND DIFFICULTIES—POSITION OF ITALY—EXCHANGE OF NOTES—EFFECT OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION—THE THESSALIAN CROPS—ENTENTE DECISIONS—M. JONNART APPOINTED HIGH COMMISSIONER—ABDICATION OF KING CONSTANTINE—THE NEW KING, ALEXANDER—CONSTANTINE'S DEPARTURE FROM GREECE—M. VENIZELOS BECOMES PRIME MINISTER—PERSECUTION AND MASSACRES OF GREEKS IN TURKEY AND MACEDONIA.

THE events of December 1, 1916, in Athens marked the end of a definite stage in the relations of Greece with the Entente Powers.

During the next six months the Powers were obviously dealing with an unfriendly and unfaithful Government which needed careful watching. Though formally "friendly relations" were maintained, both sides were conscious that this was mere temporizing. Anti-Venizelism and anti-Ententism had become practically synonymous terms. Athens and Salonika were spiritually at war. That the Entente Powers, while Allies of the one, still kept up the show of good relations with the other was due to political circumstances which must be discussed.

Modern Greece in an almost equal degree embodies the two "Greeces" of history—Classical Greece and Byzantine Greece. The mixed population of ancient Greece—in part of local "Mediterranean" origin, in part the descendants of Indo-European speaking peoples from Danubian lands—together evolved the unique civilization, art, philosophy, and political idea which lie at the roots of modern progress. For a thousand years or so—at least from the Persian Wars, and at latest stretching Vol. XIII.—Part 166.

down to the sixth century, when the Emperor Justinian, by closing the Schools of Athens, picturesquely indicated the end of the Hellenic epoch—Greek thought was the basis of all intellectual progress. Greek, too, became the medium for the transmission of Christianity to the peoples of Western Asia and South-Eastern Europe. The Roman Empire by Justinian's time had become Greek in all but name. The building of the great Cathedral of St. Sophia in this Emperor's reign may be taken as the symbol of the inauguration of the second "Greek" millennium, which lasted till the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. If "Hellenism" for a thousand years had connoted democracy, intellectual progress and fearless rationalism, it was for another thousand to stand for conservatism, organized bureaucracy and religious devotion.

After nearly 400 years of slavery a new Hellas emerged from the morass of Turkish misrule; and it was alike the product of the Classical and the Christian Greece that had preceded it. The War of Greek Independence was inspired by the two principles—love of freedom and faith in Christianity. In practice the two were never disconnected. Patriarchs and bishops of the Greek Church share equally

with Greek and phil-Hellene republicans the credit for the success of Greece's gallant struggle. The great Zante poet, Dionysios Solomos, has finely written in his "Hymn to Liberty":

I know thee by the terrible
Slash of thy sword;
I know thee by thy glance
That mightily measures the earth
Issuing from the holy
Bones of the Greeks,
As in thy pristine valour,
Hail, oh! hail, Liberty.



KING CONSTANTINE AND PRINCE
(AFTERWARDS KING) ALEXANDER.

It was indeed "Liberty" which was the battle-cry. But bitter experience proved Greece was yet unripe for a Republic. Instead, she yielded herself to a Bavarian autoer, yielded gratefully, yet not without protest. Though Otto failed to found a dynasty and even to keep his Crown, he at least once more introduced into the Greek mind the remembrance of the Byzantine Emperors, the first, in their own estimation, among the princes of

the earth. King George, who succeeded him, was indeed made of smoother stuff. In his reign there was little attempt on the part of the Crown to tamper with the rights the people had won by the revolutions of 1843, 1862, and more recently in 1909.

It may, indeed, be said that the first century of Greek independence was a century of struggle between two different conceptions of Monarchy—the Constitutional and the Autocratic. The democratic character of the Greek people, whose natural inspiration was drawn from their classical ancestors and from modern revolutionary France, had, however, on the whole, been in the ascendancy, and their Orthodoxy had been more national than political in tone. The accession of King Constantine, however, reopened the question. The first Orthodox King the Greeks had possessed—Otto was a Roman Catholic and George a Lutheran—he was hailed as by birth, education, and especially name, the "child of the Greek Sun." A contemporary Greek poet, Yeoryios Paraskhos, in an ode in honour of the then young Diadoch's christening hailed him in these terms:

King's son, I strew flowers for thy festival
And with a tear of mine I too
Bless thy christening.
Perfume thy path.
A stout old fellow am I; Death I fear not.
For forty years I've fought
And die I cannot
Before we reach the City.

Constantine was indeed looked on as true successor of the Byzantine Emperors—"Constantine XII." as his people fondly called him. It was the first Constantine who founded the "City"; it was the eleventh Constantine who had given his life in vain to defend it against the Turks; it was the twelfth Constantine who would recover it, and win St. Sophia once more for Christendom and Greece. "To the City, thou Twelfth Constantine!" was the shout with which the Royalist mob acclaimed him when he drove through the streets of Athens. Among the militarist cliques he was fondly known as "the Eagle's son"—another Byzantine memory. Blinded by party feeling, Constantine's partisans failed to see the absurdity of hailing as a worthy successor to the great Emperors Basil the Bulgar-Slayer and Constantine "Turned-to-Marble," the man who was chiefly responsible for the betrayal of Greek populations to these same Bulgars and Turks. But, indeed, enthusiasm for Constantine, though it was genuine among the

provincial population of the Peloponnesus and other remote parts of continental Greece, was on the whole an artificial product of anti-Venizelist agitation. By December, 1916, it had, however, become a phenomenon to be reckoned with, and the Entente Powers in dealing with Greece had to face the fact that, largely owing to the mistakes they themselves had made, the enemies of Venizelos had succeeded in representing him to the Greek people as an adventurer who thought merely of his own interests, had divided the country, and had tried to bring it completely under the sway of foreign Powers.

In December, 1916, it was doubtful what percentage of the population was actually Venizelist,* and what percentage regarded

* There was never any doubt about the feeling of Greeks abroad. The great Hellenic communities in the British Empire, France and America did not hesitate to declare themselves in favour of the Venizelist movement and against Constantine and his autocratic claims. True patriots like M. Gennadius, the Greek Minister in London, resigned rather than continue to serve a government of which they thoroughly disapproved. (M. Gennadius was re-appointed on M. Venizelos's return to office at the end of June, 1917.) Greeks in England and their British fellow-members of the Anglo-Hellenic League—led by such distinguished phil-Hellenes as Mr. Pember Reeves and Dr. R. M. Burrows—did not hesitate to give their frank support from now on to a cause which they saw was no party but a national one.

itself as first and foremost Royalist. The Entente Powers were not willing to face the prospect of civil war in Greece, a civil war which would have seriously inconvenienced the Macedonian campaign, and would have entailed the dispatch of further troops to Greece. Besides, they still felt perhaps unjustified scruples as to their right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country to the extent of imposing on it a Prime Minister whom it was not certain the Greeks as a whole were ready to accept.

But the hesitations of the next seven months were due to other causes as well as these. There was, unfortunately, a considerable difference of opinion among the Entente Powers on the question of the support which should be accorded to Venizelos. From the moment he left for Crete and raised the standard of revolt it was clear that Venizelos had declared war to the death on Constantine as the representative of absolutism in Greece. Consequently there was little prospect of winning the approval of the Romanoff Court for the leader of such a democratic movement. The Russian Government, therefore, obstructed any policy which would obviously mean the triumph of the principles asserted by Venizelos. The Russian



FRENCH TROOPS OUTSIDE ATHENS, DECEMBER 1916.

Court was bound to Constantine not only by family ties, but by the far closer bond of a common political point of view.

For very different reasons considerable opposition came from Italy to any radical solution of the Greek question, such as the deposition of Constantine or the reinstatement of Venizelos by the help of the Entente's forces. The Italian Government and Press showed an open distrust for the great national ideas upheld by Venizelos. There were important territorial issues at stake between the two countries. Italy still occupied the Dodekanese—islands which she had seized in 1911, and refused to return to Turkey till the Turks had withdrawn all their troops from Tripoli. The population of the islands was almost wholly Greek, and Italy's obvious intention of keeping them could not but arouse feelings of resentment throughout the Greek world.

Further, there was the question of Northern

simultaneously with Italy's seizure of Avlona, but he had made it clear that the one occupation like the other was conditional on the final decision of the Powers at the Peace Conference. He had, therefore, refused to admit deputies from the province to the Greek Chamber, an act of discretion which his successor Skouloudis did not imitate.

It is characteristic of the various anti-Venizelist Cabinets that they should have antagonized Italian opinion without any good reason. The Italian Government and people could plead with some show of justification that the Entente Powers ought not to leave in the possession of a State like Greece, which was on friendly terms with the Germans and Austrians, important strategic points. This was the justification offered by the Italian Government for its occupation of Northern Epirus in October, 1916, the occupation of which it declared was necessary in order to maintain communications with the Adriatic



ONE ASPECT OF THE BLOCKADE OF GREECE: INTERNED GREEK STEAMERS AT ST. NAZAIRE.


Epirus. Since 1912 a Greek Provisional Government had been administering this largely Greek-speaking province, but the Conference of London had decided that it should be incorporated in the new principality of Albania. Soon after the outbreak of the European war M. Venizelos had, with the approval of the Entente Powers, re-occupied the province

and the army advancing on Monastir. The occupation nevertheless aroused great indignation in Greece. It is characteristic of the unprincipled character of anti-Venizelist policy that the very Governments which had abused and irritated the Italians most should in December, 1916, openly seek a *rapprochement* with them on the basis of anti-Venizelism.

It was perhaps only ordinary diplomacy that the Italians should jump at the chance of support from a side from which they need fear no threat to Italy's aims. Constantine was nothing to them, and their dislike and distrust towards him was as great as that of their French and British Allies, but they knew that in his hands Greece could never be a formidable rival to Italian claims in the Adriatic and in the Ægean. It was unfortunate that there was this divergence of view between the Italians and their French and British Allies. It was, of course, easier for the latter to take an altruistic view of Greek politics; the French especially were persistently and whole-heartedly Venizelist in their outlook. British public opinion supported him perhaps not less strongly; but the British Government, both because it felt the need of avoiding friction with Italy and because it feared the danger of provoking civil war in Greece, preferred to temporize with a monarch whom it no longer trusted. Possibly this policy was justified by results, for at least it meant that no further demands were made on the Allies' military resources for use in Greece. But it was at best only a half-solution of what appeared to many a very urgent question.

It is in the light of these facts that the course of events in Greece from December 1, 1916, to June 11, 1917, must be read. The massacre at Athens had aroused Allied opinion more strongly than any event which had yet occurred in Greece. Admiral Dartige du Fournet was recalled, and measures were taken to secure satisfaction for the treacherous attack that had been made. The Allied Governments at once resorted to one of their periodic blockades of Greek shipping. On December 3 the French Government made proposals to its Allies as to the course to be adopted in dealing with the Athens Government. It was, as we have seen, difficult to secure agreement between the four Entente Powers, but at least they were united on the necessity of securing some apology for the insult which had been committed. On December 14 they served another Note on the Athens Government. They demanded full reparation for the outrage, and as a guarantee against future attacks they called on the Greek Government to transfer all its regular troops to the Peloponnesus. As usual, the Athens Government replied in a conciliatory tone and promised to

give every satisfaction. It took no urgent steps, however, to do so, for it relied considerably on the disunion among the Entente Powers and on the fact that they had before now relaxed demands which they had at first declared to be imperative. The attacks upon Venizelos in the Italian Press further encouraged it in its intransigent tone. It



M. JOANNES GENNADIUS,
Greek Minister in London.

still hoped to keep the Entente Governments from taking decisive steps, and the anti-Venizelist Press noted with pleasure that no official recognition had been accorded to the Salonika Government. It is true that in the last days of December the British and French Governments nominated Earl Granville and M. de Billy as their representative diplomatic agents at Salonika, but both Governments declared officially that there was no intention of recognizing the Salonika Government as a Power with a separate status.

The one demand that was pressed home on the Athens Government was that for an official apology. This the Athens Government was perfectly willing to give, for it regarded it as a minor point, but it made considerable difficulties about giving the guarantees demanded by the Powers in the form of the withdrawal of all the Greek troops to the Peloponnesus and their isolation from those in Central Greece.

In order to clear up the situation, representa-



THE GREEK AMENDE: THE FLAGS OF THE ALLIES.

The saluting of the Allies' flags took place on January 29, 1917, at the Zappeion, in the presence of the Allied Ministers, members of the Cabinet, and the Commander of the First Army Corps.

tives of Italy, France and Britain met in conference at Rome in the beginning of January. On January 8 they finally reached an agreement on the somewhat colourless line of policy that their primary aim in Greece was to protect the flank of the Salonika army. The Athens Government was to be pressed to execute the demands that had been made on it, but at the same time it was to be given renewed assurances

that the Venizelist troops would not be allowed to take advantage of the withdrawal of the Royalists from Thessaly and to extend their sphere of action to that province.

On January 10 the Athens Government replied to the Powers' Note. As usual, it promised acceptance of all the demands in principle, but raised objections on minor points, hoping thus to prolong the discussion.

In return for its conciliatory tone it asked for the prompt raising of the blockade and the release of all the Royalist prisoners detained by the Venizelist authorities. On January 13 the Powers reiterated their demands, the execution of which they declared must be unconditional. King Constantine's Government saw that again the moment had come to yield and on January 16 it accepted in full the Powers' Note. On January 29, in the presence of the official representatives of Greece and the Entente Powers, Greek troops formally marched past and saluted the flags of the Allies. The Government further promised the prompt execution of the other demands of the Powers, including the complete dissolution of the Reservists' Leagues, the removal of the regular troops to the Peloponnesus and the release of the Venizelist prisoners.

The Powers had won a paper victory, but the Lambros Government had no intention of loyally executing its promises. A large number of the regular troops either were not sent to the Peloponnesus or were allowed to return from it as civilians. As Professor Lambros himself afterwards admitted, large quantities of rifles and ammunition were buried in order that the Entente Powers should not get them. At the same time most solemn assurances were given that the Government's promises were being faithfully carried out, and the newspapers were most self-righteously indignant that the Entente on its part was slow to relax the blockade, which was the only weapon it was willing to use against Greece.

The tone of the Press, indeed, had become more unrestrainedly violent than ever before on the subject of the Allies, and the Ministers of the four Powers at Athens were compelled to make repeated representations to the Lambros Government on the subject. In spite of the various instructions of the Government to anti-Venizelist journalists little improvement was at first to be seen. Between December 1 and the beginning of March the anti-Venizelist Press held the field indisputably in Athens; the Venizelist newspaper offices had been wrecked and Venizelist journalists were in Salonika or in prison. In March, however, a slight improvement took place and one or two Venizelist papers resumed publication, though in their leading articles they were careful to abstain from any decided political comment such as would have provoked a repetition of the December outrages.

The Entente Powers were so well satisfied with this symptom of the slightly improved attitude of the Greek Government and its supporters that the French and British Ministers, who, since the events of December, had been living on board cruisers in the Salamis Straits, now returned to the Legations at Athens. Conditions, however, were in fact no better at all, for the



EX-CROWN PRINCE OF GREECE,
In uniform of Prussian Guards.

Greek Government was instigating its supporters to avoid the loyal execution of the Entente's demands. In spite of the Greek Government's assurance that the Reservists' Leagues had been dissolved, they continued to flourish in the provinces and to terrorize the population of the more remote districts. At their head was a nephew of Gounaris, a certain Sayas, who showed considerable cunning and resource in helping the Greek Government to evade the execution of its pledges to the Powers. Venizelists themselves had to admit that the Reservists' "organization was perfect," and that they were prepared for any sacrifice to attain their end of strengthening Constantine's throne and hampering the Entente's action. In Central Greece and especially in Thessaly their activities continued uninterruptedly. In the wild districts of the Pindus Mountains bands of brigands were organized and a successful guerilla campaign opened against

General Sarrail's armies. Small detachments of French troops were cut off and massacred. General Sarrail was compelled to add to his many anxieties the protection of his army from these treacherous flank attacks. All the time the Court and Government of Athens were professing the most irreproachable sentiments of benevolent neutrality. They sought to transfer to the injured Powers the responsibility for various "incidents" which occurred. General Sarrail, the French, the Serbians, the Italians, were always, according to the anti-Venizelist Press, committing some new outrage on Greek rights and feelings. The conduct of the French armies on the Thessalian border was the theme of many newspaper philippics. Above all, the continuance of the blockade was a fruitful subject of complaint. Every day the Athenian Press professed its indignation that though the Athens Government had loyally executed its engagements the Powers did not relax their blockade, which was reducing the civilian population to starvation. There was no reason to suppose that any such "starvation" took place. Owing to Government requisitions food was short and people felt the additional

pinch of the blockade, but the Powers showed themselves willing to admit the necessary minimum of supplies while refusing to forgo their one efficacious method of keeping a treacherous Government to the fulfilment of its pledges.

The first sign of better things was the appearance in February of a new Venizelist paper, the *Pro-odos*. This was followed at the end of March by the re-appearance of other leading Venizelist organs—first of all the *Estia* and *Ethnos* on March 28, the *Patris* on April 22, the *Messageur d'Athènes* on May 5. To begin with they avoided controversial leading articles, but at least they supplied the Athenian public with other than German propagandist news which had for four months formed their only reading. Greece was beginning to awaken from the mental isolation from Western Europe in which the policy of her King and Government had involved her.

Abroad mighty changes were taking place. On March 17 M. Briand resigned, and on March 20 M. Ribot's Government came into power, backed by a popular demand for a more resolute foreign policy. On March 12 open revolution broke out in Petrograd; three days later



EARL GRANVILLE, G.C.V.O., BRITISH DIPLOMATIC AGENT AT SALONIKA (s ated)
AND MR. WRATISLAW, BRITISH CONSUL-GENERAL.



STUDENTS' DEMONSTRATION, IN HONOUR OF M. VENIZELOS, JUNE 1917.

Nicholas II. had abdicated and a Provisional Government had put itself at the head of the Russian people. Finally, on April 5, the United States of America responded almost unanimously to President Wilson's appeal to declare that a state of war existed with Germany. On every side the factors to which the Athens autocracy had looked for support or toleration were being eliminated. It was natural that the hardly-trying patriots of Salonika should once more pluck up their hopes and renew their efforts to win the country to the only right and reasonable policy.

By the Entente Powers' agreement the Venizelist authorities were prevented from extending their government to parts of Greece which had not acknowledged them before October, 1916. So at least the Athens Government pretended to interpret the arrangement. The Entente Powers seem to have hesitated as to their obligations with regard to islands which declared of their own accord for the revolution. In Cerigo, for instance, they at first forbade, but afterwards tolerated, the formation of an autonomous republican administration. In March the Ionian island of Zante declared its adhesion to the National cause and the French were accused by Athens of having fostered this movement. On April 15 Skopelos and others of

the Northern Sporades were occupied by Venizelist troops. Other Ionian and Ægean islands hastened to follow their example. Without and within, the anti-Venizelist régime was being severely shaken.

It was clear that the time had come for clearing up an anomalous situation. Italy's special interests and prejudices had, of course, to be consulted; otherwise there was little difference of opinion between the Allies as to the general course to be pursued. On April 19 the French, British and Italian Premiers met at Saint Jean de Maurienne in Savoy. Nothing was published as to their deliberations except that complete harmony prevailed. In the general interest the Italian Government was clearly willing to modify its anti-Venizelist attitude. Venizelos, indeed, had always been willing to meet them more than half way. So long ago as December he had given an interview to the *Secolo* of Milan in which he temperately defended Greek racial claims to the Dodekanese and Northern Epirus, but offered Italy his full acquiescence in her retention of Avlona and an Ægean island, such as Stampalia, did her strategic interests demand it. This interview the Italian censorship did not allow to be published till June. But St. Jean de Maurienne marked at least an agreement on a negative

basis of a stiffer attitude towards the Athens Government. So it was interpreted in Greece. King Constantine saw himself again obliged to resort to conciliation. On April 22 he dismissed Professor Lambros, and on May 3 M. Zaïmis took office for the fifth time in the hope that a final breach might be thereby averted.

The hope was, indeed, a forlorn one. M. Zaïmis had formerly been a friend of Venizelos, but the latter's decisive action in the previous September had driven a wedge between them. Zaïmis remained a supporter, if a restive and anxious one, of the Constantinian *régime*. He would, indeed, have been willing to reach an agreement with the Venizelists, but only on the basis of their acceptance of Constantine and abandonment of their constitutional programme. But to establish "unity"—as the Powers perhaps hoped—on these lines was Utopian.

The idea of uniting Greece on a basis of compromise was equally unacceptable to the Venizelists and to the King's supporters: both alike conceived that they were struggling for the recognition of a definite principle. The Venizelists held that the King's whole course of action since the dissolution of the Chamber elected on June 13, 1915, was a violation of the Constitution, and that no settlement was possible in the future interests of Greece which did not admit this fact. The Royalists, on the other hand, held that since September, 1916, Venizelos had been in revolt against the King's Government, and that it was impossible to attempt any reconciliation without a confession on the part of the Venizelists that the Athens Government was the constitutional representative of Greece. Apart from this the difference of political theory between the two sides had grown so acute that neither would be willing to forgo the satisfaction of triumphing over its adversaries. The hope, therefore, that M. Zaïmis, even though he had the best intentions in that respect, would be able to accommodate such radically different points of view was one which found no favour in any but a few British and French circles.

From his entrance on office M. Zaïmis was received without enthusiasm and, indeed, with distrust by both political parties in Greece. He had behind him no real backing. By nature a Moderate, he was doubtless anxious to conciliate the Powers, and even the Venizelists, but he had no force at his disposal such as would have enabled him to take severe measures

against the militarist cliques which were tyrannizing over the country. The measures of repression of the Reservists' bands which he promulgated it was impossible to carry out. He was unable to grapple with the power behind the Throne represented by Germanophiles like Dousmanis, Streit and Merkouris, and he took no effectual steps to execute the guarantees demanded by the Powers with regard to handing over all the material of war in Northern Greece and releasing and indemnifying Venizelist prisoners. The activities of the various Royalist Leagues controlled by extremists such as Sayas and Livieratos proved far too vigorous for the Government to cope with, even had it had the will to do so. These Leagues and their followers indulged in a regular Byzantine adulation of Constantine. They filled the columns of the Press with fervid assertions of unreserved loyalty to him and celebrated him as almost a Divine Protector of the country.

The Powers were forced for definite reasons to break off their policy of procrastination. The Thessalian harvest began at the end of May, and it was clear that if the crops were to pass into the possession of the Athens Government, the Allies' blockade would lose the greater part of its effect. It was, therefore, necessary to take summary measures to prevent this. The anti-Venizelists, on their part, looked forward with great confidence to securing the Thessalian crops. They were willing to go any length in order to pacify the restiveness of the Powers, provided they could make sure of these valuable supplies. M. Zaïmis, for his part, in reply to the first representations of the Allied Governments about the necessity of their securing a considerable portion of the grain for the use of their own and the Venizelist armies in Macedonia, made difficulties about handing over any of the grain unless an equivalent amount were allowed to be imported from abroad. During the later part of May negotiations continued, but it was by no means certain that the Zaïmist Government was acting in good faith. Whether it was or not, the situation brooked of no further delays. The harvest was already ripe, and unless the Powers took summary measures, the bulk of it would soon pass out of their control. The French and British Governments saw the necessity of acting together. Since the Revolution the Russian Government had been inclined to wash its hands of any interference in the affairs of Greece. While it had




M. VENIZELOS.

no sympathy with, or interest in, the Royalist *régime*, it discovered serious scruples as to its rights to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Italy, on the other hand, was still dominated by a deep-rooted distrust of Venizelos's nationalistic aims, and viewed without enthusiasm any course which might, by restoring Venizelos to power, give Greece a strong Government, and a Government which, by allying itself with the Entente, would secure a stronger claim to preferential treatment after the war. Faced, however, by the

necessity of immediate action in order to prevent complete bankruptcy of Allied policy in Greece, the Italian Government somewhat reluctantly abandoned its active opposition, while the Russian Government, though formally protesting (a protest, however, which they did not publish till a month later), agreed not to interfere with the execution of the Western Powers' demands. Conferences were held in Paris and London. Their decisions were naturally not published, but on June 5 the arrival of a High Commissioner in Greek waters,

in the person of M. Jonnart, showed the Greek public that this time the Powers were in earnest in their determination to settle the Greek question.

M. Jonnart had some years before been for a short time Minister of Foreign Affairs in the French Government, and had also held the responsible post of Governor-General of Algeria. He was known in Greece as a very able and determined man, and it was clear that he was not one to be trifled with. Moreover,



[*Henri Manuel, photo.*]

M. JONNART,

High Commissioner of the Allies in Greece.

the concentration in his hands of the mandates of the British and French Ministers was a symbol of the Powers' united resolve to settle the question promptly and effectually. It was not known how far M. Jonnart proposed to go, and on what lines he proposed to bring Greece to reason. It was clear, however, that the settlement of the question of the Thessalian harvest must be the first, if not the most important, of his tasks. M. Jonnart made but a passing visit to Athenian waters, and went on almost at once to Salonika to establish personal contact alike with General Sarrail and with the Venizelist Government. But on June 9 he was back at Salamis. For the moment he possessed complete authority to re-establish the union of Greece in any such way as he judged most suitable.

The action of the Powers at Athens was

preceded by a military movement in the north. On June 4 the Italian Government, as a set-off to a policy towards Greece about which it was not enthusiastic, proclaimed the independence of Albania under an Italian protectorate. A day or so later the Italian troops crossed the Greek frontier, and on June 8 occupied Yannina. On June 11 General Sarrail's forces entered Thessaly. They occupied Larissa on June 12, after a skirmish with small Greek forces there, which resulted in a few casualties. On June 13 they seized Ellassona, and on June 14 occupied Volo without resistance. By June 17 practically the entire province of Thessaly was in the hands of French and British forces, and the majority of the inhabitants welcomed them with an enthusiasm which showed how well-founded had been Venizelos's contention that Thessaly was on his side.

Meanwhile, at Athens, M. Jonnart had carried out his mission even more promptly and successfully than had been hoped for. On the morning of June 11 French troops landed at the Isthmus of Corinth. The High Commissioner had an interview with M. Zaïmis, and informed him of the decision of the Powers. They had resolved that King Constantine must abdicate, and that as they considered the Crown Prince an unacceptable successor the new King must be Constantine's second son, Alexander. In reply M. Zaïmis acknowledged the friendly intentions of the Powers towards Greece, but postponed a definite answer till after a meeting of the Council of the Crown. At the meeting that afternoon the King recognized that he must submit. Once the Powers were united as to a policy and determined to carry it through, it was obvious that no Greek Government could hold its own against them. Failure to comply with their demands might mean both the end of the dynasty and such vigorous measures against Greece as would seriously injure the country.

Consequently, on June 12, M. Zaïmis communicated to M. Jonnart the following reply :

"The High Commissioner of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having demanded by your Note of yesterday the abdication of King Constantine and the appointment of his successor, the undersigned Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honour to bring to your Excellency's knowledge that the King, solicitous as always solely for the interests of Greece, has decided to leave the

country with the Crown Prince, and to designate as his successor Prince Alexander.

“ZAIMIS”

At the same time Constantine published a farewell proclamation to his people:

“Yielding to necessity, accomplishing my duty towards Greece, and having in view only the interests of the country, I am quitting my dear country with the Crown Prince, leaving my son Alexander on the Throne. Still, when far from Greece, the Queen and I will always preserve the same love for the Hellenic people. I beg all to accept my decision calmly and quietly, trusting in God, whose protection I invoke for the nation.

“In order that my bitter sacrifice for my country may not be in vain I exhort you, for love of God, for love of our country, and if you love me, to maintain perfect order and quiet discipline, the slightest lapse from which, even though well intentioned, might be enough to cause a great catastrophe. The love and devotion which you have always manifested for the Queen and myself in days of happiness and sorrow alike are a great consolation to us at the present time. May God protect Greece.

“CONSTANTINE.”

The proclamation aroused considerable indignation, for it was far from the nature of the case that the deposed King was a martyr to the national cause, as the anti-Venizelist Press naturally endeavoured to make him appear. Their language on this occasion transcended any previous efforts. They assured him that he would reign for ever in the hearts of the Greeks just as surely as the Greek Emperors, his predecessors; together with him Greece was “mounting the hill of Calvary bearing her cruel cross.”

The proclamation issued by the new King immediately on his accession represented the same point of view. It ran:

“At the moment when my august father, after making a supreme sacrifice to our dear country, entrusts me with the heavy duties of the Greek Throne, I express the one wish that God, hearing his prayers, will protect Greece, and that He will permit us to see her again united and powerful.

“In my grief at being separated in circumstances so critical from my beloved father, I have a single consolation: to carry out his sacred mandate, which I will endeavour to realize with all my power, following the lines

of his brilliant reign, with the help of the people, upon whose love the Greek dynasty rests.

“I am convinced that in obeying the wishes of my father, the people, by their submission, will do their part in enabling us together to rescue our dear country from the terrible situation in which it finds itself.”

M. Zaïmis was severely criticized for having tolerated a proclamation which struck such a note of recalcitrance, yet on the whole it was perhaps well that the bitter pill of the victory



PRINCE ALEXANDER,

Who became King on the abdication of King Constantine, June 12, 1917.

of the Entente Powers and Venizelos was gilded with the show of Constantine's self-sacrifice. It was important that at any cost the disturbances likely to arise at such a critical moment should be avoided; the constitutional aspect of the matter could be settled later. Facts were more important than theories, and the main object of M. Jonnart was to expel Constantine from Greece.

On the afternoon of June 12 Constantine and his family, with the exception of the new king, left Athens for their country house at Tatoi. The following day they sailed from Oropos for Messina on the Greek transport Sphakteria. The few Greeks who witnessed his departure consoled themselves with the



KING ALEXANDER READING HIS SPEECH FROM THE THRONE AFTER TAKING THE OATH.

thought that he might return, but such a contingency was hardly contemplated by the High Commissioner. On June 16 M. Jonnart published the following justification and explanation of his action:

France, Great Britain, and Russia desired the independence, greatness and prosperity of Greece, and decided to defend the noble country which they freed against the combined efforts of the Turks, Bulgarians, and Germans. They are here to counter the machina-

tions of your hereditary enemies and desire to put an end to the repeated violations of the Constitution and of treaties, and to the deplorable intrigues which resulted in the massacre of soldiers belonging to friendly countries. Yesterday Berlin was in command at Athens, and was gradually leading the people under the yoke of the Bulgarians and Germans. We resolved to restore Constitutional law and the unity of Greece. The guaranteeing Powers therefore requested King Constantine to abdicate. They do not desire to interfere with the Constitutional Monarchy, and have no desire except to assure the regular working of the Constitution to which

King George, of glorious memory, was always scrupulously faithful, and which King Constantine ceased to observe.

Greeks, the hour of reconciliation has come. Your destiny is closely associated with that of the guaranteeing Powers. Your ideals and hopes are the same. We appeal to your reason and patriotism. To-day the blockade is raised, and all reprisals against Greeks, to whatever party they belong, will be remorselessly repressed. No breach of public order will be allowed. The property and liberty of everybody will be safeguarded. An era of peace and labour has opened for you.

Remember that the protecting Powers, respectful of the sovereignty of the people, have no intention whatever to impose a general mobilization on the Greek people. Long live united, great, and free Greece!

The worst difficulty—the question of disposing of Constantine—was over; he and his family passed from Messina through Italy to Lugano, and prepared to settle down in Switzerland for the remainder of the war. The constitutional question, of course, had not been settled. It was very doubtful on what legal basis Constantine's successor had been chosen, for the Crown Prince had not abdicated and Alexander had in no sense been elected by the nation. But for the time being these were minor points, the main thing being that the Greek people as a whole approved of the change.

The re-establishment of the unity of Greece had yet to be achieved. In his farewell message to M. Zaïmis King Constantine, in expressing his gratitude, added the hope that "you may be able to continue to grant your assistance to our country and to my son Alexander." The anti-Venizelists certainly cherished the idea that Zaïmis would remain in power and that the complete humiliation of Venizelos's return to Athens would be spared them. Some attempt was, indeed, made to effect a compromise between the Athens and Salonika Governments. Conferences took place between representatives of the two Cabinets and M. Zaïmis offered to admit two Venizelists into his Ministry, but it was found impossible to reach any agreement. The constitutional question of the re-summoning of the Chamber of June, 1915, and the practical question of the compensation of injured Venizelists led to an *impasse* between the two negotiating parties. M. Jonnart's intervention was again necessary. On June 24 he saw M. Zaïmis and the King and demanded that the Chamber of June, 1915, should be assembled. This demand M. Zaïmis, who had worked with, and therefore recognized, the Chamber of December, 1916, found himself unable to accept. He handed in his resignation to the King, and, on M. Jonnart's advice, the

latter addressed an invitation to M. Venizelos to form a Government. M. Venizelos was already at the Piræus. On June 25 he arrived in Athens and after being received by the King announced that he was forming a Government. On June 27 he addressed the people of Athens from the balcony of the Hotel Grande Bretagne. Triumphantly he proclaimed the bankruptcy of the unconstitutional and unpatriotic *régime* which had nearly ruined Greece, and announced the victory of the National Movement. The future constitutional character of the Greek Monarchy and the cooperation of Greece heart and soul with the Allies in the war were to form the chief objects of the new policy. The new Cabinet, the composition of which was announced on June 27, included Admiral Koundouriotis (Marine), M. Repoulis (Interior), M. Politis (Foreign Affairs), and other members of the Salonika Provisional Government, who now won the recognition to which their sacrifices for the national cause entitled them.

But above all it was a triumph for Venizelos personally. Not only had he fought against a treacherous King and unscrupulous and self-seeking rivals; he had fought against them without the open support from his natural friends to which he had considered himself entitled. He had found himself at critical moments denied the material assistance and open encouragement on which he had relied. He had been debarred from taking advantage of opportunities which he had little hope would ever recur. He had gone to every extreme of conciliation and accommodation which did not infringe the obligations he felt to the Constitution and to the National Cause. He had been content to be styled a traitor and an adventurer by ungrateful fellow-countrymen, and to carry on without recognition what must have seemed a forlorn struggle for constitutional freedom and for national defence. Through it all he had kept his political equanimity. He had realized the difficulties of the Allied Powers as well as his own. He had never made exaggerated claims or indulged in a false optimism, and now at last he could enjoy the triumph he had deserved. More than any personal feelings of satisfaction was the satisfaction of seeing Greece once more united; once more freed from the autocracy which had oppressed and corrupted her; once more the faithful and trusted Ally of her traditional friends.



MEMBERS OF THE VENIZELIST GOVERNMENT TAKING THE OATH OF FIDELITY.

No history of Greek affairs during the first three years of the war would be complete without some account of the fate of the large Hellenic population of the Turkish Empire. The Greeks, like the Armenians, constituted the most able and successful element of the whole population with regard to commerce and industry. They had till the Revolution, which brought the Young Turks to power, been safeguarded by privileges dating from the time of the Sultan Mohammad II., which secured unfettered freedom to their Church and schools. The advent of the Young Turks, with their mania for Turkifying all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, soon introduced restrictions. Behind the Young Turks were the Germans, anxious to snap up the trade of Asia Minor, and for that purpose to eliminate their most serious rivals, the Armenians and the Greeks.

The annihilation of the Armenian element is one of the best known crimes and tragedies of recent history.* Less was published as to the sufferings of the Greeks. At first the Turks and their German masters were careful not to proceed to extremes, for there was the foreign policy of Greece to consider and the wish to

avoid unpleasant international complications. But a far-seeing statesman like M. Venizelos could not fail to understand, and, indeed, repeatedly prophesy, that the victory of the Central Powers would mean the destruction of Hellenism in the Turkish Empire. To this his adversaries replied: "Our intervention in the war will be followed by the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey and in their interest as well as our own we must remain neutral." The course of events completely disproved this plea.

At the time of the Dardanelles expedition the Turks began removing whole Greek communities from the neighbourhood of the Troad, the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and the Coast of the Sea of Marmara. The flourishing town of Aivali, with a population of nearly 20,000 Greeks, was one of the first to be attacked by persecution on the pretext that it was dangerous to leave a population of uncertain loyalty in a place where it might communicate with the enemy fleets. The Turkish authorities, egged on (as official reports have since proved) by General Liman von Sanders, insisted on the evacuation of the Greek population of the town. Their property was seized and they were driven off into the interior of Turkey without any provision of any kind being made

* A full account of the extermination of the Armenians is contained in Vol. VIII, Chapter CXXXIII.

for their support. The fate of many of them was unknown; others were reduced to beggary. There is no doubt that a very great number of lives were lost, whether by actual massacre or by starvation. Similar things occurred along the whole Anatolian Coast. Places like Smyrna, where nothing could be done without being reported to the civilized world, were, indeed, better treated, but it was not from good-will. Later on, the Greek population of Turkish Thrace and of the Southern Coast of the Black Sea met with a similar fate. Hundreds of thousands of these unfortunates were killed, robbed of their possessions, or forcibly converted to Islam. What happened to Greek communities in the interior of Asia Minor can only be surmised, but altogether it would seem no exaggeration to say that considerably more than a quarter of the Greek population of the Turkish Empire, estimated at about 2,000,000, was wiped out. As in the case of the Armenians, the massacres were not mere outbursts of oriental savagery, but were part of a definite scheme to rid the Young Turks of an element they could not assimilate, and the Germans of commercial rivals with whom they would have a difficulty in coping.

The fate of the Greeks of Eastern Macedonia

—a province King Constantine's Government allowed the Bulgarians to seize—was the same in kind, if not in degree. In the memorandum handed to M. Skouloudis by the German and Bulgarian Ministers on May 23, 1916, just before the occupation of Fort Rupel, solemn promises were made that "not only will the territorial integrity of the Kingdom be absolutely respected, but individuals' liberty, rights of property, and the prevailing ecclesiastical régime will also be respected," and "the Allies will behave in an absolutely friendly way to the population of the country." It was only to be expected that neither Germans nor Bulgarians paid much attention to their promise to respect Greek sovereignty in the province they had managed to seize, and before long they had installed Bulgarian officials there, forced the Bulgarian language on Churches and schools, and introduced Bulgarian law and Bulgarian administration. But at least the code of ordinary decency might have led them not to violate too flagrantly their promise to "behave in a friendly way" to the Greek population. At first, indeed, beyond allowing a free hand to Komitadjis and Turkish bands, they seem to have taken no definite repressive measures against the Greeks, but by December, 1916,



GREEK TROOPS TAKING THE OATH.

official documents, afterwards published by the Greek Government, show that the Greek population of Kavala and the countryside were dying of starvation, and that while the Bulgarian-speaking and Turkish-speaking population were afforded relief, nothing adequate was done, except on Greek private initiative, to help the wretched Greeks. The Greek Minister in Sofia informed his Government on April 9 that "during the last 40 days alone 1,800 individuals have died in Kavala of starvation, and in Drama on a moderate estimate 30 die daily according to the official and indisputable information I have received from there." Protests to the Bulgarian Government and to the German Government were made, but without success.

On June 14 the Greek Minister in Sofia sent a last wire to M. Zaimis :

The Bulgarian authorities in Eastern Macedonia have recently instructed the inhabitants who wish to migrate to the interior of Bulgaria, in order to settle there or find work, to register themselves on special lists. A great part of the population, suffering from lack of food and dying of starvation, has accepted the proposal and whole families have begun to move into the interior of Bul-

garia. The refugees arrive in a hopeless state from their privations. Their number is great.

The Greek Minister shrewdly conjectures :

Possibly by this measure the systematic elimination from Macedonia of the Greek population is aimed at. According to an official *exposé*, 6,000 persons had up till April 28 died of starvation in Kavala, and in Drama and Seres the situation is similar.

The object of the Bulgars was indeed akin to that of the Turks. They wished to rid themselves of an element with whom they would find it very hard to cope ; they wished to be able to appeal to the democracies of the West for the annexation of Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria on the ground that there were no Greeks there. As in the Morava Valley and in the Dobrudja they killed, starved or deported the Serbian and Roumanian inhabitants, so in Eastern Macedonia they dealt with the Greeks. Egged on by their German Allies, the Turks and Bulgars set to work with a will on a campaign which not only appealed to their instincts, but promised excellent prospects of loot, and would purge their dominions of an element which they feared and envied.



CHAPTER CCIV.

CARE OF DISABLED BRITISH SOLDIERS.

THE PROBLEM—PIONEER WORK IN FRANCE—SCIENCE OF ORTHOPÆDICS—SIR ROBERT JONES'S WORK AT LIVERPOOL—RESTORATION OF FUNCTION—NERVE SUTURES—MUSCLES, TENDONS AND BONES—SLIDING SPLINTS—SHEPHERD'S BUSH—CURATIVE WORKSHOPS—TRAINING FOR TRADES AND PROFESSIONS—LIMBLESS SOLDIERS—ROEHAMPTON—ERSKINE HOUSE, GLASGOW—SURGERY AND DISFIGUREMENTS—THE BLIND—ST. DUNSTAN'S—NERVOUS DISEASES—THE STAR AND GARTER, RICHMOND—A CATECHISM FOR THE DISABLED.

ONE of the most serious of all the domestic problems which arose during the war was that of the treatment of disabled soldiers. This problem was not merely of military importance; it was of national importance also, because the disabled soldier, if unrelieved, promised to remain an unproductive member of the community during periods of great stress, while the personal outlook was bad in the extreme.

The awakening in this matter, as in most others, was slow, but long before the general public interested itself in the disabled soldier a few men and women had recognized that preparations must be made forthwith to deal with him. Among the early workers and thinkers in the countries of the Allies was Professor Guermontprez, of Lille, who acted as Surgeon at the Military Hospital at Calais. Professor Guermontprez was himself a pupil of Lucas Champonnier, and had learned from that great man that it is easier to prevent the stiffening of a joint than to cure it once it has become established. Champonnier had fought a determined opposition when he showed that the practice of putting broken arms and legs in rigid splints, and keeping them in these splints week after week, while it might secure a mending of the fracture, resulted in almost

every case in some deformity of joints. Often the joint deformity was as crippling as any broken bone, and the latter state of the patient was worse than the first. He had shown also that the necessity for using rigid splints was by no means so great as was generally supposed. With fine courage he dispensed with splints in many cases and substituted sandbags for them, and he adopted early massage as a routine measure, so that during their period of inactivity muscles might be kept in condition and made ready for the work ahead of them. By these means he was able to avoid the bane of "after-stiffness" and to cure his patients more quickly and more easily than most of his contemporaries.

These principles Prof. Guermontprez brought to the Military Hospital. His wards in Calais, even so early as the winter of 1914-15, were an inspiration. The element of "routine" was conspicuously absent. Every fresh injury which was admitted to his care was, for the surgeon, a fresh and separate problem to be solved upon its own merits and in terms of certain clearly defined objects. It was not simply a question whether a broken bone could be united or a bad wound healed up or a leg saved. It was also a question whether the broken bone and the wound could be healed so as to restore the full function of the limb in the

quickest possible time, and whether the leg, once saved, could be rendered a useful member of the body.

Visitors to many of the military hospitals of those early days were struck with the sad plight



STEERING WHEEL FOR EXERCISING THE MUSCLES OF THE ARMS AND HANDS.

of many of the convalescents. They hobbled about with stiff joints and deformed limbs—fit, healed men, who were, nevertheless, useless to themselves and to everybody else. Now that the battle for life had been fought and won, there seemed to be no more to be done. It was “hoped” that in time the stiffness would pass away or that massage might gradually relieve it. But active, disciplined measures to turn hope into reality were not taken.

In Prof. Guermontez's wards, the translation of hope into effect went on almost from the hour a man was admitted. The wards abounded in all manner of useful and surprising contrivances, swing-ropes, treadles, movable bars and so on, the object of which was to prevent stiffness and to improve muscular strength. Down below stairs a clever carpenter and blacksmith carried out the surgeon's ideas, fashioning new appliances by which some new set of muscles should be kept active. In the corridors outside the wards “dummy bicycles” and “dummy horses” afforded exercise to riders whose cheerfulness increased as

time went on and the apparently impossible became an accomplished fact. The cripple was conspicuously absent from that hospital, and the benefit to the men themselves, the Army as a whole, and the French nation was great.

That, perhaps, was one of the earliest manifestations of the new spirit in military surgery—the spirit, that is, of the man who works against time to achieve a definite result and who recognizes that his “returns to duty” represent not merely a triumph of surgery but also a vital factor in victory itself. The new spirit spread. Surgeons no longer spoke of “cures” when men's wounds were healed. “Cure” came to mean something more, something different. The young science of orthopædics was about to come, at last, into its own.

Orthopædics, though originally of European, it is said of French, origin, had become in later times largely an American science. True, as has been stated, the French School had inaugurated a new epoch in the treatment of broken bones. That was but one aspect of the whole subject. In addition to broken bones there were deformities due to old lesions to be dealt with, wasted muscles following nerve injuries and paralysis occurring as the result of serious disease in infancy, especially the so-called “poliomyelitis.” For long years the civil surgeon in England had been dealing with these cases, and, with a few notable exceptions, had been dealing with them inadequately.

The American surgeon worked under much stronger compulsion. Poliomyelitis, or “infantile paralysis,” was, relatively speaking, a rare disease in England. In New York the disease was endemic. At certain seasons it became epidemic, sweeping over towns and villages and carrying death or great disaster into hundreds of homes. Those children who recovered from the initial attack were too often left with permanent deformities, gross lesions involving loss of movement in one limb or another, sometimes laying the victim on his back for life or producing terrible disfigurement. The *American Journal of Medical Science* stated, in regard to the outbreak of poliomyelitis which occurred in 1916, that “in the recent cases, in 948 patients there were 2,352 totally paralysed muscles, an average of $2\frac{1}{2}$ totally paralysed muscles per individual. In 375 old cases there were 1,622 totally paralysed muscles, an average of $4\frac{1}{2}$ totally paralysed muscles per individual.” The field here presented for surgical research and for the

exercise of ingenuity does not require indication. The demand itself created the supply.

The orthopædic surgeon had one aim before him—to restore function. If the cripple could be made to walk, the operative measures employed to make him walk were justified, no matter how far they might depart from so-called orthodox surgery. It was a case in every instance of "making the best of a bad job," or, in other words, of studying the individual rather than the group, and then of applying broad general principles to the service of the individual, these principles and their practice being modified in each instance as required. The results astonished the world and earned for this young science the flattering popular title of "white magic."

Happily, "white magic" had not been



ARTIFICIAL HANDS.

entirely neglected in England, though the amount of interest taken in it before the war was circumscribed and small. Sir Robert Jones, of Liverpool, had, at a period long before the outbreak of war, devoted himself to the study of this work and established a great reputation in connexion with it. When the question of the disabled soldier became clearly defined, the Army medical authorities turned to Sir Robert Jones. Sir Robert Jones gladly gave his services. The care of the disabled soldier became from that moment a recognized part of military surgical work.

It was soon evident that the lessons learned in connexion with infantile paralysis were destined to prove invaluable in connexion with the paralysis produced by bullets or caused by wounds. The problems were in their essence the same. In both cases muscles had

been separated from their nerve supply, and were in consequence cut off from control and from those subtle influences which are spoken of as "trophic" or nutritional. In both cases this decay of individual muscles or of muscle groups resulted in incapacity or in deformity and so in lack of function. For the want of a "small repair" a man was permanently incapacitated not only from the work of fighting but also from that of earning his living.

Moreover, the orthopædic methods could, it was soon evident, be applied with but little alteration to cases of injury in which perhaps paralysis played only a small part or no part at all. These were the cases of shortened and contracted muscles, the cases of stiff or "fixed" joints, the cases of badly united bones or of bony deformity, the cases of severe jaw injuries in which great facial disfigurement had resulted, even the cases of amputated limbs in which a man's future depended upon the amount of care devoted to fitting him with an artificial leg or arm. Sir Robert Jones found himself with vast fields of work opening



ARTIFICIAL LEGS.

before him; he was faced with the necessity of training numbers of young surgeons in his methods in order that the great work might not want for those competent to discharge it. "White magic" became at a bound the surgery of the future.

It is important to understand the nature of these orthopædic methods if the wonderful character of the work which was accomplished is to be grasped. As has already been said, the one primary object was to restore function. Function might have been lost in any one of a variety of ways. It might have been lost, for example, owing to the destruction of a nerve, or the laceration of a muscle, or the deformity of a bone, or the unbalanced pull of a tendon. Methods had been devised for dealing with all these structures. In the case of nerves the study was new and full of interest. For long years it had been known that, cut off from its nerve supply, a muscle wastes rapidly in addition to becoming paralysed. More recent work had shown that the damage was not, as had been supposed, irreparable. If the wasted muscle could be joined again to its nerve both muscle and nerve would undergo "regeneration."

This discovery led to the important surgical procedure known as "nerve suture," or the joining up of the ends of a cut nerve. But it led farther, for soon experiments made it clear that not only would a muscle recover if joined again to its own nerve; it would recover if joined to any other active nerve. Thus, if an important muscle had lost its nerve and union was impossible for any reason, the surgeon might elect to sacrifice a neighbouring unimportant muscle and use the nerve of this latter to regenerate the important muscle.

The possibilities opened up by this discovery were very wide. Given a sound knowledge not only of the anatomy of the body but also of the exact functions and value of each muscle, it became possible, by depriving here and bestowing there, to change a picture of hopeless inactivity into a picture of good hope and usefulness.

Another most important discovery which was made was that the nerve supply of the muscles moving a particular joint was the same as the nerve supply of that joint, or, in other words, that twigs and branches of the same nerve ran to the joint and to its muscles. Thus, if the muscle was injured the joint would



BUSINESS TRAINING AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HOSPITAL, RICHMOND PARK.

Learning typewriting.

suffer "reflexly" in the general suffering of the nerve. Conversely, if the joint received injury the muscles moving it must tend to become stiff and to waste.

This observation, which most people can confirm from personal experience of sprained joints, threw a flood of light upon the whole subject of the use of splints and afforded new justification for the point of view maintained by the French School under Lucas Champonnier. Manifestly, if a leg was fixed in a rigid splint and the knee joint held immovable, the resulting damage to the joint would affect its muscles and cause active wasting in them even in spite of measures like massage. It was therefore of first importance to use splints in such a way as to allow of as free movement as possible if permanent damage was to be avoided.

Again, it was found that if one set of muscles suffered injury, the total loss was greater than could be accounted for by the disability of this set. In other words, all muscular action being a balance action between two groups, when the one group went out of play the other group had an unrestricted pull and soon dragged the limb out of shape. The injured muscles were thus put on the stretch, and even if not permanently damaged lost their tone and failed to recover. The result was that quite simple injuries might give rise to permanent deformity.

Proper understanding of this point led to recognition of the fact that if a muscle is to recover its tone it must be placed in a position of relaxation—i.e., the "pull" of its opponents must be countered by some mechanical or postural means. Thus, if a temporarily paralysed wrist was supported by an elastic band under the fingers, and secured to the coat sleeve, recovery was almost twice as rapid as if the hand was allowed to hang free, so that the opponent muscles might have play. A nice distinction came in this way to be made between rigid fixation and absolute freedom. The dangers of both were recognized, and suitable means devised to protect the patient against both.

But in addition to the use of relaxation the value of heat and of electricity in "recovering" wasted muscles engaged the attention of the orthopædic surgeon. It was found that muscles responded to certain forms of electrical treatment and did not respond to other forms supposed at one time to be equally useful. Work was carried out and a form of apparatus devised which, while entirely painless, was



BELT CRUTCH, GIVING FREEDOM TO THE ARMS.

capable of producing most valuable results in the shape of muscle regeneration.

Once again the surgeon saw his chance. If it was possible to restore weak and wasted muscles—provided the nerve supply was intact—by means of this electrical treatment, then it must also be possible to increase the active capacity of normal muscles. So that, if one group of muscles had been destroyed by a deep shell wound and their "opponents" were causing a deformity, some other group also antagonistic to those "opponents" might be "worked up" to such a pitch of strength as to replace the "pull" of the lost muscles and restore the limb to its normal appearance and usefulness.

From this again it was an easy step to the idea that a muscle might be disconnected from its attachment in one place and connected to another place where its activities would be of greater value. One of the smaller muscles of the arm might for example be made to assist in the flexing of the fingers, where great injury had been done to the true flexors—with resulting benefit to the patient.


Here, again, as in the case of nerve grafting, a large field for the exercise of ingenuity backed by experience was opened up. The orthopædic surgeon ceased to be a mere routine worker, carrying out some definite and authorized procedure. He became a kind of knight errant dealing ever with the unexpected in new and original ways, basing his actions upon instinct, genius if you will, as much as upon knowledge, and justifying himself in his results. Imagination, it was soon evident, was as important a feature of the mental equipment of the successful "white magician" as of the successful "black" one.

There remain to be considered the methods devised in connexion with tendons and bones. These were equally interesting. A muscle, it was found, tended in many cases to contract and draw up. In order to defeat this, lengthening of the muscle tendon was carried out either by splitting the tendon and cutting small pieces out of it or by severing it and splitting the cut ends in such a manner that, on rejoining, a considerable increase of length was secured. This operation had become popular before the war as a cure for club foot. New spheres of

usefulness were soon opened to it in the military orthopædic hospitals.

In the case of bone more remarkable expedients were resorted to. As early as 1881 Sir Wm. MacEwan had written a paper describing his methods of grafting bone in cases of ununited fractures. This early work led to great attention being devoted to the subject; what was aimed at in these cases was a union of bones by means of a good, solid, unbroken "graft." Naturally many difficulties lay in the way of this achievement. For one thing the pieces of bone which were used as grafts were apt to die. These were usually bones from animals, *e.g.* chicken bone, and they did not do well in the new environment in all cases. Instances did occur, it is true, where the "heterogeneous" graft "took," and the desired result was obtained. Generally speaking, however, much the most satisfactory graft was obtained from the patient's own bone.

The difficulty was naturally how to obtain the bone required. Two methods were employed. The first consisted in cutting a piece of the needed size out of the front of the shin bone of the patient in such a manner as not




AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HOSPITAL: CALCULATING BY MEANS OF A BURROUGHS ADDING MACHINE.

materially to weaken the bone itself. This was comparatively an easy matter on account of the thickness of the shin bone and its nearness to the surface under the skin. Moreover, the advantage of this method lay in the fact that the bone was fresh and likely to grow well.

The second method, that of making what was called a sliding splint of one end of the broken bone, suffered from the disadvantage that a

nerve injuries must be relegated to one class, all muscle injuries to another, and so on. On the contrary, rigid routine methods were exactly what orthopædic surgery was in process of discrediting. Each method in this work became the handmaid of every other; all were but phases of the same general work—the work of restoring lost function.

The work, then, in the orthopædic hospitals which were opened by the War Office was



CRIPPLED SOLDIER TENDING A GARDNER OIL ENGINE.

broken bone in a wounded man is often much affected by the discharge from the wound. It becomes very hard and is not very healthy. Nevertheless, the method of the sliding splint was used with excellent effect in many cases. It consisted of a finger-shaped piece of bone cut out of one of the ununited ends and slid down into a groove previously hollowed out in the other ununited end to receive it. The result was a firm "bony splint," which locked the broken fragments together, and which finally produced a firm and even shaft.

These methods were the working basis upon which the orthopædic surgeons who were called upon to treat disabled soldiers built up their system. They were by no means separate and distinct methods in the sense that all

from the beginning intensely individual work. Every case presented a special and separate problem to be solved in terms of one or two or three or all of the orthopædic measures as might be found expedient, and to be discharged to duty or to civil life when finished with in accordance strictly with the degree of the restoration of function achieved. The surgeon essaying a new case stood to his patient in the relationship of an artist to his canvas, a relationship in which genius comes first, technical capacity second, and tradition a bad third.

The great orthopædic hospital at Shepherd's Bush, over the work of which Sir Robert Jones presided, was indeed one of the most interesting and inspiring places in London. In its evolution many agencies played a part, the



TAILORING CLASS AT SHEPHERD'S BUSH.

British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John being the most important of these. These voluntary bodies had early recognized the importance of the work of caring for the disabled, and appointed King Manoel, the former King of Portugal, who had taken a deep and personal interest in the new military surgery from its earliest days, to represent them at Shepherd's Bush. They placed their resources at the disposal of the wounded men, and, as will be shown, contributed in great measure to the success of the enterprise.

The first impression which a visitor to the hospital received was one of great pity. Its wards, like all hospital wards during the war, had many a sad story to tell, and the condition of some of the poor fellows on admission was such as to shake the strongest confidence. It seemed, indeed, beyond the bounds of possibility that useful limbs could be reshaped from helpless flail-like arms and shrunken legs, or that men who appeared to have lost all power of movement could ever be restored to activity.

That impression, however, soon passed away, giving place to a growing sense of wonder. As department after department of the great building was visited, the truth came home that there is practically no limit of possibility

so far as the orthopædic surgeon is concerned. For almost every problem he can, if given time, devise a solution. To take an example, a man was admitted to a certain hospital with a wound of the lower part of the leg which had left an ununited fracture of the shin bone. The muscles had been severely lacerated, and had begun to contract, so that the foot was pulled over out of its proper alignment. In addition, some of the nerves had been injured, causing paralysis of the muscles supplied by them.

It appeared that the only thing left to do was to amputate the foot and have done with it, and strong reasons could no doubt have been urged in justification of this procedure. But a better way suggested itself. The ununited bones were brought together by means of a "sliding splint," and after a lapse of time the fracture was disposed of. Then the nervous injury was taken in hand and dealt with by means of a muscle graft—that is to say, sound muscles were made to do the work of unsound ones. Finally, electrical treatment was used to stimulate weak muscles and to develop them to a sufficient degree of strength to replace the lost function. In course of time a foot of quite reasonable utility was obtained.



BLACKSMITH'S SHOP AT SHEPHERD'S BUSH.

When the visitor had learned of one or two cases of this kind, the encouragement with which the hospital was instinct began to be appreciated. It was seen that the patients themselves entered into the spirit of enthusiasm which actuated their doctors. The old hopelessness of the cripple left them; they began to understand the meaning of what was being done and devised on their behalf, and they made it a point of conscience to do all in their power to help towards a good result. This attitude of helpfulness was itself helpful, for it engendered a spirit of good cheer which kept everyone in the best state of mind for rapid recovery.

Women, too, played a big part in the work, as was evident the moment the massage room and the electrical room were visited. The members of the Almeric Paget Corps of Masseurs placed the wounded under a debt of gratitude by their devoted attention and labours. So very much of the success of the work depended upon painstaking efforts to develop the chosen muscle groups that the women who undertook this task undertook a heavy responsibility. Hundreds of men could be found to testify to the fact that the responsibility was not shirked. The work was performed as a labour of love.

But the work did not end when the limb had been won back to a measure of usefulness. In a very true sense the work only began then, because there is a vital difference between a leg or an arm which can merely be moved and a leg or an arm which can perform useful and productive labour. After the massage and electrical treatment, therefore, came in many cases the treatment by what are known as mechano-therapeutic instruments. The visitor to the mechano-therapeutic room, who had enjoyed the privilege earlier in the war of seeing Professor Guernonprez's work at Calais, was struck at once by the similarity of the methods employed. The "dummy" bicycle and horse were in evidence, and stiff ankles and knees were being restored to full movement and weak muscles to full power on these instruments and on other much more elaborate machines.

Even the dummy bicycle is, however, but a poor substitute for the conditions of actual life, and it was not long before the workers at Shepherd's Bush began to feel that in order to make their course of treatment complete that course of treatment must shade off gradually into a course of training leading up by degrees to a useful and productive occupation.

This excellent idea owed its origin in large measure to King Manoel, who, as has been said, identified himself with the work at an early date and devoted himself assiduously to the welfare of the men. It was suggested that if a man was able to turn the wheels of the bicycle against a measured resistance he should be able to turn the wheel of a lathe also. And it was obvious that if he



KING MANOEL.

could do this he might by the same act improve his own physical condition and also learn a useful trade.

Thus arose the idea of the "curative workshop" of which so much was soon to be heard. Various trades were studied, and the characteristic actions peculiar to them noted—*e.g.*, the swinging of the blacksmith's hammer, the carpenter's movements in sawing or planing, the mason's work in handling mallet and chisel, the turner's movements at his lathe, and so on, and after a little consideration a series of workshops were installed at Shepherd's Bush, and instructors secured.

Meanwhile the subject had been forcing itself more and more upon the attention of Parliament, and public opinion was rapidly being shaped in regard to it. The splendid work of the French authorities at Parish and Juvisy had been studied, and their encouraging statistics noted. Many writers and workers were urging that the whole subject should be reviewed

and placed once for all upon a satisfactory footing. It was contended that orthopædic surgery had become so important that no man should be finally discharged from the Army until everything which could be done to render him a fit and useful citizen had been done.

This view was undoubtedly a sound one. Experience was beginning to show that as soon as his wounds were healed and he was discharged from hospital a man tended to go back to his native town, and that then, if he remained unfit, he tended to abandon hope, give up treatment, and become a chronic invalid. The reasons were two-fold. In the first place, many of the injuries were of so grave a character that improvement seemed to be quite out of the question. Again, the local doctor did not, in many cases, possess the necessary knowledge or experience to carry out active orthopædic measures. As a result a large number of cripples who need not have been cripples at all were in process of manufacture throughout the country.

The difficulty of providing adequate orthopædic and other treatment for discharged and dischargeable men, in addition to soldiers who might be expected to recover, was, however, very great. The medical profession was greatly overworked, nearly half of its number were in the Army, and the requirements of the Army in the field tended to grow steadily. Men could not be spared from their pressing military duties. Moreover, the administrative part of the Royal Army Medical Service was working at the highest pressure, and could scarcely be expected to increase its labours to the huge extent of undertaking the after-care of all discharged soldiers.

The matter was discussed in great detail from every point of view, nor was there any important difference of opinion except in regard to the means to be employed. But the fact that the Army was in possession of almost the whole number of the trained orthopædic surgeons in the country was of so great importance that it soon became evident that a compromise must be reached. The work of handling the disabled soldiers must be relegated to civilian agencies, but treatment, where orthopædic measures were clearly indicated, must to some extent at any rate be carried out under officers of the R.A.M.C., at institutions set apart for the purpose and equipped with the necessary apparatus and with curative workshops.

After a little time a scheme upon these lines was set into working order, and once more the War Office and the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John joined hands to effect a great purpose. The result was that the disabled man had his way made smooth for him right on from battlefield to civilian occupation.

We have already traced that way through the wards and treatment rooms at Shepherd's Bush to the mechano-therapeutic rooms, and finally to the curative workshops, where work represented really a new kind of medical prescription. At this stage it was the rule to discuss with the patient his future prospects. Manifestly if a man had been a clerk, or a lawyer, or an architect in civil life, it was useless to set him to work to learn the trade of a blacksmith or other type of workman. These cases belonged to a separate group, and were treated by themselves. Efforts were made to afford them opportunities of adding to their knowledge during the period of physical treatment, and so equipping themselves for more responsible positions, for it was felt that men who had served their country so devotedly deserved well of her, and were the type of men best

suitable to serve her in positions of trust either as Government officials or as administrative officers abroad. The universities and schools throughout the land lent their help in schemes for affording special opportunities to these young men, and many technical colleges and scientific bodies throughout the country also expressed their readiness to afford facilities towards the same end.

These cases having been excluded, there remained a large number of men who could not reasonably hope to return to their former work. These were miners, labourers and others engaged in heavy manual toil requiring the full strength of a healthy man. It was recognized that in these cases a man should be afforded the chance to learn a trade, demanding a smaller expenditure of physical energy, in which he might reasonably hope to earn a living afterwards.

Consequently two groups of men found their way to the curative workshops; (1) Men who might be expected to become fit for some further form of military service, and (2) men who were about to enter upon a new occupation. Among these latter, it is interesting to note, were men who, while unfitted for one type of



BOOTMAKING BY CRIPPLED SOLDIERS AT QUEEN MARY'S WORKSHOPS, ROYAL PAVILION, BRIGHTON.

physical strain, remained quite fit for some other type. The second group were able in many cases to receive treatment while learning a new trade, and the act of practising that trade constituted in itself a therapeutic measure. These men, on being finally discharged, now returned to their own districts taking with them a card for their local War Pensions Committee, whose business it was to assist them towards complete training for some civil occupation, to see that they suffered no want during the period of training, and to secure for them any medical treatment that might be necessary.

Thus the curative workshop formed a link between the army life and civil life, and a man passed by gradual stages from the one to the other. In civil life he was still cared for, and schemes were prepared whereby he might work as a pupil in the great engineering shops and other places. The Polytechnic in Regent Street, London, played a notable part. Despondency, that chiefest enemy of the broken soldier, was fought at every turn and hope engendered. The man was impressed from the beginning with a sense of new purpose in his life; he learned, in the company of other


men similarly crippled, that there remained much for him to do in the world and that he would be rendered fully capable of doing it. Time was not given to him to mope and despair. New interests crowded upon him; new friends gathered to help him; in his darkest hour hands were extended to him.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the good which was accomplished by these means. The joy and lightheartedness of our soldiers is proverbial; nowhere were these qualities seen more strikingly than in the curative workshops of the orthopædic hospitals. The hospitals multiplied quickly, thanks to the labours of King Manoel, Sir Robert Jones, Colonel Lynn Thomas of Cardiff, and others, and to the loyal support and encouragement given by the War Office and the Red Cross. Each new hospital became a new centre of benefit and a new field of productive effort.

But there remained a type of disablement of a peculiar and special kind which could not with convenience be dealt with in the ordinary curative workshops. The limbless soldier was often in much worse case than the soldier who was merely disabled. His loss was permanent, an exactly calculable quantity, and beyond the



CHURCH PARADE OF CRIPPLED SOLDIERS, ROEHAMPTON.



LORD ROBERTS MEMORIAL WORKSHOPS: FINISHING DOLLS' HOUSES.

hope of any improvement by repair. At the beginning of the war it was felt that when he had been discharged from the army and provided, so far as possible, with some ordinary form of artificial limb, a hook or a wooden leg, everything had been done for him that could be done.

That view, like many another pre-war conception, did not long survive the huge toll of amputations which the terrible, infected wounds of the French battlefields rendered necessary. Once again the need created the supply, inventive minds became engaged on the problem of the artificial limb and scientific methods were called into play to study and solve it.

French surgeons devoted much attention to the subject of artificial limbs, and in both England and America also interest was aroused. The result was that all kinds of new ideas began to be disseminated and to be acted upon. It was found that the study of certain mechanical principles and their application in practice made a great difference so far as the value of an artificial limb was concerned. The old method of simply ordering a "cork leg" was abandoned and elaborate study made of each case in order to secure that for each case the best possible solution should be arrived at.

In the mechanical construction of the limbs themselves great progress was made. Artificial legs were designed for fitting to cases of amputation of the thigh in which whenever the knee was bent the toe automatically lifted from the ground, thus making it possible to walk comfortably over the roughest surfaces, and to pass on to and off the pavement without difficulty.

At Queen Mary's Hospital for limbless soldiers, Roehampton, this work was seen at its best during the war. The hospital marked a great advance in that it afforded definite recognition of the need for special work on amputation cases. Those who visited it carried away in every case an impression of astonishment. The perfection of the artificial limbs was beyond dispute, and many of the men declared that the new legs supplied to them were much better than the old. Cases in which one leg had been amputated were enabled to walk without a limp or indeed any sign of the loss. But much more wonderful cases, in which both legs had been amputated, were "put on their legs again" and enabled to run, jump, ride bicycles and do all sorts of unexpected things.

Roehampton became a place of pilgrimage because of the wonderful results obtained there,

and also because these results were achieved by patient care and attention to detail which produced a new body of knowledge of the utmost value to all those charged with the care of the limbless soldier. The future of the men with artificial limbs became a subject of consideration, and it was soon evident that, given the exercise of imagination, many of these men who had seemed to be doomed to helplessness would be able to carry on useful and productive labour. Especially was this change of attitude true in the case of those who had lost an arm—a loss much more crippling than that of a leg because no ingenuity could replace the human hand. It was found that the arm stump could be fitted with many different devices, each one calculated to enable a particular piece of work to be done. The old "hook" thus proved the father of a large progeny of clips and grips and cup-shaped instruments capable, for example, of slipping over the handle of a steering wheel, and other forms of attachment, and the owner of the hook enlarged his scope of usefulness accordingly.



LEARNING TRAM-CAR DRIVING, ROYAL PAVILION, BRIGHTON.

The success of the work ensured its spread. Thanks to the generosity of Mr. Thomson Aikman, a large house near Glasgow, Erskine House, was set apart for limbless soldiers in Scotland. Distinguished surgeons, among them Sir Wm. MacEwan, gave their services and the City of Glasgow helped with funds, in the



AT WORK WITH A LATHE IN THE ENGINEERING SHOP, ROYAL PAVILION, BRIGHTON.

collection of which Sir John Samuel played a prominent part. The experience gained at Roehampton was made full use of, and the manufacture of artificial limbs was begun on the premises with excellent results

While this work was going on other forms of effort on behalf of broken soldiers were being developed. Reference has already been made to some of these, notably to the work of the so-called "plastic" surgeon and to the work for the blind carried out by Sir Arthur Pearson. These advances deserve more detailed description, for taken together with the labours of the orthopædic surgeons and the work at Roehampton for the limbless they form a complete picture of the great national effort on behalf of those deprived of their strength and bodily capacity in the service of the country

The marvels of plastic surgery certainly rank among the greatest of all the surgical triumphs of the war. It is true that this service could not show the imposing statistics presented by, say, the bacteriologists with their protection against typhoid fever and other diseases; but it could and did show, in a smaller way, victory over bitter humiliation and pain which was inspiring. The lot of the disfigured soldier was indeed a hard one, especially in those instances in which a severe face wound had entirely destroyed a man's normal expression and rendered his features grotesque, even terrible. Here again, as in the case of the victim of a

deformed limb, it seemed that not all the resources of surgery could achieve betterment. When a man had lost the whole, or even a portion of his lower jaw, or when the bones of his nose had been destroyed, or when great wounds of the face had left him without an eye or with scars so terrible as to be almost unbearable, it was assumed that hope might be given up.

The assumption proved as baseless as most of the other despondent assumptions of the war. Men who were willing to try far beyond the limits of ordinary patience and men who were not afraid to try in vain had begun to consider what might be done for these terrible face injuries, and had begun to collect their forces and study their resources against this anxious work. Surgeons skilled in the difficult operation of skin grafting, that is of removing thin layers of skin from a healthy part of the body and transplanting them to the surface of an unhealed wound so as to close it, were soon attracted to the new work. They proved before long that, given care and patience, almost any wound, no matter how unsightly or intractable to treatment, could be healed over with fresh new skin so that the normal appearance was once again approached. That was an important stage upon the long journey. Then there came the dentists of the new school,

dental-surgeons in the fullest meaning of that term, who declared that they could achieve much for the jaw injuries which were so prolific a source of disfigurement. These workers much more than justified their claims. Instead of allowing broken bones to heal up in an irregular and unsightly fashion as had hitherto been the custom, they devised all manner of cunning jaw "splints" of vulcanite and other materials by means of which it was possible to hold the fractured ends in proper position and to preserve the natural shape of the face. They replaced bone actually lost by bone grafts so carefully contrived that the observer could not detect any change; in one instance a complete jaw-bone was made out of vulcanite and was placed in position and covered with skin so that a huge gaping wound was blotted out and a well-shaped chin replaced. In other cases pieces of the upper jaw were manufactured and replaced, new palates were constructed and the alignment of teeth restored.

Then again there were surgeons who devoted themselves to the practice of methods of restoring lost noses. For some time before the war the method of injecting paraffin wax under the skin in cases of nasal deformity had been in use. The plan was to inject the paraffin in a fluid state and to mould it to the required



ST. DUNSTAN'S: BLIND CARPENTERS.

shape as it hardened. By this means great deformity was successfully treated. The method was soon pressed into the service of the soldier and with good results, so much so indeed that one man, a prize fighter, who had been "fitted with" a fine Roman nose complained bitterly that his prospects in life had been ruined—a nose like that was simply impossible in his calling!



SIR C. ARTHUR PEARSON,
The Blind Helper of the Blind.

But the surgeons and dentists were not the only people who played a part in the work of facial restoration. Strange as it may seem, artists were also important members of the surgical *personnel*. This was a happy thought and more than justified its originator. The idea was that, when it became necessary to cover some large scar or wound with a plate, that plate should so completely harmonize with the other features and with the colour of the skin as to be indistinguishable from the skin itself. Some attempts had been made formerly to approach to this ideal but they had not been successful; the plates sold were usually obvious imitations and very unsightly.

The introduction of an artist of repute and capacity to the surgical staff effected a revolution. It was now no longer a question of choosing from stock patterns; it was a question of creating specially for the individual. Here again the routine method had proved unsatisfactory; the special method was resorted to. Each man's face was studied and dealt

with as a separate problem. Some of the results obtained were very wonderful, and in one case in which the eye and half of the cheek had been carried away, a plate fitted with an artificial eye absolutely transformed the wearer. The addition of a pair of eye-glasses indeed so restored him to a normal appearance that all question of unsightliness was eliminated. Injuries of the face and jaws were very numerous during the war, as may be understood from the fact that in Lyons alone 800 surgical beds were given up to these cases. The magnitude of the benefit conferred by the new methods is therefore obvious.

The work on behalf of the blind belonged to a different category from the foregoing because, unhappily, in this case cure was actually impossible. But it was nevertheless a work instinct with the spirit of progress and no mere attempt to make the best of things. The blinded soldier was a figure of tragedy and at first was apt to give way to the utmost depression. He who had been so full of courage lost his courage; life seemed to have no more to bestow. A sense of utter helplessness, which only those who have actually come in touch with these men can understand, overwhelmed hope and strength. No more terrible sight than these poor, groping figures had ever been presented.

Means of dealing with these men were discussed early in the war, for cases of blindness began almost as soon as the first shots were fired. It was then that Sir Arthur Pearson offered himself to undertake the work, and opened St. Dunstan's, at Regent's Park, for the reception of patients. Sir Arthur was a blind man himself and he had learned much of his infirmity. He knew from experience all the gloom of the blind mind, all the temptation to give up the struggle and resign himself, all the difficulties which beset the way of courage and determination to overcome the disability. Knowing these things, he made his plans for helping other men along the way and for guiding them past manifold dangers to the sure ground of achievement.

The romance of the fight he made captivated public imagination as perhaps no other work for the broken soldier ever did, and almost from the outset support was freely offered. Sir Arthur himself took the public into his confidence. He declared that only the blind could help the blind, because only they knew the language of the dark world. The blind soldier who came to

St. Dunstan's must be put upon his mettle from the first day. Not as an object of pity must he be received, but as a fellow-worker come to learn his work and expected to accomplish it efficiently and cheerfully as those around him—blind men like himself—were accomplishing their work. He had to understand that all the difficulties which he experienced had been experienced by others before him—and overcome. If he failed to overcome his difficulties he failed where others had succeeded, showed himself less of a man than these others, made himself an object of their pity—the pity, that is to say, of the courageous for those lacking in courage and determination.



POULTRY FARMING FOR THE BLIND.
Learning to distinguish by touch the breed of a Fowl.

That was quite a different kind of pity from the pity which helps in full possession of their sight would have bestowed. It was a tonic to weary minds just as much as the pity of sympathy would have been an additional source of weakness. It caused a man to set his teeth; it braced him. From the first day of his residence at St. Dunstan's he began to learn the great lesson that blindness is a difficulty to be overcome, that it can be overcome, and that usefulness in life is as possible for the blind as for those possessed of their sight.

Sir Arthur Pearson carried out his idea to its logical consequence. The blind soldiers were soon at work; their instructors were blind men. Was it poultry farming they desired to learn, Captain Webber, the blind poultry authority, instructed them; did they wish to learn a trade, blind teachers were ready to help them. In their very recreations they imbibed the same

spirit. London learned with a thrill of interest that a boat race between two blind crews had been rowed on the Thames.

The work bore speedy fruit, and it is no exaggeration to say that it was the means of saving many a man from despair. With equal confidence can the same statement be made of the Home of Recovery for the Cure of Neurasthenia and other Functional Diseases of the Nervous System, established at Golder's Green, as the result of the pioneer work of Sir John Collie. This home, a beautiful house standing in its own grounds, was designed to receive only men discharged from the army. Khaki was prohibited within its precincts. The most recent methods of medical treatment were employed and each patient received individual attention. The first appeal for funds for the Home was made by Sir John Collie in the columns of *The Times*. The response he received placed the success of the work beyond doubt. The home served as a link for these nerve-shattered men between the army they had just left and the work of life to which they were about to return. Generous terms were granted by the Ministry of Pensions so that all who entered the home



BLINDED SOLDIER MAKING A RUG.



TRAINING FOR THE BOATRACE: BLIND SOLDIERS V WORCESTER COLLEGE.

did so in the knowledge that their wives and families were amply provided for in their absence.

Finally, mention must be made of the Star and Garter Home at Richmond, for the paralysed and incurable soldier, a noble work the sadness of which was relieved only by the devotion of the staff and the courage of the sufferers.

It would be impossible to close this chapter on the efforts made to restore the broken soldier without a brief reference to the mental and moral side of the question. Naturally, if a man's acquisition of a new trade was to take place at his own expense, that is to say, at the expense of his pension, much of the satisfaction of re-education was taken away. The authorities recognized this at an early date and decided that a clear definition of the position must be afforded. A "Catechism for the disabled sailor and soldier on the advantages of joining a special course of training for some skilled occupation" was drawn up. It well merits reproduction :

- (Q.) Who will pay the expenses of my being trained ?
 (A.) All the expenses of your training will be paid by the Government.
- (Q.) How shall I manage to live whilst being trained ?
 (A.) Your pension will be made up to 27s. 6d. per week during training, and an additional 5s. per week for every week you have attended will be paid at the end of your training.
- (Q.) How shall I manage to pay for my medical treatment during my training ?

(A.) You will not have to pay anything at all. Medical attention and treatment will be provided for you quite free.

(Q.) How about the wife and children if I have to receive my training away from home ?

(A.) In such case your wife would receive the separation allowance of 13s. 9d. per week during your training, and if you held any rank above a private this amount would be increased according to your rank.

(Q.) Would any allowance be made for my children ?

(A.) Yes ; 5s. per week for the first child, 4s. 2d. for the second, 3s. 4d. for the third, and 2s. 6d. for each additional child.

(Q.) Being a single man with dependents, would they receive any help if I was trained away from home ?

(A.) Yes, they would receive the usual dependents' allowance.

(Q.) How shall I get to and from my home and the place where I am to be trained ?

(A.) Your fares will be paid for you, both to and from your home.

(Q.) Am I likely to have my pension reduced if I learn a trade ?

(A.) No, you have the most emphatic assurance that under no circumstances can your pension be reduced when once it has been finally fixed by the medical board.

Many large firms, as has been mentioned, patriotically opened their doors for the re-training of disabled men who had been discharged. At institutions like the Lord Roberts Workshops and the Queen Mary's Workshops, Brighton, also work of the utmost value and importance was carried on : indeed, the care of the disabled, when hospital days were done, became a national matter in which all those who desired to help to repay our soldiers and sailors for their great sacrifice were able to participate.

CHAPTER CCV.

VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR (III.)

THREE YEARS' AWARDS—POSTHUMOUS HONOURS—A LONG LIST—THE DARING DEEDS OF CAPTAIN BALL—THE HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY—CROSSES FOR THE FIGHTING FIFTH—SUCCOURING THE WOUNDED—A CROSS WON IN THE BUSH—MORE POSTHUMOUS AWARDS—GALLANT OFFICERS—AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE—"SUPERB COURAGE"—CANADIANS' EXPLOITS—A STRIKING INSTANCE—MACHINE-GUN ACTS—AN AIRMAN'S RESCUE—DEVOTION TO DUTY—INDIVIDUAL HEROISM—PRESENTATIONS BY THE KING—COLONIAL HEROES—A SPLENDID EXAMPLE—AN ATTACK IN A DARK WOOD—SWIFT DECISION—TWO NAVAL CROSSES—EIGHT AWARDS—A FIGHT IN A WATER-COURSE—TEN CROSSES—CRUEL TREATMENT OF A V.C. PRISONER OF WAR—DEATH OF CAPTAIN CHAVASSE, V.C.

DURING the first three years of the war the average number of Victoria Crosses awarded was almost one hundred for each complete twelve-months, the total being 306. The circumstance is interesting but accidental. In the days of the Old Army, when the precise number of troops employed in operations was known, when a regiment had rarely more than two Line battalions, and when details of localities and dates of achievements were published, it was not difficult to estimate the percentage of Crosses awarded to men engaged; but as the war progressed all such sense of proportion and possibility of investigation was eliminated, for a regiment grew to vast size owing to the creation of new battalions, and official records ceased to indicate a particular unit.

Expediency required the issue of lists of awards which did not give dates or name places, so that it was no longer possible to know precisely where gallant deeds had been performed. Before this method was adopted, however, there had been put on record several achievements which stood out very clearly, and it became an historical fact that five Crosses were awarded for valour at Le Cateau on Vol. XIII—Part 167

August 26, 1914. These were included in 19 Victoria Crosses which were gazetted in the first four months of the war; seven for the immortal stand of the Australians at Lone Pine Trenches in Gallipoli on August 9, 1915, and six for the conspicuous courage shown by the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the landing at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915. Three Crosses were given for the famous landing from the River Clyde on April 15, 1915, at "V" Beach, Gallipoli, these honours going to the Navy. The Battle of Jutland gave four Crosses.

Though no standard of comparison between regiments could be set up, it was interesting to note that the first place was taken by the Lancashire Fusiliers, with eight Crosses, the second by the Yorkshire Regiment, with seven, and the third by the East Surrey Regiment and the Rifle Brigade, with six each. To Oversea troops no fewer than 59 Victoria Crosses had been awarded, 27 of these going to Australians and 12 to Canadians.

That the Victoria Cross indisputably held its place as the most rarely awarded of all naval and military honours was shown by comparison with statistics of other rewards made public; for example, "immediate military

rewards," additional to the rewards contained in the *Gazette*, were conferred during the period December 1, 1916, to June 1, 1917, as follows : D.S.O., 202 ; Military Cross, 2,272 ; Distinguished Conduct Medal, 1,014 ; Military Medal, 10,644 ; Meritorious Service Medal, 381.

The very great extent to which advantage was taken of the new regulation by which the Cross was awarded posthumously was indicated in nearly all the lists of awards that were issued. On May 11, 1917, three awards were gazetted, and of these two were to dead officers, Second Lieutenant (temporary Cap-



PRIVATE C. COX,
Bedfordshire Regiment.

tain) Percy Herbert Cherry, M.C., Australian Imperial Force, and Second Lieutenant George Edward Cates, Rifle Brigade.* Cherry was honoured for the bravery, determination and leadership he had shown when in command of a company which had been detailed to storm and clear a village. The company suffered heavily, so much so that the command fell on Cherry. With splendid determination, and despite fierce opposition, he swept the enemy out of the village. He sent frequent reports of the progress which was being made, and when, at an enemy strong point, he was held up for some time, he organized machine-gun and bomb parties and captured the position. Having cleared the village and taken charge of the situation, Cherry beat off the most resolute counter-attacks of the enemy, and in all he did set that wonderful example of courage and endurance which had marked the achievements of so many winners of the Cross. At half-past six in the morning he was

wounded, but refused to leave his post. Hour after hour, for ten hours, he remained, all the time encouraging his men to hold out. At half-past four in the afternoon he was killed by an enemy shell.

The third Cross of this batch was awarded to Private Christopher Cox, Bedfordshire Regiment, for an exhibition of that high courage and contempt of danger which characterized the British soldier in the war. Cox was acting as a stretcher-bearer, when, during an attack by his battalion, the front wave was checked by the heavy artillery and machine gun fire of the enemy, and to avoid annihilation the whole line was forced to take cover in shell-holes. Disregarding his personal safety, Cox went out over the fire-swept ground and single-handed rescued four men. Having collected the wounded of his own battalion, he helped to bring in the wounded of an adjoining battalion ; and he did this perilous work not only on that particular occasion but also on two subsequent days, coolly and unselfishly risking his life repeatedly in his noble task of saving wounded comrades from the perils of the fire-swept battlefield.

The greatest number of awards which had been published in a single list during the war was given in a Supplement to the *London Gazette* on June 8, 1917. This list contained awards to 14 officers and 15 non-commissioned officers and men, a total of 29. There was almost sure to be at least one outstanding case amongst so many ; and such an instance was afforded by a young airman whose achievements had aroused great public attention and admiration, for he had in all destroyed 43 German aeroplanes and one balloon before he met his own death in an air fight.

This skilful and daring aviator was Captain Albert Ball, of the Royal Flying Corps, who had been previously appointed to the Distinguished Service Order and had been awarded the Military Cross. To those honours there were subsequently added the Cross of a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour and the Russian Order of St. George, so that in the matter of distinctions this officer took one of the very first places in the lists of young recipients of the Cross during the war. The official story of his marvellous deeds must be given in full. It is as follows :—

Lieutenant (temporary Captain) Albert Ball, D.S.O., M.C., late Notts and Derby Regiment, and R.F.C.

For most conspicuous and consistent bravery from April 25 to May 6, 1917, during which period Captain

* Cates's exploit is described in Vol. XII, p. 186.

Ball took part in 26 combats in the air and destroyed 11 hostile aeroplanes, drove down two out of control, and forced several others to land.

In these combats Captain Ball, flying alone, on one occasion fought six hostile machines, twice he fought five and once four. When leading two other British aeroplanes he attacked an enemy formation of eight. On each of these occasions he brought down at least one enemy.

Several times his aeroplane was badly damaged, once so severely that but for the most delicate handling his machine would have collapsed, as nearly all the control wires had been shot away. On returning with a damaged machine he had always to be restrained from immediately going out on another.

In all Captain Ball has destroyed 43 German aeroplanes and one balloon, and has always displayed most exceptional courage, determination, and skill.

This was a wonderful and unparalleled record, even for a British airman. Ball was an enthusiastic aviator and dearly loved his work. Writing to a friend shortly before his



CAPTAIN ALBERT BALL, R.F.C.,
With the propeller and nose of his machine.

death he said: "You will be pleased to hear that I have got 10 more Huns, and that my total is now 40—two in front of my French rival. Oh, I'm having a topping time! To-day or to-morrow I'm being presented to Sir Douglas Haig. Am very pleased. I just want to get a few more if I can."

Ball's wish was gratified before the end came, for he added to the number of his triumphs, and had won incomparable renown as an airman. He was a native of Nottingham, and, though only 20 years of age, had been made a freeman of that city in recog-



THE KING WITH THE PARENTS OF
CAPTAIN BALL.

nition of his achievements. So skilful and accomplished was he that he was brought home for a time to teach his methods to young pilots; but the battle-front called him and he returned, to win yet more glory in the air of which he was so wonderful a master. He died as he had so often lived—fighting against great odds, for when last seen, on the evening of May 7, 1917, he was high above the enemy's lines engaging three German machines at once. There was at first some hope that he had been taken prisoner, but the slender hope was shattered by the War Office intimation that Ball had been killed. The brave young officer lost his life at Anneullin, 5½ miles east of La Bassée.

There were few corps which had not had special glory conferred upon them by members winning the Victoria Cross; but it was not until well into the third year of the war that one very old and distinguished military body was able to claim the honour. This was the Honourable Artillery Company, two officers



SEC. LIEUT. A. O. POLLARD, M.C., H.A.C.

of which, Second Lieutenants Alfred Oliver Pollard and Reginald Leonard Haine, were gazetted, at the same time as recipients, their names and deeds being included in the list of 29. Pollard, who was 24 years old, was another instance of the irrepressible fighting instinct of the young Englishman asserting itself, another example of a placidly living civilian performing the most daring acts in battle. Before the war he was an assurance official; on August 18, 1914, he joined the H.A.C. (Infantry), and a month later went to France. As a sergeant he was awarded the D.C.M. for bravery near Ypres in September, 1915. In the following January he received a commission, and it was not long before his Distinguished Conduct Medal was followed by the Military Cross, to which, subsequently, a bar was added.

Pollard's Cross was won by sheer bravery and determination. He was a second lieutenant when troops of various units of his battalion were disorganized through heavy casualties from shell fire, and further confusion and retirement resulted from a determined enemy attack with very strong forces, the withdrawal being closely pressed. Pollard instantly realized the seriousness of the situation, and dashed up to stop the retirement. Though he had only four men, he did not hesitate to start a counter-attack with bombs, and this he pressed so gallantly that he broke the enemy attack, and more—he



SEC. LIEUT. R. L. HAINE, H.A.C.

“regained all that had been lost and much ground in addition,” forcing the enemy, who had sustained many casualties, to retire in disorder. It was recorded of him that by his force of will, dash and splendid example, coupled with an utter contempt of danger, he infused courage into every man who saw him.

Son of a Scotland Yard official, Haine, of the H.A.C., set an example of courage and initiative which was in perfect keeping with the conduct of his fellow subaltern. A pronounced salient which our troops were occupying was repeatedly counter-attacked, and there was a constant danger that the garrison would be surrounded if these assaults succeeded. There was a strong point which imperilled our communication; against this Haine most valiantly led no fewer than six bombing attacks, and with so much dash and determination that the point was captured, with 50 prisoners and two machine-guns. Roused to fury by his loss, the enemy, with a battalion of the vaunted Guard, counter-attacked, and brought about a critical situation by regaining the position. Prussian Guard notwithstanding, Haine refused to yield lightly that which had been so dearly won, and, realizing the peril, immediately formed a block in his trench. For the whole of the night which followed he resolutely held his ground against all attacks, and next morning he reorganized his men and again attacked and retook the strong point, forcing the

enemy back for several hundred yards, and so relieving the dangerous situation. For more than 30 hours of continuous fighting Haine set an example of personal courage which inspired his gallant band to continue their efforts, and his "superb courage, quick decision and sound judgment were beyond all praise."

In recording this heroic young officer's inflexible endurance, a tribute must be paid to the equally heroic band which so triumphantly supported him and taught the stern lesson that even the volunteer British civilian turned soldier was more than the equal of the conscripted Prussian Guardsman. To the famous regiment of which the two officers were such distinguished members the honours were a matter of the deepest pride, and when, after receiving their Crosses from the King in the forecourt at Buckingham Palace, they went to the regimental headquarters at Finsbury they were played on to the parade by the H.A.C. band, and were enthusiastically welcomed and congratulated by their comrades. Haine joined the H.A.C. a few days later than Pollard, and, like him, went abroad with the

battalion in September, 1914. In December, 1916, he was gazetted second lieutenant. When he enlisted, a lad in his 'teens, he was articled with a firm of chartered accountants. At the time of receiving his Cross he was only 20 years of age.

Not since the days of the Mutiny had the Northumberland Fusiliers won a Victoria Cross until the honour was awarded to Private Ernest Sykes and Lance-Corporal Thomas Bryan, who proved worthy successors to McManus, Grant and McHale, of the old Fighting Fifth, who won their Crosses at Lucknow; McHale's consistent courage making his name, according to the *Gazette*, "a household word for gallantry among his comrades." Sykes was one of those men who, in winning their Crosses, courted almost certain death. His battalion in attack was held up about 350 yards in advance of our lines by intense fire from front and flank, and suffered heavy casualties. Regardless of the peril that menaced him, Sykes went forward on the humane mission of rescuing wounded. He made four dangerous journeys, each time bringing in a wounded man: and for the



CAPTAIN POLLARD AND LIEUT. HAINE WELCOMED AT THE H.A.C. HEADQUARTERS.

Col. the Earl of Denbigh stands between the two V.C.'s.

fifth time he undertook the desperate adventure, proving himself to be a hero among heroes, for now, "under conditions which appeared to be certain death," he remained out until he had bandaged all those who were too badly wounded to be moved. Sykes survived the incessant machine-gun and rifle fire, and came home to receive his Cross from the King. The officers of his battalion presented to him a silver tea service in recognition of his honour.

Bryan was another member of the undaunted

Durhams." At about two o'clock one day, when the battalion was holding a block in the line, a wounded man was seen in a shell-hole some 60 yards in advance of our block and only about 40 yards from the enemy line. The poor fellow was making signals of distress and holding up an empty water-bottle. Snipers and machine-gun fire made it impossible to send out a stretcher party during daylight, but Private Heaviside at once volunteered to carry water and food to the wounded man. Despite the enemy fire, the intrepid soldier succeeded in



PRIVATES ERNEST SYKES, Northumberland Fusiliers (left), and MICHAEL HEAVISIDE Durham Light Infantry.

band who "carried on" in spite of injuries. Alone, and wounded, he yet accomplished a very splendid piece of work which had far-reaching results. There was a machine-gun which had proved a serious obstacle in the advance to a second objective. The weapon was causing much damage in the course of an attack, and it was with the purpose of silencing it that Bryan, unassisted, started on his almost hopeless mission. Skilfully working his way up along a communication-trench, he approached the gun from behind, disabled it, and killed two of the team as they were abandoning the weapon. It was a daring enterprise and was as successfully fulfilled as it had been skilfully planned.

A private in another North Country regiment, the Durham Light Infantry, was a companion of Sykes in this list of twenty-nine, and his Cross, too, was given for a noble act of succour to the wounded. This soldier was Michael Heaviside, a stretcher-bearer of the "Faithful

his perilous task and undoubtedly saved the life of the wounded man, whom he found to be nearly demented through his terrible sufferings, for he had lain out for four days and three nights. The man was badly wounded, but in the evening of that same day Heaviside, with the help of two brave comrades, had the joy of rescuing him.

A case in the list which arrested attention because it obviously occurred in a country far removed from the main theatre of war in which most of the Crosses had been won was that of Sergeant Frederick Charles Booth, South African Forces, attached to the Rhodesia Native Regiment. The details visualized one of the numerous fights in primitive country between British and enemy forces. The sergeant's principal achievement was during an attack, in thick bush, on an enemy position, when, under very heavy rifle fire, he went forward alone and brought in a dangerously wounded man. Later, he rallied native troops

who were badly disorganized, and brought them to the firing-line; but these acts were merely supplementary to many previous displays of the utmost courage, coolness, resource, endurance and determination. This instance, free from machine-gun fire, shelling, poison-gas, and other intense developments of the war, was reminiscent of the simpler, straighter modes of fighting which in earlier years had given the Cross to many soldiers and sailors.

The brave officers, non-commissioned officers and men who, like Ball, had been posthumously honoured were Major (acting Lieut.-Colonel) Edward Elers Delavel Henderson, The North Staffordshire Regiment; Lieutenant Donald Mackintosh, The Seaforth Highlanders; Lieutenant Charles Pope, Infantry Battalion, Australian Imperial Force; Corporal George Jarratt, The Royal Fusiliers; Corporal John Cunningham, The Leinster Regiment; Private Horace Waller, The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry); and Lance-Sergeant Ellis Welwood Sifton and Private William Johnstone Milne, Canadian Infantry Battalion.

Colonel Henderson's conduct was that of an uncommonly fine officer and leader. He had brought his battalion up to our two front-line trenches, which were under intense fire. In carrying out that movement the battalion had



MAJOR (acting LIEUT.-COL.) E. E. D. HENDERSON,
late North Staffordshire Regiment.

suffered severely. A critical situation was produced by the enemy making a heavy counter-attack and penetrating our line in several places. Colonel Henderson was shot through the arm, but he jumped on to the parapet and advanced alone some distance in front of his battalion. He and his gallant men were on open ground and the fire was intense; yet this splendid soldier cheered the troops and led them a distance of more than 500 yards. He was again wounded, but neither daunted nor deterred. In the bravest manner he continued to lead his men, and so well did he encourage them and so loyally did they support him that with a final resistless charge, in the true British way, they captured the position with the bayonet. The colonel was wounded for the third and the fourth time; and so severely had he been injured that he died when he was brought in. His was indeed a glorious instance of that resolute leadership and inspiring personal example which had done so much for British arms in times of sternest stress and danger.

Very similar to the case of Colonel Henderson was that of Lieutenant Mackintosh, who also "carried on" most resolutely and was wounded three times before he fell; indeed, his was a rare case of bravery and determination. There was devastating gun-fire during an advance, and



LANCE-CORPORAL T. BRYAN,
Northumberland Fusiliers

Mackintosh was shot through the right leg and crippled; but he continued to lead his men towards a trench, which was captured. There he collected the men of another company who had lost their leader, and drove back a counter-attack. The subaltern was again wounded, and was unable to stand; but his unconquerable spirit impelled him to hold on and fight to the end. He had only 15 men left, but he ordered this little band to be ready to go on to the final objective. With "great difficulty" he got out of the trench and encouraged the faithful remnant to advance. The heroic Highlander was "again wounded and fell," to have it officially recorded of him that his "gallantry and devotion to duty" were "beyond all praise."

Ordered to hold "a very important picquet



THE KING HANDS HER HUSBAND'S VICTORIA CROSS TO MRS. JARRATT.

post" at all costs, Lieutenant Pope displayed a courage and devotion which gloriously upheld the reputation of the Australians who had already won the Cross. The post was heavily attacked, and the enemy in greatly superior numbers surrounded it. Finding that he was

short of ammunition, Pope sent for fresh supplies, but before they could arrive the last stage of the desperate situation had been reached. There might have been salvation in surrender; if so, the very thought of it was spurned by Pope, who courted almost certain sacrifice by hurling himself and his picquet into an over-



CORPORAL G. JARRATT,
Late Royal Fusiliers.

whelmingly superior force of the enemy. How nobly he and his companions died, how dearly the enemy paid for the death of them, was shown by the fact that the bodies of the lieutenant and most of his men were found very near to no fewer than 80 of the German dead.

The case of Corporal Jarratt was exceptional, for he had been taken prisoner and, with some wounded men, placed under guard in a dug-out when he performed the act of self-sacrifice which was recognized by the award of the Cross. That same evening the enemy were driven back by our troops, and our leading infantrymen began bombing the dug-outs. In that where Jarratt was a grenade fell and death for the helpless assemblage seemed inevitable; but the corporal instantly placed both his feet on the grenade, which, exploding, blew off both his legs. Subsequently the wounded were safely removed to our lines, but Jarratt, by whom those lives had been so nobly saved, died before he could be taken away.

Cunningham was another corporal who died from the wounds he received, his achievement



PRIVATE HORACE WALLER, CORPORAL J. CUNNINGHAM, PRIVATE W. J. MILNE,
Late Yorkshire Light Infantry. Late Leinster Regiment. Late Canadian Infantry.

being one of "superb courage." He was commanding a Lewis Gun Section on the most exposed flank of the attack and his section was suffering severely from heavy enfilade fire. Though wounded and almost alone, Cunningham reached his objective with his gun, and this he got into action in spite of much opposition. A score of the enemy counter-attacked him, and, having exhausted his ammunition against them, he, "standing in full view," began throwing bombs. Again wounded, he fell, but picking himself up he continued his fight single-handed and did not stop till all his bombs were finished; then he made his way back to our lines, his wounds including a fractured arm. Cunningham was removed to hospital, where he died, but not without the knowledge that his great courage and devotion to duty had "cleared up a most critical situation on the left flank of the attack."

Many lives were saved and the success of an operation was greatly helped by Lance-Sergeant Sifton during an attack on enemy trenches. The sergeant's company was held up by machine-gun fire and many casualties were caused. Sifton located the gun and then performed the swift and uncommonly brave act of charging it single-handed. His courageous enterprise was splendidly successful, for he killed all the crew of the gun. Having done this, he kept off a small enemy party which had advanced down the trench, and held them back until our men had gained the position: but in carrying out this gallant act he was killed.

Milne's exploit closely resembled that of his fellow Canadian Sifton. While approaching the first objective he saw an enemy machine-gun firing on our troops. In this case there was no rush to the gun, but a crawling on hands

and knees. By adopting this method the resourceful private reached the gun and captured it, after killing the crew with bombs. The deed was amazing, but almost more astonishing was the fact that Milne practically repeated it in nearly identical fashion. On the line re-forming, he again located a machine-gun in the support line, and this he



LANCE-SERGT. E. W. SIFTON,
Late Canadian Infantry.

stalked as he had stalked the first, capturing the weapon and putting the crew out of action. Shortly after seizing the second gun this fine soldier, who had so triumphantly brought to his aid his skill and craft, was killed.

Private Waller made a long and brave stand before the end came. He was with a bombing section forming a block in the enemy line. The post was violently counter-attacked, but though five of the little garrison were killed Waller threw bombs for more than an hour,

and finally repulsed the onset. In the evening the enemy again counter-attacked, and all the garrison became casualties except Waller, who, "although wounded later, continued to throw bombs for another half an hour until he was killed." Here was another grand example of one man's courage and endurance



[Russell.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL (then MAJOR)
F. W. LUMSDEN, R.M.A.

repulsing determined onslaughts on important posts

The Royal Marine Artillery furnished the striking case of Major Frederick William Lumsden, who was the first member of that corps to win the Cross since the days of the Crimea. The major's exploit was on land, and it was an interesting circumstance that, of the two Crosses which had been awarded to earlier members of the Royal Marine Artillery, one was given to a bombardier for gallant conduct in the advanced batteries on June 7, 1855. Major Lumsden's act stood in a place of its own, the special circumstances having no parallel in the records of the Crosses awarded for achievements in the war. Six enemy field guns had been captured and it was necessary to leave them in dug-in positions, 300 yards in advance of our position. It was inevitable that the enemy would not allow such a considerable capture to be held unchallenged, and he maintained a heavy fire on the guns. The grave peril attaching to any effort at saving these weapons was obvious,

yet Lumsden undertook to bring them into our lines. A brave example inspired brave men, and the artillery teams and infantry who supported the officer won great renown that day. The major personally led four artillery teams and a party of infantry through the hostile barrage. As one of the teams sustained casualties, Lumsden left the remaining teams in a covered position, and led the infantry to the guns, through very heavy rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire. His valiant efforts resulted in the sending back of two teams with guns, and he succeeded in going through the barrage with the teams of the third gun; then he returned to the guns to await further teams. Finally, he attached teams to two of the three remaining guns, and these weapons he removed to safety, in spite of intense short-range rifle fire. The desperate nature of the enemy's attempt to frustrate the accomplishment of the major's obvious plan was shown by the fact that the enemy in considerable strength had driven through the infantry covering points and blown up the breach of the remaining gun. But the hostile triumph was as brief as it was small, for the unconquerable major returned, drove off the enemy, attached the gun to a team, and got it away. For completeness in the execution of a deliberately planned undertaking and for brilliant and courageous conduct this saving of the guns had not been surpassed in the war; and the achievement was well worthy of a high place in the records which contained such glorious deeds as the saving of the guns at Maiwand, Colenso, Sanna's Post, Le Cateau and Nery. At the time of his receipt of the Cross from the King Lumsden held the rank of brigadier-general, and the great bravery and fine conduct he had consistently shown were further proved by the presentation to him of the Distinguished Service Order and two bars.

Various exploits in connection with machine-guns resulted in the award of the Cross to Sergeant Harry Cator, The East Surrey Regiment; Lieutenant Frederick Maurice Watson Harvey, Canadian Force; Captain Thane Wendell McDowell, D.S.O., Canadian Infantry Battalion; Private Thomas James Bede Kenny, Private Jorgan Christian Jensen and Sergeant John Woods Whittle, Infantry Battalion, Australian Imperial Force. These half-dozen cases all illustrated uncommon courage, and one or two contained remarkable features.

Cator's achievement was on the grand scale



BRINGING AWAY A GUN UNDER FIRE.

of personal deeds. His platoon had suffered severely from hostile machine-gun and rifle fire whilst consolidating the first-line captured system. With one man the sergeant advanced across the open to attack the gun. After going a short distance the man was killed, but, undismayed Cator held on, picked up a Lewis gun and some drums, and managed to reach the northern end of the hostile trench. In the meantime it was seen that one of our bombing parties was held up by a machine-gun. The sergeant secured a position from which he

sighted this gun and he killed the entire team and the officer, adding to the importance of his act by bringing in the officer's papers. He then continued with the Lewis gun to hold that end of the trench, and this he did so valiantly and successfully that the bombing squad was enabled to work along. The result was that 100 prisoners and five machine-guns were captured, thus making this fine non-commissioned officer's work exceptionally distinguished.

Harvey's regiment was attacking a village

when a party of the enemy ran forward to a wired trench just in front of the village, and opening at very close range rapid rifle and machine-gun fire caused heavy casualties in the leading troop, of which Harvey was in command. It was a critical moment, for the fire was intense and the enemy gave no sign whatever of retiring; but it was met and surmounted by Harvey, who, running forward well ahead of his men, dashed at the fully-manned trench, jumped the wire, shot the machine gunner and captured the gun—a swift, smart act which decidedly helped the success of the operations.

Remarkable endurance as well as "indomitable resolution" characterized the achievement of Captain McDowell, who, with the help of two runners, captured two machine-guns, as well as two officers and 75 men. This fine work was done in spite of great difficulties and under heavy fire. McDowell, though wounded in the hand, held for five days the position he had gained, in face of heavy shell fire, until at last he was relieved by his battalion. It was recorded of him that by his bravery and prompt action he undoubtedly rounded up a very strong enemy machine-gun post.

Single-handed, Private Kenny enabled his platoon to occupy a position of great local importance. Kenny's platoon was held up by an enemy strong point, and progress was



[Swaine.]

MAJOR (then CAPT.) T. W. McDOWELL,
D.S.O.

Canadian Infantry.

prevented owing to severe casualties. There was heavy fire at close range, but the private dashed alone towards the enemy position and killed one man in advance of the strong point who tried to bar his way. Then he bombed the position, captured the gun crew, all of whom he had wounded, killed an officer who showed fight, and seized the gun. Here, again, was a particularly dashing act to add to the brave achievements of the Australians.

Having with five comrades attacked a barricade behind which were about 45 of the enemy and a machine-gun, one of Private Jensen's party shot the gunner. Jensen then, single-handed, rushed the post and threw in a bomb. He had still a bomb in one hand, but taking another from his pocket with the other hand he drew the pin with his teeth. This performance in itself was of considerable effect, for it threatened the enemy with two bombs; when, in addition, Jensen told them that they were surrounded, he induced them to surrender. Not content with this, Jensen adopted the bold expedient of sending one of his prisoners to order a neighbouring enemy party to surrender, which the party did. But having done that the latter party were then fired on by another party of our troops, who were ignorant of the surrender. On seeing what had happened, Jensen, disregarding personal danger, stood on



[Swaine.]

LIEUT. F. M. W. HARVEY,
Canadian Cavalry.

the barricade, and by waving his helmet caused the fire to cease, after which he sent his prisoners back to our lines. It was well said of this

descended to the pilot's rescue. This in itself was a courageous undertaking, but it was made far more so by the fact that there was heavy



PRIVATE T. J. B. KENNY, SERGT. H. CATOR, SERGT. J. W. WHITTLE.
 Australian Infantry. East Surrey Regiment, shows his Cross. Australian Infantry.

soldier that his conduct throughout was marked by extraordinary bravery and determination.

The act for which Sergeant Whittle was decorated was also of a very stirring kind. He had already, by a gallant charge on a position, regained it, the position being a small trench which he was holding with his platoon and from which he had been temporarily driven by weight of numbers. For a second time the enemy broke through our line and the sergeant's platoon was suffering severely. The enemy tried to bring up a machine-gun with the object of enflading the position, but the sergeant's swift action prevented the dangerous purpose from being carried out. He grasped the situation and unhesitatingly rushed alone across the fire-swept ground. He attacked the hostile crew with bombs before the gun could be got into action, and so successful was his intrepid onslaught that he killed the whole crew and brought back the machine-gun to our position.

Strongly resembling the thrilling performance of Squadron-Commander Richard Bell Davies, D.S.O., R.N., for which the Victoria Cross was awarded,* was the act of Lieut. Frank Hubert McNamara, Australian Forces, R.F.C. This affair took place during an aerial bomb attack upon a hostile construction train. The lieutenant saw that one of our pilots was forced to land behind the enemy's lines, and observing also that hostile cavalry was approaching he

rifle fire and that McNamara had been severely wounded in the thigh. The gallant lieutenant, however, succeeded in landing about 200 yards from the damaged aeroplane, and, the pilot having climbed on to McNamara's machine, an attempt was made to rise. But owing to his disabled leg the lieutenant was not able to keep his machine straight, and it turned over. Fortunately, however, the two officers



PRIVATE J. C. JENSEN,
 Australian Infantry.

[Swains.]

* Vol. X, p. 30.

extricated themselves and immediately set fire to the machine. Extraordinary though it may seem, they then made their way across to the damaged machine, and started it, and McNamara, although weak from loss of blood, flew this machine back to the aerodrome, a distance of 70 miles, and in that truly wonderful fashion completed the rescue of his comrade.

There was not, in the case of Captain Newlands, of the Australian Imperial Force, the distinctly individual act for which the Cross had been principally awarded, but his per-



THE KING DECORATES CAPT. J. E. NEWLANDS, Australian Infantry.

formance was marked by the consistent courage and inflexible tenacity to which the success of so many British operations was due. On three separate occasions Captain Newlands showed extreme devotion to duty when confronted by heavy odds. First, he organized an

attack by his company on a most important objective and, under heavy fire, personally led a bombing attack. He then rallied his severely punished company and was one of the first to



MAJOR G. C. WHEELER, Gurkha Rifles.

reach the objective. When, on the following night, the company, while holding the captured position, was heavily counter-attacked, the captain's personal example and sound judgment resulted in "dispersing the enemy and regaining the position." Subsequently, when the company on the left of Newlands was overpowered, and his own company was attacked from the rear, he drove off a combined attack which had developed from these directions. These attacks were renewed three or four times, and it was due to the officer's tenacity and disregard of his own safety that the men held out. "The stand made by this officer was of the greatest importance, and produced far-reaching results."

For displays of what may be called collective heroism as distinct from definite individual acts the Victoria Cross was awarded in the following cases also:—Major George Campbell Wheeler, The Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army; Captain Oswald Austin Reid, The Liverpool Regiment, attached to the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; Sergeant John William Ormsby, The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry); and Lance-Sergeant Thomas Steele, The Seaforth Highlanders.

Captain Wheeler, with a Gurkha officer and

eight men, crossed a river, and instantly rushed an enemy trench, in spite of heavy bombing, and rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire. Wheeler obtained a footing on the river bank, but he had no sooner done that than a strong enemy party counter-attacked with bombers. The officer thereupon led a charge with another officer and three men, and though he was severely wounded in the head with a bayonet he dispersed the enemy and saved the situation

did he hearten his small beleaguered garrison that triumph crowned his efforts. His steadfast courage made it possible for the passage of the river to be effected on the following night.

Inspiring and successful, too, was the example set by Ormsby in the capture of an important position. He was acting as a Company-Sergeant-Major, and after clearing a village he pushed on and drove out many snipers from localities farther forward. He



V.C.'s WAITING TO BE DECORATED BY THE KING, JULY 21, 1917.

Left to right: Lieut. Donald Stuart, Lance-Corporal W. Parker, Seaman Williams, Brig-General Lumsden, Major Thain McDowell, Capt. Pollard, Capt. Newlands, Lieut. F. Harvey, Second Lieut Haine, Sergt. Whittle, Corporal Howell, Company-Sergt.-Major Edward Brooke.

Notwithstanding his wound, he continued to consolidate his position.

Captain Reid, "in the face of desperate circumstances," consolidated a small post with the advanced troops, on the side of a river opposite to the main body. His position was made the more perilous because his line of communications had been cut by the sinking of the pontoons. This officer and his gallant band persisted for 30 hours in what was literally a forlorn hope, for there were constant attacks by bombs, machine-gun and shell fire, and Reid, while knowing that his ammunition was nearly exhausted was perfectly well aware of the fact that repeated attempts to relieve him had failed. He was wounded, too, but nothing could daunt his spirit, and so thoroughly

took command of the company when the only surviving officer was wounded, and, under heavy fire, led them forward to a new position. This position he organized with great skill, and he held his line resolutely until relieved of his command. Much of this non-commissioned officer's valuable work was done under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, but throughout the attack he showed "absolute indifference" to this grave danger.

The gallant sergeant of the Yorkshire Light Infantry had brave comradeship in Steele, The Seaforth Highlander, whose acts of valour were also performed under heavy artillery and rifle fire. Some enemy trenches had been captured, but they were temporarily lost through a strong counter-attack. Steele rushed forward and

helped a comrade to carry a machine-gun into position. This gun he kept in action until relieved, and he was mainly instrumental in keeping the rest of the line intact. Another strong attack which was made some hours later enabled the enemy to reoccupy part of the captured trenches, and this gave Steele a further opportunity of showing personal valour and setting an example which rallied his troops who were wavering. He encouraged them to remain in their trenches and by leading a number of them forward he greatly helped to re-establish our line. On this occasion Sergeant Steele was severely wounded.

Completing this memorable list of Crosses



SERG. J. W. ORMSBY,

Yorkshire Light Infantry, leaving Buckingham Palace after receiving his V.C.

was the record of Temporary Lieutenant and Adjutant Robert Edwin Phillips, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment. This subaltern's achievement was essentially in the nature of that purely individual heroism, as distinct from

leadership and endurance, to which reference has been made; it was one of those truly moving deeds of valour for which so many Crosses have been awarded since the institution of the Order. Phillips had tried to get a telephone wire across the open, after a counter-attack by the battalion; but this task became



LANCE-SERG. T. STEELE,
Seaforth Highlanders.

impossible of accomplishment when the signallers were killed. In leading the counter-attack Phillips's commanding officer had been mortally wounded and he lay in the open. The subaltern had failed in his telephone wire undertaking, but here was a situation which made a higher call upon his courage, and to that call he gave a swift and noble answer. Phillips went out, under the most intense fire, and at last, with the help of a comrade—to whom surely there is due the praise that was so justly given to the adjutant—brought the dying man back to the British lines. Phillips had devoted all his energies to the task of getting the commanding officer in, and the sustained courage of his deed was emphasized by the official statement that "throughout he had but little chance of ever getting back alive."

These 29 awards showed thoroughly the many-sidedness of British fighters' courage and resourcefulness; but they were not and could not be more than chosen instances of numberless displays of valour. Special correspondents' dispatches recorded many thrilling acts for which in other times the Cross would doubtless have been awarded, but which were now acknowledged by lesser decorations. Stories were sent, too, of achievements which

might almost have been taken from unpublished awards of the Cross, as, for example, the tale that was told by *The Times* Special Correspondent in his dispatch from War Correspondents' Headquarters on August 5, 1917. "A private saw a single German dive into a dug-out. He followed, and found 17 others there. He marched them out, and when they got out and found their captor was alone they broke away and tried to escape, but he rounded them up single-handed with his rifle and brought them safely in." The correspondent's concluding sentence admirably indicated the real estimate of such events, and the remark might well apply to the examples afforded by the awards of the Cross:—"Such things are the froth on the current of our men's heroism."

In the forecourt of Buckingham Palace, on Saturday morning, July 21, 1917, the King presented no fewer than 32 Victoria Crosses. Of these decorations 24 were received in person, and in eight cases the Crosses were handed to the next-of-kin. There were several features of special interest in connexion with this ceremony. A considerable number of members of the public had an excellent view of it, they could hear each record read, and they were able, owing to the details which had been published that morning in the newspapers, to identify each recipient. At quite close quarters, too, these spectators could see, standing side by side in two ranks, the 24 personal recipients, ranging from brigadier-general to private. The former was Brigadier-General F. W. Lumsden, Royal Marine Artillery, and he had the rare honour, already mentioned, of receiving from the King, with his Cross, the Distinguished Service Order and two bars. The D.S.O. was also presented to Major T. W. McDowell, Canadian Infantry, with the V.C.; Second-Lieutenant A. O. Pollard, H.A.C., received the Cross and the Military Cross and bar; and the V.C. and the D.C.M. were presented to Sergeant J. W. Whittle and Corporal G. J. Howell, both of the Australian Infantry.

A striking circumstance was that the award of two of the Crosses presented had been made known only on the morning of the day of the ceremony. These were the awards to Lieutenant Ronald Neil Stuart, R.N.R., and Seaman William Williams, R.N.R., the former having been selected by the officers and the latter by the ship's company of one of H.M. ships "for services in action with an enemy submarine." No further official information was vouchsafed,

and it was left to the imagination to picture—no hard task—the nature of the acts for which the Cross had been bestowed upon these sailors, both of whom were young. The quickness and completeness of some war-time methods were well illustrated by the case of Seaman Williams. His parents lived at Port Amlwch, Anglesey, and on the Friday the father received from the Admiralty a telegram saying:

Your son has been awarded Victoria Cross, which will be presented to him at Buckingham Palace to-morrow



TEMP.-LIEUT. AND ADJUTANT
R. E. PHILLIPS,
Royal Warwickshire Regt.

morning at 11 o'clock. He wishes you and his mother to see him receive it. Admiralty car will call for you in time to take you to Bangor to catch 3.15 train to London this afternoon. Tickets for journey provided. You will be met at Euston.

These arrangements were duly carried out, with the result that the parents were able to see their son receive the Victoria Cross from the King.

The next-of-kin of deceased officers and men to whom Victoria Crosses were handed by His Majesty included Alderman and Mrs. Albert Ball, parents of Captain Albert Ball, the famous young airman. The sympathetic cheering which greeted them from the crowd

showed how deeply the lad's achievements had impressed the public mind. The other next-of-kin recipients were as follows, the names and relationship of the dead being given in parentheses:—Mr. George Henderson (V.C. and M.C. awarded to his son, Captain Arthur Henderson, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders); Mr. and Mrs. Harry Hirsch (Captain David Hirsch, son, The Yorkshire Regiment); Colonel and Mrs. Donald Mackintosh (Lieutenant Donald Mackintosh, son, The Seaforth Highlanders); Mr. Thomas White (Sergeant Albert White, son, The South Wales Borderers); Mrs. Jarratt



THE KING CONVERSES WITH LIEUT. R. N. STUART, R.N.R.

(Lance-Sergeant George Jarratt, husband, The Royal Fusiliers); Mrs. Cunningham (Corporal John Cunningham, son, The Leinster Regiment); Mr. and Mrs. Edward Waller (Private Horace Waller, son, The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry)).

In addition to the Crosses already mentioned

there were personal presentations in the following cases: Lance-Corporal W. R. Parker, R.M.L.I.; Lieutenant F. M. W. Harvey, Canadian Cavalry; Second-Lieutenant R. L. Haine, H.A.C.; Company-Sergeant Major E. Brooks, The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire



SEAMAN WILLIAM WILLIAMS, R.N.R.

Light Infantry; Sergeant H. Cator and Corporal E. Foster, The East Surrey Regiment; Lance-Corporal J. Welch, The Royal Berkshire Regiment; Sergeant W. Gosling, R.F.A.; Private C. Cox, The Bedfordshire Regiment; Private E. Sykes, The Northumberland Fusiliers; Private M. Heavside, The Durham Light Infantry; Private T. Dresser, The Yorkshire Regiment; Private G. Stringer, The Manchester Regiment; and the following four members of the Australian Infantry: Captain J. E. Newlands, Private J. C. Jensen, Private T. J. B. Kenny, Private M. O'Meara.

It will be observed that of this memorable batch of 30 Crosses no fewer than six were presented to members of the Australian Infantry, a corps to which a large number of Crosses had been already awarded.

The extraordinary fascination which the Victoria Cross possesses was shown by the eagerness of many persons of both sexes at the close of the ceremony to examine the decoration and to have a word with at least one of the heroes. The simple bronze emblem, in its dainty case, was readily but shyly shown, and the true modesty of the recipients was well instanced by the reply of a North Countryman who was asked to show his Cross again. "Oh," he answered smilingly, nodding towards another North Countryman a few yards away

who also, was surrounded by admirers, "go an' ask my mate. He'll show you *his!*" With this he gladly walked away.

The Colonial Forces had given many examples of exceptional courage on the part of the splendid men who had gone to the war-zones from far countries. These fighters were so indomitable, so daring, so calculatingly cool, that frequently they achieved the seemingly impossible. They survived almost incredible dangers, to fall victims to the minor happenings of war. Such was the case of Sergeant Donald Forrester Brown, Infantry Battalion, New Zealand Forces. During an attack machine-gun fire had caused very heavy casualties in officers and men of the company to which he belonged. Brown and a comrade advanced, at great personal risk, and were so successful that they reached a point within 30 yards of the enemy's guns. They captured a gun and killed four of the crew. The company resumed the advance and continued it until again held up by machine-gun fire; but the dauntless pair "rushed the gun and killed the crew." This second position having been won, the

company came under very heavy shell fire, and Brown's "utter contempt for danger" and his coolness did much to keep up the spirit of his men. The sergeant on this occasion did great things; subsequently he attacked single-handed, a machine-gun which was holding up an attack; and he killed the crew and captured the gun. This sergeant, therefore, had survived three apparently hopeless situations and had come safely through contests against overwhelming odds—yet while sniping the retreating enemy he was killed.

Another Colonial who showed magnificent courage was Lieutenant Rupert Vance Moon, Infantry Battalion, Australian Imperial Force. This officer's own immediate objective during an attack on a strong point was a position in advance of a hostile trench itself and thence against the trench. After the capture of the trench it was intended that his men should cooperate in a further assault on a strong point farther in rear. Moon was wounded in the initial advance, but reached his first objective. Then he led his men against the trench itself,



THE KING SHAKES HANDS WITH COLONEL AND MRS. DONALD MACKINTOSH
Whose son, Lieut. Donald Mackintosh (Seaforth Highlanders), was posthumously awarded the
Victoria Cross.

but was incapacitated by being again wounded, this time badly; yet he so inspired his men that he captured the trench. Moon's command had much diminished, but he continued to encourage and lead his survivors in a general attack. This was successfully pressed home,



LIEUT. R. V. MOON,
Australian Infantry.

although the lieutenant was again wounded. While the position was being consolidated Moon was wounded for the fourth time—severely, through the face—and it was not until now that he consented to withdraw from the fight. This subaltern's conduct was truly glorious and did much to win success against superior numbers, while he was also largely instrumental in safeguarding the flank of the attack and in capturing many prisoners and machine-guns.

The war provided countless instances of men holding resolutely to their duty in spite of wounds. Fit companion to Moon was Second Lieutenant (acting Captain) David Philip Hirsch, The Yorkshire Regiment, who, though twice wounded, reached a first objective, then returned over fire-swept slopes to satisfy himself that the defensive flank was being established. So intense was machine-gun fire that it was necessary for Hirsch to be continuously up and down the line, encouraging

his men to dig and hold their position. Literally confronting death, this brave officer went on encouraging his men by standing on the parapet and steadying them in face of machine-gun fire and counter-attack. And this he did till he was killed.

"He is reported missing, believed killed." Such was the ending of the official record which paid a fine tribute to the bravery and self-sacrifice of Temporary Second Lieutenant John Harrison, The East Yorkshire Regiment, who had already won the Military Cross. The conditions of an attack in which he was taking part were highly dangerous and unfavourable,



SECOND-LIEUT. (ACTING CAPTAIN)
D. P. HIRSCH,
late Yorkshire Regt.

the objective being in a dark wood, and darkness and the smoke from the enemy barrage and our own making it impossible to see when our barrage had lifted from the enemy front line. Despite these uncommon difficulties and dangers and heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, Harrison led his company against the enemy trench. He was repulsed, but the gallant young officer reorganized his command as best he could in No Man's Land.

Again, "in darkness, under terrific fire," he attacked, but unsuccessfully. At this stage he turned round, and single-handed dashed at an enemy machine-gun, "hoping to knock out the gun and so save the lives of many of his company."

For one of those acts of swift decision and



SERGT. W. GOSLING, R.F.A.



CAPT. R. C. GRIEVE,
Australian Infantry.

fearlessly accepting the risk of almost certain death of which the war record of Crosses contained so many the honour was conferred on Sergeant William Gosling, R.F.A., whose prompt and very gallant conduct undoubtedly saved the lives of the whole detachment, when he was in charge of a heavy trench mortar. A bomb which had been discharged fell only ten yards from the mortar, owing to a faulty cartridge, and the nose of the bomb sank into the ground. Gosling instantly sprang out, lifted the nose, unscrewed the fuse, and

threw it to the ground. The peril of the situation and the swiftness and courage of the sergeant were proved by the fact that the fuse instantly exploded on reaching the ground.

These last-named five awards were gazetted on June 14, 1917, and deserve special attention because three of them were posthumous. They were notable, too, because all, except Gosling's, illustrated the wide employment of machine-guns and the desperate nature of the attacks upon positions defended by means of these destructive weapons.

Of ten Victoria Crosses which were announced in the *Gazette* on August 2, 1917, no fewer than five were awarded for valour in attacking



TEMP. SECOND LIEUT. J. HARRISON, M.C.,
East Yorks Regiment.

machine-guns. The recipients of these five honours were Captain Robert Cuthbert Grieve, Australian Infantry; Lance-Corporal Samuel Frickleton, New Zealand Infantry; Private John Carroll, Australian Infantry; Private John George Pattison, Canadian Infantry; and Private William Ratchliffe, The South Lancashire Regiment. These were single-handed exploits of the most daring character, and were uncommonly successful.

Heavy fire from artillery and machine-guns had severely punished Grieve's company, and all his officers had been wounded. Grieve then located two hostile machine-guns which were holding up his advance, and despite continuous fire from both these weapons he attacked them with bombs and actually killed both the crews. Having done that, he re-organized the remnants of his company. At last he fell wounded, but by that time the

position had been secured, and the few remaining enemy were in full flight.

No number of fallen enemies was given in Grieve's case, but in that of Frickeleton's

was wounded for the second time, this injury being severe.

Carroll began his amazing record by rushing an enemy trench and bayoneting four of the



(Canadian official photograph.)

PRIVATE J. G. PATTISON,
Canadian Infantry.



LANCE-CORPORAL S. FRICKLETON,
New Zealand Infantry.



SECOND LIEUT. J. M. CRAIG,
Royal Scots Fusiliers.

who also destroyed two machine-guns, it was stated that he "attacked a second gun, killing the whole of the crew of 12." Previously, though slightly wounded, he had pushed into our barrage and destroyed a machine-gun with bombs, this weapon having caused heavy casualties. Later Frickeleton

enemy; then, seeing a comrade in difficulties, he went to help him, and killed one of the enemy. Afterwards, coming across a machine-gun and four men in a shell-hole, he attacked the whole team and killed three of the enemy and captured the gun; so that he had accounted for no fewer than eight opponents. But that was not all, for he extricated, in spite of shells and bullets, two comrades who had been buried by a shell. The battalion was in the line 96 hours, and during that time Carroll showed "most wonderful courage and fearlessness."

These records went from prodigy to prodigy and wonder grew with each successive tale. Carroll, of the Australian Infantry, was almost outdone by Pattison, of the Canadian Infantry. Again it was a machine-gun that was "inflicting severe casualties"; but there was now a change in the tactics of valour, for Pattison sprang forward and, "jumping from shell-hole to shell-hole," reached cover within 30 yards of the enemy gun. From this point, under heavy fire, he hurled bombs, and, having killed and wounded some of the crew, he rushed forward. There were five surviving hostile gunners, and these the Canadian put to the bayonet. The act seemed impossible, yet Carroll had accomplished it.


The bayonet was again the terrible weapon of the victor Ratcliffe, who had already shown uncommon courage and resource more than

once. He now, after an enemy trench had been captured, located a machine-gun which was firing on his comrades from the rear. Seeing this, he, on his own initiative and single-handed, instantly rushed the machine-gun position and bayoneted the crew. Then he brought the weapon into action in the front line.

Having on three occasions shown conspicuous bravery, Second Lieutenant John Manson Craig, The Royal Scots Fusiliers, again showed the exceptional courage and resource which earned the Cross. An advanced

rescue. The enemy continued to fire, and added to the peril of the situation by turning on shrapnel and high explosives, but Craig was as resourceful as he was brave, and by scooping cover for the wounded he was able to save their lives. The valour of his conduct was enhanced by the fact that he was within close range of the enemy, under full observation by them, and that it was broad daylight.

Added to the Etonians who had won the Cross in the War was Second-Lieutenant John Spencer Dunville, late Dragoons, who died



PRIVATE W. RATCLIFFE (South Lancashire Regt.) HEARS THE STORY OF HIS DEEDS READ OUT TO THE KING.

post having been rushed by the enemy, Craig immediately organized a rescue party. The enemy was tracked over broken country back to his trenches, and the subaltern then set his party to work removing the dead and wounded. This was done under heavy fire from rifles and machine-guns. A non-commissioned officer had been wounded, and a medical officer who had gone to his aid was also wounded severely; unhesitatingly Craig went to their help, and managed to get the N.C.O. under cover. Having done that he returned for the medical officer. In getting the doctor to safety Craig was himself wounded, but he stubbornly kept to his resolve to save the doctor, and after strenuous and persevering efforts he completed his work of

on June 26, 1917, aged 21 years. His honour, like that of Temporary Second-Lieutenant Frederick Youens, The Durham Light Infantry, was posthumous. Dunville's act was singularly unselfish and courageous. He was in charge of a party of scouts and Royal Engineers in demolishing the enemy's wire, and so that he might absolutely ensure the success of his work he placed himself between a non-commissioned officer of the Engineers and the fire, a noble protection which enabled the N.C.O. to finish a work of great importance. Dunville was severely wounded, but he continued to direct his men in the wire-cutting and general operations until the raid was completed. This brave subaltern afterwards died of his wounds.



SECOND LIEUT. J. S. DUNVILLE,
late Dragons.

Lieutenant Youens also died of the wounds he received when winning his Cross. While on patrol he was wounded, and was obliged to go back to his trenches to have the wounds dressed. A report coming in that the enemy were preparing to raid our trenches, Youens,

peril which British officers and men had so constantly met successfully. Youens without a moment's loss of time picked up the bomb and hurled it over the parapet. Shortly afterwards another bomb fell near the same place, and again Youens picked the deadly missile up, intending to throw it away as he had thrown the other. But this time the bomb burst in his hand, severely wounding him and some of his men; but the officer's prompt and gallant action had undoubtedly saved several of his men's lives, and his energy and resource resulted in the complete repulse of the enemy's raid. Youens afterwards succumbed to his wounds.

Completing the 10 Crosses were those which were awarded to Second-Lieutenant Harold Broadbent Maufe, Royal Garrison Artillery, and Second-Lieutenant Frank Bernard Wearne, The Essex Regiment. Maufe's conduct was marked by very great enterprise, for, under intense artillery fire, on his own initiative, and unaided, he repaired a telephone wire between forward and rear positions, and so enabled his battery to open fire at once on the enemy. He added to that smart performance by preventing what might have been a most disastrous occurrence. This was extinguishing a fire in an advanced ammunition dump, which had been caused by a heavy explosion, the risk being



SECOND LIEUT. F. B. WEARNE,
Essex Regt.

disregarding his wound, set out at once to rally the team of a Lewis gun which heavy shell-fire had disorganized. While this was being done an enemy bomb fell on the Lewis gun position without exploding, and instantly created one of those situations of supreme



LIEUT.-COMMANDER (then ACTING
LIEUT.) W. E. SANDERS, R.N.R.

intensified by the presence of gas-shells in the dump, a fact of which the lieutenant was aware.

Second-Lieutenant Wearne showed very great courage when commanding a small party on the left of a raid on the enemy's trenches. He

bravely reached his objective and as bravely maintained his position, according to his orders. He was repeatedly attacked, and realizing that, if the left flank was lost, his men would have to give way, Wearne, at a most critical moment, leaped on the parapet, and, followed by his left section, "ran along the top of the trench, firing and throwing bombs." A manœuvre so daring and unexpected disconcerted the enemy and threw him back in disorder. Wearne was

servicing with the Canadian Forces, had been wounded.

From the Admiralty on June 22, 1917, came the announcement of the award of two Victoria Crosses, one to "Acting Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-Commander)" William Edward Sanders, R.N.R., and the other to Lance-Corporal Walter Richard Parker, R.M.L.I., Royal Naval Division. No details were given of Sanders's achievement beyond the formal



TEMP. SECOND LIEUT. F. YOUENS,
Durham Light Infantry.


severely wounded while on the top of the trench, but refused to leave his men. He remained at his post and his duty. Just before the order to withdraw was given he was severely hit for the second time, and was mortally wounded while being carried away. This young officer—he was 22 years old—afforded another instance of the posthumous award of the Cross, there being three of these cases in the 10. He enlisted when war broke out, and six months later received his commission. In 1916 he was severely wounded. Returning to the front in May, 1917, he was killed on June 28 following. His elder brother, Captain K. M. Wearne, The Essex Regiment, had been killed a few weeks previously, and another brother,



SECOND LIEUT. T. H. B. MAUFE,
R.G.A.

intimation that the Victoria Cross had been awarded "in recognition of his conspicuous gallantry, consummate coolness, and skill in command of one of H.M. ships in action." This was the exact wording of the announcement of the award of the Cross to Commander Gordon Campbell, D.S.O., R.N., spoken of at the time as a "mystery V.C.)* The necessary suppression of particulars resulted in the circulation of many "true" stories of the deeds, but as the tales varied amazingly it was clear that some of the truth-tellers unwittingly romanced. There was, however, no erring on the side of smallness of performance, for in every case the act was so splendid as almost to put into the

* Vol. XII, p. 186.



BOMBING A GERMAN DUG-OUT.

shade even the most magnificent of the achievements for which the Cross had been actually given. Sanders did not live long to enjoy his great honour, for his death was officially reported—no details being given—on August 20, 1917. He had become a sub-lieutenant in

the Royal Naval Reserve in April, 1916. After Sanders's death it was said that he was in charge of an anti-submarine vessel which was attacked by a German submarine. His ship was severely damaged by shell-fire and he was the only unwounded member of his com-

pany; but he handled his gun personally and sank the submarine, killing 13 of her crew and bringing four prisoners to port. Subsequently he was the means of destroying four other enemy submarines.



[Swaine.]

LANCE-CORPORAL. W. R. PARKER,
R.M.L.I.

Parker was the third member of the Red Marines and the second member of the Royal Naval Division to win the Cross during the war. His case was remarkable because more than two years elapsed between the performance of his act of valour and the public intimation of the award. In this case also times and places were mentioned, the occasion being the Dardanelles operations. Parker was one of those gallant stretcher-bearers whose courage had been so often shown in the most perilous surroundings, a courage that was all the more to be commended because there could not be for these non-combatants the fierce joy of the actual battle, and his act was purely voluntary. On the night of April 30—May 1, 1915, a message was received from an isolated fire trench at Gaba Tepe, asking for ammunition, water and medical stores. Parker had already, during three days, shown great bravery and energy under fire, while in charge of the battalion stretcher-bearers, and now, when a party of non-commissioned officers and men were detailed to carry water and ammunition, and there was a call for a volunteer from among the stretcher-bearers, the lance-corporal at once responded. The extreme peril of the undertaking was obvious, for several men had been killed in a previous attempt to assist the men who were holding the fire trench, and to reach the trench a completely exposed and rifle-fire-swept

area at least 400 yards wide had to be traversed. When the party emerged from shelter it was daylight, and one of the men was immediately wounded. Parker organized a stretcher-party, then, going on alone, for all the water and ammunition carriers had been either killed or wounded, he succeeded in reaching the fire trench, where he assisted the wounded, "displaying extreme courage and remaining cool and collected in very trying circumstances." Finally the trench had to be evacuated, but Parker, although he was seriously wounded during the operation, helped to remove and attend the wounded.

Eight awards of the Cross were announced from the War Office on June 27, 1917, two of them being posthumous. These were the cases of Lieutenant Robert Grierson Combe,



LIEUT. R. G. COMBE,
Canadian Infantry.

Canadian Infantry Battalion, and Sergeant Albert White, The South Wales Borderers. The Canadian officer gloriously maintained the reputation for valour and resource which the Colonial troops had established. He afforded yet another illustration of a fighter escaping many great dangers to fall at last to a sniper's bullet. Combe showed the utmost courage in steadying his company under intense fire; indeed, so severe were his losses that when he

had led his men through the enemy barrage he had only five men left ; but he had reached his objective. Combe now coolly and most courageously bombed the enemy, on whom he inflicted heavy losses ; then, collecting small groups of men, he attacked the objective so resolutely that he captured it and 80 prisoners. Repeatedly he charged the enemy and drove them before him, all the time inspiring and leading his men. It was due to his valour and example that the position was carried and held. Bombing formed an important part of this officer's exploit, and it was while personally leading the bombers that he was killed by an enemy sniper.

White, because of his willing sacrifice of his life to save others and secure the success of the work he had in charge, won a high place in the list of heroes and amongst the officers and men of the old 24th Regiment who had gained for that corps an unexampled number of Victoria Crosses. He realized that an enemy machine-gun, which had been previously located, would probably hold up the whole advance of his company. White, seeing this,



CORPORAL E. FOSTER,
East Surrey Regt.

instantly dashed ahead of his company with the object of capturing the gun. The enterprise was of the most desperate character. The sergeant might have miraculously escaped ; his very intrepidity and swiftness might have given him one of the little dazzling victories which had often attended the single-handed rushes against these deadly weapons. His quickness and bravery actually did carry him through the hail of fire to within a few yards

of the gun ; then he fell, "riddled with bullets."

Singularly like the gallant Sergeant White's deed, but with a more fortunate result, was the act for which Company-Sergeant-Major Edward Brooks, The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire



CO.-SERGT.-MAJOR E. BROOKS,
Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

Light Infantry, was awarded the Cross. While taking part in a raid on the enemy's trenches, this warrant officer saw that the front wave was checked by a machine-gun at close quarters. Just as regardless of personal danger as White had been, Brooks, on his own initiative, rushed forward from the second wave with the object of capturing the gun. He reached the weapon, killed one of the gunners with his revolver and bayoneted another. So far splendid, but the act was not complete, for the rest of the gun's crew made off, leaving the gun in the sergeant-major's possession. He promptly turned the weapon on the retreating enemy and at last carried it into our lines. This was another of the great personal achievements of the war by which much of the success of an operation was assured and undoubtedly many lives were saved.

A very brilliant affair of machine and Lewis guns went to the credit of Corporal Edward Foster, The East Surrey Regiment. An advance was held up by two machine-guns in a portion of a village. These weapons, being entrenched and strongly fortified by wire entanglements, were a formidable obstacle ; but the corporal, who was in charge of two Lewis guns, succeeded in entering the trench. He engaged the two machine-guns, and during the fight one of the Lewis guns was lost. The



THE KING CONGRATULATES CORPORAL G. J. HOWELL (Australian Infantry).

situation which then arose was dangerous, but Foster showed the bravery and resource which were needful to master it. With "reckless courage" he rushed forward and bombed the enemy and actually managed to recover the temporarily lost gun. Strengthened by this bold and triumphant onslaught, Corporal Foster mercilessly and most gallantly

worked his two Lewis guns, and with such telling effect that he killed "the enemy gun team" and "captured their guns"; and so enabled the advance to continue successfully.

A whole battalion witnessed the conspicuous bravery of Corporal George Julian Howell Infantry Battalion, Australian Imperial Force, and it was told of them that in subsequent

counter-attacks they were greatly inspired by his example. Howell's was a single-handed exploit, accomplished on his own initiative. He saw that a party of the enemy were likely to outflank his battalion, whereupon, alone and exposed to heavy bomb and rifle fire, he climbed on to the top of the parapet and bombed the enemy back along the trench. He maintained this victorious proceeding until

enemy, more than once going into the open, fully exposed to heavy fire at short range, to search for and collect ammunition and spare parts in order to keep his guns in action.

Private Tom Dresser, The Yorkshire Regiment, performed an act of sheer devotion to duty in delivering an important message from Battalion Headquarters to the front line of trenches. In carrying out his very dangerous



PRIVATE TOM DRESSER (YORKSHIRE REGT.) RECEIVES HIS V.C.

his stock of bombs was exhausted; then he continued the attack with his bayonet, and was plying this truly British weapon when he was severely wounded. It was a fine spectacle and rejoiced the hearts of the considerable number of men who saw it.

"Armed only with an empty revolver," Lance-Corporal James Welch, The Royal Berkshire Regiment, after entering an enemy trench and killing a man in a severe hand-to-hand struggle, chased four of the enemy across the open and captured them single-handed. For five hours, until he was wounded by a shell, Welch kept up machine-gun fire on the

task he was twice wounded, but in spite of great pain he fearlessly persisted in his undertaking and at last reached the front line of trenches in an exhausted condition. It was recorded of Private Dresser that the delivery of the message "at any cost" proved of the greatest value to his battalion at a critical period.

This list of eight awards was completed by the record of Private Jack White, a signaller of the Royal Lancaster Regiment. During an attempt to cross a river White saw the two pontoons ahead of him come under heavy machine-gun fire with disastrous results. By

the time his own pontoon had reached mid-stream every man except himself was either dead or wounded and White found that he was not able to control the pontoon. He thereupon promptly tied a telephone wire to the pontoon



LANCE-CORPL. J. WELCH,
Royal Berks Regiment.

jumped overboard, and towed it to the shore. By doing this the signaller saved an officer's life and brought to land the rifles and equipment of "the other men in the boat, who were either dead or dying." This was a very resourceful act and in its details afforded a considerable change from the nature of many of the deeds for which the award of the Cross was contemporaneously announced.

On July 14, 1917, a memorial was unveiled in the churchyard at Withnell, Corley, to Private James Miller, to whom the Cross had been awarded for an act like Dresser's. Miller delivered his message and returned with the answer; but in doing so he was mortally wounded.

Shortly after the memorial to Miller had been unveiled a memorial tablet was unveiled and dedicated in Warneford Chapel, Highworth, Church, Wiltshire, to the late Flight Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, V.C., R.N.A.S.* This memorial had been subscribed to by 68 members of the Warneford family throughout the world. It was unveiled by Mrs. Maude Nightingale, and only members of the family were present at the ceremony.

The award of two Victoria Crosses was gazetted on July 5, 1917, one being posthumous—Second-Lieutenant (acting Captain) Arthur

Henderson, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. This officer, during an attack on the enemy trenches, although very soon wounded in the left arm, led his company through the front enemy line until his final objective was gained. Then he consolidated his position, which was in danger of being isolated through bombing attacks and heavy fire from machine-guns and rifles. "By his cheerful courage and coolness he was enabled to maintain the spirit of his men under most trying conditions." This fine officer was killed after he had successfully accomplished his task.

Private John Readitt, The South Lancashire Regiment, was the other recipient, his conduct being marked by very splendid bravery and devotion to duty. Readitt was working down a broad, deep watercourse, and took part in advances the desperate nature of which was shown by the fact that, in the face of very heavy machine-gun fire at very close range, he was the sole survivor on five occasions. These five onslaughts, however, drove back the enemy machine-guns and "about 300 yards of watercourse was



PRIVATE J. WHITE,
Royal Lancaster Regiment.

made good in an hour." On his own initiative, Readitt, after his officer had been killed, organized and made several more advances, but on reaching the enemy barricade he was forced by a counter-attack to retire. The unconquerable soldier, however, gave ground slowly and continued bomb-throwing, and when supports reached him he held a forward bend by bombing until the position was consolidated. Readitt's conduct in itself was

* Vol. X, p. 23.

most admirable, and was specially valuable in that it saved the left flank and enabled his battalion to maintain its position.

The extreme ill fortune of becoming prisoners of war in Germany befell more than one Victoria Cross recipient, amongst these captives being the brilliant young airman William Leefe Robinson and Lieutenant G. S. M. Insall, another famous aviator. Insall became a prisoner in Germany in December, 1915, and his case became of much public interest owing to a letter written from Paris by his father, and published in *The Times* on July 3, 1917, describing the officer's cruel treatment in confinement. The son wrote from Crefeld on April 28 saying that he had just been removed to a cell, approximately 6 ft. by 9 ft. in size, with a small window



PRIVATE J. READITT,
South Lancashire Regt.

fitted with an apparatus to shut out all light but which at the time he wrote had not been brought into use. One hour's walk a day in a small yard shut in on all sides was the only exercise allowed him. Lieutenant Insall was sentenced to solitary confinement for 20 days with the door of the cell unlocked, to be followed by five months with the door kept locked. Seven other British officers were undergoing the same sentence, and the lieutenant had been instructed to tell his

father that this was a "reprisal" for supposed similar treatment to German officers in England. In his letter to *The Times* the justly indignant father observed that the German authorities were well aware that no protest could possibly be made before these



SEC. LIEUT. (acting CAPT.) A. HENDERSON,
M.C.,
Late Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

officers had undergone a considerable part of their sentence. This case of gross ill-treatment of British officers who had become prisoners of war was by no means isolated: it was merely one of many that could be fully proved against a degraded and brutal nation that was utterly lost to all sense of chivalry and honour. Perhaps an explanation of their unconscionable treatment of a British hero was to be found in the fact that they knew full well how grievously German troops had been beaten and humiliated by men who had won the Victoria Cross.

Soon after these details of German barbarism had been published, and while the feeling of indignation and contempt they aroused was still strong, there was a dramatic and unexpected development, for the announcement was made that Insall had escaped from Germany and had reached London. The daring and resourceful young officer had previously made two attempts to escape, these



THE RUNNER'S LAST STRIDE.

efforts bringing upon him not merely closer confinement, but rigorous punishment. He was also one of the officers whom the Germans placed in German towns threatened with Allied air raids, for the purpose of so-called "reprisals." Insall had been a prisoner for

more than 18 months, and had not received the Cross which had been awarded to him for his flight over German lines on November 7, 1915. He was brought down and made a prisoner 10 days before his honour was gazetted. Soon after reaching

England Insall had the great joy of receiving his Cross from the King.

From time to time brief statements were published concerning the death of recipients



LIEUT. G. S. M. INSALL, R.F.C.,
Decorated with the V.C.

of the Cross during the war, and among these announcements none was more regrettable than that relating to the noble Captain Noel Godfrey Chavasse, R.A.M.C.* Early in August, 1917, it was reported that this brave medical officer had died of wounds received while attending to his medical work at the front. Chavasse was born in 1884, and for some time was attached to The King's (Liver-



SERGT. F. C. BOOTH, South African Forces,
attached Rhodesian Native Regt. (p. 366).

pool Regiment). He had been at the front since the beginning of the war. He was a

twin son of the Bishop of Liverpool, an interesting circumstance which had a parallel in the fact that the first winner of the Victoria Cross in the war, Captain F. O. Grenfell, was also a twin son.†

There was no cause for surprise, but much for deep gratification, when the announcement was made that a Bar had been awarded to the Cross which Chavasse had won. This was a rare honour, and it is a remarkable fact that the only other recipient of the double honour was also a member of the Royal Army Medical Corps—Lieutenant Arthur Martin-Leake.‡ The details given of Chavasse's conduct



CAPT. N. G. CHAVASSE, V.C., R.A.M.C.
(Bar to Cross).

showed how truly he had won the official description of "devoted and gallant officer." Though severely wounded early in action, while carrying a wounded soldier to the dressing-station, Chavasse refused to leave his post, and for two days he not only continued to perform his duties but also went out repeatedly under heavy fire to search for and attend the wounded who were lying out. During these searches Chavasse was practically without food, he was "worn with fatigue and faint with his wound," yet he helped to carry in a number of badly wounded men, over heavy and difficult ground. It was due to his "extraordinary energy and inspiring

* Vol. XII, p. 170. † Vol. X, p. 3. ‡ Vol. X, p. 27.



[Official photograph.]

CARRYING IN WOUNDED UNDER FIRE.

example" that many wounded were rescued who would otherwise undoubtedly have succumbed to the bad weather conditions.

There had been many displays of almost superhuman courage and endurance in the war, displays which had been recognized by the bestowal of the greatest of all naval and military distinctions; but standing out prominently even amongst these proofs of highest bravery and duty was the heroism of Chavasse.

The following is a list of the Victoria Crosses, the award of which was made known between March and August, 1917, the rank given being that which the recipient held at the time of the announcement of the award:

BALL, Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) A., D.S.O., M.C., Notts and Derby Regt. and R.F.C.
 BOOTH, Sergt. J. C., South African Forces, attd. Rhodesia Native Regt.
 BROOKS, Co.-Sergt.-Major E., Oxford and Bucks L.I.
 BROWN, Sergt. D. F., Infantry Bn., N.Z. Forces.
 BRYAN, Lce.-Corpl. T., Northumberland Fus.
 CARROLL, Pte. J., Aus. Inf.
 CATOR, Sergt. H., East Surrey Regt.
 CHAVASSE, Capt. N. G., V.C., R.A.M.C. (Bar to Cross).
 CHERRY, 2nd Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) P. H., M.C., Aus. Imp. Force.
 COMBE, Lieut. R. G., Canadian Inf. Bn.
 COX, Pte. C., Bedford Regt.

CRAIG, 2nd Lieut. J. M., Royal Scots Fus.
 CUNNINGHAM, Corpl. J., Leinster Regt.
 DRESSER, Pte. T., Yorkshire Regt.
 DUNVILLE, 2nd Lieut. J. S., Dragoons.
 FOSTER, Corpl. E., East Surrey Regt.
 FRICKLETON, Lce.-Corpl. S., N.Z. Inf.
 GOSLING, Sergt. W., R.F.A.
 GRIEVE, Capt. R. C., Aus. Inf.
 HAINE, 2nd Lieut. R. L., H.A.C.
 HARRISON, Temp. 2nd Lieut. J., East Yorkshire Regt.
 HARVEY, Lieut. F. M. W., Canadian Force.
 HEAVISIDE, Pte. M., Durham L.I.
 HENDERSON, 2nd Lieut. (Acting Capt.) A, M.C., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
 HENDERSON, Major (Acting Lieut.-Col.) E. E. D. North Staffordshire Regt.
 HIRSCH, 2nd Lieut. (Acting Capt.) D. P., Yorkshire Regt.
 HOWELL, Corpl. G. J., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 JARRATT, Corpl. G., Royal Fus.
 JENSEN, Pte. J. C., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 KENNY, Pte. T. J. B., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 LUMSDEN, Major F. W., Royal Marine Artillery.
 MACKINTOSH, Lieut. D., Seaforth Highlanders.
 MAUFE, 2nd Lieut. I. H. B., R.G.A.
 McDOWELL, Capt. T. W., D.S.O., Canadian Inf. Bn.
 McNAMARA, Lieut. F. H., Aus. Forces, R.F.C.
 MILNE, Pte. W. J., Canadian Inf. Bn.

- MOON, Lieut. R. V., Inf Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 NEWLANDS, Capt. J. E., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 ORMSBY, Sergt. J. W., Yorkshire L.I.
 PATTISON, Pte. J. G., Canadian Inf.
 PARKER, Lce.-Corpl. W. R., Royal Marine L.I. R.N.D.
 PHILLIPS, Temp. Lieut. and Adj. R. E., Royal Warwickshire Regt.
 POLLARD, 2nd Lieut. A. O., M.C., H.A.C.
 POPE, Lieut. C., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 RATCLIFFE, Pte. W., South Lancs Regt.
 READITT, Pte. J., South Lancs Regt.
 REID, Capt. O. A., Liverpool Regt.
 SANDERS, Acting Lieut. W. E., R.N.R.
- SIFTON, Lce.-Sergt. E. W., Canadian Inf. Bn.
 STEELE, Lce.-Sergt. T., Seaforth Highlanders.
 STUART, Lieut. R. N., R.N.R.
 SYKES, Pte. E., Northumberland Fus.
 WALLER, Pte. H., Yorkshire L.I.
 WEARNE, 2nd Lieut. F. B., Essex Regt.
 WELCH, Lce.-Corpl. J., Royal Berks Regt.
 WHEELER, Major G. C., Gurkha Rifles, Ind. Army.
 WHITE, Sergt. A., South Wales Borderers.
 WHITE, Pte. J., Royal Lancaster Regt.
 WILLIAMS, Seaman W., R.N.R.
 WHITTLE, Sergt. J. W., Inf. Bn., Aus. Imp. Force.
 YOUENS, Temp. 2nd Lieut. F., Durham L.I.



VICTORIA CROSS.

Bronze, with deep crimson ribbon (actual size.)

CHAPTER CCVI.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA (III.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA AT THE CLOSE OF 1916—THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL TOMBEUR—WORK OF ORGANIZATION—OPENING OF THE OFFENSIVE, APRIL, 1916—CONQUEST OF REGION BETWEEN TANGANYIKA AND VICTORIA NYANZA—BRITISH COLUMN SEIZES MWANZA—COLONEL OLSEN OCCUPIES UJIJI—JOINT ADVANCE ON TABORA—LIFE IN TABORA UNDER THE GERMANS—HARSH TREATMENT OF BRITISH PRISONERS—BELGIANS ENTER TABORA—GERMAN FORCES RETREAT SOUTH TOWARDS MAHENGE—RESULTS OF THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN—GENERAL NORTHEY'S CAMPAIGN—ADVANCE FROM THE NYASA-RHODESIA FRONTIER—TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES—NEARLY 400,000 CARRIERS EMPLOYED—GERMAN FORCES DEFEATED—NORTHEY'S ADVANCE TO IRINGA—GERMANS FROM TABORA UNDER GENERAL WAHLE PIERCE NORTHEY'S LINES—VAN DEVENTER'S COOPERATION FROM THE NORTH—MAHENGE FORCE ATTACKS NORTHEY—ASSAILANTS REPULSED—GERMAN CONCENTRATION AROUND MAHENGE—COMBINED OFFENSIVE BY VAN DEVENTER AND NORTHEY FAILS—GENERAL SMUTS RE-ORGANIZES HIS ARMY AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION—KILWA OPERATIONS—ADVANCE TOWARDS THE RUFJI—GERMAN MAIN FORCE ESCAPES FROM THE MGETA—CAPTAIN SELOUS KILLED—CHANGES IN THE COMMAND—PORTUGAL'S HELP.

IN earlier chapters dealing with the campaign in East Africa it has been shown that the central position of the German Protectorate, with interior lines of communication (including two railways), together with the free use of Lake Tanganyika, gave the Germans at the outset very considerable advantages. Nevertheless, as Great Britain held command of the sea and as landward German East Africa was surrounded by British, Belgian or Portuguese territory, it was only a question of time when the geographical factors would turn to the advantage of the Allies.

Thus, after a delay of a year and a half, adequate forces having been raised, the greater part of German East Africa was seized by the Allies in the seven months March—September, 1916. General Smuts conquered the region from Kilimanjaro to Dar es Salaam, the Belgians the region from the great lakes to Tabora, while General Northey occupied the south-west part of the country. The Germans were then

restricted to the south, the south centre and south-eastern regions (save for the coast line). This, however, was an area considerably larger than England, Scotland and Wales combined, and in it they had fair freedom of movement. After evacuating Tabora the German troops in that region, who were under General Wahle, retired south-east towards Mahenge, a government station on a high plateau centrally situated between the northern end of Lake Nyasa and the sea at Kilwa. Part of the enemy force which had opposed General Smuts also retreated to Mahenge, its commanding officer being Major Kraut. In its retreat General Wahle's force harried, and was harried by, General Northey's columns. Wahle broke through the British lines and joined Kraut, who was being threatened from the north by General Van Deventer, the commander of General Smuts's Second Division. In the closing days of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 a combined effort was made by Generals Van Deventer and Northey

to "round up" the Germans holding the Mahenge plateau. The movement promised success, but, in the words of General Smuts, the enemy "eventually escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness, and eluded pursuit."

Meantime the main enemy force, under Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, upon whom the Kaiser in November, 1916, conferred the Order Pour le Mérite, had been driven by General Smuts to the region of the Rufiji, south of Dar-es-Salaam. At this period General Smuts reorganized his forces, and, in view of the extremely unhealthy character of the country in which further operations were to be conducted, as many as possible of the white troops from South Africa were sent home, over 12,000 leaving East Africa between the middle of October and the end of December, 1916. They were replaced by newly raised battalions of King's African Rifles and by a Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe. On January 1, 1917, General Smuts began a new offensive in the Rufiji area, his object being to cut all connexion between the enemy in the Rufiji and Mahenge regions and either to envelop the enemy on the Rufiji or to deal a heavy blow as he escaped south. The last object was accomplished; a heavy blow was inflicted upon von Lettow-Vorbeck's force, but it was not brought to a decisive engagement. This brief campaign was ended in March by the advent of the rainy season. While it was in progress General Smuts was summoned to England to represent South

Africa in the special sittings of the War Cabinet. He relinquished his command on January 20, 1917, being succeeded by Major-General A. R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had previously commanded the First Division.

General Smuts's Kilimanjaro and main campaigns, including the operations of General Van Deventer, have been described in Vol. XII, Chapter CLXXXIII. The campaign carried out by the Belgians was equally successful and only second to those of General Smuts in importance. The difficulties the Belgians had to overcome before they were in a position to take the offensive were exceedingly great. Two tasks confronted them—(1) the creation of an Expeditionary Force; (2) the provision of supplies and means of transport. The second task was the more serious; men in sufficient numbers were forthcoming from the warlike tribes of the Congo regions. Unlike General Smuts's army there were no Europeans other than officers and a few gunners in the Belgian force. But the Congo produced practically nothing that an army needs save food, and all other supplies had to be drawn from Europe. Even when they had reached Africa there was, either from the Congo estuary or from Cape Town, a journey of from 2,000 to 3,000 miles before the Belgian headquarters were reached. Means of communication in Central Africa are very inadequate. The completion in March 1915 (after the war had been in progress nine months) of a railway from the Lualaba, as the upper



THE BELGIAN TORPEDO-BOAT "NETTA" ON LAKE TANGANYIKA.

Congo is called, to Tanganyika gave indeed a rail and steamer connexion from the mouth of the Congo to the lake, but it was a tedious journey involving breaking bulk seven times. The route from Cape Town was even more arduous, though it began deceptively with a train journey, without change of gauge, of 2,300 miles, *via* Bulawayo and Livingstone (just above the Victoria Falls) to railhead north of Elizabethville in Katanga. Then the trouble began. There was first 150 miles of atrocious road with heights varying from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, just possible for traction engines—if water could be found; then a few more miles of rail, to Bukama on the Lualaba; next a 400 miles stretch of river down which lighters and shallow draught steamers find a doubtful passage through rocks and shoals; and last the newly completed railway to Lake Tanganyika—if Tanganyika was the destination. If Kivu was the objective there would be a further 200 or 300 miles to be covered on foot, for German supremacy on Lake Tanganyika debarred at that time the Belgians from the use of its 400 miles of waterway.

Not only had the Belgians to equip their Expeditionary Force in spite of the difficulties indicated regarding transport; from the beginning of the war they had to meet German attacks on their frontier,* and though the enemy was held in check these early operations caused some delay in preparing the offensive. The official upon whom fell responsibility both for the creation and supply of an adequate force, and also for the general direction of the operations, was M. Tombeur, who at the outbreak of war held the rank of State Inspector, and acted as Vice-Governor General of Katanga, the rich copper and iron region adjoining Northern Rhodesia. M. Tombeur was originally an infantry officer in the Belgian army. Adopting a colonial career, he had held commands in the Welle and Kivu districts before his appointment to Katanga, which brought him into touch with South Africa. When the war began he, in conjunction with the Rhodesian authorities, undertook such defensive measures as were immediately possible. In February 1915 he was made commander in chief of the Belgian troops in Africa with the rank of colonel. The work of preparation occupied the next 12 months. The normal strength of the Belgian forces in the Congo was no more than adequate

for the preservation of order—a body of some 16,000 men to guard a territory larger than Germany, France, Italy and Austria combined. But as from its foundation the Congo State had been declared neutral, its military forces were not organized for offensive purposes. Belgian statesmen had indeed, even after Belgium itself had been invaded, sought, unavailingly, to preserve the neutrality of their African colony, which was first violated by the unprovoked attack by a German steamer on the



[Bassano.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL A. R. HOSKINS, C.M.G.
Succeeded General Smuts in the command of the British Forces in German East Africa.

port of Lukuga, on Lake Tanganyika.* Forced therefore into the war in Africa, the Belgians set systematically to work to make such thorough preparations that when they took the offensive their blow should be effective. The active help of Great Britain was assured from the first.

The first development of the offensive was the wresting of the supremacy on Lake Tanganyika from the Germans. This was accomplished with the help of two small British vessels under Commander Spicer Simson, R.N. They were fast motor boats, called the Mimi and Toutou, provided with heavier armament than that possessed by the German steamers. The scheme for sending the boats was approved

* The effort made by Belgium to preserve neutrality in the Congo and the later proposals of Germany for neutrality in Equatorial Africa are described in Vol. VIII. pp. 283–285.

* See Vol. X, p. 149 *et seq.*

by the Admiralty in March, 1915; the boats with their crews arrived at Cape Town about the end of June, and nearly six months were occupied in transporting them to the lake. The route followed was that given above as from Cape Town to Tanganyika. An idea of the difficulties overcome is conveyed in the following extract from Commander Simson's report of the road section of 150 miles through Katanga. It may be taken as an example of what the bringing up of supplies to the Belgian front meant.

The officers and men of the Expedition have cheerfully

worked under the most trying conditions of heat always, rain occasionally, and thick dust on most occasions. The first and last of these conditions were particularly hard to bear on account of the shortness of water which was experienced. Washing, and even drinking water was voluntarily given up for use in the boilers of the traction engines in order that the progress of the Expedition should not be delayed. Only those who have had to work without shade in the thick dust raised by the engines under a tropical sun, with the added discomforts of nothing to drink and nothing to wash in, can realize what determination is necessary to maintain the necessary energy to overcome the great difficulties which were encountered on the road. It was, in the opinion of all competent judges who knew the road, sheer madness to attempt to take traction engines alone over it, and more so to try to tow the boats by this means, or any other. I wish to bring to your notice the excellent work



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN.

done by Sub-Lieutenant A. Dudley, R.N.V.R., who was in charge of the transport. It is mainly due to his exertions that the transport of the boats over the road was safely accomplished.

The Belgians also launched a small boat, the *Netta*, on Tanganyika, and the "Allied Fleet" at once took action. The *Kingani* was captured on December 26, and the *Herman von Wissmann* sunk on February 9, 1916. After these events the remaining German steamer, the *Graf von Götzen*, would not risk an engagement, sheltering in Kigoma Harbour, and the final destruction of the enemy naval force on Tanganyika awaited the development of military and aerial operations. Navigation of Lake Kivu was of less importance than that of Tanganyika, but there, too, the Germans had had the upper hand. Conditions were reversed in March, 1916, when the Belgians having placed on its water a small gunboat, the *Paul Renkin*, and an armed motor boat, the *Tshiloango*, the Germans, seeing themselves in a hopeless position, sank the small vessels with which they had up to then dominated Kivu and prevented the transport of Belgian troops.

By this time, March, 1916, Colonel Tombeur's preparations were almost complete. It was the month in which General Smuts opened his campaign in the Kilimanjaro region. On the eve of his taking the offensive Colonel Tombeur was promoted Major-General. The force he had formed was a little over 10,000 strong, divided into two brigades and various minor detachments. Its organization had been carried out with minute care. There were special companies of bridge-pioneers, bombers, telegraphists and telephonists; and transport, wireless telegraphy, medical and supply services were all ample. The fighting force consisted entirely of infantry and gunners. Each battalion had its quota of machine guns and each regiment its quick-firing guns. In all there were 60 machine guns and 12 cannon. More of both would have been desirable, but what there were did good service.* The plan of campaign was conditioned as much by geographical as military considerations. The only place on Tanganyika where a landing would have served General Tombeur's purposes, Kigoma, the port of Ujiji, was strongly defended. Thus no attempt was made to invade German East Africa

* After the loss of Tabora the Germans tried to explain their defeat by alleging that the Belgian force opposed to them was 25,000 strong and had 72 cannon and 108 machine guns. The true figures were as stated in the text.

by the lake. But as the Anglo-Belgian flotilla assured the adequate defence of Tanganyika, the Belgian force, which up to February 1916 had been charged with that duty, was free for service elsewhere. This force, the Southern Brigade, was under a very capable officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Olsen, a Dane who had been



GENERAL TOMBEUR, K.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Forces in
Africa.

long in the Congo service. He had aided in the defence of the Rhodesian frontier in 1915. His brigade was now placed along the Rusizi river, which connects lakes Tanganyika and Kivu, where it was in position to menace the north-eastern shores of Tanganyika. The other, or Northern Brigade, was distributed at either end of Lake Kivu and north of that lake along the Congo-Uganda border. Colonel Molitor, who at the outbreak of war was Commandant-Supérieur of the troops in the province adjoining German East Africa, and had since been Chief of Staff to General Tombeur, now, March 1916, assumed command of the Northern Brigade. In conjunction with Colonel Olsen's brigade it was intended to clear the Germans from the region between lakes Tanganyika and Victoria.

It was a wonderful country in which Colonel Molitor had to campaign—the land of the Nile Springs and the mysterious Mountains of the Moon. Immediately north of Lake Kivu

are a series of volcanoes (known as the Mfumbiro Range), some of them very active, the highest reaching to 14,780 feet. Round several of them is a great lava sheet, in part bare, in part forested. Further east, extending through Western Uganda to Victoria Nyanza, is a region of plateaus, hills, forests, lakes, rivers and swamps, the main river being the Kagera. Here the Belgians joined hands with the British force guard-



[Elliott & Fry.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR CHARLES P. CREWE, C.B., K.C.M.G.,
In command of the British Lake Detachment
in Central Africa.

ing the Uganda frontier. From Victoria Nyanza a fairly good road had been built to Kigezi, 11 miles from the Belgian frontier, and this place became one of the Belgian bases. South of the Mfumbiro Range, on the German side of the frontier, lies the fertile and thickly populated province of Ruanda, and a stronger position for defence could scarcely be found. The German forces here, from Lake Kivu to the Kagera river, were under Major Wintgens.

General Tombeur, whose headquarters were at Kibati, north of Kivu, had, however, no intention of making the main advance across the lava field. Wintgens was to be squeezed out of his strong positions, known as the Sebea lines, by flank attacks. This was rendered possible by the ready aid of General Smuts and the British

authorities in Uganda. The Governor of Uganda, Sir F. J. Jackson, from the East Africa Transport Corps he had raised, formed a Congo Carrier Section of 5,000 natives under British officers, and this was placed at the disposal of the Belgians. Further to facilitate the Belgian operations an arrangement was made by General Smuts for part of Colonel Molitor's force to move north-east from Kibati to Lutobo, a post only 150 miles west of the small port of Bukakata on Victoria Nyanza. General Smuts made himself responsible for the transport and supply arrangements to Lutobo from Bukakata, which by steamer and rail is 825 miles from Mombasa. Thus Colonel Molitor's lines of communications were shortened from 3,000 to 1,000 miles. Brigadier-General Sir Charles Crewe, of General Smuts's staff, was sent to Uganda to complete the arrangements with General Tombeur. By April 23 the concentration of the Belgian forces was complete. At that time the position of the chief regiments was:—At Lutobo Major Bataille; on the lava plain Major Rouling; at the southern end of Lake Kivu Major Muller; on the Rusizi Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas. Opposing them were Major Wintgens in Ruanda; Captain Godovius along the Kagera and in Bukoba; Major von Langen along the Rusizi and guarding Urundi (the province south of Ruanda). Between Lutobo and Victoria Nyanza was the major part of the British force, known as the Lake Detachment, which since the beginning of the war had been opposing Captain Godovius. It consisted of the 98th Infantry, 4th Batt. King's African Rifles, Baganda Rifles, Nandi Scouts and other small irregular units, and was under Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. Adye. It proved highly efficient, and in February, 1916, had shown its quality when a post held by one officer and 35 men had utterly defeated an enemy raid, killing three Europeans and 22 Askari, besides capturing one European, 31 Askari, and a machine gun, its own casualties being *nil*. This force was a support to, but did not take part in, the Belgian offensive.

Major Rouling opened the campaign with an attack, on April 4, on the German positions along the Sebea, thus holding part of Major Wintgens's force near the great lava field. The contest was stubborn, but Major Rouling made gradual progress. Major Muller, crossing the southern end of Lake Kivu on April 19, struck west towards Nyanza, the residence of Musinga, the native chief of Ruanda, a man who had only within a year or two acknowledged

German authority and who had no liking for his masters. Next Major Bataille moved. He seized Kamwezi, 10 miles south-east of Lutobo, towards the end of April. With him were Colonel Molitor and the staff of the Northern Brigade. From this point the first phase of the Belgian campaign came to a rapid and happy end. On May 6 Colonel Molitor occupied Kigali, the capital of Ruanda; Major Muller advanced to Nyanza, and Major Wintgens, fearful of being trapped, evacuated his strong positions on the Sebea, making good his escape before the junction of the Belgian columns along the Kivu-Nyanza-Kigali line, which was effected on May 20. In Ruanda the Belgians were cordially received by the natives, whose help in the provision of food and carriers was welcome and timely. During this period Lieut.-Colonel Thomas had remained on the Rusizi to guard against any counter-attack which von Langen might attempt to compel the Molitor Brigade to withdraw. Von Langen remained inactive and Colonel Olsen could now put his brigade in motion. Crossing the Rusizi, he occupied, on June 8, Usumbura, the German port at the northern end of Tanganyika, thence marching east to Kitega, the capital of Urundi.

Colonel Molitor's column, going south-east, crossed the Kagera on June 24, turning thence due east in the direction of Victoria Nyanza. On the next day, June 25, it had a sharp engagement with the enemy at Biaramulo, which ended in the retreat of the Germans, and on June 27 Molitor's troops reached Victoria Nyanza at two places, Namirembe and Busira-

yombo, at the south-west corner of the lake. During this period the columns of Majors Rouling and Muller had united, and advancing into Urundi, attacked on June 6, at Kiwitawe, a strong German rearguard supplied with field and machine guns. The enemy held out during the day, but abandoned his positions during the night. On June 12 the Belgians overtook the enemy, who, after a sharp fight, again retreated, leaving his dead on the field.

As the Belgian columns got in touch along the line from Victoria Nyanza to Tanganyika the German commanders found themselves in danger of having their line of retreat barred. Some, including Major Wintgens, slipped through; Captain Godovius, retreating from Karagwe, decided to pierce the Belgian lines. On July 3 his force attacked the Belgians at a river crossing held by Major Rouling's regiment, which was considerably inferior in strength to the Germans. A stiff fight, lasting seven hours, ended in the complete defeat of the Germans, though scattered remnants escaped. They left 14 Europeans and many natives dead on the field, while the prisoners taken included 17 Europeans, among them being Captain Godovius. The Belgians also secured a large quantity of war material. Major Rouling's regiment behaved with the greatest gallantry; Major Rouling himself was twice wounded during the action.

Part of the German forces which escaped the Belgian cordon retired to a line guarding the approach to Tabora from the north. Over-taken at Diobahika, they were again defeated



REVIEW OF BELGIAN COLUMN BY GENERAL SIR CHARLES CREWE.

(July 14) with heavy loss. Then for a time there was a pause in the Belgian operations, employed in making secure their new bases on the Tanganyika-Victoria Nyanza line. But the chief aim of their campaign, the capture of Ujiji and Tabora, was now apparent. In the operations against Tabora a British column was to cooperate. As has been seen, Colonel Molitor's progress had compelled the retreat of the German troops which, under Captain Godovius, had been threatening Western Uganda, and it thus became possible for the British Lake Detachment to form a mobile force for use elsewhere. It was decided to attack Ukerewe, the largest island on Victoria Nyanza. It lies north of Mwanza, which was the chief German port on the lake, and 200 miles north of Tabora. On June 9 Colonel Adye, helped by the Naval Flotilla under Commander Thornley, R.N., attacked Ukerewe. The enemy, completely surprised, quickly surrendered. Eight Germans, 60 Askari, and two small field pieces were captured. Ukerewe was a valuable possession. In the hands of the British it not only served as a base against Mwanza, and therefore Tabora, but on it grew much of the rice which formed the staple diet of the German native troops. From this supply they were now cut off. Shortly after the capture of Ukerewe Brigadier-General Sir Charles Crewe was appointed by General Smuts to command the Lake Detachment and to cooperate with the Belgians. Having

consulted Colonel Molitor, Sir Charles Crewe decided to attack Mwanza. His force of about 1,800 rifles was embarked at Ukerewe and Namirembe on July 9, 10 and 11, and on the night of the 11th a column under Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Burgess was landed at Kongoro Point, east of Mwanza. On the 12th another column, under Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Towse, was landed farther north

The skilful disposition and movement of these columns made it impossible for the enemy to withstand the British advance; Mwanza, though strongly fortified, was abandoned on July 14 after a very feeble resistance. Before evacuating the place the Germans destroyed their wireless station, a powerful installation, but they left behind a 4.1 inch Königsberg gun. The Askari fled along the road to Tabora: most of the Germans escaped by boat—in the small steamers Mwanza and Heinrich Otto, the steam pinnace Schwaben, lighters and other craft. These represented the German fleet on Victoria Nyanza which, to avoid Commander Thornley's flotilla, had been sheltering under the guns of Mwanza. Filled with refugees they steamed up Stuhlmann Gulf, which leads south from Mwanza, pursued by the British. Presently the Germans scuttled the steamers and continued their flight by land. All the Europeans except five got away. So headlong was their flight that they abandoned much of their stores and ammunition and even their personal belongings and



BELGIAN PONTOON BRIDGE: NATIVE CARRIERS CROSSING A RIVER.

40 boxes of specie. Sir Charles Crewe's expedition had begun excellently, but difficulties of transport now hindered rapid movement, and similar difficulties beset Colonel Molitor. It was arranged between the two commanders that the Belgians should advance on the east and the British on the west of the main road from Mwanza to Tabora. About half-way to Tabora the Germans held a fortified position in hill country extending from Maria Hilf, by St. Michael to Shinyanga. Maria Hilf, the most northerly of the three places, was captured by the Belgians in the latter half of July.

While Colonel Molitor, with Crewe's column on his left, was preparing to attack St. Michael, the Southern brigade, under Colonel Olsen, had won notable victories, culminating in the capture of Ujiji, famous for its memories of Burton, Speke, Livingstone, Stanley and Tippu Tib, and in Arab and native estimation the most important place in Central Africa. After the occupation of Kitega Colonel Olsen turned south and marched towards Kigoma. As indicated already, Kigoma, a fine natural harbour with a small dockyard, strongly fortified, was the chief German port on Tanganyika. Some four miles north of Ujiji—which, owing to fluctuations in the level of Tanganyika, is no longer useful as a port—Kigoma is the terminus of the Central Railway, which starts from the Indian Ocean at Dar-es-Salaam and passes through Tabora. On July 27 Colonel Olsen reached the railway and the next day occupied Kigoma. This success was largely due to the activity of the Allied flotilla on Tanganyika and to the aid given by Belgian airmen.

The intervention of aircraft on Tanganyika was as unexpected by the Germans as had been the appearance of the British armed motor-boats brought overland from Cape Town. The air squadron arrived on the Belgian side of Tanganyika in June, having left Europe in the previous January. The machines were seaplanes provided by the British Admiralty; the personnel consisted of officers of the Corps d'Aviation of the Belgian Army. On June 10, flying to Kigoma in one of the seaplanes, Flight-Lieutenants Benaegle and Collignon bombed and damaged the Graf von Götzen. The Graf von Götzen, a twin-screw steamer 220 feet long, was the biggest boat ever seen at Tanganyika. It came to an inglorious end. Air reconnaissances made from July 17 to 23

showed the Belgians that the steamer had been disarmed, and a few days later, on the eve of evacuating the port, the Germans sank the vessel close to the spot where it had been launched a twelvemonth previously. Another vessel, the Adjutant, still upon the stocks,



COLONEL MOLITOR,
Commanding the Belgian Northern Brigade in
German East Africa.

was burnt. There remained to the Germans the armed tug Wami, and on July 28, the day Kigoma fell, it put out of harbour. Attacked by the Belgian gunboat Netta (Lieutenant Lennarts) the Wami was blown up by its crew. Thus vanished Germany's naval power on Tanganyika.

To the repeated bombing of the defences of Kigoma and Ujiji by the seaplanes the Germans had no means of reply, and as the garrisons had instructions not to risk capture they retired as the Olsen brigade approached, taking train eastward towards Tabora and destroying as much as possible the railway behind them. Ujiji itself was occupied by Colonel Olsen by August 2. The Olsen brigade was now supported by the Borgerhoff detachment sent from Albertville, on the Belgian side of Tanganyika. Of equal importance, railway material was also transported, and on August 25 the first train constructed of Belgian material was run on the German railway. The repairing of the line had already made considerable pro-

gress. Colonel Olsen's energy, and that of his second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, were inexhaustible, and by the middle of August the brigade was on the march towards Tabora. This was a trek of over 200 miles, but making good use of the railway, Colonel Olsen by the end of the month was within 30 miles of his objective. Another



LIEUT.-COLONEL OLSEN,
Commanding the Belgian Southern Brigade in
German East Africa.

Belgian force, under Colonel Moulaert, had taken the offensive as soon as Kigoma fell. Crossing Tanganyika, south of the Central Railway, it occupied Karema early in August, and thence advanced north-east, cooperating with the Borgerhoff detachment.

During August Colonel Molitor's brigade and the British column under Sir Chas. Crewe had overcome serious opposition. After severe fighting Colonel Molitor drove the Germans out of St. Michael, which he occupied on August 12. He was thus astride the direct road to Tabora, some 100 miles north of that place. Owing to the never-ending hindrances occasioned by the bringing up of supplies it was not, however, until August 22 that his brigade was concentrated at St. Michael and ready for the next move. By the end of August it had turned the enemy positions in the Kahama mountains, south of St. Michael, and the Germans, who appeared to be under the command of Major Wintgens, retreated farther south, taking up a new line for the defence of Tabora. Sir Chas. Crewe's column, moving as arranged, parallel to and east of Colonel Molitor, occupied Ivingo, and at the beginning

of September was at Ndala, about 40 miles north-east of Tabora. Here it remained some little while.

Much importance was attached by the Germans to Tabora. It was the largest town in the country, and from its central position was regarded as the virtual capital; it had, indeed, been intended to remove the seat of administration thither from Dar-es-Salaam, had the war not intervened. It stood in an open elevated plain, and a circle of hills about 10 miles distant afforded naturally strong defensible positions. These had been fortified, while at Tabora itself was a very strong *boma* (fort), a 4.1-inch gun from the Königsberg and other artillery, and a considerable number of troops, under the command of Major-General Wahle. To Tabora, as being supposedly secure from attack, the Germans had removed the majority of their prisoners of war, as well as civilian enemy aliens—who were treated exactly as were the service prisoners.* With British-Indian and British and Belgian native soldiers, the prisoners numbered 2,000 to 3,000. The European captives included French, Belgians, Italians, Russians, Boers and British. The British-European prisoners were over 200, more than a third of that number being missionaries—members of the C.M.S. and Universities Mission, which had been at work in the country before the establishment of the German protectorate. Among them were over 30 women and children. In the treatment of the British prisoners (the other European prisoners fared a little better) a policy was followed deliberately calculated to lower the prestige of the race in the eyes of the natives. As to this only one instance need be cited. British prisoners were made to drag a wagon loaded with Government stores through the streets and were halted in the native market to afford opportunity for the negroes to come to jeer at them, while they saw them doing the work of oxen. At the same time instructions were sent that the men pulling the wagon were not to take the road past the Governor's house as it offended His Excellency to see men who were not decently dressed. (The Germans made no effort to supply clothing to the prisoners, many

* The account of life in Tabora which follows is drawn mainly from statements made by British prisoners during their captivity and after their release. See in particular *In German Gaols*, by the Rev. E. F. Spanton (S.P.C.K. 1917), and the White Paper (Cd 8689) on the treatment by the Germans of British prisoners and natives.

of whom were reduced to wearing rags.) The orders for the treatment adopted came from the German General Staff at Mrogoro, though there was no evidence to show that Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck himself sanctioned the measures taken. But as the campaigns of General Smuts and of the Belgians progressed, Dr. Schnee, the Governor of German East Africa, discovered that mistakes had been made. On July 13, when it began to be realized that Tabora might have to be given up, Brandt, the commandant at that place, informed the prisoners that Dr. Schnee had discovered a convention by which certain classes of civilians, all, that is, save able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 55, could not be kept as prisoners of war. They were accordingly allowed out of the fort, but after 12 days were again brought back, though now their treatment was better. Then on August 26 the civilians were again liberated, and for the next few weeks the Germans—with the Belgians hammering at their gates—lavished attentions upon the British civilians. But over 100 service men, sailors and soldiers, had been removed from Tabora in July, being sent south to Mahenge, which the Germans still held securely. Outwardly in Tabora normal conditions still prevailed; the officials went out as usual in their rickshaws, preceded and followed by "boys" in uniform; the Governor's

garden was carefully tended; the Director of Public Works provided nice new baths for the tardily released prisoners. But as the Allies drew nearer there was a change; all the non-German part of the population—the French, Italians, Greeks, Indian traders, Arabs, Africans, *tout le monde*, set to work to provide themselves with flags to welcome the victors, British or Belgians, the Goanese merchants finding bunting for a consideration which was not conspicuous for moderation. The British civilians made a fine Union Jack out of a blue skirt, a white apron, and a red silk cover; it was with this flag borne aloft that they subsequently tramped the long road to Mwanza *en route* for England.

Important as Tabora was, the Germans had no intention of resisting there to the last man, often as they declared that they would do so. General Wahle's declarations that the enemy would only enter the town over his dead body were mere bluff. The instructions of Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, the Commander-in-Chief, were positive; action of a decisive character was to be avoided, and accordingly as soon as it was realized that the Belgian advance was a serious danger, preparations were made to evacuate the Tabora district. British-Indian and African prisoners were employed in making a new road leading south-east towards Mahenge,



TWO SEAPLANES ARRIVE AT KIGOMA.

and food depots were established along this route. At Mahenge, so the Indians reported, the Germans intended to make their last stand and "await the assistance promised from Germany." Late in August it was rumoured in the town that the British column near Ndala was expected to reach Tabora in a week, and had that column struck the railway east of Tabora at that time the German retreat would have been much hampered. The Germans, according to statements made to British prisoners, would have offered little opposition to General Crewe; they preferred to lose the

at Lulanguru (west of Tabora); on the 13th and 14th the Molitor brigade fought actions at Itaga (nine miles north of Tabora). The German troops—many of them were Wanyamwezi, natives of the district and fine fighters—offered a stout resistance but were steadily driven back. These were exciting days in Tabora, for the sound of the guns was distinctly heard, the bombardment of the German lines on the night of the 13th-14th being particularly violent. On the morning of the 14th the white flag was hoisted on the fort and arrangements made for the surrender of the town on the 15th. But the



BRITISH PRISONERS IN THE HANDS OF THE GERMANS AT TABORA.

town to the British rather than to the Belgians. As it was, they put up a stiff fight before evacuating the place—short of risking capture in Tabora they opposed the Belgians as long as possible.

The last stage in the Belgian advance was a period of very hard fighting, aggravated by the torrid heat and the great scarcity of water which marked the end of the dry season. On September 1 the advance-guards of the Molitor brigade came into contact with the enemy at Mambali, about 40 miles north of Tabora, and were there held up. On the same and the following day west and south-west of Tabora the Olsen brigade was engaged with the enemy and made good progress. General Tombeur thereupon directed Colonel Molitor to push his brigade south with all speed and cooperate directly with Colonel Olsen. On September 10, 11, and 12 Colonel Olsen was hotly engaged

and was not quite yet. Reinforcements sent to Itaga had enabled the Germans temporarily to throw back the Belgians from the advanced positions they had gained. So General Wahle cancelled his orders for evacuation. Part of the transport had already left by train, but a cow strayed on to the line and upset a truck, blocking the track; before the line was cleared the order for evacuation was cancelled. On September 15 there was an artillery duel both north and west of the town; the fighting continued on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and on the night of the 18th General Wahle decided not to delay further. Covering the retreat with fire from the 4.1-inch gun, the German troops left by train, taking with them a number of British-Indian prisoners as carriers. After going by rail some 25 miles, the troops were detrained and taken along the newly prepared road leading towards Mahenge.

News that the Germans had evacuated Tabora

speedily reached the Belgian forces; which, ignorant of the presence of hundreds of prisoners of war in the town, were prepared to bombard it until it surrendered. At midday on September 19 a detachment under Colonel Olsen marched into the town and hoisted the Belgian flag on the fort. The town was *en fête*, and from almost every house the flag of one or other of the Allies was hung. All the people were on holiday and the rejoicings were genuine, most of all by the released Indian and African prisoners of war, whose treatment during captivity had been marked

freed—the British, 105 all told, returned home via Mombasa, the first stage of their journey, as already stated, being the long march to Mwanza, whence steamers were taken to the terminus of the Uganda Railway.

During the almost continuous 10 days' fighting which preceded the fall of Tabora the Germans lost, beside the killed and wounded, 125 Europeans and over 300 Askari taken prisoners. The war booty of the Belgians included the 4.1-inch gun and several machine guns. A considerable quantity of railway



THE MARCH OF THE RELEASED PRISONERS FROM TABORA.

throughout by extreme brutality. Among the natives there was a trace of fear; they had been told horrible tales by the Germans of what they might expect from the "cannibal Congolese troops." The Congo troops, of whom a number did come from tribes formerly cannibal, were, however, well in hand—the majority were quartered outside the town. For the rest, the natives were well content to be rid of "the people of fifteen," fifteen being a reference to the minimum number of lashes given by the Germans for trivial offences. About 150 German soldiers (European) remained in hospital at Tabora, some of them by no means too ill to travel, as well as a number of German civilian men and women. At their own request these civilians were sent to Europe and interned in France.* The prisoners of war in the town were

* On the pretext that these people were ill-treated the Germans, in June 1917, seized in Belgium 23 persons who had been connected with the Congo service and

material was also found in Tabora. The Central Railway had served its last purpose for the Germans; a week after General Wahle had used it for his retreat it was reached at Igalulu, to the east of Tabora, by Sir Chas. Crewe's column. Shortly afterwards—before the end of October—this British column was abolished. Such of its units as were not disbanded were sent to the Second Division under General Van Deventer, except one battalion, which remained in occupation of a portion of the Central Railway. Sir Charles Crewe, who, said General Smuts, "rendered very useful service," returned to South Africa, where he resumed his parliamentary duties.

As to the German forces which had been fighting north and west of Tabora, those that

interned them in Germany. Among those arrested was the septuagenarian Count Jean d'Oultremont, whose return to Belgium was secured by the intervention of the King of Spain.

did not get away with General Wahle withdrew, under the leadership of Major Wintgens, to Sikonge, 40 miles due south of Tabora. Here, towards the end of September, they were defeated by the detachment which had advanced from south of Ujiji and had given support to Olsen's brigade. Under Commandant Borgerhoff it gave the Wintgens column a hard blow, capturing 20 Europeans and 28 Askari, a field gun, a machine gun, a food depot, and much other booty. Major Wintgens and the main part of his force escaped, making for the Great Ruaha river, a direction which would bring them into touch with General Wahle.

With the success at Sikonge the Belgian campaign of 1916 ended, just as the rainy season was beginning. It had been highly successful. With the forces at their disposal it was impossible for Colonels Molitor and Olsen to prevent the escape of General Wahle and Major Wintgens, and it was no part of their programme to follow them south. That was left for the British under Generals Northey and Van Deventer. The Belgians greatly enhanced their reputation by the seizure of Ujiji and Tabora, and in the eyes both of the Arabs and the natives the loss of those towns did much to shake German prestige in East Central Africa. It counteracted, to an extent, the bad impression created by the calculated policy of brutality adopted by the Germans to their white prisoners.

During the whole campaign from May to September the Belgian losses were 41 Europeans and 1,235 natives, about an eighth of the total fighting force. General Tombeur received many congratulations and honours in recognition of the success achieved by the army which he commanded. King Albert, in acknowledging his services, referred to the brilliant manner in which his troops "upheld on African soil the honour and reputation of our arms." General Smuts eulogized "the splendid exploits" of the Congolese troops and expressed his keen appreciation of the enormous difficulties they had overcome—the Belgian columns had marched 500 miles in enemy country—and his gratitude for their cordial cooperation. King George conferred upon General Tombeur the Knight Commandership of St. Michael and St. George and King Albert made him a Commander of the Order of Leopold on his return to Europe in the spring of 1917. Colonels Molitor and Olsen, whose conduct of the operations had been so successful, also received decorations from King

Albert. A civil administration was established by the Belgians in the territory they occupied and in December, 1916, Colonel Malfeyt, who had previously held important posts in the Congo, was sent out as Royal Commissioner with his headquarters at Tabora.

The operations of the Nyasaland-Rhodesia Force had not a spectacular climax such as marked the campaign of the Belgians in the capture of Tabora, nor was it opposed by forces of the strength which General Smuts and his lieutenants had to meet. Its work was carried out in the obscurity of an unknown region, where the obstacles presented by Nature, if not on the stupendous scale of those in the volcanic region north of Kivu, were many and great. Brigadier-General Edward Northey assumed command of all the British Forces on the south-west border of German East Africa early in January, 1916, his Chief of Staff being Maj. W. A. C. Saunders-Knox-Gore, D.S.O. From January until mid-May General Northey was engaged, as he says, "in re-organizing the forces on the border, converting the garrisons between lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika into mobile columns, and arranging for supply and transport." The last was by far the hardest task. First, however, as to the composition of his force. The Union of South Africa had raised for service in Nyasaland a contingent of 1,000 men, which reached that country in September, 1915. Apart from that contingent, and before its arrival, the defence of Nyasaland was conducted by the 1st Battalion King's African Rifles and a volunteer force formed by the settlers. Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) G. M. P. Hawthorn, D.S.O., was in command until General Northey's arrival. In Rhodesia there were the Northern Rhodesia Police (natives under British officers), the British S.A. Police (Europeans), and the Northern Rhodesia Rifles (a volunteer body formed by the white residents). Subsequently a battalion was raised from the natives of Northern Rhodesia, and it appears to figure in the dispatches as the 1st Rhodesian Regiment. It will be seen that General Northey's force was of mixed composition, and it was well adapted to the bush fighting and marching which was its lot. For supply and transport the Rhodesia-Nyasa border was probably even more awkwardly situated than were the Belgian bases. To reach the frontier all supplies had to be brought

either through Rhodesia, some 600 miles from the nearest railway, by native porters, or from Chinde, at the mouth of the Zambesi, through Nyasaland and up Lake Nyasa to Karongo (General Northey's then headquarters), which was a distance of 700 miles "with constant transfers from sea-going ship to stern-wheeler, railway, motor, carriers, and lake steamer."

the effort made respectively by Rhodesia and Nyasaland :

In connexion with transport (said Sir Starr Jameson), I would specially pay a tribute to our administrator in Northern Rhodesia, Mr. Wallace. He has practically mobilized the whole of our adult native population in the interests of the carrying of supplies to General Northey's column. He has laid down a telegraph the whole way from the railway in the west to Kasama, the base of operations in the east, some hundreds of miles



NATIVE BOWMEN AS BRITISH SCOUTS GUARDING A WATER-HOLE.

A line of carriers is seen in the background.

It must also be remembered that the many thousands of carriers had to be fed ; and each carrier eats in three weeks the equivalent in weight of his load. The provision of transport was truly, as General Northey said, "a colossal task." A statement made in July, 1917, by Sir Starr Jameson at the annual meeting of the British South Africa Company brings out vividly what this task was, and none the less because the speaker was in part contrasting

through a roadless country. He has also laid down a motor road for use in the dry season. Further than that, he opened last year a water route, and at the present time thousands of native canoes are on that route carrying up supplies for some hundreds of miles. General Northey's column is jointly kept supplied by our Administration in Northern Rhodesia and by the Administration in Nyasaland. What brought to my mind the other day how much we were doing was a demand from Nyasaland for a further 6,000 carriers from Mr. Wallace. I then looked up the matter and this is the result : Our native population in Northern Rhodesia is 875,000. For periods varying from two to six months 293,000 natives have been engaged on military transport.



AREA OF GENERAL NORTHEY'S OPERATIONS.

Some of these, I daresay, are counted over again for the term of two to six months, but still the figures are extraordinary—293,000 out of 875,000, and this has been going on continuously for nearly three years. In Nyasaland the native population is much larger; it is 1,140,000, and the figure I have is that in military transport only 120,000 are engaged.

Thus a total of 395,000 carriers was required to supply a force whose fighting strength was a few thousands only. It was a great tribute to the sympathetic insight into the native's mind possessed by Mr. Wallace and the District Officials in Northern Rhodesia and by Sir George Smith, the Governor, and the other authorities in Nyasaland, that the numbers required were obtained without causing any ill feeling. The quantity of supplies carried may be gauged by the statement of Lord Buxton (High Commissioner for South Africa) that in nine months 20,000 natives carried 1,000,000 lb. of supplies from distant bases. In the same nine months 50,000 carriers were employed in bringing grain from districts adjacent to the frontier. Lord Buxton wrote of this work: "But for the indefatigable efforts of the District Officials a breakdown would have been inevitable. The military authorities are especially indebted to Mr. C. P. Ches-

naye, Magistrate and Commissioner of the Tanganyika District.* Mr. R. Goode, Secretary to the Administration, and Mr. N. Nightingale, Controller of Stores, are equally deserving of mention for their work in forwarding supplies from Livingstone." In Nyasaland Major C. Thorburn, commanding Base and Lines of Communication, and Captain V. J. Keate, who was responsible for procuring all food supplies for the native troops and carriers, performed their duties with signal success. On the work of the men named and of their colleagues depended the security of the fighting force, and it is fitting that it should be placed on record at the outset. Later, the Hon. H. C. Duff, Chief Political Officer, Mr. J. S. K. Wells (of the Nyasaland service), and Mr. Chesnaye rendered good service in the administration of the conquered territory, where the British were cordially welcomed by the natives.

All arrangements completed, General Northey took the offensive on May 25, 1916. He had divided his force into two main columns,

* Mr. Chesnaye was the official responsible for the organization of the defence of Abercorn in the first weeks of the war when it was attacked by the Germans. (See Vol. X. p. 156.)

one to operate from Nyasaland, the other from Rhodesia. The Nyasaland column was under Colonel Hawthorn, and included South African troops and the 1st Batt. King's African Rifles; the Rhodesia column was under Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Murray, D.S.O. A third column under Lieut.-Colonel T. A. Rodger, D.S.O., was also formed, and acted in conjunction with that of Colonel Murray. The frontier along which the advance was made extends from the northern end of Lake Nyasa to the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, and is in a straight line 200 miles long. At the southern end, about 20 miles north-west of Nyasa, was the German fort and town of Neu Langenburg; on the south-east shore of Tanganyika, some dozen miles within the German frontier, was the port of Bismarckburg. On May 25 the British troops, moving forward at several points, met with very little opposition. The South African and King's African Rifles did very good work in bridging and crossing by night the Songwe river, which at the Nyasa end formed the frontier. The enemy retired north-west towards Neu Langenburg. The German commander in this district was Count Falkenstein, the man who had tried to stir the Moslem inhabitants of Nyasaland to revolt. Pressing home his initial advantage, Colonel Hawthorn's column compelled the enemy to evacuate Neu Langenburg, which was occupied

on May 30, and subsequently became General Northey's headquarters. Part of Colonel Hawthorn's force cleared the enemy from the region east of the Livingstone Mountains, a range rising in an almost unbroken wall 5,000 to 6,000 feet above the north-east part of Lake Nyasa, but inland forming a rough plateau. Alt Langenburg, a small port formed where a river makes a break in the mountain wall near the head of the lake, was occupied on June 13. A counter-attack made the following night was driven off. By the end of June the enemy had also been dislodged from the important centre of Ubena, which is 55 miles north-east of Nyasa, and on the main road from the lake to Iringa and the Central Railway.

Success also attended the operations of Colonels Murray and Rodger. At the first advance of Colonel Murray from Abercorn all the enemy frontier posts retired except that at Namema, on the road to Bismarckburg. The garrison of Namema, which was invested, broke out on the night of June 2-3, suffering in the process heavy casualties, among the prisoners captured being the commandant, who was wounded. Following this, Colonel Murray occupied Bismarckburg on June 8. Two days previously Colonel Rodger attacked and dispersed an enemy force in the Poroto mountains, north of Neu Langenburg. This action brought to light a piece of infamy on



REINFORCEMENTS FOR GENERAL NORTHEY LANDING AT KARONGO, LAKE NYASA.

the part of Count Falkenstein. It is thus described in an official report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies :

On June 6 Colonel Rodger attacked the enemy and put them to flight. Just before this action a most disgraceful incident occurred. A trooper of the 2nd South African Rifles, captured by the enemy, was tied to a gun-wheel, beaten by a native under orders of a European, and then shot by seven bullets. He died two days later, having been quite conscious and able to make depositions. The officer in command of the enemy force was Captain Count Falkenstein, and it is believed that we have here, as prisoners, three Germans who were present, one of whom is probably guilty of the murder. .

Europeans captured . . . of whom 13 are missionaries, but they have been fighting or doing supply and transport work.

During July came the real trial of strength between General Northey's troops and those of Count Falkenstein. The main German southern detachments had occupied strongly organized positions along the Neu Langenburg-Iringa road at Malangali, the object of the German commander being to prevent the British striking north-east in the direction where General Van Deventer was operating. On July 24 Northey drove the enemy from these positions. The defenders included the majority of the survivors of the crew, of about 600, of the cruiser *Königsberg*. The Germans made several strong but unsuccessful counter-attacks and then retreated in the direction of Iringa, abandoning a 4.1-inch gun and two machine-guns. The enemy casualties amounted to 150, exclusive of prisoners. After the

engagement General Northey's columns pushed on to Madibira, 30 miles farther on the road to Iringa. Besides this success, in operations during July in the Ubena district several Germans were captured, among them being Dr. Stier, the Governor of Neu Langenburg, who died shortly afterwards from wounds received in action. By the end of July the enemy had been cleared out of the whole of the Neu Langenburg and Bismarckburg districts—a very rich and fertile country covering about 20,000 square miles.

The occupation of Lupembe, east of Ubena, on August 19, and of Iringa on August 29, followed. "Iringa," wrote General Smuts, "would have been occupied much earlier but for my advice to him [General Northey] to slow down while the line of retreat of the enemy's force from the Central Railway was still uncertain." General Northey, in his own brief account of the operations, wrote:—"During August and September we made a complete wheel to the eastward, pivoting on the north end of Lake Nyasa, and driving our enemy, who had now been reinforced from the north, eastward from the districts of Iringa, Ubena and Songea, the occupation of Iringa being timed to synchronize with the arrival of General Van Deventer at Kilossa." Kilossa is on the Central Railway 120 miles north-east of Iringa, and was occupied by Van Deventer on August 22. Songea, mentioned in General



NEU LANGENBURG.

Northey's dispatch, is 70 miles east of Lake Nyasa and 50 miles north of the Portuguese frontier, and its occupation was the first disturbance of the German detachments in the southern part of their protectorate. On his western flank General Northey had extended his occupation of the south-east shore of Tanganyika up to the point where he joined hands with the Belgians. The first phase of his campaign was over. In his report upon it General Northey laid less emphasis on the hard fighting his columns had been engaged in than on the work of the transport :

The difficulties to be overcome (he wrote) can hardly be realized by any but those who have experienced them. Arrangements were made by which we were able in a few months to deploy, feed, and munition columns operating 100 miles north of Bismarckburg, at and east of Iringa, and 50 miles east of both Lupembe and Songea.

The distances by road from Bismarckburg to Neu Langenburg, thence to Iringa, and from Iringa to Songea, are each about 200 miles. None of the roads are more than improved native paths, and the country is all hilly or mountainous, much of it being dense bush and very unhealthy. . . .

This colossal task was considerably helped later by the arrival of light motor lorries, by the untiring efforts of the mechanical transport units, and the splendid work of the South African Engineers, under Major Colin Clark, in cutting and maintaining roads through most difficult hilly country. In six months 450 miles of motor road were made, and from Mwaya [a port at the north-west corner of Lake Nyasa] to the Poroto Hills, just north of Neu Langenburg [a distance of 35 miles only] the road level varied from 1,500 to 8,000 feet above sea level.

In October (1916) General Northey was called upon to face a new and difficult situation. While the main German force, with Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Governor of German East Africa, had retreated before General Smuts to the south-east coast region, some 3,000 troops under Major Kraut had retired to Mahenge, considerably south and east of Iringa, while General Wahle and Major Wintgens—who between them were 1,600 strong—were coming from Tabora towards Iringa, which stood between them and Major Kraut, whom they had been ordered to join. Between them the forces of Wahle, Wintgens, and Kraut greatly outnumbered those of General Northey, which were, moreover, scattered. To meet this new danger Northey had the help of Van Deventer from the north, but considering the extreme length of their lines and the setting in of the rainy season it was a matter for speculation how far they could effectively cooperate. In mid-October Colonel Rodger's column was in and around Iringa and was that first engaged with Wahle's troops, but the bulk of Northey's force was on the

Ruhuje river west and south of Mahenge, where they had to face a "containing" movement by Major Kraut. General Wahle had by this time travelled 250 miles from Tabora and had crossed the Great Ruaha river west of the lines held by Van Deventer, unmolested save for a picquet at the river, which could offer no serious opposition. Wahle was now not



COLONEL R. E. MURRAY, D.S.O.,
Commanded a column under Brigadier-General Northey.

more than 50 miles west of Iringa, and Colonel Rodger, with a small column of South African Rifles and 4 guns of the 5th Battery S.A.M.R., moved out to oppose him. This movement proved unsuccessful. On the night of October 21-22 the larger portion of the enemy force from Tabora broke through the British lines and cut off Iringa from all communication with General Northey. "In addition," wrote General Smuts, "many small [enemy] parties broke through in the darkness, which, of course, they were able to do without any fear of detection over a large front." On October 23 welcome help came to Iringa from the north, the 7th S.A. Infantry, sent by Van Deventer reaching the place on that day, Lieut.-Colonel Fairweather, with the Cyclist Battalion, following the next day. The Iringa force now came under General Van Deventer's command.



FORT NAMEMA, ON THE RHODESIAN FRONTIER, CAPTURED IN JUNE, 1916.

A number of incidents marked the passage of the enemy through the British lines. On October 23 a patrol of N. Rhodesia Police was ambushed by the enemy and suffered 33 casualties, among the killed being Lieut.-Colonel Baxendale, the officer in command. On October 29 a post at Ngominyi (32 miles southwest of Iringa) held by 50 men, was compelled to surrender to an enemy detachment eight times its strength, after a resolute and gallant resistance of seven days. Captain C. B. Clark, the officer in command, was killed and the Germans captured two naval 12-pounders. Against these mischances could be set a sharp reverse inflicted on October 25 by a detachment of the 4th S.A. Horse on a larger enemy body at some wells 12 miles north of Iringa, the Germans abandoning all their sick and wounded. At the end of October attacks delivered on Van Deventer's outposts at Alt Iringa failed and in that district the enemy now became less active. He left behind many sick and wounded at various camps and released considerable numbers of British prisoners of war. It became known, however, that a detachment of the force from Tabora was still west of the British lines, though for the time it could not be located.

General Northey's main columns thus had the enemy on three sides of them—Wahle's force between them and Iringa, the detached force just mentioned on its west, and Major Kraut's Mahenge force on its east. Major

Kraut took the offensive at the same time as General Wahle approached Iringa, evidence that the German Intelligence Department was well served. On the night of October 21 Kraut with eight companies—fully 1,500 men—crossed the Ruhuje river east of Lupembe and threatened the British force at Mkapira, where were both Colonels Hawthorn and Murray. Of Kraut's eight companies one, about 100 strong, was mounted, half of them being Europeans. Another company was the 10th Field Co., 200 strong, which had the reputation of being the bravest of the German companies. One enemy company was sent to block the road to Lupembe, whence Hawthorn and Murray drew their supplies; the others entrenched round the British position, which was well dug in. It was rather a loose investment and the British maintained communication with a detached body, under Captain Galbraith, posted west of the German lines. For three days the Germans bombarded the British encampment with a 2.4 in. gun without effect or reply. On the fourth day, the position of this gun having been located, it was put out of action by a direct hit from one of the British guns. On October 29 Colonel Hawthorn issued orders for a general attack on the enemy at dawn the next day. Captain Galbraith with his small body was to make a diversion—which he did with marked success—while the principal body attacked the main enemy position. The British moved at night, the K.A.R.'s getting un-

perceived to within a short distance of the enemy trenches. A section of B.S.A.P., 43 men under Lieut. H. T. Onyett, M.C., were challenged when about 500 yards from the enemy line. It was just getting light. The enemy picquet retired, firing. The B.S.A.P. at once charged with the bayonet. When about 60 yards from the trenches hot machine gun and rifle fire was opened upon them. But the Rhodesians pressed home the charge, and this handful of men, bayoneting four Europeans and 16 German Askari, captured part of the enemy trench and two machine guns. Though enveloped from the remainder of the trench they held their ground, and on Lieutenant Vaughan bringing up another section of B.S.A.P. the enemy fell back with their remaining machine gun. The attack of the K.A.R.'s was equally brilliant, and within an hour of the opening of the fight the enemy were in full retreat, though their force was the more numerous, was well entrenched, and had plenty of machine guns. Kraut hastily recrossed the Ruhuje river. The British casualties were seven killed and 18 wounded. The Germans left five European and 37 native soldiers dead on the field, and six Europeans and 54 native soldiers were made

prisoners. The 2.4 in. gun, undamaged, three machine guns, 15,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, three field telephones, and other material were captured.

After this action Colonel Murray's column moved south to Lupembe, where it was proposed to concentrate the bulk of Northey's troops. The Germans were still active and now invested Malangali, the supply depot north-west of Lupembe and on the main road from Lake Nyasa to Iringa. It was held by a company of the newly raised Rhodesian (Native) Regiment, under Captain T. Marriott. On November 6 Captain Fair's company of N. Rhodesia Police, with four machine guns, was sent to relieve it. Fair's marched 26 miles in his first 24 hours, and covered 28 miles in the next day. He was then held up. On November 8 Colonel Murray, with 400 rifles, also set out to relieve Malangali, the columns proceeding in motor cars. Meantime Captain Marriott and his almost untried natives had most gallantly defended Malangali against considerable odds. Three assaults were repulsed at close quarters and heavy loss inflicted upon the enemy. On the first day of the attack the Germans, by a lucky shot, had set fire to all the stores and the



GERMAN ASKARI CAPTURED NEAR IRINGA.

garrison was short of food. The water, too, was bad. On November 10 and 11 part of the German force withdrew; on the 12th the remainder were dispersed by Colonel Murray, his column, taking full advantage of the surprise which it had been able to effect—by its use of motor cars—inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. For his defence of Malangali Captain Marriott was given the Military Cross.

The situation was not yet clear. While Colonel Murray had moved north to relieve Malangali a German column proceeded to attack Lupembe, where Lieutenant A. H. L. Wyatt, M.C., had been left with 250 K.A.R.'s (Awemba recently recruited in Northern Rhodesia), three maxims and certain details. Colonel Murray's column, part on foot, part in motor cars, hastened back towards Lupembe. In a sharp fight on November 17 an enemy detachment which tried to bar the road suffered heavily, being outflanked, the Cape Boys of the Ox Transport giving effective help. A Belgian maxim was among the booty secured by Murray's men. On the 19th Colonel Murray heard from Colonel Hawthorn, who was also on the march to relieve Lupembe, that the enemy had retired from that place. Lieutenant Wyatt had, unaided, brought about this result, though the Germans had pressed the attack with determination. On three successive days, November 12, 13 and 14, the German Askari had charged up to the British trenches, the assailants including Sudanese, who boasted that, unlike their fellows, they had not been beaten by the Belgians at Tabora, but on each occasion they were driven back by machine-gun and rifle fire. Once, indeed, the Germans got into the trenches of the King's African Rifles, but were immediately ejected. Disheartened, the whole force retired, a movement hastened by the news of the approach of Colonels Murray and Hawthorn. In the defence of Lupembe Lieutenant Wyatt was helped by Lieutenant T. Slattery, M.C., and Sergt. C. Barton; this defeat of a very determined attack was a noteworthy achievement. The British casualties were 5 killed and 4 wounded; the Germans lost 7 Europeans and 60 Askari in killed alone, and left behind two guns, one of them being one of the two 12-pounders captured from Captain Clarke at Ngomanyi. Lack of supplies, as in previous cases, prevented either Colonel Hawthorn or Colonel Murray from following up the retreating enemy.

By November 19 General Wahle's troops were no longer in contact with the British, and Major Kraut discontinued his containing movement. The Germans took up positions covering Mahenge and extending from Kedatu on the north to north-east of Songea in the south. Kedatu is on the Ruaha river, 95 miles east of Iringa and 80 miles north-north-east of Mahenge, and Songea is 100 miles south-south-west of Mahenge; the Germans' chain of posts stretched a distance of over 200 miles facing Van Deventer and Northey's lines, while on the east they were in loose contact with Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck. No immediate offensive against Wahle and Kraut was attempted, but the column from Tabora which had not penetrated Northey's lines was now settled with. Fresh units of Van Deventer's force, namely the Mounted Brigade, reduced by disease and casualties to approximately 1,000 rifles, had reached Iringa, and there being no longer any danger in that direction it was determined to seek out this enemy column, which was under Lieut.-Colonel Huebener. It had been wandering in a region, the country between Tabora and Lake Rukwa, where there were neither Belgian nor British forces, and it was some weeks before the British gained any positive knowledge even of its existence. Then there came persistent reports of its movements, and the assertion that it had with it "a big gun" captured from the Belgians. Next it was reported to be west of Madibira, and then it was definitely ascertained that on November 20 it had occupied the mission station of Iembule, north-west of Ubena, and that it intended moving east, no doubt hoping to pierce a weak spot in Northey's lines and reach Mahenge. But at Iembule it was trapped by Colonel Murray's column. Colonel Huebener's force held a strong position in the mission buildings, and a severe fight was anticipated when on November 23 Murray's column began to close in upon it—Major Carbutt, with a company of the Rhodesian (Native) Regiment and maxims, from the north-west; Captains Vaughan and Hendri, commanding respectively "A" and "B" companies of the B.S.A.P., from the east and north-east, and Colonel Murray, with two companies of the N. Rhodesia Police, from the south-east. On November 25 Captain Fair's company of the N.R.P. opened fire with maxims from trenches dug during the night about 1,200 yards from the mission buildings. Captain Hendri's company also



BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDWARD NORTHEY, C.B.
Commanded the Nyasaland-Rhodesia Force.

opened fire, and the enemy replied. That night Captain Fair moved his company into the bed of the river which flows below the mission buildings and was the main source of the enemy's water supply. The banks of the

river are sheer, and good cover was obtained for a howitzer within 500 yards of the German trenches. From this howitzer the German lines were shelled, and the following morning the other British forces closed in. At 2 p.m.

a *parlementaire* was sent informing the German commander that his water supply was cut off, that he was surrounded and could not be relieved, and demanding his surrender. Believing resistance to be useless, Colonel Huebener did as he was bid, surrendering with all his stores, guns and ammunition intact, save that he blew up the breech-block of his "big gun," which proved not to be Belgian, but a 4.2 in. howitzer made by Krupps in 1915. The force, which was in fact bluffed

in October, it had to travel by sea from Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambesi, and thence by river, rail, motor, and lake steamer to Wiedhafen on Lake Nyasa. It had reached that port, which is 75 miles north-north-west of Songea, by November 22, having travelled a distance 10 times as great as that separating Dar-es-Salaam and Songea in a straight line. At Songea Colonel the Hon. J. H. J. Byron, C.M.G., was in command.

Towards the end of November Gen. Smuts



RHODESIANS IN OCCUPATION OF IRINGA.

into surrendering, consisted of seven officers and 47 other Europeans and 249 Askari. Besides the howitzer, three machine-guns, quantities of rifles, ammunition and cattle were captured. The British casualties were but seven men wounded.

General Northey was now entirely free from anxiety with regard to the German forces from Tabora; his success was due not only to good generalship and the fine fighting quality of his troops, but also to the mobility of the force owing to its possession of motor transport. The detachment he had in the south at Songea had been strengthened by the arrival there of a battalion of South African Infantry, sent by General Smuts. Dispatched

visited the Iringa district to make arrangements for a combined forward movement by Gens. Van Deventer and Northey. It was intended, in the first place, that from the north Van Deventer should drive the enemy south of the Ulanga river—which runs south and east of Iringa—and that from the west Northey should drive the enemy east of the Ruhuje river; if both these movements were successful Wahle, Kraut and Wintgens would be confined to an area immediately around Mahenge and further operations greatly facilitated. To be nearer his front, Gen. Northey on December 4 moved headquarters from Neu Langenburg to Ubena. On Van Deventer's side any immediate movement proved out of the question. Vast inundated

areas rendered it impossible to carry sufficient supplies of food from the Central Railway to places south of the Ruaha river. It was, therefore, decided to accumulate a supply dump by the Ruaha and wait for a more convenient season. Gen. Smuts, in his dispatch of February 28, says :

Continuous heavy rain in the west produced conditions under which every movement became a matter of extraordinary difficulty, and the supply situation was at times seriously insecure ; and on December 19 General Van Deventer, whose headquarters were now at Iringa, reported that he had been unable to build up the reserve of supplies which we had hoped we should have been able to collect at Iringa, and that he could not feed his whole division during the forward move which was then imminent. He further advised moving a considerable portion of his command back to the railway, and that a reduced force of three infantry battalions and a squadron of mounted troops should be kept at Iringa for the advance. To this I agreed.

It is of interest, as indicating in some measure the difficulties which are attendant upon military movements on a large scale in tropical Africa, here to observe that of 1,000 mounted men who had marched from Morogoro early in November, rather more than 90 per cent. had lost their horses by death from disease by this date, viz., in six weeks.

The combined forward movements by Gens. Van Deventer and Northey were arranged to begin on December 24, in conjunction with a general advance of the army under Gen. Smuts, and, apparently, the hope was entertained that the whole campaign might be brought to an end in one more great effort. In spite of heavy rains which had just fallen, both Northey and Van Deventer were ready on the appointed day. Gen. Northey pressed the enemy back on the road to Mahenge, driving him from the high ground east of Lupembe, while Col. Byron co-operated by moving north from Songea. Gen. Northey, nevertheless, did not make sufficient progress to bar the road of the Germans should they decide to retreat south or south-east from Mahenge. This would have been of less consequence had Gen. Van Deventer's advance succeeded. This was not, however, the case. The country in which Van Deventer had to operate, that between Iringa and the Ulunga river, was mountainous and covered with dense bush, while the rivers were in flood. The enemy, believed to be Kraut's troops, were strongly entrenched east of a pass known as Lukegeta Nek or Magoma. On Christmas Day this position was attacked frontally by the infantry of the Second Division. While the attack was in progress the Mounted Brigade was sent to cut off the retreat of the enemy to the south and a force under Col. Taylor moved east to join hands with the Mounted Brigade. On the 25th Van Deventer's infantry gained a ridge in front

of the main position held by the enemy. The fight continued all day on the 26th, the Germans offering a stout resistance. After sunset the South Africans "pushed up to within 300 yards of the enemy's main position, but dawn on the following day [December 27] found the position empty, the enemy having slipped away through dense bush during the night." On that day—the 27th—the enemy tried to break through to the east near Muhenga, but was driven back by the Mounted Brigade, and engaged near the Lukosse river, Taylor's column being pushed forward to cooperate. "The enemy," says Gen. Smuts, "again attempted to effect his retirement on the 28th, and was once more driven back, but eventually escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness and eluded pursuit." On January 2, 1917, torrential rains descended and thereafter Gen. Van Deventer was obliged to confine himself to patrol work. The enemy had escaped from a tight corner and now had a breathing space. The rains, however, were not so great in Gen. Northey's area, and on January 16 Col. Murray's column secured a bridge over the Ruhuje, near Ifinga, south-east of Lupembe. A distinct success was scored by Col. Byron on January 24, when at Likuju, 55 miles north-east of Songea, he compelled the surrender of an enemy detachment of 289 men. Among them were 39 Europeans, including the officer in command of the German southern detachment.

If Van Deventer and Northey, who were made Companions of the Bath in recognition of their services, had not attained their object, the Germans in this central area had been badly shaken. A large proportion of their force left Mahenge in February making southward in two columns. Another phase of the campaign in East Africa had ended inconclusively. For this result no blame attached to the Nyasaland-Rhodesia force. It had achieved results which, considering its limited numbers and the character of the country, were all that was possible. The reputation of the British for just dealings with the natives had stood them in good stead. Not only were they well received by the people whose districts they entered, but they obtained from them valuable help and information. This was partly the result of their experience of the tender mercies of the Germans.

The Germans in their retreat (wrote a correspondent of *The Times* in East Africa) have adopted measures of ruthless cruelty towards the natives. They have practically depopulated whole areas of their inhabitants,



TROOPS FOR GENERAL NORTHEY DISEMBARKING.

Women as well as men have been roped together and forced to carry baggage. The cattle and foodstuffs of these people have been taken away with them. Deserters have been at once shot, and hundreds of these unfortunates have died from starvation and cold on the high plateaux of the interior. The war seems, in fact, to have revived slavery, and I have seen sights of grim horror along the German line of retreat which must be comparable only with the terrors of the slave caravan routes from Tanganyika to the ocean in the days of Livingstone. Carriers, when no longer capable of bearing loads, were abandoned by the Germans. [Many, dead or dying, were found by the wayside by the British.]

In contrast with German methods the native carrier found the discipline of the British benign,* and there were many instances of real heroism on the part of these men. To cite but one example: eight native porters attached to Colonel Murray's column carried ammunition under heavy fire right up to the men serving the machine guns. Six of the eight porters were wounded, but the loads were all delivered. Apart from their services as carriers, a great share in the success or non-success of the campaign rested on the natives and on their loyalty to their employers, for they formed the real Intelligence Department, as well as a most important element of the fighting force.

This has been a campaign (wrote the correspondent already quoted) in which the primeval subtlety of the

* "Elephant, giraffe, eland, zebra, mpala, pig and the rest afforded sport for Europeans and food for police and carriers in quantities they had never known before," wrote an officer stationed on the Ruaha river, in a letter which contained many passages showing the good relations existing between the British and the natives, both those of German East Africa and those drawn from British territories.

staked pit has been employed in conjunction with the twentieth-century complexities of barbed-wire entanglements. Old muzzle-loading cannon and guns have been used in the same battle as the latest Mausers, "short" service Lee Enfields and 1915 howitzers. Our northern columns have employed aeroplanes for reconnoitring and general intelligence work, but throughout East Africa the raw native, with his wonderful knowledge of bushcraft, has been the main medium of information. These anachronisms of war have had a fairly equal application to both sides, Allies and Germans alike. And in consequence of the combination of modern and medieval methods and arms, tactics have had to be amended, vigilance has had to be as extreme as it has had to be unceasing, and unit commanders have of necessity departed from the orthodox ideas of deployment and attack.

It is one thing to be pitted against an enemy force composed entirely of natives. It is quite another matter to be confronted by that same force when it is led by resourceful and highly-trained Europeans who have drilled and disciplined their followers to perfection and who have equipped them with modern arms and taught them how to use them.

It should not be supposed that the native troops are much the inferiors of the whites from the point of view of courage. The native garrisons of East Central Africa have been drawn from the most powerful and warlike tribes of the continent. The Yao, Angoni, and Awemba Companies of the King's African Rifles are composed of men who have inherited fighting instincts. The Manyema soldiery of the Belgians are the fierce descendants of the martial followers of Tippoo Tib. The Germans, too, with characteristic thoroughness, have selected the members of their *force noire* from the bravest and strongest of the peoples of Equatorial Africa—Sudanese, Wahehe, and Wanyamwezi.

To nearly all the Europeans who took part in Northey's operations the country they entered was unknown. Still less known was the district of the Rovuma river, by the Portuguese border, to which a number of the enemy companies under Major Kraut, which

left Mahenge in February, penetrated. General Northey, in his first dispatch, dated March 10, 1917, stated that these companies had been reduced to an average of 10 Europeans and 50 Askari each, about one-third of their strength in the previous September. At that time the known casualties (exclusive of dead and wounded removed by the enemy) inflicted on the Germans by General Northey's force was 1,760, in that total being 56 Europeans killed and 275 captured.

Major Wintgens did not go with Major Kraut to the Portuguese border. In the neighbourhood of Songea he separated from his comrade, and with a body of 700 soldiers, several hundreds of carriers, and a good supply of machine-guns, turned west. Evading the British columns, he passed Neu Utengule in March, and seemed to be making for the Rhodesian border in the neighbourhood of Fife—there being on the spot practically nothing to prevent him entering British territory. Apparently Wintgens preferred to keep to country with which he was familiar, for when only three days' march from the Rhodesian border he altered his course to the north. His Askari came from the Tabora and Lake Albert districts, and it is believed that he promised to take them thither and disband them—and this appears eventually to have happened with regard to part of the force. Colonel Murray's column was quickly in pursuit, but as when it received its orders it

was 200 miles away, and in scattered parties, Wintgens obtained a good start, and after a delaying action he escaped. Typical of much good work, largely unrecorded, is the following account of the effort to corner this force:

The advanced party of Murray's column got into touch with Wintgens's (wrote a correspondent) near the mission station of St. Moritz, south of Lake Rukwa. This advanced party, two companies of the Rhodesian (Native) Regiment, and N.R. Police, was under Lieut.-Colonel Tomlinson. Pressing forward too eagerly, Colonel Tomlinson's men were checked and dug themselves in seven miles from the mission station. Here they were invested by Wintgens, who seemed unaware that Colonel Murray with his main force was about 20 miles distant. Murray, expecting to receive reinforcements in a few days, delayed immediate action, being reassured as to Colonel Tomlinson's ability to hold out by a heliograph message received in answer to his enquiries. It was subsequently found that Murray's message had been intercepted and answered by the enemy, and it was not till Lieutenant Booth and a few native soldiers from Tomlinson's camp got through the enemy lines that it was found that the small besieged British force was in a very bad condition, had eaten all its food and must surrender unless relieved. Tomlinson promised to hold out one day more—he had not known help was so near. The next day, March 27, Murray moved out to attack, but Wintgens was not to be caught and drew back his force to St. Moritz—a very suitable spot for a defensive action. To the north and north-west was the Songwe river* and beyond it the Lupa river, both unfordable, so that Major Wintgens considered his rear secure. To prevent news reaching the British he had deported all the natives living in the neighbourhood. On March 28 Colonel Baxter with some 400 King's African Rifles joined Colonel Murray and it was decided to cut through Wintgens's line of retreat; the best chance of success appearing to be to get command of the bridge immediately behind the mission buildings. On the 29th

* This Songwe river, an affluent of Lake Rukwa, should not be confused with the Songwe river which flows into Lake Nyasa.



THE FORT OF IRINGA.

the British advanced under cover of the long grass to within four miles of St. Moritz. They slept that night without fires or blankets, the prey of a hardy breed of mosquitoes which apparently did not mind the cold. On March 30 action was given, and but for a piquet of about 20 Askari no opposition was encountered till the advance force, chiefly N.R. Police, under Major Fair, was some 600 yards from the mission buildings. Then heavy machine-gun and rifle fire was opened from concealed trenches 300 yards away, and Major Fair was compelled to retire on the supports. This had hardly been done when a picked company of Wintgens's Nubian [Sudanese] Askari suddenly appeared from dead ground and charged at the British with their wonted courage. They were received with heavy if erratic fire and failed to drive home their charge. But the plans of Colonels Murray and Baxter had been upset. Wintgens had seen his danger and had posted most of his machine-guns on high ground commanding the route by which the troops intended to cut off his retreat would have had to advance. The British casualties were four killed and 15 wounded, a small total for a vast amount of firing, but on both sides the native soldier fired as usual, too high.* There was much sniping the next day, and during the night of March 31 the British dug in farther round on the flanks, only to find on the morning of April 1 that Wintgens had got clean away during the night, destroying the bridge over the Songwe behind him.

The pursuit of Wintgens was continued, and in May it was taken up by Belgian columns from Tabora. As was fitting, seeing that he was the officer who first opposed the Belgians in their 1916 campaign, a Belgian column succeeded in capturing Major Wintgens himself. On May 22, at a place about 60 miles south-south-west of Tabora, the Belgians forced

* High firing accounted for the low casualty lists in many of the engagements where African troops were employed, especially in the case of newly raised levies.

an action in which the Germans were severely punished, Major Wintgens being among the prisoners taken. As a tribute to the "valour and courtesy" which distinguished him "from all the German leaders whom the Belgians have encountered on the battlefields of Europe and Africa" Major Wintgens was allowed to retain his sword. The remnant of his force continued to go northward and nearly reached the frontier of British East Africa. In July it turned south, pursued by Belgian and British columns. Finally, in September, all that was left of Wintgens's band, 3 Europeans and 55 Askari, surrendered to the British, sharing the fate of two or three isolated enemy parties left north of the Central Railway in the general retreat in August, 1916. These parties were one after another forced to surrender. Their presence had no military significance, and as early as April 1917, it was announced that the whole of the German territory north of the Central Railway had been transferred from military to provisional civil control, and had rapidly settled down.

During the last three months of 1916 the army of General Smuts, except Van Deventer's division, was not engaged in important operations. The situation at the close of the previous campaign may be recalled. On August 26 Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and the main German force had retreated from Mrogoro, on



RHODESIAN DETACHMENT ON THE MARCH: SWAMPY GROUND.



RHODESIAN DETACHMENT ON THE MARCH: CROSSING A RIVER.

the Central Railway, into the Uluguru Mountains. The "audacious and successful" pursuit by General Enslin's Mounted Brigade forced von Lettow-Vorbeck to abandon his intention of making a prolonged resistance in those mountains. But his knowledge of the country enabled him to escape from a somewhat critical situation. It was only by the most strenuous efforts that the British columns penetrated the mountains at all. Along some roads wheeled traffic of any kind was impossible.* And owing to the ruggedness of the *terrain* what was meant to be a joint attack by the brigades of Brits and Nussey on Kissaki, a fortified post at the south end of the mountains, resulted in two isolated efforts, a double retirement, and, said General Smuts, "a regrettable recovery of enemy *moral*." The denseness of the bush prevented Brits from going to the aid of Nussey when that general was hard pressed, though they were only a short distance apart. But a few days later, on September 15, a threat to cut off his retreat to the Rufiji induced von Lettow-Vorbeck to evacuate Kissaki. He then took up positions between the Mgeta and Rufiji rivers and also


south of the last-named river. To the north the German outposts were about 55 miles south-west of Dar-es-Salaam, their presence constituting a threat to the British railway communications; south of the Rufiji the enemy had outposts to within 25 miles of Kilwa. That port 130 miles south of Dar-es-Salaam, had been occupied by British naval forces on September 7. No general advance against the new German positions was made until January 1, 1917.

The intervening period was nevertheless one of great activity on the British side. The first task which General Smuts undertook was to shorten his lines of communication. Instead of Mombasa and Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam became his sea base, and thus 1,000 miles were saved, including the long trek across country from the Usambara to the Central Railway. The establishment of the new base took some time. Not only had the Germans damaged Dar-es-Salaam harbour but they had carefully demolished the many score of bridges on the Central Railway. To restore the bridges so that they could carry heavy locomotives would have taken many months, and speedier action was necessary. The difficulty was solved by Van Deventer's South African Pioneers. With the materials locally available they temporarily repaired the bridges so that they were able to carry a weight

* General Brits, in his march from Mahalaka to Kissaki, followed the elephant track which had been taken by Burton and Speke in their journey in 1857 which resulted in the discovery of Lake Tanganyika.

of about six tons. At the same time the gauge of the British heavy motor lorries was narrowed so that they could run on railway trolley wheels over the restored railway line. By this ingenious device a great saving of time was effected. Dar-es-Salaam had only been occupied by the British on September 4, yet by October 6 the railway was open for traffic for 300 miles, and by November there was through communication with the Belgians at Tabora. The strain of maintaining supplies, though lightened, re-

among all the troops. It was clear that white troops who had had repeated attacks of malaria or dysentery would in the further prosecution of the campaign in these extremely unhealthy areas be more of an encumbrance than a help. I therefore decided to abolish the Third Division, under Major-General C. J. Brits, including the Second Mounted Brigade, under Brigadier-General Enslin, and to return these officers with their staffs to South Africa; to incorporate into the First Mounted Brigade, under Brigadier-General Nussey, all fit men belonging to the Second Mounted Brigade, and finally to evacuate from East Africa all white troops declared to be medically unfit by special medical boards. My forces, therefore, again became organized into two divisions, under Major-Generals Hoskins and Van



THE MGETA-RUFIJI CAMPAIGN.

mained serious, for south of the Central Railway—the future theatre of operations—there were no railways. Disease had wiped out the horses, mules and oxen employed in transport work by thousands, and the mechanical transport after many months of continuous use over appalling roads or trackless country was in a seriously damaged condition. These defects took months to be made good.

A second task to which General Smuts applied himself was the reorganization of his army, which at the close of the operations in the Uluguru Mountains was in an exhausted condition. The steps he took and the reasons which prompted his action are set forth by General Smuts as follows:—

Our advance to the areas of the Rufiji and Great Ruaha rivers through numerous tsetse-haunted belts has resulted in the loss of most of the animals of the mounted troop, and the very rapid rise of the sick rate

Deventer respectively, while Brigadier-General Beves's infantry brigade again became a force reserve under my immediate control. As a result of these steps close on 12,000 white troops were evacuated from East Africa between the middle of October and the end of December, 1916, and their places were to some extent taken by the new King's African Rifles battalions, which I was forming and training with the sanction of the War Office, as well as by the Nigerian Brigade under Brigadier-General F. H. B. Cunliffe C.B., C.M.G., which reached Dar-es-Salaam in the second and third weeks in December.

The Nigerian troops were a valued asset. They had, under the same commander, General Cunliffe, played a great part in the conquest of Cameroon and were thoroughly seasoned. It must not be supposed, however, that the reorganized army was mainly composed of Africans. Whites (including Imperial, South African and local units) formed about 25 per cent. of the total and the Indian troops some 30 per cent. The period of preparation had

been one of constant strain, but by December 22 General Smuts was ready for a new offensive. The inaction of his army had caused some criticism in England, and General Smuts in his final dispatch took occasion to state that "an intimate knowledge of all the circumstances of our position is absolutely essential to a correct and fair estimate of what was accomplished."

Part of the preparatory work had been to despatch to Kilwa a strong force, which was to take part in a great encircling movement when the general offensive was resumed. Soon after Kilwa had been occupied by the Navy, transports from Dar-es-Salaam conveyed thither Brigadier-General Hannington and some 2,000 rifles—the Gold Coast Regiment and others. By the second half of October Hannington had pushed out detachments northward as far as Kibata, nearly half-way between Kilwa and the Rufiji, and was in touch with the enemy. Between November 7 and 29 Brigadier-General H. de C. O'Grady's Brigade was also, by rail, road and sea, transferred to Kilwa, where, on November 15, General Hoskins assumed command. Von Lettow-Vorbeck, quick to recognize the meaning of the presence of the Kilwa force, did not let General Hoskins develop his plans unhindered, and there was some brisk fighting in this area before the British offensive was resumed. Early in December, a month marked by violent, intermittent rain, enemy patrols were active

around Kibata, and on the 6th there began an attack on that place—held by General O'Grady—which persisted with much vigour for 10 days. Bringing up several naval as well as field guns, the Germans attempted to invest Kibata, and constantly interrupted communications between it and Kilwa. Heavy attacks were made on the British positions on December 7 and 8. They were followed by a determined night attack on December 9-10. This attack, like the others, was beaten back though with somewhat severe loss to the defenders. On the 11th the British camp was constantly shelled and could not reply, the bad state of the roads having prevented their artillery from getting up. The pressure on Kibata was relieved on the 15th, General Hannington coming up from the west and threatening the German right wing. The Gold Coast Regiment took a commanding hill west of Kibata and held it in spite of heavy counter-attacks and considerable casualties, notably from the enemy's larger guns. On the morning of the next day, December 16, O'Grady's brigade occupied a hill two miles north-east of Kibata, and from this date von Lettow-Vorbeck gave up his offensive. On December 21 General Hoskins reported that, in his opinion, he could in the coming offensive prevent the enemy retreating south by the route leading through the Matumbi Hills, which lie north-west of Kibata.

The general offensive, opened on January 1,



TYPICAL SCENE IN THE ULUGURU MOUNTAINS.



SERGEANT OF THE THIRD BATTALION
NIGERIA REGIMENT.

1917, was preceded by the concentration of the striking forces at their respective rendezvous. General Smuts, in his dispatch of February 28, 1917, gives details which show with what minute care he had worked out his plans. Two main considerations governed the disposition of his forces—"the seizure of a crossing over the Rufiji and the capture, if possible, of the enemy force immediately opposing me." Once over the Rufiji Smuts intended to move south-east and effect a junction with the division under Hoskins moving north-west. If all went well connexion between the Germans around Mahenge and those in the Rufiji area would be severed, and it was hoped that the enemy on the Rufiji would be enveloped or at least dealt a heavy blow as he escaped south. To carry out his plan General Smuts detached the 2nd South African Brigade, under General Beves, to make a wide detour and capture and maintain a bridgehead on the Rufiji at Mkalinso, considerably west of his main positions and near the junction of the

Ruaha with the Rufiji. The advance party of Beves's men was to arrive near this confluence by January 3, the remainder of the brigade was to follow one march in rear, and before day-break on January 4 a crossing of the Rufiji below the junction with the Ruaha was to be made. Such were the instructions to General Beves.

Meanwhile, with the rest of his force, General Smuts attacked that part of the enemy force entrenched along the Mgeta. He left Mrogoro, which had been his headquarters since its capture, on December 22 for the Mgeta front. The scene of operations extended, roughly, some twenty miles along the Mgeta river south and east of Kissaki. A "holding" attack was begun on January 1, and was accompanied by local flanking movements east and west. In the centre about Duthumi was the main body of the Nigerian Brigade, under General Cunliffe, supported by the Army Artillery under Brigadier-General Crowe. It did not press home its attack as its action was dependent upon the result of the flank movements. The flanking column on the east was composed of the 2nd Kashmirs and a battalion of Nigerians and was under Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lyall; that on the west was the First Brigade,* under General Sheppard. These columns endeavoured to enclose the enemy facing General Cunliffe. Sheppard advanced south-east from the direction of Kissaki. A double column of the 130th Baluchi, under Lieut.-Colonel Dyke, detached from his brigade, began the forward movement on the afternoon of December 31. Marching throughout the rest of the day and all through the night, it took up positions early in the morning astride the road by which enemy left wing was retreating before Sheppard's main body. Unexpectedly finding their road barred the enemy immediately sought to force a way through. Four successive charges were made against the Baluchi, the German Askari getting to close quarters with the bayonet. The Baluchi stoutly held their ground and then counter-charged. The enemy, breaking formation, scattered through the long grass, the majority escaping. In this short and bitter hand-to-hand encounter the casualties on both sides were comparatively heavy. At 10 a.m. Sheppard joined the Baluchi who, an hour later, captured the enemy camp at Wiransi, to which place the whole of the First Brigade pushed on by nightfall.

* Formerly known as the First East African Brigade.

Lyll's column did well. It advanced against the right flank of the Germans. Starting from Kiruru, on the Mgeta, in the morning his column did not come up to the enemy till the afternoon. He found them endeavouring to remove a 4.1-in. howitzer. A company of Nigerians charged and captured the gun; a German who tried to destroy it only succeeded in killing himself. Lyll's arrival, which almost blocked the line of retreat of the enemy, had seemingly taken the Germans by surprise. On realizing the position the force opposing Cunliffe in the centre sought

to encircle the enemy. The Germans from the Mgeta were moving south-west by Beho-Beho towards the Rufiji, near the spot where Beves had been told to force a crossing, and should the enemy get there before Beves the task of securing the crossing would be much more difficult, even if possible. Beves was warned of the probable direction of the enemy retreat and hastened his movements. On January 2 he reported that his troops had been marching and road making—the route was through virgin forest—for 14 hours had just completed a



NATIVE CANOE LANDING GERMAN PRISONERS.

to retire, and between 6 and 7 p.m. a heavy attack was delivered on the Nigerian battalion of Lyll's column. Fighting then died down and "the night of January 1-2 passed without incident" (General Smuts). That night, nevertheless, was put to good purpose by the Germans for during the morning of January 2 it was discovered that the whole enemy force on the Mgeta had vanished. It had slipped through and was south of the British lines.

Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck may not himself have been with the German force on the Mgeta front, but the credit of again escaping from the trap was his. General Smuts, whatever his disappointment, decided once more to attempt

march of 20 miles, and were still 10 miles from the Rufiji. There had been no sign of the enemy. The next day, January 3, the much-desired crossing was seized.

At 6.30 a.m. (wrote General Smuts) and, therefore, a day ahead of their programme, the advance troops of Beves's Brigade, after a 30 miles continuous march, crossed the Rufiji a few miles south of Mkalinso, and secured and entrenched a bridge-head. The march of the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade on this occasion was a noteworthy achievement, even in a campaign which affords repeated instances of splendid endurance by every unit of the forces.

January 2 and 3 had been spent by the main force under General Smuts in developing the new encircling movement. The troops, which had to march through most difficult country,

got in touch with the enemy again on the afternoon of the 3rd, and at 10.30 a.m. on January 4 Sheppard's Brigade caught up the chief enemy force as it was retiring from Beho-Beho. A sharp engagement followed, but though severely handled the enemy "again slipped past," to use General Smuts's phrase. The brunt of the action was borne by the 25th Royal Fusiliers (the Legion of Frontiersmen). During the fight Captain F. C. Selous fell at the head of his company. He was buried under the shadow of a tamarind tree, beside the graves of members of his company who fell at the same time. Thus ended the life of the most distinguished of the hunter-naturalists of recent years, the man who had opened up thousands of miles of South Central Africa. Throughout the campaign, though well over 60, he had set an example of endurance and devotion to duty unexcelled by any member of the force. As stated in Chapter CLXXXIII, he had already been given the D.S.O. in recognition of his services. None knew better than Selous the dangers and difficulties of the campaign. Writing home from Tanga in November, 1916, he set forth some of these difficulties, adding: "I shall try and hold out to the end, if possible, or, at any rate, as long as my health and strength lasts. General Smuts is now working . . . for the next forward movement, and when he is ready the remnants of my battalion will join him."

From Beho-Beho the Germans had gone south by east to Kibambawe, where was a bridge over the Rufiji. This bridge had been

constantly bombed by the British aeroplanes (which did "consistently excellent work" throughout these operations) and had been damaged by flood. The Germans had worked hard for days to repair it. They crossed the river by it on the night of January 4, afterwards removing the whole roadway of the bridge. The next day General Sheppard reached Kibambawe and pushed troops across on the 6th and 7th. On the 7th the enemy offered still resistance to the 30th Punjabi, part of the force which had crossed the river. The Punjabi suffered severely, the enemy gunfire being very accurate, but held their position. General Sheppard subsequently got more troops across, but was not strong enough to undertake further offensive operations. Farther west General Beves at his crossing near Mkalinso found that he, too, could not continue the offensive. His troops, the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, had by this time become very exhausted, and the Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe was sent to Mkalinso, and afterwards, on January 17, pushed forward towards the most westerly troops of the First Division (the Kilwa force under General Hoskins). Between them Sheppard's, Cunliffe's and Beves's men a little later cleared the enemy from the Rufiji in the neighbourhood of Kibambawe.

The result of the Mgeta and subsequent fighting led to the withdrawal of other enemy detachments north of the Rufiji but nearer the coast than those engaged by General Smuts's main body. Evacuating Kissangire and



UP-HILL WORK WITH A GUN.

Mkamba, several German companies crossed the Rufiji near Utete in mid-January. They had scored one small success before withdrawing, two officers and nine other ranks of the Arab Rifles being killed as the result of an ambush.

General Hoskins's force co-operated, as intended, in General Smuts's offensive, but did not get in close touch with the enemy. It had to campaign in roadless and almost unknown country. As General Hoskins had foreseen, he prevented von Lettow-Vorbeck from attempting to retreat south by the Matumbi Hills, but the cordon which should have enclosed the Germans in the Rufiji Valley was never completed. The First Division did, however, good work. Advancing north from Kibata, it reached, on January 16, Mohoro, in the Rufiji delta, finding a 4.1-in. naval gun abandoned by the enemy. The harrying of the Germans continued during February, but the rainy season setting in operations were brought to a standstill, with the main German force still in the Rufiji region, a most unhealthy area. The straits to which part at least of their troops were reduced was evidenced by the surrender in April of a large hospital at Mpanganya, on the Rufiji above Utete, on account of the flooding of the site and the lack of food. The British found in the hospital 62 European and 140 native patients. The rainy season proved the wettest in German East Africa for nine years and lasted till about the end of April. At the beginning of May the Germans evacuated the Rufiji Valley, moving to the valley of the Matandu river, 50 to 100 miles farther south, and in the hinterland of Kilwa. This transference they were able to effect unopposed. Moreover, they secured positions reaching in places right up to the coast. They still had guns, machine guns and plenty of ammunition, and, as the event proved, their fighting capacity was far from exhausted.

General Smuts was not able to bring to a conclusion the operations he had initiated. Shortly after he had begun the Mgeta offensive he was asked by the South African Cabinet to go to London to represent the Union at the forthcoming special sittings of the War Cabinet. He accepted the offer, and on January 20, accompanied by General Van Deventer, he sailed from Dar-es-Salaam. Before leaving he handed over the command to Major-(temp. Lieutenant-) General Hoskins. General Hoskins held this post but a short time. On May 17, soon after the Germans had occupied the Matandu Valley, it was officially announced

that General Van Deventer had been appointed to command the forces in East Africa, with the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General.

Portugal's military effort in the East African campaign was commensurate with her available resources. In April, 1916, Mozambique troops seized Kionga, the chief place in the small area south of the mouth of the Rovuma which formed part of the German Protectorate. Farther inland a Portuguese force crossed the



[Vandyk.]

CAPT. F. C. SELOUS, D.S.O.,
African Big Game Hunter,
Commanded a Company of the 25th Royal
Fusiliers in German East Africa.

Rovuma in September, 1916. It met with some success, but in December was compelled to retire across the river. The offensive was renewed in the closing days of the year, but the Portuguese were not strong enough to withstand the raiding parties dispatched by the Germans in May, 1917, from the Kilwa-Lindi hinterland. The raiders penetrated far into Portuguese territory, and a British column had to be organized to deal with them. It advanced from Fort Johnston, at the south end of Lake Nyasa, and by August the Germans had been driven back across the Rovuma. The value of Portugal's help in the East African campaign was not, however, to be measured by the operations on the Rovuma. By her entry



A MOTOR-CAR SQUADRON IN NYASALAND.

into the war the magnificent harbour of Delagoa Bay was placed at the disposal of the British, and the German ships interned there became available for transport service. Moreover, an end was put to German intrigues

in Mozambique, while the Germans in East Africa were deprived of all chance of imitating the example of their comrades in Cameroon and evading capture by retreating to neutral territory.



CHAPTER CCVII.

THE DISORGANIZATION OF RUSSIA : MARCH—JULY, 1917.

RISE OF THE SOVIET—BOLSHEVIKS AND MAXIMALISTS—JEWISH INFLUENCES—INDISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY—KERENSKY ABOLISHES THE DEATH PENALTY—ALEXEIEFF AS GENERALISSIMO—GERMAN PROPAGANDA—LENIN AND HIS AGENTS—RESIGNATION OF MILIUKOFF—PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S NOTE TO THE ALLIES—REPLIES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE—"NO ANNEXATIONS AND NO INDEMNITY"—RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOFF—A COALITION CABINET—THE "SOLDIER'S CHARTER"—DISMISSAL OF GENERALS—KERENSKY'S VISIT TO THE ARMIES—CHAOS IN RUSSIA—CONFISCATION OF LAND—MUTINIES IN THE FLEET AND ARMIES—THE SUKHOMLINOFF TRIAL—ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS—DRUNKENNESS REVIVED—TREATMENT OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY—THE REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH—FRATERNIZATION WITH THE ENEMY—WOMEN SOLDIERS.

IN Chapter CXCVI. the events preceding and attending the Russian Revolution were described up to the abdication of Nicholas II. on March 15, 1917, and the renunciation by the Grand Duke Michael of the throne subject to the desire of the people, expressed by means of a plebiscite, that he should assume the supreme power. Reference was also made to the recognition of the new regime by Great Britain and the Allied Governments.

The course of events which will be dealt with in the present chapter, entailed serious difficulties, disappointments and reverses to New Russia such as were unexpected by many who had hailed the change. Particularly was this the case in regard to the Moderate, not to speak of the Conservative parties. They were totally unprepared for the revolutionary developments that marked the history of their country during the earlier months and, to a large extent, found themselves unable to exert any decisive influence upon them.

During the historic interview at Pskoff between the Sovereign and the representatives of the Duma, which led to his abdication, Nicholas II. asked—according to M. Shulgin's Vol. XIII.—Part 169.

account—"whether they could assume the responsibility and give him a guarantee that his abdication would really calm the country and would not provoke complications." To this MM. Gutchkoff and Shulgin replied that "so far as they could foresee there would be no complications." They were too sanguine.

While President Rodzianko and the leaders of political parties in the Duma were debating and sending messages to General Headquarters urging the Tsar to give way to the popular demand for Constitutional reform, the Socialists were busy making hurried arrangements to take control of affairs at the opportune moment. The moment came quickly and suddenly. The soldiers in some of the regiments forming the Petrograd garrison had been drawn from the local working class. This was due to mismanagement, or, perhaps, intention, on the part of subordinate officials. Nicholas II. had called the attention of his War Office to the mistake, but it had not been rectified. The Petrograd reservists refused to fire on their kinsmen when the latter started the bread riots that gave rise to the revolutionary outbreak in the early days of March, 1917. Now, thanks to the cooperation of the troops, who

conflict. It must be wound up on the basis of self-definition of all nationalities. All Governments must forego to the same extent their Imperialistic objects of conquest." He had stated the Socialist position in foreign affairs with striking accuracy, as the subsequent activities of the Soviet testify. What he failed to perceive—and in this he shared the mistake of older statesmen—was the inevitable discredit to lofty ideals once they become the

violence. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were divided into Minimalists and Maximalists. To this last-named faction belonged the terrorists, who under the old regime had practised political assassination, and, being the most dangerous faction, were the particular objects of solicitude on the part of the secret police (Okhrana). Disposing of huge secret funds, the Okhrana suborned numerous agents to enter the Terrorist ranks in order to upset or direct their



M. KERENSKY,

The first Socialist Minister of War.

stock-in-trade of extreme politicians like his colleagues in the Soviet.

The Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries both had their particular objects in view; the former to enable labour to dominate capital, the latter to place the peasants in full possession of the land. Each body was, however, under the sway of its extreme faction. The Social-Democrats were divided into a Bolshevik (majority) and Menshevik (minority) group—the latter professing Marxism, the former believing only in

plans, as it happened to suit its purpose. With the passing of the Old Regime the chief Maximalist occupation was gone, but its spirit remained and so did the men and their methods. A natural alliance bound the Maximalists with the Bolsheviks. A confusion between the very names of these factions arose and was perpetuated in the columns of the foreign press.

As many of the former Terrorists were Jews, it was to be expected that they would figure largely in the composition of the Soviet.

Later it became known that such was the case, although for a long time they concealed their identity under assumed (Russianised) names.*

Having made this necessary digression in order to explain the real character and composition of the Soviet, let us resume the narrative of events that marked the juxtaposition of two bodies of such unequal character and influence as the Provisional Government created by the *bourgeois* Duma and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates created by the Socialists.

The Mensheviks, led by Tehkheidze and Tseretelli, backed up by the Minimalists (nominally under Kerensky), were quite willing that the Duma should continue to bear the responsibility for the Government until they should themselves feel equal to assume the

* Here are some of the names and pseudonyms of Soviet leaders:—

Nahamkes became Stekloff; Apfelbaum became Zinovieff; Bronstein became Trotsky; Rosenfeld became Kameneff; Goldmann became Goreff; Goldberg became Mekovsky; Zederbaum became Martoff; Himmer became Sukhanoff; Krachmann became Zagorsky; Hollaender became Meshkovsky; Lourier became Larin; Seffer became Bogdanoff; Zederblum became Lenin; and Feldmann became Teherhoff.

direction of affairs. Till then they would be feeling their way and preparing the ground for the realization of their programme, and as they felt their position becoming more secure, asserting their domination over the Provisional Government.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks and Maximalists—mostly Jews—had gone straight to the root of the Socialistic problem. They were not concerned with recondite theories, Marxian or Georgian. They wanted to achieve results—at once. But it was necessary to make themselves secure from interference. The ignorance and the traditions of the people rendered a counter-revolution possible, even probable. There was an easy way to prevent it. Disorganize, disrupt and revolutionize the army; overthrow its discipline and the authority of its officers, and instead of being a menace to the revolutionary ideals it would become a safeguard against reaction. Within a few days of its inception, the Russian revolution was discredited by the issue of the so-called Order No. 1, the handiwork of Bolsheviks in the Soviet; its reputed author was Stekloff (Nahamkes). Soldiers and sailors were enjoined to



A MEETING OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN A TRENCH.

The British officers seen in the foreground were making enquiries into the object of the meeting.

take possession of their arms and exclude their officers from the management and control of regimental affairs. This revolutionary document gave the signal for substituting committees in the place of the existing authority, civil or military.

Perhaps the authors of Prikaz (Order) No. 1 did not expect such sudden and sweeping consequences. If they did the fact says much for their acumen and little for their patriotism. It is not too much to say that all the evils of the Revolution—internal anarchy and military disaster—were directly traceable to the Committees. For the causes of this remarkable phenomenon we must seek in the natural love of the Russians for discussion and controversy. The endless debates in the Duma had demonstrated this failing. In their village assemblies the peasants were just as voluble. Now every soldier, seaman or ragamuffin could hold forth on any and every subject before an audience as ignorant as himself. The temptation was irresistible. Committees sprang up like mushrooms, and each committee was a convenient medium for Soviet agitation even if it did not always recognize the authority of that body.

While the mob in Petrograd was still engaged in destroying emblems of Tsardom or holding meetings and demonstrations, and the soldiers were enjoying their new found liberties by insulting or murdering officers, there appeared on the scene a modest general who was destined to play a leading part in the Revolution. The Provisional Government on March 16 appointed General Korniloff as Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd military district. He had attained great popularity some months earlier by his escape from Austrian captivity. During the retreat from Galicia in 1915 he had performed prodigies of valour and was taken prisoner severely wounded, having fought with a handful of men to cover the withdrawal of a whole army till the last cartridge had been expended and his men disabled. To handle an unruly gathering of undisciplined soldiers was a more difficult task. General Korniloff did his best. He appeared before the Soviet and got into touch with its Moderate section. He visited the regiments, talked with the men, and tried to get them to listen to reason. He introduced some semblance of order in units which had been so out of hand that they were capable of committing unprovoked excesses.

Acting under orders from the Provisional Government General Korniloff went to Tsarskoe and notified to the ex-Tsaritsa the order for her arrest and the arrest of her children and suite.

Later, when news came that the Germans were concentrating on the Northern Front, General Korniloff went to the Soviet and represented to them the danger of subverting discipline in the army. All in vain



M. TCHKHEIDZE
Addressing a Soldiers' Meeting.

During the previous week (ending March 22) the Zemstvos (County Councils) throughout Russia signified to the Provisional Government their willingness to cooperate in every way with the new regime. They had already done invaluable service at the Front in organizing transport and relief work and had helped, so far as they were permitted, to remedy the food crisis. Their assistance in this all important matter would have enabled Russia to overcome her difficulties without undue hardship to the urban population. Unhappily the Zemstvos were soon driven out and superseded by the ubiquitous Committees.

Fulfilling the pledges given at the outset of the Revolution by M. Kerensky, the Provisional Government abolished the death penalty in civil courts and in courts martial (March 22). This humane act led to an increase of revolutionary agitation at the Front. Irresponsible demagogues of the Bolshevik persuasion could

pursue their activities with the utmost impunity. The *Pravda* (Truth), a Bolshevik organ, openly incited the troops to fraternize with the enemy. On the other hand the *Novoe Vremya* was subjected, by order of the Soviet, to all the rigours of censorship for denouncing the activity of the pacifists in the army.

The Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) party,



M. ALEXANDER GUTCHKOFF,
Minister of War in the first Coalition
Government.

influenced also by its left wing, proclaimed itself in favour of a Democratic Republic.

Notwithstanding the Bolshevik agitation the great bulk of the armies in the field was as yet unspoilt, and when M. Gutchkoff, the Minister of War, visited the Northern Front at the end of March he was received with the greatest enthusiasm and was able to assure himself that the land and sea forces at Riga could be counted upon to resist any encroachments.

At this stage the Soviet thought fit to make its sentiments on the question of peace known to the "German brethren," who were invited by wireless to imitate the Russian example, "cast off the despotic yoke" and

live for ever in amity with their neighbours.

On April 6 the revolutionary democracy of Petrograd attended the burial of some of the soldiers and workmen who had fallen in the "fight for freedom."

The Provisional Government issued a proclamation to the Poles, assuring them of Free Russia's support to regain their independence, and expressing confidence in their becoming a reliable rampart against German aggression.

At the same time M. Gutchkoff, although constantly menaced by interference from the Soviet, was proceeding with the organization of the High Command. The post of Generalissimo, vacant since the departure of the ex-Tsar and the Grand Duke Nicholas, was confided to General Alexeieff, who had long been Chief of Staff. His noble and lofty devotion to the interests of the country had been sorely tried under the old regime. It was to undergo a still ruder experience at the hands of the Revolutionaries. However, at that time hope was not lost that he would be able to save the army from ruin.

Some improvement was also noticeable in regard to the agrarian question. The Soviet and the Provisional Government emphatically declared that its fate would depend upon the Constituent Assembly and that meanwhile no arbitrary land grabbing should be permitted. The Cossacks very promptly announced that they would permit no alienation of their land reserves, which were very extensive, and that all Cossack lands which had been donated should revert to the original owners.

The Petrograd Soviet had given rise to numerous organizations like itself. They existed in all towns and large villages. On the initiative of the Petrograd Council they all sent delegates to a Soviet Congress which met early in April. It decided to continue the war and to support the Government, but only so far as it reflected the views of the Congress. What those views were has already been stated. As regards international relations they depended on the assumption that peace could and should be arranged between the peoples of each belligerent country, and that the respective Governments should be compelled to abandon "imperialistic" aims. Later, this theory was to develop into the watchword "No annexation, no indemnity."

In order to promote some knowledge of the aims and ideals permeating the British demo-

cracy, our Government had arranged for a visit to Russia by some representatives of labour. Messrs. O'Grady, Saunders and Thorne came to Petrograd at this juncture. The French Socialists were also represented. Their mission was, however, misconstrued by the extremists in the Soviet, who held that men of such moderate views could not reflect the opinions of the working class in their country.

To return to affairs in the Army, the insidious work of agitators had been producing great ravages in the ranks. Hundreds of thousands of peasant soldiers left the front, seduced into the belief that lands were being distributed to the villagers. The tide of desertion ebbed and flowed, disorganizing traffic on all the railways in the war zone and far inland. A disastrous rupture of the Russian lines on the Stokhod had been easily accomplished by the Germans. Then the enemy decided to abstain from hostilities, to make full use of "fraternization" in order to obtain information regarding the Russian front and to allow the process of revolutionary disintegration due scope, whereby they hoped to secure Russia as an easy prey. German and Austrian Socialists

were encouraged to negotiate with the Soviet. Thirty Russian pacifists, headed by the Bolshevik Lenin, were conveyed from Switzerland through Germany to Sweden, whence they made their way unimpeded into Petrograd.

Here are some instructive examples of German propaganda among the Russian troops. Under portraits of the Tsar and the King of England appeared this proclamation:

Two brothers—Nicholas II. and George V. You maintain that you are free citizens and have overthrown the autocratic power. But you remain the slaves of England.

Two brothers are before you, Nicholas II. and George V., and how they resemble one another! Not only in outward appearance, but also in character. Both plotted the present war. One of them—Nicholas II.—has ceased to reign, to the great joy of liberated Russia. He brought much grief, not only to the Russian land but also to us.

We are glad of the liberation of Russia, and do not think of the restoration of the old regime.

The other brother—George V.—carries on the war. All England wishes to wage an endless war. The Russian people, the honest Russian soldier, has to go on serving as cannon meat. England demands it. Then throw off once for all the shameful yoke of the English. They are ready to buy your generals, only to attain their ends. From pure motives we offered you peace. But your Command refused our honest offer at the orders of England.

Therefore you yourselves must act, in order to put an end to useless bloodshed.



MR. WILL THORNE, M.P., AND MR. O'GRADY, M.P., CONVEYING BRITISH LABOUR'S GREETINGS TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.



STREET SCENE IN PETROGRAD DURING THE REVOLUTION: LENINISTS FIRE ON THE CROWD.

Another proclamation read :

SOLDIERS!

REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD !

Don't you see that they are deceiving you ? Don't you really see that the English are leading Russia to the verge of ruin ?

The English deceived your Tsar and forced him into a war so that with his help they might conquer the world. To begin with, the English went with your Tsar. Now they are against him because he would not agree to their greedy demands. The English have thrown down from the throne the Tsar given you by God. England is draining Russia of her wealth. The muzhik is dying for England's sake. Open your eyes, Russian people. England is to blame for your ruin. England is now ruling Russia as if in her own house.

The *Novoe Vremya* on June 22 published the following letter from a German prisoner of war in Russia which was intercepted by the military censor on the way to Germany :—

Edrovo, 7th June (N.S.), 1917.

My dear Herr Blase,—Many thanks for your kind postcard of the 14th February. In reply, I can tell you that I feel quite well and comfortable here. During the last few months, and especially the last few weeks, I have gone through a good deal of most interesting experience, and cannot help thinking how good it is to be in Free Russia. Just imagine me, a prisoner of war, vieing with the Russians themselves in working for Russia's freedom. I could hardly dream, when I was taken prisoner, that one of these days I should become a Russian Social Democrat. But I am quite happy in my new position, as I feel that by my work I am helping, not only our Russian "comrades," but also my beloved Fatherland. I firmly believe that the heartfelt wish of our beloved country will soon be realized, and Germany and Russia will shake each other's hands and celebrate the joyous triumph of peace. Kind regards to all.

(Signed by four initials.)

What was the cost of Russian "fraternization" ? A writer in the *Novoe Vremya* (May 26) pointed out that Hindenburg had 390 divisions of infantry in the united armies of the enemies of Russia at the end of February.

There were 242 German divisions, of which a third were on the Russo-Rumanian front and two-thirds on the Western front.

The Austrians had 80 divisions, of which some 45 were on the Russo-Rumanian front, and all the rest, except a few divisions, were on the Italian front.

There were 55 Turkish divisions, of which about 40 were on the Caucasian-Mesopotamian, Arabian-Egyptian front, while the remainder were on the Russian and Macedonian fronts or in the interior of the country.

Of the 14 Bulgarian divisions, 11 were on the Macedonian front and three in the Dobruja.

Of the reserves not more than 20 divisions of the Austro-German armies were kept in the interior. The reserves on the whole Western German Front numbered only 40 divisions. At that time the German General Staff were preparing a formidable blow on the Anglo-French front and a supporting attack on the Italian front. The weakening of the Russian Army and the inactivity on the Russian front made Hindenburg change his plans. To take Petrograd would have been easy and the capital was threatened with an attack by land and sea. At that decisive moment the Anglo-French forces took the initiative in the West and the Anglo-Russian forces in Mesopotamia.

The following was the total result of Russian inactivity and fraternization with the enemy : "(1) Having used up his reserves on the Anglo-French front, Hindenburg was able to withdraw some 30 divisions from the Russo-Rumanian front ; (2) Almost all the Turkish divisions on the Russo-Rumanian front were taken away, together with two or three German divisions and sent to the Caucasian-Mesopotamian front ; (3) The troops of Germans and Austrians who came into our trenches to fraternize were able to see the disposition of our forces and our numbers, and are now able to direct their fire accurately against our batteries."

Lenin and his cohort of German agents invaded Petrograd simultaneously with the Austrian peace overtures of April, 1917. Upon the minds of the ignorant masses and the lazy, demoralized troops his speeches exercised a strong influence. "Expropriating" a handsome villa from a well-known ballerina, Lenin daily and hourly held forth from the balcony to the crowds below, inciting them to stop the war, persuading the soldiers to draw their comrades away from the trenches. "Only stop fighting and the Germans will become harmless," such was the tenour of his appeal. "Take the land, it is yours. Make yourself masters of the mills, they rightfully belong to the workers. There is only one enemy : it is England ; she wants to go on fighting."

The fruits of this doctrine were to be gathered later in the stricken fields west of Tarnopol. Its success at the time aroused no small apprehension among Russia's Allies. The Soviets had peculiar notions about Russia's obligations and duty as an ally, but they did not go to the length of a separate peace preached by Lenin. Yet who could be sure about the future ? The Russian Revolution had already brought some highly unexpected developments. Would it try to imitate some of the time-servers who had disgraced the old regime ?

An emphatic disclaimer was given to any such suspicions by a series of statements of policy issued to the Russian people and to the Allied Governments. The latter were assured that Russia would "remain faithful to the pact which united her indissolubly to them" and that she would "fight by their side against the common enemy until the end, without cessation and without faltering."

In April a Manifesto was published in Petrograd in which the Provisional Government repudiated any design to dominate foreign

nations or forcibly occupy their territory, but stated that it desired to bring about peace on the basis of the right of nations to decide their destinies for themselves. This had been the burden of M. Kerensky's Duma speech before the Revolution and it became the accepted standpoint of the Soviets.

Austria took advantage of this declaration to



MILITIA (POLICE) EXAMINING PAPERS.

make a fresh bid for peace. She made a separate offer to Russia in the shape of a public declaration of "conformity of aims." No specific terms were named. The imminence of this new German move was to be inferred from the facts that 10 days previously the two Kaisers had met at Hamburg and Austrian and German Socialists were trying to arrange a meeting with Russian Socialists in Stockholm.

To avoid any misunderstanding a Russian Note to the Allies reaffirming her determination to continue the war to "decisive victory" was published in Petrograd, May 2. It was regarded by the Soviet as a challenge because it failed to specify the qualifying terms "no annexation, no indemnity." Some days previously the Soviet had threatened to boycott the War Loan unless this sacramental phrase was endorsed by the Provisional Government. Relations between them had grown strained. It was agreed finally that they

should hold a joint meeting in the Marie Palace that same evening. The Bolsheviks called out some regiments, surrounded the palace and were prepared to arrest the Ministers. M. Miliukoff had to address the crowd in order to save himself and his colleagues from bodily violence. The soldiers were ultimately persuaded to disperse. Here is the Note to which the Bolsheviks and the Soviet objected so strongly:—

The Provisional Government of Russia published on April 27 a manifesto to Russian citizens in which it explained the views of the Government of free Russia in regard to the objects to be attained in the war. The Minister for Foreign Affairs instructs me to communicate to you the contents of the document referred to, and to add the following considerations:

Our enemies have striven lately to sow discord among our Allies by propagating absurd reports regarding the alleged intention of Russia to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. The text of the document annexed will form the best refutation of such inventions. The general principles therein enunciated by the Provisional Government are in entire agreement with the ideas which were repeatedly expressed up to quite recently by eminent statesmen of the Allied countries. These principles were also lucidly expressed in the words of the President of our new Ally, the great oversea Republic.

The Russian Government under the old regime was certainly not prepared to appreciate and share these ideas as to the liberating character of the war, the establishment of a stable basis for the pacific co-operation of nations, the freedom of oppressed peoples, etc. But emancipated Russia can now use language which will be understood by modern democracies, and hastens to add her voice to that of her Allies.

The declarations of the Provisional Government, being imbued with this new spirit of a free democracy, cannot naturally afford the least pretext for the assumption that the demolition of the old structure has entailed any slackening on the part of Russia in the common struggle of all the Allies. On the contrary, the nation's determination to bring the world-war to a decisive victory has been accentuated owing to the sense of responsibility which belongs to all in general and to each one of us in particular. This spirit has become still more active by the fact that it is concentrated on the immediate task which touches everybody so closely, of driving back the enemy who has invaded our territory. It is understood, and the annexed document expressly states so, that the Provisional Government in safeguarding the rights acquired for our country will maintain strict regard for the engagements entered into with the Allies of Russia.

Firmly committed to a decisive victory in the present war, and in perfect agreement with our Allies, the Provisional Government is likewise confident that the problems which were created by this war will be solved by the creation of a firm basis of a lasting peace, and that, inspired by identical sentiments the Allied democracies will find a means of establishing the guarantees and penalties necessary to prevent any recourse to a sanguinary war in the future.

The significance of M. Miliukoff's unpopularity soon became apparent. He remained in office for some days and resigned ostensibly on account of internal differences in the Cabinet, but his departure was undoubtedly due to an honourable disposition to stand by the

Allies of his country till a decisive victory had been achieved. It signified almost unconditional surrender to Socialist dictation, and from that moment the control arrogated by the Soviet over the Provisional Government was to become a leading factor in Russian politics. An open rupture was avoided for the time. By a narrow majority the Soviet voted confidence in the Lvoff cabinet after receiving a promise to explain the Note of May 1 in a sense satisfactory to the delegates.

"In face of the doubts which had arisen as to the interpretation of this Note," the Provisional Government, in a communication addressed to the Allies, offered the following explanation:—

1. The Note (of May 1) was subjected to a long and detailed examination by the Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved.

2. It is obvious that the Note, in speaking of a decisive victory, had in view the solution of the problems which were mentioned in the communication of April 9. and which were thus specified: "The Government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that Free Russia does not purpose to dominate other peoples or to take from them their national patrimony, or forcibly to occupy foreign territory, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or humiliate anyone. In the name of the higher principles of equity the Russian people has broken the chains which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or weakened in its vital forces."

3. In referring to the "penalties and guarantees essential to a durable peace" the Provisional Government had in view the reduction of armaments, the establishment of international tribunals, etc.

After accepting this "explanation" as putting an end to all interpretations of the Note of May 1 in a sense contrary to the interests and the claims of the revolutionary democracy, the Soviet passed a resolution declaring that the question of the renunciation of the policy of annexation had now for the first time been made a subject of international discussion, and that this fact should be considered as an important victory for democracy. The resolution concluded as follows:

The executive committee while asserting its unalterable determination not to make peace except on these conditions, appeals to the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally round its Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and declares its firm assurance that the people of all the belligerent countries will be able to overcome the resistance of their Governments, and will force them to enter upon negotiations for peace on the basis of the renunciation of all annexations and indemnities.

Having compelled its own Government to adopt this point of view, the Soviet agreed to support the War Loan of Liberty.

The following is the text of the reply of the British Government, published June 12, to the Russian Note regarding the Allied war aims:—

On May 3 His Majesty's Government received through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires a Note from the Russian Government declaratory of their war policy.

In the Proclamation to the Russian people, enclosed in the Note, it is said that "Free Russia does not purpose



ROUNDING-UP ANTI-REVOLUTIONISTS IN PETROGRAD.

to dominate other peoples or to take from them their national patrimony or forcibly to occupy foreign territory." In this sentiment the British Government heartily concur. They did not enter upon this war as a war of conquest and they are not continuing it for any such object. Their purpose at the outset was to defend the existence of their country and to enforce respect for international engagements. To those objects has now been added that of liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny. They heartily rejoice, therefore, that Free Russia has announced her intention of liberating Poland, not only the Poland ruled by the old Russian Autocracy, but equally that within the dominion of the Germanic Empires. In this enterprise the British Democracy wish Russia God-speed. Beyond everything we must seek for such a settlement as will secure the happiness and contentment of the peoples and take away all legitimate causes of future war.

The British Government heartily join their Russian Allies in their acceptance and approval of the principles laid down by President Wilson in his historic message to the American Congress. These are the aims for which the British peoples are fighting. These are the principles by which their war policy is and will be guided. The British Government believe that broadly speaking the agreements which they have from time to time made with their Allies are conformable to these standards. But if the Russian Government so desire they are quite ready with their Allies to examine, and if need be to revise, these agreements.

The French Government's reply was couched in almost identical terms. It made, however, express stipulation regarding the lost provinces as follows:—

For herself, France intends that her faithful and loyal

Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which were snatched from her in the past by violence, shall be liberated and shall return to her. With her Allies she will fight until victory, in order that they may be assured the complete restoration of their territorial rights and their political and economic independence, as well as reparatory indemnities for the long toll of inhuman and unjustified acts of devastation and the indispensable guarantees against a recurrence of the evils caused by the incessant acts of provocation of our enemies.

The Government of the Republic remains, like the Russian people, convinced that it is by drawing inspiration from these principles that the foreign policy of Russia will attain the aims of a people enamoured of justice and liberty, and that, after a victorious struggle, the Allies will be able to create a solid and lasting peace founded on right. The Russian Government may be assured that the French Government is desirous of coming to an understanding with it, not only regarding the means for continuing the struggle, but also regarding those for ending it, by examining and settling a common agreement as to the conditions in which they may hope to reach a final settlement in accordance with the ideas by which their conduct in this war is directed.

The impression produced by the British and French Notes was, however, influenced by party considerations. Resolutions against a separate peace were passed afresh, but the undercurrent of Socialist opinion had been clearly indicated some days previously by the organ of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. After quoting two English newspapers to the effect that the declaration of the



MILITARY SCHOOL CADETS REVIEWED IN PETROGRAD.

Provisional Government and the pronouncements of the Revolutionary leaders show that the Russian peace formula coincides with British and French war aims, it said :

You are deceiving yourselves, gentlemen, or, rather, you are vainly striving to delude your fellow-countrymen concerning the real policy of the Russian Revolution. The Revolution will not sacrifice a single soldier to help you repair "historic injustices" committed against you. What about the historic injustices committed by yourselves and your violent oppression of Ireland, India, Egypt, and innumerable peoples inhabiting all the continents of the world? If you are so anxious for "justice" that you are prepared in its name to send millions of people to the grave, then, gentlemen, begin with yourselves.

It may be added, in this connexion, that M. Kerensky had forbidden the Russian troops in the Mediterranean to join the Allies in landing at Athens, although they had been compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the treacherous actions of the Government under the ex-King Constantine and to restore the Constitution. By a curious irony of fate the party passions of the Soviet led the Revolutionary Provisional Government to protect the existing Constantine regime which for family and dynastic reasons had also been the policy of the Tsar's Government.

As a matter of fact, no dreams of conquest had inspired Russia or her Allies when they drew the sword against Germany. The Soviet had deliberately misinterpreted their aims and motives in order to carry the theory of class warfare into the domain of international relations and to promote the doctrine that the democracies could and should terminate the struggle—a doctrine that could only bring military disaster. The first move in this direction had been made by the Soviet in creating a section of foreign relations, as was pointed out by *The Times* Petrograd Correspondent, who had then defined it as an indication of the Soviet's intention to bring about a dishonourable peace.

By proclaiming the theory of "no annexation and no indemnity," the Soviet had delivered another fatal blow at the fighting efficiency of the Army. To the ignorant soldiers, who had already been shorn of their guiding lights—of their faith and of their loyalty—the new doctrine implied the utter futility of continuing the struggle at the front. Soon it was to be further developed into a demand for the publication and revision of all treaties binding the Allies. The obvious desire of the Soviet was to impose their doctrines upon the Allies. Not content with disrupting

and disorganizing their own Army, they sought to carry the seeds of anarchy into Allied lands and forces. After destroying faith and loyalty, they meant to put an end to honour between nations, to reduce the Allies to the primitive materialism which had been borrowed from the teachings of Karl Marx and applied in their own narrow scheme of existence.

There were clear-sighted men in Russia who



A SOLDIER ADDRESSING THE CROWD FROM THE BALCONY OF THE TOWN HALL, TSARSKOE SELO.

had the courage to rebuke the Soviet in plain language. The *Novoe Vremya* declared :

Hitherto international treaties have been torn up only by one Power, Germany. Do we want to follow in her footsteps? If we do so, our Allies will cease to be allies. They would have the right to despise and oppose us. We doubt whether the Petrograd delegates could prevent the armies of the Mikado from occupying Vladivostok or the whole of Siberia. Germany would be delighted to surrender Alsace-Lorraine in return for a new frontier along the Dvina and Dnieper, while Turkey would resume possession of the Caucasus and the Crimea. We think that all citizens of Russia, excepting the Bolsheviks, recognize the fundamental principles contained in the Note of May 1.

The resignation of M. Gutchkoff, Minister of War and Marine, further complicated the position of the Lvoff Cabinet. He explained his reasons for this step in a letter to the Prime Minister :

In view of the conditions in which the power of the Government is placed, especially the authority of the Minister of War, in relation to the Army and Navy conditions which I am powerless to alter and which threaten to have consequences fatal to the defence, the liberty and even the existence of Russia, I can no longer exercise the functions of Minister of War and Marine nor share the responsibility for the grave sin that is being committed against the country.

At a sitting of the Duma held a few days previously (May 10) M. Gutchkoff had declared

"Our country is on the edge of an abyss." To the Army delegates he had explained that, while he was a profound believer in the democratization of the Russian Army, there was danger that, in this process, the Government might lose all authority and that power might ultimately fall into the hands of "irresponsible persons" (the Soviet).



PRINCE LVOFF,

Russian Prime Minister in the first Provisional Government, 1917.

Almost at the same time General Korniloff resigned in view of attempts to interfere with his control of the garrison. He applied for service at the front, and was given command of the Eighth Army.

With the departure of MM. Gutchkoff and Miliukoff, two of its strongest members, the Lvoff Cabinet had to seek help from the outside, i.e., from the Socialists, both because of the difficulty of finding men rash enough to assume office without the countenance and support of the Soviet, and because it was hoped by including Socialists to effect a working arrangement with the Soviet. To the latter it appeared that the time had come when they could follow M. Kerensky's example with safety and profit. The principles

laid down for the entry of the Socialist parties into the Provisional Government at a joint conference between Prince Lvoff and the Soviet were as follows:—

"An active foreign policy openly pursuing the aim of reaching as soon as possible a general peace without annexations and without indemnities on a basis of the rights of nations to work out their own destinies.

"Decisive measures with a view to the democratization of the Army, as well as the reinforcement of Russia's military strength at the front for the defence of Russian liberty.

"In addition, a series of social, economic and financial reforms."

The new Coalition Cabinet was formed on May 16. Prince Lvoff remained Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, M. Kerensky (Justice) became Minister of War and Marine, M. Tereshchenko exchanged from the Ministry of Finance to that of Foreign Affairs, M. Shingareff left Agriculture for Finance, and five Socialists took office, M. Tchernoff (Socialist Revolutionary) becoming Minister of Agriculture, M. Skobelev (Social Democrat) Labour, M. Tseretelli (Social Democrat) Posts and Telegraphs, M. Pereverzeff, Minister of Justice, and M. Peshekhonoff, Munitions. The other departments remained under the former titularies. The assumption of control over the Army and Navy by a Socialist Revolutionary (M. Kerensky) was a startling innovation, although quite in harmony with the general trend of events.

In the conference which preceded the formation of this Coalition the Executive Committee of the Duma took part. It was its last appearance in such a rôle. As the Socialist tide flowed stronger, all memory of the services rendered by this body to the Revolution became obliterated.

With the concurrence of the Soviet, it was agreed that the policy of the Coalition should be based on:

1. Unity of all the Allied fronts.
2. The full confidence of the Revolutionary Democracy in a reconstructed Cabinet.
3. Plenitude of powers for the Government.

None of these pledges was observed by the Soviet. In each case an arbitrary construction was applied. The disorganization of the Army and Navy proceeded apace. "Confidence" was shown only to Socialist Ministers, and "plenitude of power" was a mockery even in their case, inasmuch as they were bound over to report in full to the Soviet and obtain its sanction to all their acts.

As regards the first point, an unofficial armistice already prevailed on the Russian front. Desertion had diminished, but the Army was passive, undisciplined, neglecting the most elementary duties; the command had been usurped in many corps by privates. The men were disappointed in the Revolution; they had not obtained the lands that had been promised them; they drifted back from their villages without any clear idea of why they did so and without any desire to fight. Even the excitement of fraternizing with the enemy had lost its charm. Out of this disconcerting apathy they were not extricated by the promulgation of the Soldiers' Charter or Declaration of Rights, an instrument which embodied the revolutionary spirit of Order No. 1. M. Gutchkoff had refused to endorse it. M. Kerensky hastened to issue it and to boast that he had conferred privileges on Russian soldiers such as were not enjoyed by any other armies in the world.

The "Soldiers' Charter" was issued by Kerensky as an army order. It consisted of the following clauses:—

(1) All serving in the army enjoy all the rights of citizens, but while on duty they must strictly conform their conduct to the demands of military service and military discipline.

(2) Every person serving in the army has the right to belong to any political, national, religious, economic or professional organization or society.

(3) Every person serving in the army has the right, when off duty, to utter freely and publicly, orally, or in writing, or in print, his political, religious, social and other views.

(4) All persons serving in the army enjoy complete liberty of conscience, and no one can be prosecuted for his faith or be compelled to attend divine service or religious rites performed according to another religion. Attendance at common prayer is not obligatory.

(5) All persons serving in the army are subject, in respect of their correspondence to the rules common to all citizens.

(6) All publications, periodical and non-periodical, without exception, must be delivered, without let or hindrance, to the addressees.

(7) All persons serving in the army have the right to wear civilian dress when off duty, but military uniform remains obligatory at all times for all persons serving in the army in the military sectors and at the front. The right to wear civilian dress in certain large towns within the military zone may be granted to persons serving in the army by commanders of the armies at the front, or of the navy. A mixed form of dress is absolutely prohibited.

(8) The mutual relations of persons serving in the army must be based on the strict observation of military discipline, and also on the sentiment of dignity of citizens of free Russia and on mutual trust, respect and courtesy.

(9) Such special phraseology which has hitherto been regarded as obligatory for individual soldiers is to be replaced by the ordinary forms of speech.

(10) The appointment of common soldiers as orderlies is abolished, an exception being made for officers, army surgeons, army officials and army clergy in the active

army and navy, in fortress districts, in camps, on board ships, and on manœuvres, as well as in such places as offer no opportunity for hiring servants. In these cases one orderly is allowed on conditions and at a pay agreed upon mutually.

(11) Orderlies who are used for personal service are not freed from active service.

(12) The obligatory salute, both by individual soldiers and by units, is abolished, and is replaced for all persons serving in the army by a voluntary and mutual salute. An exception is made for ceremonial occasions, for



M. SHINGAREFF,
Russian Finance Minister.

funerals, etc., when military honours are prescribed. The command "Attention" also remains in all cases provided by the rules.

(13) In those military districts which are not included in the zone of military operations, all persons serving in the army, when off duty, have the right to leave the barracks, or the vessel, as the case may be, after previously informing the competent authority and receiving a proper certificate of identity. In case of vessels in port, also that part of the crew is allowed to leave for shore which is not required in case the ship may have urgently to raise anchor.

(14) No person serving in the army may be punished or fined without a proper trial, but in face of the enemy a commander has the right, on his personal responsibility, to take all measures, including the use of armed force, against persons declining to obey his orders, such measures not being regarded as disciplinary punishments.

(15) All punishments which are offensive to the honour and dignity of a person serving in the army, as well as which inflict torture or cause damage to health, are not allowed.

(16) The employment of punishments which are not mentioned in the disciplinary code is an offence against

law, and persons guilty of committing them are to be placed before a court-martial. A commander striking his subordinate whether in the line or outside it, is also to be placed before a court-martial.

(17) No person serving in the army may be subjected to corporal punishment. This exemption also affects those who are undergoing a term of punishment in military prisons.

(18) The right of appointing to posts, and, in certain cases defined by law, of temporarily removing from command, belongs exclusively to the commanders, who alone have the right to issue orders affecting the fighting activity and efficiency of any unit, its training, its special work, as well as the work of inspection and administration. On the other hand, affairs concerning internal self-government, punishment and control belong to the elected army, organizations, committees and courts.

(Parts of Clauses 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 14 and the second part of 18—consolidating the Committee system—were incompatible with military discipline.)

The appearance of this document dealt a great blow to the hopes of officers and generals who had valiantly remained at their posts trying to rally their men. A Union of officers had been organized to stimulate this good work. Over 600 members attended a meeting at General Headquarters, when Gen. Alexeieff, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Gen. Denikin, his Chief of Staff, delivered speeches, memorable for their outspokenness and eloquence, and while fully recognizing the imminent peril of a further invasion, bade them not to despair but to labour unremittingly for the welfare of their country, which could be assured only by victory over the common foe.

General Ruzsky, the veteran Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front, had been summarily dismissed on a complaint from the Soviet delegates who had visited his headquarters and not received the cordiality or attention to which they considered themselves entitled. General Gurko, commanding the Central front, had resigned as a protest against the Soldiers' Charter and been degraded by order of M. Kerensky. Later he was to be the object of further reprisals. The High Command was beginning to feel the influence of the widespread disorganization of Russia's armed forces. Gen. Alexeieff also lost favour with the Soviet on account of his speech and was replaced by Gen. Brusiloff. He had had the temerity to impugn as Utopian the doctrine of "no annexation, no indemnity."

But just when the military outlook appeared to be darkest a notable improvement took place. M. Kerensky started a personal campaign to stir up the soldiers to a sense of their duty. Himself a convinced Socialist of the

revolutionary school and committed to pacifist doctrines, he was by temperament disinclined to carry the invertebrate theories of his party to their logical conclusion, and was endowed with sufficient political sense and acumen to perceive the discredit that would inevitably fall upon Socialism at large if the armies of Revolutionary Russia failed in their task. Single-handed he manfully undertook the colossal task of instilling fervour into men who had lost every human stimulus to sacrifice themselves in the cause of patriotism and honour.

Only a few days before the inception of his campaign among the armies the Germans had decided that the troops confronting them were ready to conclude a separate peace. A deputation of officers came into Dvinsk under the white flag and offered to open negotiations. Gen. Dragomiroff received them in the presence of delegates from the men under his command and gave the German emissaries a stern and dignified answer. At other places the insidious overtures of the enemy were more successful. Several regiments ceded Russian territory—Vilna and Kovno—to the Germans in perpetuity, renouncing any equivalent on the



M. NEKRASOFF,
Russian Minister of Railways.



GENERAL RUZSKY,

Commander-in-chief on the Northern Front: dismissed on the complaint of Soviet delegates.

ground that they were opposed to annexation or indemnity and pledged themselves to a separate peace.

M. Kerensky's "tour of inspection" among the sailors at Helsingfors and the armies at the front changed all this with startling rapidity. He himself appears to have been carried away by the enthusiasm that was aroused by his emotional oratory. Attired in a khaki jumper, wearing a soldier's cap, he impressed the simple imagination of the peasant-soldiery. In the place of their old beliefs he set up the goddess of Revolution and, like their forefathers in the days of Vladimir, they espoused the new faith with seeming fervour. From the confines of Galicia came news that the Socialist Minister of War had proclaimed a Holy War in defence of the Revolution. In an order of the day to the Army and Navy he solemnly announced a coming offensive. The proceeding was highly dramatic—electrical in its effect upon the troops and the people. Russia's Allies listened with rapt attention. Was the Russian Revolution destined, after all, to realize the high hopes that had accompanied its birth? Only among his political associates did the Socialist Minis-

ter's zeal arouse resentment. M. Tchernoff, speaking at a congress of delegates from the front in Petrograd, said (May 29):

A peace must be concluded in which there shall be no victors and no vanquished. Appeals have been published for an immediate attack, but the Army should take advantage of the present calm: at the front to organize itself, and then it will not need any prompting as it will know itself what to do.

Two days later the Bolsheviks organized demonstrations in Petrograd and Kronstadt against Kerensky. His own party declined to re-elect him as a member of their executive committee.

With M. Kerensky went a deputation of 200 sailors belonging to the Black Sea fleet, headed by a young seaman named Batkin, who had lived for some years in England. This deputation had made its appearance in Petrograd some days before the Minister's departure. The Black Sea fleet had escaped the influence of Bolshevik agitators, thanks to their remoteness from the capital and to the resourcefulness and tact of their Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kolchak. The deputation was formed under his auspices to carry war into the enemy's camp—if possible to capture the stronghold of Bolshevism. In Petrograd they met with a hearty reception. Their cheerful faces, breezy language, their confidence in the efficacy of setting an example to all who were unwilling to fight for their country—all this recalled the short-lived enthusiasm that had pervaded Petrograd in the dawn of Revolution and had wilted in the fierce fever of Bolshevism. They even carried the national tricolour instead of the blood-red flag that had become obligatory under the rule of the Soviet. Batkin and his gallant crew departed with the announcement that they were off to shame the soldiers into fighting. "One of us will march at the head of a battalion, and if it does not follow he shall go on alone." They were the first of the Death or Glory boys—the shock battalions that were to bear the brunt of the Russian offensive. All honour to these brave lads. Their deeds should not be forgotten, despite the evil that was afterwards done by their comrades in the Black Sea fleet.

M. Kerensky returned from the front to find that some of his colleagues had been working hard in the Socialist cause, which had little in common with the object he himself was pursuing. M. Tchernoff and M. Skobelev had been particularly active. The former had lost no time in attuning the Ministry of Agriculture

to the most extreme agrarian ideals. The fomenting and perpetuation of unrest among the peasants appeared to be his main consideration. Similarly, M. Skobelev, at the newly created Ministry of Labour, was rendering the already strained relations between employers and working men well-nigh untenable. Neither of them could be expected to subordinate their party views to the exigencies of the military situation. What cared they whether land was untilled or the munition output was reduced so long as Socialist Revolutionary and Social Democratic principles triumphed! As a result of differences with the Socialist Labour Department, M. Konovaloff, the Cadet Minister of Commerce and Industry, resigned, declaring that under present conditions he could not avert a catastrophe.

Having organized the workmen for a "war of classes," and spread disaffection and indiscipline among the troops, the Socialists lost no time in enrolling the peasants in the revolutionary movement. In each case the methods used were the same—an appeal to the selfish instincts of an ignorant class. Extreme doctrines subversive of the principle of private property had become the order of the day. That no State had ever existed in which the rights of property were unrecognized did not cause the Socialist experimenters to hesitate. They affected an invincible confidence in their untried ability to create a new earth, to upset all existing economic laws, and impose an example to peoples who had centuries of experience and were immeasurably more civilized.

In the domain of manufacturing industries they "improved" upon Karl Marx. The working men, under Bolshevik auspices, demanded not only a six-hours day and huge and ever-growing increases of wages, but insisted that all the profits of the mills should go into their hands. In one case they brought huge sacks in which the management was requested to deposit immediately 12,000,000 roubles (about £1,200,000 at pre-war exchange), the profits assessed by them for two and a half years, or else the directors themselves would be placed in the sacks and dropped into the adjoining canal. With great difficulty violence was averted on the understanding that the money would be ultimately forthcoming. Similar occurrences were not infrequent. Employers were terrorized into compliance with demands that left them no alternative between

pecuniary suicide or a violent death. Some relief was afforded by emergency grants from the Treasury. The huge expenditure on the war thus grew by leaps and bounds. Nor did the working classes benefit so much. The prices of all commodities rose five-fold and more because of the increased cost of production. On the other hand the rouble itself depreciated in value owing to the resulting increase of the note issue. No belligerent country offered any comparison with the industrial crisis engendered by revolutionary experiments in Russia. All the smaller mills and workshops had to close down, completely bankrupt. The larger concerns managed to struggle along, losing their profits and their capital, hoping for some improvement in the situation.

But the peasants were in a different position to the workmen.* They were all property owners, and might have been expected to repudiate any scheme of confiscation, no matter whether it was conceived by Henry George or by the Socialist-Revolutionaries under various high-sounding titles—"nationalization" or "municipalization." As a matter of fact they did not understand, nor did they care for, these distinctions. Land was promised to them and they wanted to get it. Once theirs, they would keep it. Besides, they had been reared under a system of communal ownership, a survival of serfdom, and they were naturally gregarious, associating themselves in *artels* or guilds for carrying out contract work and readily forming themselves into associations for the purchase and exploitation of lands, and into co-operative societies. The Russian socialists early appreciated the opportunities afforded by the co-operative movement for the spread of propaganda and for the enlistment of the peasant farmers in the combined labour organization.

Moreover, there was the undoubted lack of arable lands for peasant farming in some of the richest agricultural provinces of Russia—a stringency that had grown apace with the enormous increase in the population (nearly 3,000,000 per annum)—and it had been only slightly relieved by emigration to Siberia, which had been too long neglected and even

* One of the many senseless acts committed during the Revolution was the downthrow of a statue of M. Stolypin, erected in Kieff near the spot where he had been murdered. No man had done so much to benefit the peasant farmer and—incidentally—to preserve the Empire, but his agrarian reforms and his general policy did not please the Socialists. Hence the reprisals against his statue.

opposed under the old régime. Incidentally it may be noted that the rich loam provinces of the south—which were also the most densely populated—offered an ideal field for farming on a large scale. Here huge agricultural enterprises had arisen, producing vast quantities of wheat and sugar. To parcel out these properties into small lots would greatly diminish pro-

the peasant population would have to migrate elsewhere. But these arguments were unpalatable to the Socialists, and were disregarded. The Conference was instructed to waive contentious questions and to prepare data for the constituent assembly which was to decide the fate of Russian land-property. Meanwhile all sale or transfer of land was forbidden.



RUSSIAN TROOPS IN FRANCE TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

General Lohvitzky and Officers in front of the Troops.

ductiveness; Russian exports, chiefly confined to foodstuffs, would be affected after the war, and complicate the process of readjusting financial indebtedness. But these considerations were not permitted to weigh with the doctrinaires.

The Provisional Government called an agrarian conference soon after its assumption of office. The secretary gave a statement of the available lands. The cultivated area in European Russia was about 400,000,000 acres. There were altogether about 16,000,000 peasant households. Thus, if all the lands were equally divided, each farmer's family would receive about 25 acres. They could live on the produce, but there would be nothing left over, and they would be idle half their time. To make the scheme workable, he pointed out that half

A congress of peasant delegates assembled in Petrograd not long afterwards. The delegates were chosen very much after the model of the Soviet. M. Tchernoff, *alias* Feldmann, headed the list of candidates to the Executive Committee, another leading Socialist Revolutionary, the aged Madame Breshko-Breshkovskaia, came second, M. Kerensky third, and Vera Figner, the terrorist, fourth. Prince Kropotkin was not elected. Among the leaders of the Soviet there had been no workman and no real soldier; similarly, in the C.P.D. (Council of Peasants Delegates) there was not a single peasant leader.

From the outset of the Revolution it had been apparent to well-informed observers that the movement was being directed by irresponsible (often alien and Jewish) elements bereft of

real touch with the needs of the people and exploiting the ignorance of the masses in order to carry out their doctrinaire ideas, utterly regardless of the interests of their country. In no respect was this so widely felt as in agrarian policy. Although nominally reserving the land question for the Constituent, the Socialists in the Soviet and, later, in the Cabinet openly avowed and encouraged spoliation, while their agents in the rural committees, which had usurped the authority of the Zemstvos and local authorities, incited the peasants to help themselves to private lands and forests.



KATARINA KONSTANTINOVNA
BRESHKO-BRESHKOVSKAIA,
"The Grandmother of the Revolution."

The special correspondent of *The Times* in Odessa made a tour through the districts of Poltava, Ekaterinograd and Nicolaieff in the spring and gave an account of the prevailing anarchy. His observations could have been applied to the whole country. He wrote:

A considerable portion of the landlords' estates has been appropriated by the peasants. In some instances trifling compensation was offered. This was not paid to the landlords, but handed over to a fund for the widows and families of soldiers. The peasants in the Poltava district have forbidden labourers from other districts to work there, insisting upon the employment of local labour, but this will be scarce, as most of the land will be used by employed on their own lands.

The Women's Deputies at Nicolaieff propose to solve the labour difficulty by sending the whole male and female population of the town between the ages of 15 and 50 to work as harvesters. The proposal excites distrust among many parents of the upper classes, who

object to allowing their daughters to work in the fields in company with roughs and hooligans from the town.

The urban agitators who have urged the peasants to take possession of the landlords' estates without delay or ceremony have unconsciously taken steps to effect their own starvation. Plunder is by no means universal, and in many cases where the peasants have appropriated the landlord's property they have been unable to cultivate it owing to want of seed, scarcity of labour, and other causes; while their own land has been neglected. It is evident that the supply not only of cereals but of all agricultural products must be seriously diminished in such conditions. In many towns milk is already scarce, the landlords owning neighbouring pasturage having taken fright and sold their cattle. Elsewhere the peasants insist that only the landlords' cattle should be requisitioned for the Army. Owing to the neglect of the cultivation of beetroot there is a great dearth of sugar, and it seems inevitable that wool will be scarce, as many of the landlords' sheepwalks have been seized.

In general the position of the landlords is being rendered untenable. They possess no means of defence, as the Workmen's and Soldiers' Committees have usurped authority, and the Government officials are powerless to protect them. In the Kieff and Poltava governments various pogroms have taken place on the estates of unpopular landlords, but little information is obtainable in regard to these tragic events, as much reticence is observed. . . .

The Cossacks in the Poltava government and the region of the Don are the only considerable portion of the population imbued with conservative sentiments, and they may yet, in conjunction with their brethren in other districts, prove an important factor in future developments, should the increasing disorder lead to a reactionary movement. They openly declare that they will resist any attempt to compel them to yield a portion of their lands to others, and any effort in this direction might be productive of serious consequences.

Under the revolutionary regime a network of food committees was created to control the grain monopoly which had been introduced in order to supply the Army and the urban dwellers with bread. It involved an outlay of something like 700,000,000 roubles. But as the officials were selected for revolutionary considerations the committees were a failure. They gave rise to wholesale abuses.

In Siberia people were not feeling the effects of the war except in the enormous accumulation of foodstuffs due to the collapse of the railways. During the Revolution, the men employed in railway workshops were too busy in committees, discussing politics, to repair cars and locomotives. Thus Russians were, in some places, starving, in others glutted with food. Moreover, in the more prosperous regions money could not buy many commodities, and the villages and towns reverted to a primitive system of barter.

The agrarian problems had been complicated before the Revolution by the drafting of enormous numbers of men into reserve formations. So long as the successive mobilizations involved only the younger men husbandry did not suffer too heavily. The women in the

villages bravely filled the breach. Over two millions of prisoners of war, mostly Austrian peasants, helped to make good the wastage of war and the removal of younger men from the rural economy. But later the older men, heads of peasant households, were also called out. This was a serious blow to farming. It led to a large decline in the area under tillage, at least 10 per cent. While the towns were filled to overflowing with soldiers, the villages were denuded of men. To this circumstance may be ascribed much of the evil influence exerted by the local committees, composed often of extraneous elements, sometimes convicts who had been released in the gaol-delivery everywhere practised by the Revolution. It is true there was a large influx of deserters in the villages, but they came not to work but to plunder and then went off, intending to return in the autumn when the harvested crops would afford them a further booty.

May and June were sad months for Russia. Disorders in the cities and rural districts followed in rapid succession. Republics arose defying the Provisional Government. The financial situation was daily growing worse. Every day the State Bank was issuing 50 million roubles in paper. The Army and Navy alone gave promise of better things. It was this circumstance that aroused the ire

of the Extremists. The garrison of Kronstadt, 30,000 men under the leadership of a student named Lamanoff, threatened reprisals against the Provisional Government; some warships prepared to come up the river and bombard the capital. Bloodshed was averted on this occasion. While this episode was at its crucial stage Mr. Henderson, the British Labour Minister, arrived on a special mission to seek if possible some common ground of discussion with the Soviets. His visit began in a characteristic fashion. Effects and documents were stolen from him at his hotel.

The connection between Robert Grimm and a German Peace Campaign, discovered under circumstances fully dealt with in Chapter CC. (Swiss Neutrality), showed that Lenin (Zederblum) and Zinovieff (Apfelbaum), his fellow travellers in the celebrated pilgrimage from Berne to Petrograd *via* Germany, were in the plot, but these revelations, published by the Provisional Government in response to pressure from the Soviet, led to no decrease in Bolshevik activity in Kronstadt and elsewhere.

A serious mutiny broke out among the sea men of the Black Sea Fleet (June 20). The outbreak was fomented by delegates from the Baltic Fleet who came to Sebastopol. Fifteen thousand soldiers and seamen attended a meeting, and it was resolved to arrest the



RUSSIAN TROOPS IN GALICIA TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE AT ZALESZCZYKI.

officers, including Admiral Kolchak and his Chief of Staff, on the alleged ground that they had been carrying on a counter-revolutionary propaganda. The crew of the flagship demanded that the Admiral should surrender his sword. He thereupon unsheathed it, saying, "The Japanese left me this sword of St. George when we capitulated at Port Arthur. I had won it in the Japanese war, and I will not give it to you." He then threw the sword into the sea. The mutineers wirelessly to the crews of other warships to disarm their officers, whereupon, to avoid bloodshed, Admiral Kolchak signalled to them not to resist. The mutineers finally decided not to detain their Admiral, but to be satisfied with his resigning his command.

About this time a regiment on the Rumanian front commanded by General Shcherbatcheff refused to march to its new positions. The mutiny was quelled with the assistance of a loyal battalion and some cavalry. Two divisions mutinied soon afterwards, and were surrounded by cavalry with guns, which opened fire on the mutineers with shrapnel. The cavalry then charged and routed them, after which they were disarmed and disbanded. The Russian General Nogin was shot through the

head by one of his soldiers. The enemy commander on this front had offered a sum of 15,000 roubles for Nogin's life. Cases occurred of Russian infantry attacking their own guns. The following missive sent by the Germans into the Russian trenches will explain the motive of this abominable treachery:—

Russian soldiers! We must have a serious word with you. Whilst we are stretching our hand out to you your artillery is pounding at our positions. You have seen that we reply to your artillery very faintly. The order has just come, however, that our artillery should reply vigorously to yours and every shot fired by them will bring an avalanche of gun and machine-gun fire on your heads. We are very sorry for this, but you will understand that we cannot do otherwise. If you wish to prevent it you must silence your artillery. Show the Japanese and other foreigners who are in command of your artillery that pure Russians are alone the masters on the Russian front. You must see to it that the rule of foreigners should cease on your side. (Signed) German soldiers.

The deliberately false suggestion about "foreigners in command" was a very cunning fable. It did not occur to the ignorant minds of the Russian soldiers that this was an added insult; that the Germans took it for granted that no Russians would fight them. Some days later the German aeroplanes near Vilna dropped the following message:—

"Thanks for the long rest during our fraternization. It has enabled us to transfer troops



DIVINE SERVICE ON BOARD A RUSSIAN WARSHIP.

to the Western Front and withstand the British and French attack."

General Sukhomlinoff was indicted (May 31) on a charge of neglecting to supply the army with munitions when he was Minister of War and of treasonable relations with Colonel Miasoyedoff, who had been shot as a spy, and with an Austrian named Altschüller, who had been Consul in Kieff. Mme. Sukhomlinoff was accused of having abetted her husband. The case had excited much attention in Russia. The accused had been a personal friend of the ex-Tsar, who had, however, permitted his arrest and prosecution. Sukhomlinoff appears to have been under the domination of his wife and to have acted indiscreetly. The trial, which did not come on till late in the autumn, resulted in his exoneration on the charge of treason and in a conviction for neglect of duty, for which he was sentenced to penal servitude. His wife was acquitted. Sukhomlinoff was a typical representative of the old régime. He managed through his influence at Court to carry out a certain number of useful reforms in the Army and to bring it to a state of efficiency, as shown by the rapidity of the Russian mobilization, but failed entirely to appreciate the magnitude of the struggle upon which his country had embarked in 1914 and was incapable of tackling such a task as the mobilization of industries for munition work.

Elections for the new district councils in Petrograd were held in June for the first time. All the soldiers had votes. The ballot boxes were taken round the hospitals, to the bedsides of the wounded. The vote cast by revolutionary soldiers was enormous. The final returns gave the Socialist Block 299 seats, the Cadet Party 185, and the Bolsheviks 156. Thus the Moderates were in control, but, appearances being deceptive, the Bolsheviks continued to exert their influence.

This and other events were overshadowed by the meeting of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets (June 16). The skilful moderators of the Petrograd Soviet, MM. Tehkheidze and Tseretelli, were in charge and conducted the proceedings with decorum. M. Kerensky received an ovation, in which, however, the Bolsheviks did not join, but they were in a minority. Floods of eloquence were, of course, let loose. But the resolutions, carefully prepared beforehand, by the two Socialists above mentioned, lent an appearance of sobriety to the proceedings. M. Tseretelli explained to his unen-

lightened audience "that the worst result of our struggle for universal peace would be a separate peace with Germany, which would destroy the fruits of the Russian Revolution and be disastrous for the cause of international democracy. A separate peace was indeed impossible. Such a peace would bring Russia into a new war on the side of the German coalition, and



GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF,
Minister of War under the Old Régime.
Condemned to penal servitude for life after a
trial by jury.

would mean leaving one coalition only to enter another." M. Lenin, *alias* Zederblum, bluntly characterized M. Kerensky's efforts for an offensive as treason to the cause of international Socialism, and suggested that his party could and would save the situation. M. Kerensky retorted: "We must prove to the Internationale that we are not a negligible quantity, and that we are possessed of a determination which will not allow itself to be dominated by an isolated and unorganized group." Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's representative, a former captain in the Sveaborg Artillery, deploring his master's incapacity to be present in the flesh, "owing to the action of a group of British seamen with the connivance of the British Government," called upon the gathering

“to shun a separate peace and to devote their efforts to compelling the Imperialist Governments of Great Britain and France to adhere to the principles proclaimed by Revolutionary Democratic Russia”—a piece of advice that elicited loud cheers.

A week passed in endless debates on all sorts of Socialistic experiments. Meanwhile the followers of Lenin, including a group of Anarchists fresh from America, established a Government of their own within the city, seizing first the Palace of the Duke of Leuchtenberg, which they ransacked and pillaged, and transferring their headquarters to the Villa Durnovo, on the outskirts of the Vyborg side of the Neva (a large manufacturing quarter). The house and grounds were fortified and equipped with arms and provisions to stand a long siege. A journalist who visited the garrison asked why the refugees had not carried out their theories in free America. The answer was, “You do not know the American police.” General Polovtsoff, the Commander-in-Chief, had much difficulty in reducing the fortress.

After passing resolutions denouncing the Anarchists, the Congress appealed to the inhabitants to refrain from armed demonstrations without the consent of the Soviet. Coming to the question of the war, the Congress resolved “that it could not be ended by the efforts of international democracy alone.” “The breaking of the Russian front would mean the defeat of the Russian Revolution and a fatal blow to the cause of international democracy.”

At the same time it “drew the attention of the democracies of all belligerents to the fact that the lack of energy shown in their protests against recent statements by their Governments regarding their usurpatory war aims placed the Russian Revolution in an extremely difficult position,” demanded a Socialist Conference of Allies and neutrals, protested against the difficulties which the Imperialist Governments (meaning Britain and France) had placed in the way of sending such delegates and decided “the democratization of the Diplomatic service.”* The only thing—but it was the main thing—that the Congress omitted to explain was how to save the front and yet continue their pacifist conversations.

* Probably in anticipation of this demand M. Sazonoff, whose appointment as Ambassador to London had not been cancelled, was recalled when he had already taken his seat in the train to proceed to his post.

The Congress waxed very wroth because President Rodzianko had summoned all members of the Duma to be on hand in case of need. This was regarded as evidence of a counter-revolution. It was decided to abolish the Duma there and then. However, some months elapsed before M. Kerensky acted upon this resolution.

Simultaneously, a Cossack Congress had been assembled in Petrograd. They decided “to support the Duma,” “to fight the enemy without and the enemy within,” to create a special Cossack Army, to call for energetic measures against Lenin and other traitors, and finally—most important of all—they resolved unanimously that “all lands now belonging to the Cossacks, their patrimony, should remain in their possession.”

One of the evil effects of unrestrained liberty was the recrudescence of drunkenness. By his humane edict abolishing the State liquor monopoly Nicholas II. had performed the miracle of introducing temperance among the masses. It was said that he thereby indirectly engendered one of the conditions favourable to revolutionary agitation. The people who had formerly spent their leisure in the forgetfulness of inebriety began to ponder over political matters. However that might be, the Revolution rapidly did away with the restricting influences imposed by the ex-Tsar. The Provisional Government was powerless to stem the tide of drunkenness.

All the old restrictions were maintained, but they operated only against the upper classes. Wine could not be obtained except at prohibitive prices. Champagne was secretly dispensed at 150 roubles (nominally £15) in a few of the fashionable restaurants. Even at that price its consumption was not slight. Money could be easily obtained. Corruption and profiteering had never attained such dimensions as under the Revolutionary régime.

Among the working classes methylated spirits, procured in devious ways and suitably “doctored,” were consumed in huge quantities. The streets of Petrograd and other cities—uncared for and unkempt since the Revolution—presented the sad spectacle of drunken soldiers and civilians, to which people had become unaccustomed since the Temperance Edict came out before the war. In the villages it was much worse. The removal of the police had done away with any impediment to private and illicit distilling. Raw spirit could be obtained



DELEGATES TO THE SOVIET (COUNCIL OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES) HOLDING A MEETING IN THE DUMA.

in unlimited quantities. The peasants found it much more profitable to convert a poud (36·4 lbs.) of rye into vodka than to sell it to the State, or even to fatten pigs, as they had been doing a year before. The spirit could be sold for 20 roubles, whereas the market price of the rye represented only a quarter of that sum.

Although the Liquor Monopoly had been suspended in 1914, huge quantities of spirit remained on the Treasury's hands. Distilleries could not be immediately closed down without serious disturbance to the potato crop. These accumulations had to be gradually dispensed in methylated form. They were a constant source of danger. Mutinous troops or riotous

peasants could and repeatedly did break into these stores, in each case with dire consequences to the lives and property of all who dwelt in the neighbourhood. It had been urged upon the Provisional Government to destroy the stuff, but nobody could be found who would assume the responsibility of "wasting" it. It remained in huge quantities distributed at various points all over the country, an object of peculation to the officials who were in charge of it, dangerous and deadly as dynamite.

Drunkness went hand in hand with gambling. Formerly this vice had not affected the lower classes. They had their work to do and not too much money to spend. The Revolution changed all this. Every barrack-room became a gambling den. The soldiers' pay had been increased tenfold. Moreover, they could plunder, engage in trade or take on work during the day, during the long intervals between nominal drill, all of which brought them a good deal of money. The evening would be devoted to politics or a dance, and then came cards and dice. Private soldiers who were "clever" made a handsome income by gambling. They could indulge in joy-rides on expensive cars, and taste the delights of high living. The Revolution had removed all disciplinary restrictions. Men could go everywhere in uniform or don private clothes. The munition workers, drawing fabulous wages—often far in excess of the salaries of engineers—and doing a maximum of six hours' work during the day, had even greater advantages than the soldier, and turned them to a "joyous" account.

Of course there was the reverse side of the medal—the dearness of living, which swallowed up a large portion of the men's earnings, and the difficulty of providing suitable food for their children. And it should be noted that, even amidst the depraving influences and despite the materialistic, animal-like tendencies of the revolutionary fever, many of the workmen and the soldiers, especially among those who remained at the Front, kept aloof from vicious self-indulgence. The engine-drivers deserved especial praise. No body of men could have displayed greater devotion to duty. No less commendable was the gentle, unrepining self-sacrifice of the lower middle class, the humble officials who worked night and day in the postal and telegraph services and other unobtrusive but essential pursuits. It was these bright exceptions that prompted assurance

in the ultimate revival and regeneration of the country.

Qualities of heart and mind calculated to interest and attract all who came in close touch with the Russian people manifested themselves in a very striking manner during the Revolution. Excesses, whenever they occurred, were invariably due to extraneous reasons—to drink and, more often, to the influence of alien agitators. Amidst such a terrible upheaval it was surprising how few, comparatively speaking, were the victims. The blood toll in Petrograd during the first four months did not exceed some hundreds—nearly all of whom were killed in the first two days of revolution. In Moscow the dead were counted in tens. Unhappily the officers, especially in the Baltic Fleet, provided a more numerous contingent. They were butchered wholesale at Helsingfors and Kronstadt at the instigation of Bolshevik agitators from Petrograd, aided and abetted by Finnish, Swedish and German Socialists. Setting aside the mutinies and atrocities in the Army and Navy, and taking into account the purely civilian side, it must be recognized that no other nation would have passed through such an extraordinary convulsion at such slight cost of human life. Discomfort, rudeness, and even gross injustice in the form of arbitrary arrest and usurpation of property—these were endured in plenty, but murder was rare, and this appeared to be all the more remarkable because there was practically no authority capable of bringing the guilty to judgment.

The conscience of the people was slumbering, not dead. It could not assert itself in protest against the unwarrantable hardships inflicted upon their late ruler and his kinsfolk or upon the aged relics of his former entourage. The peasant gaolers who guarded the captives in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul did not realize that in subjecting infirm persons gently bred, to a peasant diet, they were practising cruelty more harsh than had been the custom of the old regime. All the members of the former Imperial family suffered morally and physically. That was to be expected.

There was, however, no excuse or justification for the abominable treatment meted out to the Dowager Empress. Everyone in Russia knew that she had vainly tried for many years to combat the dark influences which were imperilling the Throne and which finally brought about its downfall. Yet this aged

lady, who had been suffered to live on a pittance in one of the Romanoff residences in the Crimea, was awakened one night by armed soldiers and sailors invading her bedchamber, dragged out of her bed, searched and insulted. This act of brutality was an offshoot of the mutiny instigated by Petrograd agitators against Admiral Koichak on an imaginary charge of conspiracy against the Revolution, and the ruffians who invaded the Empress Dowager's

Romanoff. At 1 o'clock luncheon is served, usually consisting of green vegetables, potatoes, and sweets.

After luncheon the ex-Emperor, escorted by an orderly officer, takes a walk in the garden. Sometimes he has two walks a day, and usually goes about in military uniform. At 8 o'clock there is dinner, consisting in the Lent week referred to of four courses, including fish. Usually, half a bottle of red wine is placed on the table, but nobody touches it, and the bottle travels back to the cellar unopened. The dinner is charged at 4 roubles 50 kopecks per person.

The Grand Duke Alexis, being ill, has his meals in bed, and usually chooses his own dishes. Twice a day



ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE PATRIOTISM IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Officers addressing the troops.

room came to seek for evidences of this offence. Already much shaken by her sufferings, the Empress Dowager nearly succumbed to the shock. Her health became seriously impaired.

Interesting details of the captivity endured by the ex-Tsar and his family at the Alexander Palace at Tsarskoe Selo were given in the *Russkoe Slovo* (April 13):

They occupy the upper floor of the palace, but different apartments, the Minister of Justice having ordered that the Tsar and Tsaritsa should not meet one another. It was on this condition that the Tsaritsa had been allowed to stay with her children, who were ill. Daily life in the palace begins rather late. The prisoners arise between 9 and 10 o'clock. They are given tea, and the ex-Tsar sends out a soldier to get some papers, usually the *Retch*. The *Russkoe Slovo* he gets daily from Moscow, the wrapper being addressed to Nikolai Alexandrovitch

the entire family gathers in the church, but here, too, the Tsar is separated from his wife. The Tsaritsa comes down from the staircase, and is taken to the church in an invalid chair. She takes her place behind a screen and kneels down in devout prayer.

At 11 o'clock at night tea is served and at 1 o'clock everybody goes to bed. The ex-Tsar gives the impression of a man totally indifferent to his fate; at least, he shows no signs of uneasiness or agitation. The Tsaritsa is exceedingly reserved. With a cold and impassive face and tightly closed lips she resembles a marble statue. She has betrayed her feelings only once, when she was parted from her favourite lady-in-waiting Madame Vyroubova. Then she broke out into sobs, and cried for several minutes. The whole day the Tsaritsa and her daughters are busily sewing underclothing for wounded soldiers. The correspondence of the Tsar and Tsaritsa is strictly controlled, and even their interviews with members of the former entourage, who are interned in the same palace, take place in the presence of warders. Alexis is always in the company of his favourite manservant and a French tutor. The Tsaritsa

is in a sort of religious trance. She has a mass of religious literature, such as the devotional booklets of John of Kronstadt. Her correspondence is also generally of a religious character, being carried on for the most part on post-cards with religious pictures. She usually signs herself by her initial "A," to which is added a cross.

Many attempts had been made by the Bolsheviks to get the ex-Tsar transferred to the Fortress in Petrograd or to Kronstadt. They were defeated by the Provisional Government. The removal of the family to Tobolsk was undertaken, perhaps, partly on this account, but principally for other, and less commendable, reasons—to arouse public feeling against a supposed reactionary plot.

Most revolutions have, in their early stages, intensified the evils and abuses of the systems that they displaced. The Russian Revolution did not escape this rule. Although law and justice had been virtually suspended, owing to the disappearance of the police and local authority, many of the irritating and vexatious accompaniments of a police régime continued to



THE GUARD AT THE GATE OF THE EX-TSAR'S VILLA, TSARSKOE SELO.

prevail. Tsarism had oppressed the Socialists or used them in its own way; the Socialists revenged themselves upon all who were suspected—even unjustly—of favouring the old system. Freedom of speech and of the press was more restricted under the rule of the Soviet than

it had been before the Revolution. Newspapers could not criticise the Soviet without being immediately suspected of conspiracy. Reprisals of a drastic character were not infrequent. Outspokenness entailed summary confiscation by Socialist editors, who calmly appropriated paper, plant and offices. "Freedom must not be one-sided, otherwise it is not freedom," modestly urged the Conservative *Moscow Gazette* (April 24). "Before the Constituent Assembly meets real liberty ought to reign . . . It is inadmissible to force one's opponents to be silent, and then, on the basis of their silence, to boast for all the world to hear that the whole country is in agreement. *Dum tacent, clamant*. Silence may mean, not agreement, but the sharpest protest." This was a very mild way of stating the position. As a matter of fact, the Revolution introduced a reign of terror over the minds and consciences of all who did not share the views of its Socialist exponents.

Reference has been made above to the irreligious tendency and influence of the Russian Revolution among the troops. "Holy Russia," as she had been commonly pictured, disappeared suddenly. The people in Petrograd ceased to cross themselves in passing before its numerous churches and chapels. The sacred shrines—even the sanctuaries of Kieff—which had formerly drawn countless pilgrims, were deserted. War conditions and the difficulty of transport could not altogether account for this sudden change. In the villages it was not so noticeable. The women, naturally devout and conservative, went to church on a Sunday, while the men waited outside, holding impromptu meetings.

The overthrow of the autocracy was bound to react upon the Church. For two centuries, since Peter the Great, himself a sceptic, had abolished the Patriarchate and set up a collegiate administration known as the Holy Synod, the Church had been degraded to the role of a mere adjunct of government, and in more recent times, under the despotic rule of a Procurator like Pobiedonostzeff, had succumbed to the deadening influence of a police-ridden bureaucracy. When the manifesto of 30th October, 1905, had awakened short-lived promise of a Constitutional government it was hoped that the Church would have her share in the resulting liberties. Preparations were made under the auspices of Monsignor Anthony, a liberal-minded Prelate, then Metropolitan of St.

Petersburg. But as the ensuing reaction asserted its tightening grip these projects were relegated to an indefinite period. Later the Church fell on still more evil days, when Rasputin and his pernicious associates wrought their will upon her.

A curious light is thrown on the relations of the Crown and the Church under the old regime by the story told in the *Utro Rossii* (March 20) of the events which led up to A. D. Samarin's resignation of the office of Procurator of the Holy Synod in October, 1915.

At the time there was a good deal of speculation as to the cause of Samarin's unexpected retirement, but, as the *Utro Rossii* points out, it was not possible to elucidate the matter in the Press. It now appears that the question whether the relics of John of Tobolsk should be venerated or not led to the fall of the Procurator. Supported by the Synod, he objected to the action of the Bishop of Tobolsk, who had celebrated a service in honour of the relics without proper ecclesiastical sanction. The Bishop was summoned to Petrograd to explain to the Holy Synod how it was that he had employed the "rite of glorification of the relics," or, to use Western language, regarded John of Tobolsk as already beatified.

To this question the Bishop gave the extraordinary reply that he had begun the practice objected to in view of a telegram received from the Emperor.

The Holy Synod was not satisfied with this reply, and asked to see the imperial telegram. The Bishop went away, and the next thing the Synod heard of the matter was from the Emperor's chaplain, the Archpriest Vasileff, who informed the members that the Bishop had been received by the Emperor and had complained to him that the Synod had treated him rudely, that he had not been asked to sit down, and that he had had to remain standing while replying to questions.

Rasputin, it appears, was in favour of the canonization of John of Tobolsk, and was at the time intriguing against Samarin. The Emperor's interest in the cause of John of Tobolsk and his relics presented the charlatan with an opportunity of injuring the obstinate Procurator, who appeared at Tsarskoe Selo and read the Emperor a report on the matter.

Nicholas II. received him in so amiable a manner that he telegraphed to his brother, after the audience, to tell him that all rumours about his resignation were false. But the next

time he attended a meeting of the Cabinet the Prime Minister seemed much confused when they met, and, at the end of the proceedings, took him aside and showed him a letter from the Emperor, in which were the words: "Samarin has no idea how to behave. He took up an entire hour of my time. Propose to him to send in his resignation."



THE EX-DOWAGER EMPRESS MARIE FEODOROVNA.

M. Vladimir Lvoff, the new Procurator, stated in an interview with a reporter (March 19) that his programme was summed up in the words: the Freedom of the Church.

A friendly and loving attitude of the Church to the State, non-interference of the Church in the political structure of the State and, on the other hand, non-interference of the State in the life of the Church, these are the fundamental bases which it will be my effort to establish. Besides these tasks devolving on the Procurator there are others, such as the assembly of a Church Council. The Church should and will organize her own life. At the present the fundamental task is the reform of the Synod, the renewal of its composition, the healing of the wounds of the Church, and her liberation from the stuffy atmosphere in which she has so long existed.

At an All-Russian Congress of clergy and laity opened in Moscow on June 14, confidence was expressed in the possibilities of a religious revival, and the errors of the old regime underwent severe handling, notably from Bishop Andrew of Ufa (Prince Ukhtomsky); but there was some anxiety lest the new regime should

again enslave the Church. Prince E. M. Trubetskoi said :

Now that we have got spiritual freedom at a great price, let us be no man's slaves. . . . The question of spiritual freedom is not settled by a change of regime. Our relations to the power of the people may be, and in many cases are, as slavish as were our relations to the power of the monarch.

The Prince doubtless had in his mind the attempt on the part of the Provisional Government to continue the old system of governing the Church by the Holy Synod, or rather by a Minister (Procurator) responsible to the Cabinet, who wields the real power attributed to the ecclesiastics of the Synod. But he spoke uncompromisingly of the old regime, declaring that in the last days of the reign of Nicholas II Russia was like "some dark and devilish realm." This he attributed to the lack of spiritual life in Russia, and then turned to point out that the materialism, the insistence on temporal happiness alone, which characterized the present period, were due to the same cause. He looked to a religious revival to cast out the spirit of selfishness, which was making people look after their individual interests before those of the State.

Although the breach between State Orthodoxy and the Old Believers had been healed some years previously, it is important to note the effects of the Revolution upon this large section of the Russian nation, which comprised many of the wealthiest merchants and manufacturers of Moscow. Like our own Dissenters in the days of Penn and the Mayflower, many of the Old Faith had gone forth to found new lands in the Urals and beyond.

We find these characteristics well reflected in the resolution adopted by the Congress of Old Believers, as printed in the *Retch* (June 15) :

The Revolution in Russia took place during her war with the Germans, which has now lasted nearly three years. The war was begun by the Germans who had been preparing for it dozens of years and who had started it with a view to conquering all Europe and to dictating to her their will. These haughty Satan-like aspirations are not repudiated by the Germans even now. In the course of the war they laid their hands upon a portion of France and upon the entire western part of Russia, and have mercilessly destroyed Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania. Russia can only wage war with such a cruel and strong enemy in union with her Allies, England, France, Italy, Rumania, Japan and America, who are assisting us with all their strength and all their means so as to achieve a victorious end. If, which God forbid, Germany should emerge victorious from the war, she will compel the entire Russian people to work for her and will make Russia her tributary. The old Government wanted to make with Germany a separate peace in order to transfer the Russian people to her autocratic power. But the people refused to accept such self-mutilation and treachery and overthrew the Govern-

ment, which was deliberately leading Russia to perdition. At present also a separate peace with Germany would be for Russia pernicious. Apart from the servitude and humiliation which it would inflict upon Russia, such a peace would be an act of treachery towards our honest and self-sacrificing Allies, and would be a terrible betrayal of the unhappy peoples of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania. Eternal and indelible disgrace would in such a case cover Russia. The great Russian people must bend all its energies in unshakable union with its Allies to compel Germany to restore to Russia and France the conquered territories and also to restore the States which she has destroyed. Only on such a condition is it possible, in the interests of Russia and Europe as a whole, to terminate the present war: and to compel Germany to accept such a termination is only possible by a united offensive on the part of Russia and her Allies.

Many Cossacks belonged to the Old Faith. For conscience sake they had sought the freedom of the wilds, cultivating the fertile valleys and prairies of Siberia, going ever farther eastward, and in their fearless, adventurous pilgrimage braving the perils of the Arctic and Pacific oceans till they had skirted the shores of Alaska and Mexico. These people were a staunch, hardy race, temperate, thrifty, unlikely to be swayed by the eddies and cross-currents of revolutionary dogma.

The following speech made by Volozhinoff, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, at a Diet held by them at Novoch rskak in June appealed to the Cossack heart:—

Our road is straight: No turning either to the right or to the left. We shall walk our historical road, the road of the country's salvation, as we walked in the terrible days of the seventeenth century, as we walked in 1812. History has again imposed upon us a great honour, namely, to save the country, and we shall save the country, or perish. Citizen-Cossacks, we must come together, we must unite in one force, we must proclaim: Anarchy has no place in Russia! Lenin has no place in Russia! None of those have a place in Russia who are leading the country into the abyss! The Cossacks will save the country from the anarchists and from the Leninites. The Cossacks have never been serfs and will never be such, and they will not allow that the Russian people, having thrown off one yoke, should place upon its neck another. Cossacks, they want us to become once more slaves, the slaves of Socialism; but one must remember that the people are not ripe for such a Socialism as is now being propagated. It is only an ideal, and the hour for its realization has not arrived. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a sin. I have not come across anyone among the Cossacks who would say: "I do not love my country." We all love our country and are entirely devoted to it. Let us place all our strength on the altar of the Fatherland; the country demands from us sacrifices.

When the men at the front began to desert, mutiny or "fraternize," and their comrades in Petrograd evinced no inclination for duty, the women came forward to shame them by their example. An appeal was issued (June 19) by the Women's Military Union, founded with M. Kerensky's approval, calling upon all females of 16 years and over who had



THE EX-TSAR IN THE GARDEN OF HIS VILLA AT TSARSKOE SELO.
(Under guard by revolutionary soldiers during his walks).

passed through a secondary school to join the ranks of the "Death Battalion," whereby they hoped "to raise the spirit of the army," and save their country from imminent ruin. Mme. Botchkareva, an officer's widow who had



**A WOMAN SOLDIER OF THE
BATTALION OF DEATH.**

fought under her husband's command, became colonel, and Mlle. Skrydlova, the beautiful young daughter of the well-known Admiral, adjutant. She was afterwards severely wounded.

Within a few days recruits had flowed in, and the battalion, attired in men's uniforms, was paraded by General Polovtsoff, the Commander-in-Chief. Some weeks later they fought bravely, but alas! their gallant behaviour did not produce the impression they had hoped to make upon their male comrades.

Mrs. Rheta Childe Dorr, an American writer who visited them at the front, published her impressions:

When I left the women's headquarters a few days ago they did not expect to go into action, though they had been asking to do so for many days. I lived with them for two weeks. There are women of all types, peasants, intellectuals, doctors, stenographers, telephone girls and others. Whilst we were travelling from Petrograd crowds on the station platforms made fun of us asking, "Why do girls want to fight?" "Because you men are cowards," retorted the women.

The first night after we reached the front near Vilna there was a pounding on the door, and a Jewish girl sentinel gave the challenge. "Aren't the girls in here?" asked some soldiers outside. "We are not girls; we are soldiers," said the sentinel, stepping out. "If you don't go away we will shoot."

It rained every day, but the women carried out their drills and practices in sharp-shooting unflinching. They lived just as do the men soldiers, with this difference, that Mme. Botchkareva, who is now wounded, was about four times stricter.

Many of the soldiers said, "They will never let you get to the front; the extremists have sent us word, and we will kill you before we permit you."

When word came that they were to be moved nearer the front, their "Hurrahs" lasted many minutes.

These women have overthrown every convention and forgotten everything women have ever been taught. These did their job in dead earnest, and there was no nonsense about them. It had never occurred to me before that women ought to go to war, but I am convinced now that in any country under such conditions women ought to step into the breach, guns in hand.

Many other fateful problems had arisen from the swelter of revolution, the most ominous among them being the demands of various races for autonomy, and even for independence. They were destined to grow with menacing intensity after the disastrous campaign of July, 1917.

END OF VOLUME THIRTEEN.

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