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Summer–Winter 2006

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
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Social Networks and the Occupational Settlement Experiences of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine in Toronto*

Vic Satzewich, Wsevolod W. Isajiw, and Eugene Duvalko

Introduction

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the rise of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991 helped turn the 1980s trickle of Ukrainian immigration to North America into a new, fourth wave of migration. Between 1992 and 1997, a total of 107,916 individuals who had been born in Ukraine emigrated to the United States.¹ Further, approximately 25,000 individuals whose country of last permanent residence was Ukraine have come to Canada between 1991 and 2001.² Since independence, Ukrainians have also

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1. Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2003), 193.

2. Ukraine is a multi-ethnic society and not all immigrants from Ukraine would identify themselves as being of Ukrainian ethnicity or heritage. According to the 1989 Soviet census, Ukraine consisted of ethnic Ukrainians (seventy-three percent), but also ethnic Russians (twenty-two percent), Jews, Tatars, Poles, Mennonites and others. From Canadian Immigration Statistics, which record the country of last permanent residence of immigrants, there is no way of knowing what proportion of immigrants from Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians. Also, some ethnic Ukrainians arrived in Canada from other countries.

migrated legally and illegally, and temporarily and permanently, to other parts of Europe, Israel, and the Middle East.³

Ukraine currently supplies less than one percent of all immigrants to Canada in any single year. As a result, this new wave of immigration from Ukraine has captured only scant attention on the part of social scientists interested in issues of migration and settlement. Although smaller than the earlier waves of Ukrainian migration to Canada,⁴ the social significance of this migration for the Ukrainian-Canadian community exceeds its relatively modest numerical size. Within some circles of the organized Ukrainian community new immigrants are seen to constitute a potential source of renewal for organizations that are suffering from declining membership or an identity crisis in the wake of Ukrainian independence. In other words, the presence of new immigrants means potentially new blood, new ideas, and a new focus for established organizations that are having trouble recruiting second, third, and later generations of Ukrainian Canadians.

The impression of at least some activists and newspapers within the organized Ukrainian community is that new immigrants have only a tenuous connection to established Ukrainian ethnic organizations and to longer settled immigrants and their descendants. Some attribute this to the supposed disinterest of the new immigrants in “things Ukrainian,” while others see this as the consequence of an unwelcoming attitude of the wider community to the post-Soviet newcomers. Furthermore, there is also an awareness that at least some recent immigrants from Ukraine are struggling economically and, in particular, are having difficulty making the transition from their occupations in Ukraine to broadly similar jobs in Canada.

One of the aims of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for some of the current impressions about the new, fourth wave of migration. We do this by posing a number of interrelated sociological questions: (1) What do recent immigrants from Ukraine perceive to be barriers to their job transitions in Canada? (2) To what extent do Ukrainian immigrants

We know that since the late 1970s, several thousand have arrived from Poland, and since the breakup of the Soviet Union, some Ukrainians may have arrived from Russia and other third countries.

3. Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, 193–4; and Wolowyna’s article in this issue.

4. Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Andrij Makuch, “Ukrainians in Canada,” in *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World*, ed. Ann Lencyk Pawliczko (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 332–4.

make use of ethnic networks when it comes to finding work? (3) To what extent do Ukrainian immigrants make use of the Ukrainian language in transactions in the marketplace for goods and services? (4) How does the use of ethnic networks change as immigrants settle? (5) What are the potential socio-economic consequences of using ethnic networks in job searches?

Theoretical Background

There are two sets of sociological literature that form the theoretical backdrop to these questions. The first is the literature on the barriers that immigrants face in finding work that is commensurate with their education and their occupational training, background, and experience. The second is the literature on ethnic networks and ethnic concentrations in jobs.

Contemporary research in Canada that examines immigrant and ethnic-group incorporation begins with John Porter's seminal work *The Vertical Mosaic* in which he describes Canada as a society where there is a reciprocal relationship between ethnicity and social class. In his view some ethnic groups occupy an entrance status at the bottom of social and occupational hierarchies, while other ethnic groups occupy elite positions. Aboriginal people and the small number of Black and Asian people in Canada are at the bottom of the mosaic, and close to them in their lower entrance status are southern and eastern Europeans, including Ukrainians. Northern Europeans are close to the top, with British, French, and white Americans and their descendants distributed around the top of the mosaic.⁵ Since the publication of Porter's work, there has been a plethora of research that examines the patterns of social inequality among immigrants and ethnic groups in Canada.

More recently, social scientists have argued that Porter's original version of the vertical mosaic is an inaccurate picture of contemporary social reality.⁶ One reason for this is that over the past thirty-five years the European groups and their descendants that in the 1960s he placed at, or near, the bottom of the social scale have experienced inter-, and in some cases, intra-generational upward mobility. In other words, "white" Europeans from the southern and eastern periphery of Europe, including Ukrainians, have been able to move up the social scale and now occupy

5. John A. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 60–103.

6. Gordon Darroch, "Another Look at Ethnicity, Stratification and Social Mobility in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 1979, no. 4: 1–25.

social and economic positions that are broadly comparable to those of the former elites.⁷

Even though “white” Europeans from southern and eastern Europe have experienced socio-economic mobility and no longer face structural disadvantages in Canadian society, many analysts have argued that race has replaced ethnicity as the main criterion that allocates individuals to their inferior class and social positions in Canada.⁸ In other words, with some exceptions, the new vertical mosaic in Canada is now divided along colour, rather than ethnic, lines; visible minorities and aboriginal peoples (immigrants and Canadian-born) have replaced the Ukrainians, Poles, Italians, Portuguese and other southern and eastern Europeans at the bottom of the social scale.⁹

While the literature in this area is quite extensive, two broad sets of variables are considered to be responsible for the socio-economic position of immigrants. The debate here is about the extent to which human capital, as opposed to structural barriers, affects the economic positions of immigrants and members of ethnic and racial communities. Human-capital theorists argue that many of the difficulties that new immigrants face in finding work in Canada stem from some of the traditional variables that have been used to explain socio-economic achievement more generally: educational credentials, various attitudinal and cultural factors that inhibit or promote advancement, and the skills, training, talent, and experience that individuals bring to the labour market.¹⁰ For immigrants, language abilities have been added to the mix insofar as facility in Canada’s official languages is said to account for the variations in occupations and income achievements of recent immigrants.¹¹

7. Jeffrey Reitz, “Ethnic Concentrations in Labour Markets and Their Implications for Ethnic Inequality,” in Raymond Breton, Wsevolod Isajiw, Warren Kalbach, and Jeffrey Reitz, *Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 190–2.

8. Vic Satzewich and Peter Li, “Immigrant Labour in Canada: The Cost and Benefit of Ethnic Origin in the Job Market,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 1987, no. 12: 237–8.

9. Augie Fleras and Jean L. Elliott, *Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race, Ethnic and Aboriginal Dynamics in Canada* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 116; and Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context* (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishers, 1999), 109–37.

10. Gurcharn Basran and Li Zong, “Devaluation of Foreign Credentials as Perceived by Non-White Professional Immigrants,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 30 (1998): 89.

11. Theresa Scassa, “Language Standards, Ethnicity and Discrimination,” *Canadian*

Those who emphasize the importance of structural barriers in the process of immigrant economic adjustment recognize that human-capital variables explain part of the process of adjustment of recent immigrants in Canada.¹² However, the human-capital barriers are secondary to what are regarded as the more fundamental structural factors that are responsible for occupational and income outcomes; namely, the non-recognition of educational credentials, prejudicial attitudes and practices of employers and decision makers, and systemic racism, which denies opportunities to visible-minority immigrants and their descendants.¹³

One of the unstated assumptions of the literature on the new vertical mosaic in Canada seems to be that recent white immigrants from Europe do not face the same structural barriers as visible-minority immigrants.¹⁴ As a result, their process of economic adjustment is assumed to be smoother, and they are assumed to be better able to parlay their abilities, skills, and human capital into good jobs and high wages. What is not clear in the literature is the extent to which recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, like Ukrainians, experience some of the same difficulties in job transitions as their visible-minority counterparts.

The second and related body of work that forms the theoretical backdrop for this paper is the literature on ethnic networks and ethnic concentrations in occupations. Much of the literature on the role that ethnic networks and ethnic job concentrations play in facilitating or impeding mobility and economic adjustment comes from the United States.¹⁵ Early literature in this area focussed on Asian immigrants. The argument was that Asian immigrants in North America faced hostility in the mainstream labour market, turned inward, and formed ethnic

Ethnic Studies 26 (1994): 105–20.

12. Peter S. Li, "The Market Value and Social Value of Race," in *Racism and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance*, ed. Vic Satzewich (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishers, 1998), 120–6; and idem, *Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2003), 100–23.

13. Frances Henry et al., *The Colour of Democracy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 2000), 56; and Basran and Song, "Devaluation of Foreign Credentials," 11–19.

14. Basran and Song, "Devaluation of Foreign Credentials," 10.

15. Richard Alba and Victor Nee, "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration," in *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, ed. Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 152–3.

businesses as ways of escaping the prejudice and discrimination they faced from dominant groups.¹⁶ Asian entrepreneurs formed businesses and used their marginalized co-ethnics as sources of labour. Alejandro Portes and his various colleagues have advanced the argument that participation in ethnic networks and an ethnic economy can facilitate social mobility and economic advancement. Participation in an ethnic economy, either through self-employment or through wage employment in businesses owned by co-ethnics, may provide recent immigrants with an opportunity to gain valuable on-the-job experience and further hone their language skills, which can later be translated into assets within the so-called mainstream economy.¹⁷

Sociologists in Canada have also discussed the impact of ethnic networks and ethnic identity on social mobility and economic adjustment.¹⁸ In Canada the discussion initially occurred in the context of Porter's work, and much of that discussion initially focussed on the downside of participation in the ethnic economy. Even though Porter did not put it in the same terms as network theory, he felt that the ethnic groups that were accorded an entrance status had the potential to become caught in an ethnic mobility trap if they stuck too stubbornly to their "old world" ethnicity.¹⁹ For Porter that mobility trap involved members of ethnic communities being caught up in immigrant cultures that did not encourage educational advancement, occupational mobility, and individual achievement. Other, left-inspired versions see participation in an ethnic economy as the basis for intra-ethnic class exploitation; that is, in some

16. Edna Bonacich and John Modell, *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

17. Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 219–30.

18. Reitz, "Ethnic Concentrations in Labour Markets"; Wsevolod Isajiw, Aysan Sev'er and Leo Driedger, "Ethnic Identity and Social Mobility: A Test of the 'Drawback' Model," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 18 (1993): 177–96; and Emi Ooka and Barry Wellman, *Does Social Capital Pay Off More Within or Between Ethnic Groups? Analyzing Job Searches in Five Toronto Ethnic Groups* (Toronto: Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000), which is available at <<http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman/publications/ethnic14a/ooka-bw-uj-26feb03.PDF>>.

19. Norbert Wiley, "The Ethnic Mobility Trap and Stratification Theory," *Social Problems* 15 (1967): 147–59.

cases, employers may take advantage of the marginalized social status of co-ethnic immigrants and use the ties of ethnicity to facilitate economic exploitation.²⁰ As a result, the use of ethnic networks in job searches and participation in an ethnic economy may not, in the end, be very beneficial to individual immigrants and members of ethnic communities. When more recent versions of network theory are added to this literature, the view is that diverse social networks and contacts with higher-status members of society may in fact be better for individual-immigrant and ethnic-group mobility. Diverse ethnic networks improve an individual's social and network capital, which can then be translated into better jobs and higher income.²¹ Reitz, on the other hand, cautions that the effects of ethnic networks may depend on the nature of the work setting: concentrations in mainstream job settings may have negative consequences, while concentration in minority-enclave settings may have positive consequences.²² He also shows that concentrations have different consequences, depending on whether the dependent variable is occupation or income.²³

The Study

Our study was conducted in collaboration with the Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society (CUIAS) in Toronto. CUIAS was founded in 1974, and its mandate is to provide settlement services for Ukrainian immigrants in Toronto, to assist in family reunification and refugee sponsorship, and to create links between Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and mainstream agencies that deal with immigration and settlement. In addition to operating courses of English as a second language (ESL), it helps immigrants in job searches and resume preparation, and provides them with sponsorship information and services. While its services are available to all immigrants regardless of origin, its client base consists mostly of Ukrainian immigrants from Ukraine and other countries such as Russia and Poland.

20. Jan Lin, *Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 11.

21. Ooka and Wellman, *Does Social Capital Pay Off More Within or Between Ethnic Groups?*

22. Reitz, "Ethnic Concentrations in Labour Markets," 170.

23. Ibid.

CUIAS has a database of 10,125 individuals, who have contacted it or used its services in the past fifteen years. This database contains basic background and contact information. In the fall of 2000, 1,000 names were selected randomly from this database, and individuals were contacted by telephone and asked if they would be interested in participating in a study of recent immigrants from Ukraine. From these 1,000 contacts 310 individuals agreed to participate in our survey. Six interviews were spoiled; thus there were 304 usable surveys.

The research team hired ten interviewers to administer the survey questionnaire. Seven interviewers were themselves recent immigrants from Ukraine and three were first- or second- generation Ukrainian Canadians, who were longer settled in Canada. The questionnaire was initially drafted in English and then translated into Ukrainian. Between December 2000 and February 2001 closed-ended interviews were conducted in Ukrainian. They lasted between one and one and a half hours and took place in locations that were convenient for the respondents. Some took place in public spaces such as coffee shops and libraries; others in the homes of interviewees or interviewers.

The interview schedule contained six sections: (1) background questions regarding age, immigration category, marital status, and the like; (2) language use and retention both before and after immigration to Canada; (3) ethnic cultural retention and religious affiliation; (4) involvement and interest in ethnic community organizations; (5) economic incorporation; and (6) attitudinal questions about settlement and adjustment into life in Canada.

Results

Just over ninety percent of the respondents had lived in Ukraine prior to arrival in Canada. A small number of them had lived either in Poland, the United States, Argentina, Israel, Russia, or other countries of the former Soviet Union. Ninety percent of the respondents were independent-class immigrants; that is, they were selected on the basis of the points system, in which admission to Canada depends on an assessment of the skills, training, and talent the immigrant can bring to the Canadian labour market.²⁴ One-quarter of the respondents were Canadian citizens at the time of the interview. There were almost equal numbers of men

24. Li, *Destination Canada*, 23–8.

(151) and women (148) in the sample. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents were married, 10.9 percent were unmarried, 8.9 percent were separated or divorced, and 1.3 percent were widowed. The average age upon arrival in Canada was 35.4, and the average age at the time of the interview was 39.2. The average interviewee had lived in Canada for almost four years.

About forty percent of the respondents in our sample were from western Ukraine, twenty-six percent from Kyiv, and the rest from central, eastern, and southern Ukraine. They were relatively well educated. Upon arrival in Canada forty-one percent had the equivalent of an undergraduate or graduate university degree, thirty-seven percent had some post-secondary education (fifteen–sixteen years), and only 17.8 percent had eleven or fewer years of education. A small proportion had a combination of Canadian and Ukrainian educational backgrounds. Four in ten respondents had enrolled in some kind of educational institution in Canada, and 83.3 percent of them obtained qualifications by studying in Canada.

Not surprisingly, as the immigrants in our sample settled into life in Canada, their self-assessed English-language skills improved: 72.4 percent of the sample reported that their ability to speak English was either poor or non-existent prior to emigration. By the time of the interview 83.8 percent reported that their English-speaking abilities were either good or very good. Eight in ten respondents took an ESL class after their arrival, but only half of them reported receiving an ESL diploma.

Occupational Background

In the survey jobs were measured at three points in time: immediately before emigration to Canada, at the first job in Canada, and at the current job in Canada. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the broad job categories at these three points in time. It is difficult to make direct comparisons of jobs across countries. However, from table 1 it appears that immigrants whose jobs in Ukraine were in the broad area of computing had the easiest time making the transition to broadly similar kinds of jobs in Canada. Before emigration 15.2 percent of the respondents had jobs in the field of computing, 13.4 percent of them had a first job in Canada in that field, and 20.1 percent of them were currently working in computing.

Immigrants with job backgrounds in Ukraine in the areas of engineering, other professions (including health-related professions), and the humanities seem to have the most difficulty finding work in similar

Table 1: Employment of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine (%)

	Job in Ukraine	First Job in Canada	Current Job in Canada
Computers	15.2	13.4	20.1
Engineering	22.4	0.3	0.7
Professional	12.1	2.3	3.7
Humanities	13.8	1.3	2.0
Science-research	4.8	1.7	2.3
Arts	3.4	1.3	2.3
Management	7.6	2.3	2.7
Business/entrepreneurial	3.4	3.0	6.4
Banking/finance	.7	1.0	1.3
Sports	1.0	0.0	0.3
Labour	9.7	28.8	21.5
Retail	0.7	2.0	3.7
Secretarial/clerical	0.3	2.3	1.7
Non-skilled/manual labour	0.0	19.1	4.0
Student	4.1	13.4	13.8
Not working	0.7	7.7	13.4
Total	99.9	99.9	100.0

fields in Canada. While almost half of the respondents in our sample had held jobs in these three areas before emigration, only 6.4 percent reported that their current jobs were in these fields. For both the first and current jobs in Canada, the single most frequently reported field was unskilled manual labour or service jobs. Only ten percent of the respondents reported that they had had unskilled labour and/or service jobs before migration, but over one-half reported their first job in Canada to have been in these areas, and over one-quarter of the respondents reported their current job to be in these areas. Thus, while there is some improvement in job prospects as immigrants in our sample establish themselves in Canada, this is not always the case.

In our sample some immigrants seem to be able to parlay abilities and skills developed in Ukraine into Canadian jobs that make use of their skills. Computing jobs may require less specific English-language and context-specific skills. As a result, the skills learned in computing jobs in Ukraine may be more easily translated into resources here in Canada. At

the same time it appears that those who had been employed in engineering and the professions in Ukraine found it more difficult to turn their skills into broadly similar kinds of jobs in Canada.

Table 2: Self-reported Reasons for Difficulty in Finding Work in Canada (%)

Reason	Very important/important
Lack of Canadian experience	85.3
Lack of Canadian contacts	80.8
Did not speak English well enough	80.8
Difficulty in proving credentials	55.7
Did not know Canadian employment system	55.5
Completely different professional requirements	36.5
Lack of professional experience	30.3

What do immigrants report as some of the main barriers to employment in Canada? In our sample, eighty-five percent of the respondents reported that a lack of Canadian experience was an important or very important barrier to employment. Eight in ten respondents indicated that their inability to speak English well enough was also a barrier (see table 2). Comparatively fewer immigrants reported that a lack of professional training or different professional requirements in Canada were barriers to employment. This indicates that in their minds the problems immigrants face in finding work are not necessarily rooted in different job requirements or different training in Ukraine and Canada. While over half of the respondents (55.7 percent) indicated that the problem they had in finding work in Canada arose from the difficulty of proving that they had equivalent occupational credentials, proportionately more respondents indicated a lack of Canadian experience and a lack of human capital in the form of poor English-language abilities as reasons for their problem in finding work. This finding is consistent with the respondents' self-assessment of their poor English-language skills upon arrival in Canada. As noted previously, nearly three-quarters of our sample indicated that at the time of their migration to Canada their English-language skills were poor or very poor. Thus, while the non-recognition of credentials is an important issue for immigrants, it lags behind the importance of a lack of networks and Canadian experience, and of poor English-language skills as a barrier to employment.

Ethnic Networks and the Ethnic Economy

One way to examine the extent to which ethnic networks play a role in economic adjustment is to examine self-employment among immigrants. In this context we were interested in analyzing the extent to which recent immigrants from Ukraine are self-employed, and if they are, the extent to which they are participants in anything resembling an ethnic economy in Toronto.

In our sample eighteen out of 273 individuals who were in the labour force (6.6 percent) indicated that they earned self-employment income. For comparative purposes it is useful to set this finding into a larger context. Ornstein's study of ethno-racial inequality in Toronto using 1996 census data shows that in Toronto as a whole 7.9 percent of all women in the labour force and 10.8 percent of Ukrainian women in the labour force reported some self-employment income.²⁵ At the same time 5.2 percent of all women, and six percent of Ukrainian-origin women reported a higher level of self-employment income than wage income. In 1996 12.3 percent of all men in the Toronto labour force and 15.3 percent of Ukrainian men reported some self-employment income, while 8.8 percent of all men in the labour force and 11.4 percent of Ukrainian-origin men reported self-employment income greater than wage income.

Since our sample size is relatively small, we must be cautious in drawing conclusions about self-employed immigrants. At first blush, however, it appears that compared to the entire labour force in Toronto a very modest proportion of recent Ukrainian immigrants are self-employed. Furthermore, nearly three-quarters of the self-employed respondents in our sample indicated that they had few or no Ukrainian clients or customers. Two thirds also indicated that English was the main language that they used with their clientele. On the basis of these measures there seems to be little evidence that self-employed immigrants in our sample are part of a Ukrainian ethnic economy in Toronto.

A somewhat different picture emerges when we examine other measures of an ethnic economy. In Toronto the Ukrainian community as a whole is distributed across the range of occupational categories. According to Ornstein's study of ethno-racial inequality in Toronto,

25. Michael Ornstein, *Ethno-Racial Inequality in the City of Toronto: An Analysis of the 1996 Census* (Toronto: Community and Neighbourhood Services Department and Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000), 78.

Ukrainians in the city tend to be over-represented in high-status occupations and the professions, and under-represented in lower-status occupations. Tables 3 and 4 show the occupational distribution of Ukrainian-origin men and women compared to the distribution of Baltic and other East European groups and of all men and women in the Toronto labour force. His data shows that 23.9 percent of Ukrainian-origin women and 24.1 percent of Ukrainian-origin men were in professional occupations. This compares to 20.7 percent of Baltic- and other East European-origin women and 18.5 percent of all women in the Toronto labour force. For men the respective figures are 21.4 and 17.9. Ukrainian-origin men and women also tend to be over-represented in the ranks of high-level managers and middle managers and under-represented in the ranks of lower non-manual and lower manual occupations.²⁶

What these data suggest is that in Toronto Ukrainians on the whole are doing well compared both to Baltic and other East European groups and to all workers in the city. This assessment is further confirmed by Ornstein's analysis of income data, which shows that Ukrainian men and women have higher median earnings than both the Baltic- and East European-origin population and all the men and women in the labour force.²⁷ Ornstein's data is also useful because it suggests that, at least theoretically, both longer settled Ukrainians and Ukrainian immigrants in the city are in positions to be participants in an ethnic economy. With the over-representation of Ukrainians in the ranks of the self-employed, of professionals and high and middle managers, Ukrainians may offer professional and other goods and services and control important resources, such as jobs, that may be accessible to recent immigrants from Ukraine. In these circumstances we are interested in whether ethnic ties play a role in the labour-market experiences of immigrants in our sample and the extent to which ethnic ties play a role in the way that Ukrainian immigrants access various goods and services.

One way to assess the role of ethnic ties in the labour market is to assess the origins of the employers of immigrants.²⁸ According to table

26. Note that the pattern that Ornstein detects for Toronto is different from the entire Canadian pattern. When Canada as a whole is considered, Ukrainians are under-represented in managerial and administrative occupations (Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity*, 132).

27. Ornstein, *Ethno-Racial Inequality in the City of Toronto*, 64.

28. Reitz, "Ethnic Concentrations in Labour Markets," 167-8.

Table 3: Occupations of Women in Toronto, 1996

	Occupation (Percentage distribution)							Total Employed	
	High Level Manager	Middle Manager	Professional	Higher Non-Manual	Skilled Manual & Supervisors	Lower Non-Manual	Lower Manual		
Ukrainian	0.9	7.5	23.9	25.1	1.1	38.3	3.2	100.0	6,720
Baltic & East European	0.6	5.9	20.7	22.4	1.2	42.5	6.7	100.0	34,435
Total Labour Force	0.6	6.1	18.5	20.9	1.1	44.8	8.0	100.0	610,115

Source: Michael Ornstein, *Ethno-Racial Inequality in the City of Toronto: An Analysis of the 1996 Census* (Toronto: Community and Neighbourhood Services Department and the Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000).

Table 4: Occupations of Men in Toronto, 1996

	Occupation (Percentage Distribution)							Total Employed	
	High Level Manager	Middle Manager	Professional	Higher Non-Manual	Skilled Manual & Supervisors	Lower Non-Manual	Lower Manual		
Ukrainian	2.7	9.9	24.1	16.6	12.2	21.8	12.8	100.0	6,940
Baltic & East European	1.9	9.2	21.4	14.9	14.7	21.1	16.8	100.0	37,295
Total Labour Force	1.8	9.6	17.9	15.1	11.3	27.1	17.3	100.0	665,845

Source: Michael Ornstein, *Ethno-Racial Inequality in the City of Toronto: An Analysis of the 1996 Census* (Toronto: Community and Neighbourhood Services Department and the Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000).

5, 28.4 percent of respondents indicated that Ukrainian Canadians or other Ukrainian immigrants were their employers for their first job in Canada. Other immigrants were reported as employers in first jobs by 32.1 percent of respondents, and Anglo-Canadians were reported as employers in 27.8 percent of cases.

Table 5: Origins of Employers of Recent Ukrainian Immigrants to Canada, First and Current Job

	First Job		Current Job	
	N	%	N	%
Ukrainian Canadian	31	19.1	21	10.3
Ukrainian Immigrant	15	9.3	7	3.4
Other Immigrant	52	32.1	47	23.2
Anglo-Canadian	45	27.8	86	42.4
Other/don't know	19	6.2	42	20.7
Total	162	100	203	100

Measured by the origin of employers, participation in an ethnic economy decreases over time. When the current jobs of immigrants are examined, Ukrainian-origin employers (Ukrainian Canadians and Ukrainian immigrants) decrease to 13.7 percent. Reliance on other immigrants for current jobs also decreases, with 23.4 percent reporting other immigrants as their employers in current jobs. Conversely, Anglo-Canadian employers increase in importance, with 42.4 percent of respondents reporting this category as their current employer. "Other/don't know" also becomes increasingly important for current jobs, with 20.7 percent of respondents falling into this category.

Another measure of immigrants' participation in an ethnic economy is the main language spoken among co-workers in both the first job and the current job.²⁹ Regarding the first job in Canada, table 6 shows that half of the respondents in our sample indicated that English was the main language spoken among co-workers. The next most common response was Ukrainian, with 18.6 percent reporting this as the main language spoken among co-workers. Russian was the main language spoken among

29. *Ibid.*, 170–3.

14.7 percent of respondents and Polish among 6.4 percent. The rest of the respondents spoke a mix of languages with their co-workers.

**Table 6: Main Language Spoken among Co-workers,
First Job and Current Job**

	First Job		Current Job	
	N	%	N	%
English	78	50.0	154	75.9
Russian	23	14.7	10	4.9
Polish	10	6.4	4	2.0
Ukrainian	29	18.6	16	7.9
Mix	16	10.1	19	9.4
Total	156	100	203	100

Like employer origins, the language spoken among co-workers in current jobs indicates that ethnic ties become less important as immigrants become established. The use of English as the main language with co-workers in current jobs increased to 75.9 percent of respondents, while the use of Ukrainian decreased to 7.9 percent, of Russian to 4.9 percent, of Polish to 2.0 percent, and of mixed languages to 9.4 percent. It is important to note, however, that the use of language as an indicator of ethnic ties in occupational settings is a conservative measure insofar as immigrants may be employed alongside co-ethnic members who speak English as their main language.³⁰

Even though the salience of ethnic ties diminishes when employer origins and languages used with co-workers are considered, there seems to be evidence for an ethnic economy in the ways in which immigrants access various goods and services in the marketplace. When asked "what is the main language you use when you need to see the following people or do the following things?" 34.5 percent indicated that they used mainly Ukrainian with their family doctor, 31.4 percent with their lawyer, 37.7 percent with their dentist, and 31.6 percent at their bank. The use of Russian was also common in transactions with professionals, although not as common as Ukrainian: 19.9 percent of respondents used Russian with

30. *Ibid.*, 144.

their family doctor, 10.7 percent with their lawyer, 15.1 percent with their dentist, and only one percent at their bank. The use of Ukrainian and Russian was negligible when immigrants purchased groceries or had their vehicles repaired.

These data, which indicate that roughly one-third of new immigrants use Ukrainian in accessing professional services in Toronto, are significant when put in the context of the relatively few members of the new wave of immigration who participate in Ukrainian-Canadian ethnic organizations. In our sample, only nine percent of respondents indicated that they were members of Ukrainian-Canadian ethnic organizations. An even smaller proportion, seven percent, indicated that they were members of non-ethnic organizations in Canada. Even though the immigrants in our sample do not appear to be "joiners" of either Ukrainian-Canadian or other organizations, there is evidence that when it comes to professional types of transactions in the marketplace, Ukrainian immigrants do in fact access Ukrainian-language providers of these services.

Even though accessing professional transactions in Ukrainian may be done more out of necessity than choice, this is evidence of some degree of institutional completeness within the Ukrainian community in Toronto. It may also provide the most compelling evidence for the existence of a Ukrainian ethnic economy. For Breton institutional completeness refers to the extent to which members of an ethnic community make use of ethnic organizations and services to solve their needs.³¹ A measure of institutional completeness of Ukrainians in Toronto is the ability of second- and third-generation Ukrainian Canadians to move into the professions and self-employment and to hold positions in which they can offer their goods or services to other members of the ethnic community. There is some evidence that new-wave Ukrainian immigrants participate in ethnically relevant exchanges for professional services in the marketplace. Involvement in ethnic organizations is certainly one dimension of institutional completeness, but economic exchanges in the marketplace should not be overlooked when it comes to assessing the strength of ties between new-wave immigrants and the longer settled members of the Ukrainian community in Toronto. The marketplace forms one arena where social interactions between different waves of migration occur, and

31. Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," *The American Journal of Sociology* 70 (1964): 193-205.

those social interactions are not trivial dimensions of social life for members of ethnic communities.

Table 7: Job Search Techniques for Recent Ukrainian Immigrants, First Job and Current Job in Canada

	How did R find			
	First Job		Current Job	
	N	%	N	%
Ukr-Can friends ^a	24	14.6	25	12.4
Ukr immigrants ^a	39	23.8	24	11.9
Ukr-Can organization ^a	2	1.2	2	1.0
Other Immigrants	13	7.9	8	4.0
Non-Ukr-Can friends	4	1.3	5	2.5
Relatives	4	1.3	2	.7
Private employment agency	10	6.1	19	9.4
Newspaper ads	37	12.2	40	19.8
Bulletin board ads	3	1.8	2	1.0
Approached employer directly	14	8.5	30	9.8
Other	14	8.5	45	21.3
Total	164	100	202	100

^a Ethnic networks as a % of total: first job = 39.6%, current job = 25.3%.

Ethnic Networks and Job Searches in Canada

A related issue that we were interested in exploring is the extent to which immigrants make use of ethnic networks in their search for jobs in Canada. Table 7 provides data on job-search techniques for immigrants in their first job and current job in Canada. It shows that when the first job in Canada is considered, broadly defined ethnic networks seem to play an important role in how immigrants access jobs. Almost forty percent of respondents indicated that either Ukrainian-Canadian friends, other Ukrainian immigrants, or Ukrainian-Canadian organizations were responsible for helping them find their first job in Canada: 23.8 percent got their information mainly from other Ukrainian immigrants, 14.6 percent from Ukrainian-Canadian friends, and 1.2 percent from Ukrainian-Canadian organizations.

Table 7 also shows that reliance on ethnic networks diminished in searching for the current job. Only 25.3 percent of the respondents reported that they found their current job through Ukrainian ethnic networks: 12.4 percent through Ukrainian-Canadian friends, 11.9 percent through other Ukrainian immigrants, and one percent through Ukrainian-Canadian organizations. Conversely, the use of "mainstream" sources increased in importance: 9.4 percent used private employment agencies, 19.8 percent newspaper advertisements, 9.8 percent approached employers directly, and 21.3 used other means, such as co-op programmes in schools.

Potential Consequences of the Use of Ethnic Networks

Our data do not allow us to examine some of the socio-economic consequences of using different kinds of networks in job searches. However, some other Canadian data does provide an indication of the socio-economic consequences of relying on ethnic networks in job searches. Ooka and Wellman's analysis of data collected in the "Ethnic Pluralism in an Urban Setting Research Project" in 1978-79 by Isajiw et al. provides a glimpse into the social consequences of using intra-ethnic, as opposed to inter-ethnic, personal contacts in job searches for five ethnic groups in Toronto: English, German, Italian, Jewish, and Ukrainian. Ooka and Wellman examine the ethnic background of cases in which respondents reported personal contacts for their job search.³² In the study by Isajiw et al. respondents were asked about the people who provided help in job searches. If a subject pointed to a member of his own ethnic group, the case was coded as an intra-ethnic tie. If the respondent pointed to a person of different ethnicity, the case was coded as an inter-ethnic tie.

Table 8 provides data on job-search methods of the five ethnic groups. It shows that Ukrainians in that sample tended to make less use of personal contacts in job searches than the other four groups. Only forty percent of Ukrainians used personal contacts, compared to forty-four percent of English respondents, forty-five percent of Germans, fifty-one percent of Italians, and fifty-four percent of Jews. On the other hand, twenty-eight percent of Ukrainians in the sample applied directly to their employer, whereas thirty-two percent used other "more formal methods,"

32. Ooka and Wellman, *Does Social Capital Pay Off More Within or Between Ethnic Groups?*

such as newspaper want ads, private employment agencies, and government-operated employment services.

Table 9 provides data on the ethnic background of on-the-job contacts and mean income for men and women in the five ethnic groups. It shows that for English and German men intra-ethnic job contacts are associated with higher mean incomes than inter-ethnic job contacts. On the other hand, for Italian, Jewish, and Ukrainian men, inter-ethnic job contacts are associated with higher mean incomes than intra-ethnic job contacts. In the case of Ukrainian men inter-ethnic contacts in job searches led to a mean income forty-five percent higher than intra-ethnic job searches.

For women the pattern is less clear. For English, German, and Ukrainian women ethnicity of job contact was associated with almost no difference in mean income, but for Italian and Jewish women inter-ethnic contacts were associated with higher mean incomes than intra-ethnic contacts.

Certainly, to shed light on the findings of our own research we must use the data collected in the "Ethnic Pluralism" study with care. The research was undertaken more than twenty years after the data for the "Ethnic Pluralism" study was collected, and the earlier study collected data on both the immigrant and Canadian-born generation. However, the findings of the Ooka and Wellman analysis suggest that inter-ethnic job ties can be more economically beneficial than intra-ethnic ties to new immigrants.

Conclusion

There appears to be a mixed picture regarding the job transitions of Ukrainian immigrants in Toronto. Immigrants with skills and backgrounds in computing-related jobs in Ukraine seem to be able to translate their skills into jobs in a broadly similar field in Canada. Other immigrants with engineering and other professional backgrounds seem to be having the most difficulty making the transition. Immigrants also report facing barriers to finding jobs in Canada that are commensurate with their education, training, and background. They are more likely to identify their own underdeveloped English-language skills and their lack of Canadian contacts and experience than the non-recognition of their credentials as responsible for their difficulties in finding work. Thus, a combination of human capital (language skills) and structural variables (lack of Canadian networks) are seen as the main barriers to finding work, with relatively less weight placed on the non-recognition of their occupational credentials.

Table 8: Methods of Job Search among Five Ethnic Groups in Toronto, 1978-79

	Formal Method		Direct Application		Personal Contact		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	% ^a
English	94	33	65	23	123	44	282	100
German	84	33	58	23	115	45	257	100
Italian	54	21	70	28	131	51	255	100
Jewish	49	27	36	20	98	54	183	100
Ukrainian	28	32	80	28	114	40	285	100
Total	372	29.5	309	24.5	581	46	1262	100

^a Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Emi Ooka and Barry Wellman, *Does Social Capital Pay Off More Within or Between Ethnic Groups? Analyzing Job Searchers in Five Toronto Ethnic Groups* (Toronto: Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000).

Table 9: Ethnicity of Contact and Mean Income of Males and Females by Ethnic Groups in Toronto, 1978-79

	Males			Females		
	Intra-Ethnic	Inter-Ethnic	Monetary Difference	Intra-Ethnic	Inter-Ethnic	Monetary Difference
English N=72	\$20,510 48	\$14,125 4	\$6,385 13	\$11,038 7	\$10,929	\$109
% Difference			-31%			-1%
German N=62	\$19,917 18	\$17,580 19	\$2,337	\$10,100 10	\$10,300 10	\$200
% Difference			-12%			2%
Italian N=83	\$15,310 50	\$17,625 8	\$2,315	\$8,789 19	\$10,750 6	\$1,961
% Difference			15%			22%
Jewish N=46	\$16,860 25	\$20,167 6	\$3,307	\$8,769 13	\$15,000 2	\$6,211
% Difference			20%			71%
Ukrainian N=68	\$11,380 25	\$16,500 17	\$5,120	\$12,265 17	\$12,278 9	\$13
% Difference			45%			0%

Note: "% Difference" refers to the % increase (or decrease) in income for using inter-ethnic as compared with intra-ethnic ties.

Source: Emi Ooka and Barry Wellman, *Does Social Capital Pay Off More Within or Between Ethnic Groups? Analyzing Job Searchers in Five Toronto Ethnic Groups* (Toronto: Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 2000).

The data presented in our paper points to the relevance of ethnicity in the job market and in the market for goods and services. The distinction between the concept of ethnic-enclave economy and ethnic economy is relevant in this context.³³ It is not clear, for instance, whether the concept of ethnic enclave refers to place of work, place of residence, or industry section.³⁴ There are also difficult questions about the spatial concentration and breadth of firms that make the concept of an ethnic-enclave economy difficult to measure empirically. While there are parts of Toronto where Ukrainian immigrants have traditionally settled and where some Ukrainian-owned businesses and banks are visible parts of the urban landscape, there does not appear to be a “Little Ukraine” in Toronto in the same way that there is a stereotypical “Chinatown,” “Greektown,” or “Little Italy,” with a concentration of a variety of ethnic businesses. Thus, it is doubtful that there is a Ukrainian ethnic-enclave economy in Toronto in the narrow sense of the term, which is defined by the spatial concentration of a broadly based set of firms and professional and other services on offer in the marketplace. However, if we take a broad definition of the ethnic economy, which includes the extent to which ethnicity plays a role in market transactions, job searches, and workplace cultures, then the evidence for an ethnic economy is stronger.

The ethnic economy, measured in terms of the origins of employers, language used among co-workers, and how jobs are found, is relatively important when it comes to immigrants’ first jobs in Canada. However, the importance of such ties diminishes as immigrants learn the ropes, develop more confidence in their English-language abilities, and make more contacts with members of other ethnic communities. Even though recent immigrants from Ukraine seem to be little interested in joining established Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and do not appear to be building parallel organizations of their own,³⁵ ethnic ties do play a role in determining whom immigrants seek out when they need to access professional services. Aside from being considered as another dimension of an ethnic economy, accessing professional services in the Ukrainian language may contribute to the further institutional completeness of the

33. Alba and Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” 152–3.

34. Lin, *Reconstructing Chinatown*, 10.

35. Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 198–244.

Ukrainian community in Toronto. Those transactions may also provide the basis for the development of further co-ethnic ties that may be useful for organizational renewal.

If the data collected in the late 1970s is at all relevant to the current situation of Ukrainian immigrants in Toronto, it shows that immigrants who distance themselves from Ukrainian contacts may be economically better off than immigrants who retain co-ethnic contacts and links in the job market. In other words, the tendency for recent immigrants to branch out and create more diverse networks for themselves may be a better long-run economic strategy than using ethnic-specific resources and contacts in the search for work. That said, another analysis using the same data set suggests that there is no evidence that the retention of ethnic identity retards social mobility for European ethnic groups.³⁶ While the two analyses use different measures of ethnicity and economic achievement, they suggest that identity and networks for job contacts are two different dimensions of ethnicity. Furthermore, the impact of these different dimensions of ethnicity on economic achievement may vary, and this should make us cautious in making definitive judgments whether ethnicity is a drawback to the economic mobility of recent immigrants from Ukraine.

36. Isajiw, Sev'er and Driedger, "Ethnic Identity and Social Mobility," 191.

The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir

By Manoly R. Lupul

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
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Recent Immigration from Ukraine to the United States: Levels and Characteristics

Oleh Wolowyna

The topic of the so-called fourth (or fifth, according to some) wave of immigration of Ukrainians to the United States has received significant attention in recent years. However, most of the writings on the topic have been anecdotal; little quantitative research has been done so far. This article has two limitations: first, it deals only with legal immigration as captured by the two official statistical systems—the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (Derzhkomstat) and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Except for one paragraph at the end of the article, it does not discuss the illegal component of this immigration. Secondly, the article is basically descriptive, since I do not have enough information to explain some of the patterns revealed by the statistics.

The article is divided into four sections. In the first section I present the immigration statistics from Derzhkomstat.¹ The second section deals with the statistics on immigrants from Ukraine published by the INS. The third section presents statistics of non-immigrants from Ukraine, also from the INS. In the fourth section I summarize the results and attempt to draw some conclusions from the data.

It is important to note that the two statistical systems (Derzhkomstat and INS) are very different in nature, and it is difficult to compare the

1. I would like to express my appreciation to Ms. Liubov M. Stelmakh, head of the Population Statistics Department, for providing me with special tabulations on international migration for Ukraine, which were a significant contribution to this article.

data presented by the two systems. The Derzhkomstat system follows the United Nations recommendations and tabulates immigrants by year of immigration. "Official immigration statistics for the United States are reported according to the date when the immigrants are granted permanent residence status. For many immigrants, adjustment to permanent residence status occurs many months or years after arrival in the country."² This difference should be kept in mind when analyzing the statistics from the two systems.

Immigration Statistics from the Statistics Committee of Ukraine

I first present some background data on international immigration for Ukraine for the period from 1991 to 2001, that is, since independence. Data on immigration from Ukraine to the United States is available only for the period 1994–2001. It will be shown that in order to understand the nature of immigration from Ukraine to Western countries in general and to the United States in particular, it is important to consider the ethnic composition of the immigration streams.

In table 1 I present total numbers of international in- and out-migrants for Ukraine from 1991 to 2001. These immigrants are divided into two categories: (1) to and from former USSR countries (including the Baltic countries); (2) to and from other countries, including all the East European countries from the former Soviet block. Unfortunately, no details are available about the countries of origin and destination of these immigrants.

In the first panel we have the time series (1991–2001) of all in-, out-, and net international immigrants for Ukraine. The first few years of independence are characterized by large numbers of both in- and out-migrants. The number of in-migrants decreases significantly in time, from a maximum of 716,000 in 1991 to a minimum of 46,000 in 2001. The number of out-migrants also decreases in time, but at a slower rate, from a maximum of 576,000 in 1991 to a minimum of 89,000 in 2001. For the first three years Ukraine had positive net international immigration, but starting in 1994 there were more out- than in-migrants. Starting with

2. Ellen Percy Kraly and Robert Warren, "Estimates of Long-Term Immigration to the United States: Moving US Statistics Toward United Nations Concepts," *Demography* 29 (1992): 613–26.

Table 1: International Migration: Ukraine, 1991–2001 (in 1000s)

Year	Total Migrants			To, from USSR ^a			To, from Other Countries		
	In-	Out-	Net	In-	Out-	Net	In-	Out-	Net
1991	715.9	567.5	148.4	668.4	493.9	174.5	47.5	73.6	-26.1
1992	556.3	268.2	288.1	522.7	214.3	308.4	33.6	53.9	-20.3
1993	356.6	307.0	49.6	338.1	259.1	79.0	18.5	47.9	-29.4
1994	202.7	345.9	-143.2	193.4	287.3	-93.9	9.3	58.6	-49.3
1995	166.5	261.0	-94.5	159.8	206.9	-47.1	6.7	54.1	-47.4
1996	129.5	260.6	-131.1	123.7	207.5	-83.8	5.8	53.1	-47.3
1997	108.6	190.7	-82.1	102.6	139.0	-36.4	6.0	51.7	-45.7
1998	71.8	165.4	-93.6	66.8	115.4	-48.6	5.0	50.0	-45.0
1999	65.8	110.6	-44.8	61.7	62.2	-0.5	4.1	48.4	-44.3
2000	53.7	100.3	-46.6	49.7	55.4	-5.7	4.0	44.9	-40.9
2001	45.8	88.8	-43.0	41.0	52.3	-11.3	4.8	36.5	-31.7

^a Includes Baltic countries.

Source: Special tabulations by Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics (Derzhkomstat).

about 100,000 per year between 1994 and 1998, the net loss stabilized at about 45,000 net international immigrants in later years.

The second panel of table 1 shows international immigrants from and to former USSR countries. We see that the bulk of the total international immigration was with former Soviet republics. The time series for in-, out-, and net immigrants have a similar pattern to the ones for all immigrants in the first panel: the number of in-migrants diminishes rapidly with time, while the number of out-migrants decreases at a slower pace. The pattern of net immigrants is also similar, except that it approaches zero in 1999 and 2000 and jumps to -11,000 in 2001.

The level of international immigration with other countries (all countries except former USSR countries) is much lower, compared to immigration to and from former Soviet countries, with the main difference that in all years the number of out-migrants is larger than the number of in-migrants; that is, net immigration is negative for all years. The number of in-migrants experienced a significant decrease from a maximum of 47,000 in 1991 to a minimum of 5,000 in 2001, while the number of out-migrants, with the exception of 1991, fluctuated between 55,000 and 40,000 per year. The net result is that, starting in 1994, Ukraine has experienced a net loss of about 45,000 immigrants per year to countries outside of the former Soviet Union.

In table 2 the immigrants to and from non-USSR countries are decomposed by the ethnicity of the immigrants. The great majority of these immigrants belong to three ethnic groups: Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. In all years the number of Jewish in-migrants was insignificant, less than 500 on average. There was a significant number Ukrainian and Russian in-migrants in 1991, 1992, and 1993, but with a decreasing trend from 24,000 in 1991 to 9,000 in 1993 for Ukrainians and from 16,000 in 1991 to 4,000 in 1993 for Russians. Starting in 1995, the number of Ukrainian in-migrants stabilized around 1,500 per year, and the number of Russians stabilized around 500 per year.

The patterns of out-migration are very different for each ethnic group. For Ukrainians the number of out-migrants was about 10,000 per year in 1991–93 and then gradually increased to about 20,000 per year in 1998–2001. This results in negative net immigration in each year, starting in 1993, from a loss of 500 in 1993 to a loss of about 18,000 per year in 1998–2001. The number of Jewish out-migrants started with a maximum of 45,000 in 1999 and experienced a monotonic decrease to a minimum of 7,000 in 2001. As the number of Jewish in-migrants was negligible

Table 2: International Migration of Three Major Ethnic Groups to and from Non-USSR Countries: Ukraine, 1991-2001 (in 1000s)

Year	Ukrainians			Russians			Jews		
	In-	Out-	Net	In-	Out-	Net	In-	Out-	Net
1991	24.0	10.9	13.1	16.2	7.6	8.6	0.3	45.0	-44.7
1992	17.1	10.5	6.6	9.9	6.5	3.4	0.6	26.8	-26.2
1993	8.9	9.4	-0.5	4.0	6.3	-2.3	0.6	21.6	-21.0
1994	3.3	12.5	-9.2	1.5	8.7	-7.2	0.6	28.3	-27.7
1995	1.8	14.2	-12.4	0.9	8.6	-7.7	0.5	22.3	-21.8
1996	1.3	16.1	-14.8	0.7	8.8	-8.1	0.4	19.6	-19.2
1997	1.4	17.6	-16.2	0.6	8.8	-8.2	0.4	15.4	-15.0
1998	1.4	20.5	-19.1	0.6	8.2	-7.6	0.3	11.2	-10.9
1999	1.2	19.9	-18.7	0.4	8.5	-8.1	0.3	11.9	-11.6
2000	1.2	20.9	-19.7	0.4	7.8	-7.4	0.3	9.7	-9.4
2001	1.1	17.9	-16.8	0.3	6.1	-5.8	0.3	6.6	-6.3

Special tabulations by Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics (Derzhkomstat).

every year, the number of net immigrants was practically equal to the number of out-migrants. The number of Russian out-migrants was fairly consistent at about 8,000 every year. In sum, with the exception of 1991–93 for Ukrainians and Russians, all three ethnic groups had negative net immigration every year. Ukrainians experienced increasing losses from 500 in 1993 to 17,000 in 2001. Russians had more or less constant yearly losses of about 8,000 between 1993 and 2001. Jews started with a loss of 45,000 in 1991 and had gradually decreasing yearly losses to 6,000 in 2001.

Table 3: Out-migration Rates to Non-USSR Countries for Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews: Ukraine, 1991–2001

	Migrants/100,000 Population		
	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews
1991	29	91	13,975
1992	28	78	9,675
1993	25	76	8,633
1994	33	104	12,380
1995	38	103	11,133
1996	43	106	11,011
1997	47	106	9,722
1998	55	98	7,832
1999	53	102	9,029
2000	56	94	8,090
2001	48	73	5,989

Sources: Special tabulations by Derzhkomstat.
Author's analysis.

In order to put these numbers into perspective, we need to translate these absolute numbers of out-migrants into out-migration rates, taking into account the actual size of each ethnic group in Ukraine at the time of out-migration. Table 3 presents out-migration rates from Ukraine to non-Soviet Union countries, between 1991 and 2001 for Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. The out-migration rates are calculated using numbers of out-migrants for each ethnic group as numerator and the total size of

each ethnic group as denominator; the rates are per 100,000 population. The out-migration rates for Ukrainians show an upward tendency from 29 immigrants/100,000 in 1991 to 56 in 2000. The pattern for Russians is U-shaped: lower values at both extremes of the period with a maximum in the middle of the period. Out-migration rates for Russians are about three times higher than for Ukrainians; that is, Russians were three times more likely to migrate from Ukraine than Ukrainians.

Out-migration rates for Jews show very clearly the extent of out-migration of Jews from Ukraine in the last decade. The rate for 1991 was 14,000/100,000, or fourteen immigrants per hundred of population. These rates decreased somewhat in 1992 and 1993 and went up to twelve per hundred in 1994. From that year on they experienced a monotonic decrease, reaching a minimum of six per hundred in 2001.

The previous discussion provides the background for analyzing immigration from Ukraine to the United States. As shown in table 4, the total number of legal immigrants from Ukraine to the United States was 17,068 in 1994, and has been steadily decreasing to a minimum of 7,830 in 2001; no data is available before 1994. As in the case of out-migration to all countries outside of the former Soviet Union, the three main ethnic groups among the immigrants are Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews; there is also a small number of Armenian immigrants, while numbers for other individual ethnic groups are very small.


The total number of immigrants from Ukraine to the United States was strongly affected by the Jewish component of this immigration stream. It constituted the largest percentage of the immigration stream in 1994 and 1995, and estimates for 1992 and 1993 show even higher numbers of Jewish immigrants. The pattern of the number of Jewish immigrants from Ukraine to the United States shows a drastic decline with time from an estimated maximum of 16,309 in 1992 to a minimum of 591 in 2001. If we subtract the number of Jewish immigrants from the total, the pattern for total immigrants is quite different. These adjusted totals start with 7,900 in 1994, reach a maximum of 11,000 in 1998, and then decline to 7,200 in 2001. This pattern follows closely the pattern for Ukrainian immigrants, which starts with 4,700 in 1994, reaches a maximum of 7,800 in 1998, and declines to 5,700 in 2001. The Russian component starts with about half of the number of Ukrainian immigrants, but then decreases significantly with time.

Table 4: Immigrants from Ukraine to the United States by Major Ethnic Groups, 1992–2001

Year	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Armenians	Others	Total	Total-Jews
1992			16,309				
1993			12,809				
1994	4,663	2,492	9,206	94	613	17,068	7,862
1995	5,164	2,141	5,730	65	652	13,752	8,022
1996	5,480	1,961	4,852	70	830	13,193	8,341
1997	5,801	1,759	3,239	84	1,282	12,165	8,926
1998	7,831	1,577	1,403	49	1,623	12,483	11,080
1999	6,135	1,228	1,107	31	1,063	9,564	8,457
2000	6,470	1,173	922	32	701	9,298	8,376
2001	5,667	920	591	17	635	7,830	7,239
Average: 1994–2001	5,901	1,656	3,381	55	925	11,919	8,538

Sources: Special tabulations by Derzhkomstat.
Jewish American Yearbooks, 1992–1993.

Figure 1: Percent Distribution of Migrants from Ukraine to the United States for Major Ethnic Groups: Ukraine, 1994–2001



The dynamics of the ethnic composition of immigrants from Ukraine to the United States in the last seven years is clearly portrayed in this graph. The percent of the Jewish component starts with more than fifty percent in 1994 and decreases significantly with time, while the Ukrainian percentages show the opposite trend, almost in a complementary fashion to the Jewish percentages. The Russian component is basically stable at about fourteen percent, while the “others” component has a U-shaped trend: low percentages at the beginning and end of the time period and a relative maximum in the middle of the period.

Immigration Statistics from the INS

I mentioned at the beginning that the two statistical systems used as data sources for studying the immigration from Ukraine to the United States are quite different, and the data is basically not comparable. Table 5 explores possible differences and similarities between the two systems. Besides measuring the number of immigrants that received permanent visa status in the respective year, the INS statistics also use the fiscal year, not the calendar year. In order to make the numbers more comparable, I adjusted the INS figures to a calendar year (middle panel of table 5). It is also important to point out that the INS statistics refer to persons born in Ukraine, not persons who lived in Ukraine prior to immigration.

Table 5: Immigrants from Ukraine Admitted to the United States, According to Ukrainian and U.S. Statistics, 1992–20

Year	USA-INS		Ukraine - Derzhkomstat
	(fiscal year)	(calendar year)	
1992	14,383		
1993	18,316	17,333	15,800
1994	21,010	20,336	17,068
1995	17,432	18,326	13,752
1996	21,079	20,167	13,193
1997	15,696	17,042	12,165
1998	7,448	9,510	12,483
1999	10,123	9,454	9,564
2000	15,810	14,388	9,298
2001	20,975	19,684	7,830
Total		146,241	111,153

Notes: INS = Immigration and Naturalization Service
 Derzhkomstat = Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics
 Ukraine = country of birth for INS and country of residence for Derzhkomstat

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS: 1992 to 2001.
 Derzhkomstat, 2000 Demographic Yearbook.

We see that the numbers from the two systems differ significantly from year to year. In some years one source shows more immigrants and in some years the other source shows more immigrants, and differences can be substantial. If we add up all the immigrants for the period 1993 to 2001, the INS system reports 146,241 immigrants, while the Derzhkomstat system reports 111,153. Thus, in spite of the differences between the two systems, in the aggregate both probably capture reasonably well the level of immigration from Ukraine to United States. The INS system provides a fair amount of detail about these immigrants, and allows us to form a picture about some of the basic characteristics of the immigrants, such as age, gender, and class of admission. Unfortunately, the INS system does not provide information about the ethnicity of the immigrants. Thus we are not able to relate some of the time trends to the dominance of the Jewish component in the first years.

Table 6 presents the gender composition of the immigrants. We see that in all years the percent of females was somewhat higher than the percent of males, with small variations from year to year. The averages for the 1996–2001 period were forty-six percent for males and fifty-four percent for females. In order to evaluate the gender selectivity of the immigrants, I compare these averages with respective percentages for Ukraine and the United States for the year 2000. (Using only one year for this comparison is not problematic, as the distribution of males and females, as well as the age structure, in a large population varies very little during a period of six years, unless it is affected by drastic events during that period.) The average percentages of males and females were very close to the percentages in Ukraine; thus we can say that there was no notable selection of immigrants from Ukraine in terms of gender. Comparing the average percentages with the respective United States percentages, we see that the percent of males among the immigrants was lower than the percent of males in the United States population, and the percent of females was higher. This is to be expected, as the percentage of males in Ukraine is lower than in many countries because of the significantly higher male mortality.

Table 7 presents data on the age structure of the immigrants. The median age of the immigrants had significant fluctuations between 1996 and 2001 from a maximum of 39.6 years in 1996 and a minimum of 26.5 years in 2001. The average median age for the period was 31.6 years. These age fluctuations are likely due to the nature of the INS immigration statistics system, which tabulates immigrants according to the year when they received their permanent status visa, not the year of immigration. If we compare the average median age of the immigrants, 31.6 years, with the respective median ages for Ukraine and the United States, we see that the immigrants were significantly younger compared to both the origin and destination populations.

The bottom panel of table 7 shows the age structure of the immigrants in terms of three age groups: up to fifteen, sixteen to fifty-nine, and sixty and over. Initially, the percentage of children was rather low, eighteen in 1996, but it increased almost steadily to twenty-eight in 2001. This increase was basically at the expense of the older age group, which decreased from twenty-three percent in 1996 to eleven percent in 2001.

Table 6: Gender Characteristics of Immigrants from Ukraine to the United States, Fiscal Years 1996-2001

	Fiscal Year							Average: 1996-2001	Pop. in 2000 ^a	
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2001		Ukraine	U. S.
Total immigrants	21,079	15,696	7,448	10,123	15,810	20,975	20,975	15,188		
Numbers:										
Males	9,911	7,381	3,379	4,637	7,214	9,676	9,676			
Females	11,168	8,308	4,053	5,481	8,584	11,287	11,287			
Percent:										
Males	47.0	47.0	45.5	45.8	45.7	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.7	49.1
Females	53.0	53.0	54.5	54.2	54.3	53.8	53.8	53.8	53.3	50.9

^a Based on calendar year.

NOTE: Migrants by year when visa status approved.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS: 1996 to 2001.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 U.S. Census of Housing and Population.

Derzhkomstat, 2000 Demographic Yearbook.

Table 7: Age Characteristics of Immigrants from Ukraine to the United States, Fiscal Years 1996-2001

	Fiscal Year						Average: 1996-2001	Pop. in 2000 ^a	
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		Ukraine	U.S.
Total immigrants	21,079	15,696	7,448	10,123	15,810	20,975	15,188		
Median Age	39.6	28.7	28.5	34.0	33.2	25.6	31.6	35.3	36.7
Numbers:									
0-15	3,757	3,177	1,765	2,306	3,824	5,841			
16-59	12,566	10,225	4,583	6,187	9,621	12,821			
60+	4,756	3,194	1,100	1,630	2,365	2,313			
Percent:									
0-15	17.8	19.1	23.7	22.8	24.2	27.8	22.6	19.1	22.8
16-59	59.6	61.6	61.5	61.1	60.9	61.1	61.0	57.5	60.9
60+	22.6	19.2	14.8	16.1	15.0	11.0	16.4	23.4	16.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^a Based on calendar year.

NOTE: Migrants by year when visa status approved.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS: 1996 to 2001.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 U.S. Census of Housing and Population.

Derzhkomstat, 2000 Demographic Yearbook.

The percent of immigrants in the adult age group has been fairly constant at about sixty percent.

If we compare the average percentages for the three age groups with the respective percentages for Ukraine and the United States, we have the following situation. For the younger age group the average percentage is close to the percentage in the United States and somewhat higher than in Ukraine. For the older group the average percentage is also similar to the respective percentage in the United States and significantly lower for Ukraine. The average percentage of the middle age group is similar to the respective percentages for Ukraine and the United States. Thus, on average the age structure of immigrants from Ukraine to the United States was similar to the age structure of the United States population. There were more children and fewer older persons among the immigrants than among Ukraine's population.

Table 8 presents the number of immigrants to the United States that were born in Ukraine for the period from 1995 to 2001 and by selected classes of admission. (Before 1995 INS did not publish statistics for Ukraine and lumped Ukraine in the category of other under Soviet Union.) Six classes of admission are listed: family-sponsored preference, employment-based preference, immediate relatives of United States citizens, refugee and asylee adjustment, diversity program (lottery), and other.

As we saw in table 7, the total number of immigrants fluctuates widely from one year to the next because of the nature of the statistics: immigrants are tabulated by the year in which they receive permanent visas. The numbers in most of the classes also show significant variations. In absolute numbers, the largest category is refugee and asylee adjustment, with a total of 71,000 immigrants in the 1995–2001 period. This category showed large numbers in the first three years, then a sudden drop in 1998 and 1999, and then a significant increase in 2000 and 2001. It is difficult to explain these variations, given the nature of the statistical system. It is quite likely that from 1995 to 1998 many members of this category were Jewish immigrants adjusting their visa status.

The second largest category is persons who won the lottery, with a total of 17,000 for this period. These immigrants numbered 1,000 in 1995, and then gradually increased to a maximum of 4,000 by 2000. As the yearly quota for Ukraine has been 3,000 for several years, there is likely a backlog of family members in this category that migrated or will migrate later, and it will take some time for them to get their visa adjustment.

**Table 8: Immigrants Born in Ukraine Admitted to the United States,
by Selected Class of Admission, Fiscal Years 1995-2001**
A. Number of Migrants

Fiscal Year	Total	Family-	Immediate	Refugee and asylee adjust.	Diversity	
		sponsored pref.	Relatives of U.S. citizens		programs (lottery)	Other
1995	17,432	57	688	14,937	1,068	304
1996	21,079	87	1,053	16,636	2,328	295
1997	15,696	69	1,107	12,137	1,660	236
1998	7,448	66	1,148	3,641	2,095	158
1999	10,123	77	1,348	4,956	3,093	297
2000	15,810	137	2,672	7,742	3,970	867
2001	20,975	129	4,193	11,130	2,749	1,944
Total	108,563	622	12,209	71,179	16,963	4,101

B. Percent

Fiscal Year	B. Percent					Other	
	Total	Family-sponsored pref.	Employment-based pref.	Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens	Refugee and asylee adjust.		Diversity programs (lottery)
1995	100.0	0.3	2.2	3.9	85.7	6.1	1.7
1996	100.0	0.4	3.2	5.0	78.9	11.0	1.4
1997	100.0	0.4	3.1	7.1	77.3	10.6	1.5
1998	100.0	0.9	4.6	15.4	48.9	28.1	2.1
1999	100.0	0.8	3.5	13.3	49.0	30.6	2.9
2000	100.0	0.9	2.7	16.9	49.0	25.1	5.5
2001	100.0	0.6	4.0	20.0	53.1	13.1	9.3
Total	100.0	0.6	3.2	11.2	65.6	15.6	3.8

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS.

The third largest category is immediate relatives of United States citizens, with a total of 12,000 for the period. This category shows a slow but steady increase, with significant increases in the years 2000–2001. It is possible that this category will further increase with time as original immigrants will sponsor family members. The other two classes are relatively small. Employment-based preference varied between 340 and 830 per year, while family-sponsored preference increased from fifty-seven immigrants in 1995 to 129 in 2001.


In panel B of table 8 we see the dynamics of the relative distribution of the different classes of admission. The class of refugee and asylee adjustment decreased in weight from eighty-six percent in 1995 to forty-nine percent during 1998–2000, with an increase to fifty-three percent in 2001. The lottery class started with only six percent in 1995, reached a maximum of thirty-one percent in 1999, and then declined to thirteen percent in 2001. The class of immediate relatives of United States citizens showed a significant increase from four percent in 1995 to twenty percent in 2001, while the classes of employment-based and family-sponsored preference fluctuated mildly around 3.2 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively.

The class of immediate relatives of United States citizens can be decomposed into three subcategories: spouses, children, and parents. Graph 2 shows the relative distribution of these three subcategories for the period from 1995 to 2001.

We see that in 1995 two-thirds of all immigrants in this class belonged to the spouse subcategory. Its relative weight has been decreasing and has stabilized around fifty percent in the last two years. The children subcategory has increased significantly from nineteen percent in 1995 to forty-four percent in 2001, while the parents subcategory has decreased from fourteen percent in 1995 to eight percent in 2001. These patterns reflect the dynamics of more immigrants gradually bringing family members to the United States. It is also consistent with the changes in the age structure of immigrants shown in table 7: the gradual increase in the number younger immigrants and the gradual decrease of older immigrants.

As part of the process of acquiring a permanent visa, immigrants are asked to state where they intend to live. Although this does not mean that the immigrants will end up living in the stated city, it provides some idea about their possible place of settlement. This information can be used to

Figure 2: Percent Distribution of Immediate Relatives of United States Citizens: Immigrants Born in Ukraine Admitted to the United States, Fiscal Years 1995–2001



address two questions: (1) has there been a significant shift in stated place of residence among the immigrants in the last five years; and (2) is the stated place of residence related to the distribution of Ukrainians in the United States as documented by the 2000 population and housing census?

In table 9 I present this information for the main cities of stated residence; more detail is presented in Appendix A. If we compare the ranking of cities for 1996 and 2001, we see significant differences in the patterns of stated city of residence. First, New York City continues to be the main destination, but its importance decreases significantly. In 1996 close to half of the immigrants stated New York City to be their intended place of residence; by 2001 the importance of New York City decreased to nineteen percent. One clear pattern is a wider dispersion of cities with time: in 2001 the four cities with the largest number of immigrants were New York, Sacramento, Seattle, and Portland. Cities on the west coast have become more popular destinations with time, although some, like Los Angeles and San Francisco, were more popular in 1996.

If we compare the ranking of cities of residence of Ukrainian Americans in the year 2000 with the ranking for immigrants both in 1996 and 2001, we see that there is very little correlation between these rankings. It is clear that the decision by the new immigrants on where to

live is little influenced by where the majority of Ukrainians live in the United States.

Non-immigrant Ukrainian Citizens Admitted to the United States: 1995–2001

In the previous section we analyzed the characteristics of legal immigrants from Ukraine, who were granted permanent status visas. Here we look at non-immigrants from Ukraine, who came on a temporary basis for a variety of reasons. It is important to note that there are several differences between the data on immigrants and the data on non-immigrants. First, the data on permanent immigrants from Ukraine are tabulated for persons born in Ukraine; the data on non-immigrants is tabulated for citizens of Ukraine. Secondly, non-immigrants are tabulated by the year of their travel to the United States (fiscal year). Also, since these non-immigrants are supposed to leave the United States after a certain time, it is possible that in some years the same person, who traveled to the United States more than once, is counted.

Table 10 shows that the total number of non-immigrants from Ukraine to the United States was about 23,000 in fiscal year 1995 and increased to 33,000 in 2001 (a forty-five percent increase). Note that no information was available for fiscal year 1997. If we estimate the number of non-immigrants in 1997 at 25,000 and assume that between 1991 and 1994 there were on average 15,000 non-immigrants yearly, we obtain a total of about 250,000 non-immigrants who came to the United States between 1991 and 2001.

Non-immigrants are classified in table 10 in the following categories: foreign government officials, temporary visitors for pleasure or business, students and their immediate family (spouses and children) members, temporary workers and their spouses and children, international representatives, foreign media, exchange visitors and their spouses and children, fiancés(ées) of U.S. citizens, intra-company transfers with spouses and children, and others. The largest category by far is temporary visitors, with seventy-two percent of all non-immigrants in 1995. Although the absolute number of non-immigrants in this category increased with time (by about twelve percent between 1995 and 2001), its relative proportion diminished to fifty-six percent by 2001.

The second largest category was exchange visitors and their families, with ten percent of all non-immigrants in 1995. The numbers of non-immigrants in this category increased by fifty percent between 1995 and

Table 9: Immigrants Born in Ukraine Admitted to the United States, by Statistical Metropolitan Area of Intended Residence, Fiscal Years 1996 and 2001

	Ranking			Immigrants			
	Immigrants		Ukr. in US, 2000	Numbers		Percent	
	2001	1996		2001	1996	2001	1996
Metropolitan statistical area							
Total				20,975	21,079	100.0	100.0
New York, NY	1	1	1	3,020	8,460	19.1	47.2
Sacramento, CA	2	6	13	2,266	503	14.4	2.8
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA	3	9	10	1,683	577	10.7	3.2
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA	4	2	12	1,456	444	9.2	2.5
Chicago, IL	5	3	3	996	1,380	6.3	7.7
Philadelphia, PA-NJ	6	5	2	772	840	4.9	4.7
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH	7	19	7	425	417	2.7	2.3
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA	8	4	5	429	970	2.7	5.4
San Francisco, CA	9	8	9	353	657	2.2	3.7
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI	10	20	16	318	228	2.0	1.3
Boston, MA-NH	11	13	11	304	513	1.9	2.9

Bergen-Passaic, NJ	12	16	1 ^a	247	202	1.6	1.1
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV	13	24	6	239	135	1.5	0.8
Newark, NJ	14	22	1 ^a	225	280	1.4	1.6
Dallas, TX	15	17	29	212	92	1.3	0.5
Denver, CO	16	7	24	208	174	1.3	1.0
Baltimore, MD	17	10	6	203	282	1.3	1.6
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ	18	18	1 ^a	201	158	1.3	0.9
Detroit, MI	21	15	4	170	214	1.1	1.2

^a Part of New York Statistical Metropolitan Area.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS, 1996 and 2001.

Table 10: Non-immigrant Ukrainian Citizens Admitted to the United States by Selected Class of Admission, Fiscal Years 1995 to 2001

A. Numbers

Year	1995	1996	1998 ^a	1999	2000	2001	%(2001-1995)/ 1995
Total	22,716	26,610	25,674	24,255	30,404	33,017	45.3
Foreign government officials	669	631	574	774	714	557	-16.7
Temp. visitors (business/pleasure)	16,440	19,347	15,445	13,139	16,484	18,376	11.8
Students (and family)	739	946	1,235	1,171	1,459	1,672	126.3
Temp. workers (and family)	770	1,133	1,730	1,743	2,775	2,758	258.2
International representatives	274	327	328	302	355	394	43.8
Foreign media	24	27	16	7	18	16	-33.3
Exchange visitors (and family)	2,175	2,354	2,674	2,546	3,200	3,269	50.3
Fiances(ees) of U.S. citizens	126	228	578	1,073	1,361	1,405	1015.1
Intra-company transfers (& family)	251	202	191	257	135	234	-6.8
Other	1,248	1,415	2,903	3,243	3,903	4,336	247.4

B. Percent

Year	1995	1996	1998 ^a	1999	2000	2001
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Foreign government officials	2.9	2.4	2.2	3.2	2.3	1.7
Temp. visitors (business/pleasure)	72.4	72.7	60.2	54.2	54.2	55.7
Students (and family)	3.3	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	5.1
Temp. workers (and family)	3.4	4.3	6.7	7.2	9.1	8.4
International representatives	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Foreign media	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
Exchange visitors (and family)	9.6	8.8	10.4	10.5	10.5	9.9
Fiances(ees) of U.S. citizens	0.6	0.9	2.3	4.4	4.5	4.3
Intra-company transfers (& family)	1.1	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.4	0.7
Other	5.5	5.3	11.3	13.4	12.8	13.1

^a No information available for 1997.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS, 1995 to 2001.

Table 11: Non-immigrant Citizens of Ukraine Admitted to the United States: Temporary Workers, Exchange Visitors, and Intra-company Transferees, Fiscal Years 1995-2001

A. Numbers

Non-immigrant categories	1995	1996	1998 ^a	1999	2000	2001	1995
Total	2,702	3,040	3,845	3,611	4,975	4,969	83.9
Workers with specialty occupations	275	338	533	720	1,003	1,212	340.7
Exchange visitors	2,020	2,118	2,475	2,338	2,925	3,018	49.4
Intra-company transfers	162	116	121	164	135	148	-8.6
Workers with extraordinary ability or achievement	30	34	37	39	66	81	170.0
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers	127	352	314	172	322	262	106.3
Artists and entertainers	58	31	302	106	409	121	108.6
Workers in religious occps.	21	27	57	55	87	89	323.8
Other temp. workers, industrial trainees, others	9	24	6	17	28	38	322.2

B. Percent

Non-immigrant categories	1995	1996	1998 ^a	1999	2000	2001
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Workers with specialty occupations	10.2	11.1	13.9	19.9	20.2	24.4
Exchange visitors	74.8	69.7	64.4	64.7	58.8	60.7
Intra-company transfers	6.0	3.8	3.1	4.5	2.7	3.0
Workers with extraordinary ability or achievement	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.6
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers	4.7	11.6	8.2	4.8	6.5	5.3
Artists and entertainers	2.1	1.0	7.9	2.9	8.2	2.4
Workers in religious occps.	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.8
Other temp. workers, industrial trainees, others	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8

^a No information available for 1997.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS, 1995-2001.

2001, but their relative proportion stayed at the ten percent level. Categories such as foreign government officials and intra-company transfers were more or less stable. Other categories, such as students, temporary workers, and fiancés(ées) of United States citizens, experienced significant increases. Students and their families increased by 126 percent, temporary workers and their families by 258 percent, and fiancés(ées) by a whopping 1,015 percent. The number in this last category increased from 126 in 1995 to 1,405 in 2001. The number of immigrants in categories such as foreign government officials, international representatives, foreign media, and intra-company transfers were relatively small and, with the exception of international representatives, did not experience growth.

In table 11 I provide more detail for some categories that may be of special interest, such as workers with specialty occupations, workers with extraordinary ability or achievement, internationally recognized athletes or entertainers, and workers in religious occupations. With the exception of the category exchange visitors, the numbers in the other categories were quite small. In the aggregate the immigrants in these categories increased by eighty-four percent between 1995 and 2001. The largest increase was experienced by the workers with specialty occupations (341 percent). This was followed by workers in religious occupations (324 percent), other temporary workers and industrial trainees (322 percent), workers with extraordinary ability or achievement (170 percent), artists and entertainers (109 percent), and internationally recognized athletes or entertainers (106 percent). The only category that did not experience growth was intra-company transfers.

Although the numbers of immigrants from Ukraine were rather small in these categories, it is encouraging that practically all of these categories show an increasing trend. This shows that slowly but surely, Ukrainians are beginning to take advantage of opportunities for work and study in the United States.

In order to put some of these numbers in perspective, a comparative analysis of the number of non-immigrants to the United States was made for Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. In table 12 I present the number of non-immigrants in fiscal year 2001 for the following categories: total, temporary visitors for business and pleasure, students and their families, temporary workers and their families, and exchange visitors and their families. Then I standardize the number of non-immigrants by the total population of the country in year 2002 (per 100,000 population). This

Table 12: Non-immigrant Citizens of Ukraine, Poland, and Russia Admitted to the United States by Selected Types of Non-immigrants, Fiscal Year 2001

	Ukraine		Poland		Russia	
	Non-immi-grants	Non-immigrants/ 100,000 pop.	Non-immi-grants	Non-immigrants/ 100,00 pop.	Non-immi-grants	Non-immigrants/ 100,000 pop.
2002 population (in 1000s)	48,200		38,600		143,500	
Total non-immigrants	33,017	68	150,232	312	126,564	263
Temp. visitors (business & pleasure)	18,376	38	119,359	248	80,282	167
Students (and family)	1,672	3	3,204	7	6,293	13
Temp. workers (and family)	2,758	6	3,025	6	11,954	25
Exchange visitors (and family)	3,269	7	16,130	33	13,384	28

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the U.S. INS, 2001.

Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet, 2002.

Table 13: Immigrants-Orphans Born in Ukraine and Adopted by United States Citizens, by Sex and Age,
Fiscal Years 1995-2001

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Total	5	10	65	168	307	645	1,227	2,427
Male	2	4	33	70	142	329	672	1,252
Female	3	6	32	98	165	316	555	1,175
Under 1	1	0	10	31	44	127	235	448
1-4	2	4	44	111	211	435	772	1,579
5-9	1	4	8	18	45	68	194	338
over 9	1	2	3	8	7	13	25	59
unknown	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. INS, 1995-2001.

indicator shows the relative propensity to travel for each country and in each category. The indicator for the total number of non-immigrants is sixty-nine for Ukraine, 312 for Poland, and 263 for Russia. This shows that Poles and Russians were much more likely than Ukrainians—about four times as likely—to travel to the United States as non-immigrants.

If we compare the indicators for the different types of non-immigrants, it is clear that Ukrainians travel much less and take much less advantage of opportunities provided by such travel than Poles and Russians. For the category visitors for business and tourism, Russians are about four times more likely to travel than Ukrainians (167 vs. thirty-eight), and Poles are about six times more likely to travel than Ukrainians (248 vs. thirty-eight). For the students and temporary workers categories, Russians are much more likely to travel than Poles; and the relation between Russians and Ukrainians is about four times for students (thirteen vs. three) and for temporary workers (twenty-five vs. six). Two intriguing examples are: (1) the indicator for temporary workers is the same for Ukrainians and Poles; (2) the indicator for exchange visitors is higher for Poles than for Russians and much lower for Ukrainians. In sum, with the exception of temporary workers, non-immigrant rates to the United States for Ukrainians are much lower than for Poles and Russians.

Finally, the INS provides some data on immigrant orphans born in Ukraine and adopted by United States citizens. As seen in table 13, initially the number of orphans was very low (five in 1995), but it increased very rapidly to 1,227 by 2001; the total number of orphans born in Ukraine adopted by United States citizens between 1995 and 2001 was 2,427. On average, more boys than girls were adopted: 1,252 vs. 1,175. In terms of age composition the great majority of orphans were one to four years of age (sixty-five percent), followed by orphans under one year of age (18.5 percent) and orphans aged five to nine years (fourteen percent). If this trend continues, the adoption of orphans born in Ukraine may become quite an industry.

Summary and Conclusions

The legal immigration stream from Ukraine to the United States for the period from 1994 to 2001 started at a maximum of 17,000 in 1994 and gradually diminished to 7,800 in 2001; the yearly average was about 12,000 immigrants. The stream was originally heavily influenced by the Jewish component. In 1994 more than fifty percent of immigrants from Ukraine to the United States were Jewish, and this percentage was even

higher in previous years. With time the percent of Jews experienced a significant decrease, while the percent of Ukrainians increased in a complementary fashion. If we subtract from the total the number of Jewish immigrants, the pattern of total immigrants is very different. It starts with close to 8,000 in 1994, reaches a maximum of 11,000 in 1998, and then drops to a minimum of 7,000 in 2001. The yearly average of these immigrants is 8,500.

As mentioned above, the time series of immigrants from Ukraine to the United States reported by the INS are distorted by the fact that they are recorded by the year the migrant receives permanent residence status. However, in the aggregate (1993–2001 period), the total numbers of immigrants according to each system are not too far apart: 146,000 according to the INS and 111,000 according to Derzhkomstat. In terms of yearly numbers of immigrants the Derzhkomstat system is probably more accurate, and it has the advantage of reporting immigrants by ethnicity. The INS system has the advantage of reporting immigrants by several important characteristics, such as age, sex, and class of admission.

Although data from INS is available starting in fiscal year 1992, detailed and comparable time series for immigrants born in Ukraine became available starting in fiscal year 1996. (Note that these data are for persons born in Ukraine, not residing in Ukraine before immigration.) On average there were more females than males among the immigrants, and this reflected the distribution of males and females in the Ukrainian population; that is, there was no gender selection among immigrants from Ukraine to the United States. In terms of age immigrants were younger than both the populations at the origin and destination, and their age structure was close to the age structure of the United States. This shows that the legal immigration from Ukraine was basically a family immigration.

The largest class of admission during this period was the category of refugee and asylee adjustments, with an average of sixty-six percent of the total, and many of its members were probably Jewish immigrants. The second largest class of admission was the diversity program (lottery), with a total of 17,000 or sixteen percent. Since the lottery quota for Ukraine has been 3,000 for several years, we can observe an increase of immigrants in the class of immediate relatives of United States citizens as families are reunited and acquire permanent visa status. The number of immediate relatives of United States citizens started low but has grown quite rapidly from four percent in 1995 to twenty percent in 2001,

reflecting the well-known family immigration chain as the number of primary immigrants from Ukraine grows. The number of employment-based preference immigrants has been quite small, about 500 per year.

Data on intended place of residence show that there is little relationship between the geographical distribution of Ukrainians in the United States and where the new immigrants plan to settle. Their place of residence seems to be affected mainly by job opportunities, with a progressive preference for western-coast cities. Initially a great majority of immigrants (almost fifty percent) planned to settle in New York City, but with time the immigration stream became more scattered.

INS data on non-immigrants to the United States are also for the period from 1995 to 2001, but they refer to citizens of Ukraine, not to persons born in Ukraine. The total number of non-immigrants from Ukraine increased from 23,000 in 1991 to 33,000 in 2001. The great majority were temporary visitors for business or pleasure (from seventy-two percent in 1991 to fifty-six percent in 2001), followed by exchange visitors and their families (about ten percent of the total). Classes such as exchange visitors, temporary workers, students, and fiancés(ées) of United States citizens, although small in absolute numbers, grew significantly during this period: by fifty percent, 126 percent, 258 percent, and 1,015 percent, respectively. More specific classes of non-immigrants, such as workers in specialty occupations, workers with extraordinary ability or achievement, workers in religious occupations, and internationally recognized athletes or entertainers, although small in absolute numbers, also grew significantly during this period: by 341 percent, 170 percent, 324 percent, and 106 percent, respectively.

If we transform the numbers of non-immigrants in some of these classes into out-migration rates per 100,000 population, we see that in comparison to Poles and Russians, Ukrainians are not taking enough advantage of the opportunities presented by travel to the United States for work and education purposes. In terms of total non-immigrants, Poles and Russians are about four times more likely than Ukrainians to travel to the United States. Temporary travel for business or pleasure is four times more likely for Russians and six times more likely for Poles than for Ukrainians. Travel for studying was more than twice more likely for Poles and four times more likely for Russians than for Ukrainians. Russians take much more advantage of temporary workers programs than Ukrainians and Poles, and Russians and Poles are about four times more likely than Ukrainians to travel to the United States as exchange visitors.

Finally, the number of orphans born in Ukraine and adopted by United States citizens has been increasing at a fast pace since 1995; it has more than doubled every year since 1997, reaching 1,227 orphans in 2001.

In sum, in order to understand the dynamics of legal immigration from Ukraine to the United States, it is important to take into account the ethnic composition of the immigration stream. In the yearly years of the 1990s, Jews constituted more than half of the immigrants. If we consider only ethnic Ukrainians, between 1994 and 2001 the average number of yearly immigrants to the United States was about 6,000. If we do not consider the class of admission of refugee and asylee adjustment, which is very likely composed mostly of Jews, the two largest classes of legal immigrants were winners of the lottery and immediate relatives of United States citizens. Ukrainians seem to be taking full advantage of the lottery program, and the immigration stream is being strengthened by family members joining the original immigrants. It is also quite clear that the new immigrants are not especially attracted to American cities with large Ukrainian communities, and they become geographically more dispersed as time goes by.

The number of non-immigrants from Ukraine reached 33,000 in 2001, and since 1995 it increased by forty-five percent. Categories of non-immigrants that have experienced significant increases during this period are: students, temporary workers and fiancés(ées) of United States citizens, as well as workers in religious occupations, in specialty occupations, with extraordinary ability, and internationally recognized athletes and entertainers. However, compared to neighboring countries such as Poland and Russia, Ukrainians, although making progress, have a way to go in order to take fuller advantage of the opportunities provided by immigration to the United States for work and study.

Finally I shall make an attempt at estimating the total number of fourth-wave immigrants living in the United States. Taking the Derzhkomstat statistics for the period from 1994 to 2001 and making some educated guesses about the number of immigrants from 1991 to 1993, I estimate that a total of 56,000 ethnic Ukrainians (excluding all other ethnic groups such as Jews and Russians) migrated legally to the United States during the first ten years after Ukraine's independence. Taking the INS statistics of non-immigrant Ukrainian citizens during the period from 1995 to 2001 as my basis, making educated guesses about non-immigrants from 1991 to 1994, and eliminating non-immigrants that are not

ethnic Ukrainians, I come up with a total of about 120,000. If we assume that about half of them decided to stay as illegal, this number is reduced to 60,000, giving us a total of 116,000 ethnic Ukrainians in the United States. If we assume that a third of them decided to stay, the number of illegal immigrants is about 40,000, giving us a total of 96,000. Thus I estimate that the total number of forth-wave ethnic Ukrainians in the United States is between 100,000 and 116,000.

Considering that the size of the post-Second World War Ukrainian immigration to the United States was about 85,000, it is important to note that the forth wave is larger even according the lower estimate. If we add that these new immigrants are highly educated and that most of them speak Ukrainian, it is clear that their potential contribution to the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States can be significant.

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Appendix A: Immigrants Born in Ukraine Admitted to the United States, by Statistical Area of Intended Residence, Fiscal Years 1996 and 2001

Metropolitan statistical area	Ranking		Immigrants					
	Immigrants		Ukr in US in 2000		Numbers		Percent	
	2001	1996		2000	2001	1996	2001	1996
Total					20,975	21,079	99.8	99.8
New York, NY	1	1	1	1	3,020	8,460	19.1	47.2
Sacramento, CA	2	6	13	13	2,266	503	14.4	2.8
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA	3	9	10	10	1,683	577	10.7	3.2
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA	4	2	12	12	1,456	444	9.2	2.5
Chicago, IL	5	3	3	3	996	1,380	6.3	7.7
Philadelphia, PA-NJ	6	5	2	2	772	840	4.9	4.7
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH	7	19	7	7	425	417	2.7	2.3
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA	8	4	5	5	429	970	2.7	5.4
San Francisco, CA	9	8	9	9	353	657	2.2	3.7
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI	10	20	16	16	318	228	2.0	1.3
Boston, MA-NH	11	13	11	11	304	513	1.9	2.9

Bergen-Passaic, NJ	12	16	1 ^a	247	202	1.6	1.1
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV	13	24	6	239	135	1.5	0.8
Newark, NJ	14	22	1 ^a	225	280	1.4	1.6
Dallas, TX	15	17	29	212	92	1.3	0.5
Denver, CO	16	7	24	208	174	1.3	1.0
Baltimore, MD	17	10	6	203	282	1.3	1.6
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ	18	18	1 ^a	201	158	1.3	0.9
Oakland, CA	19	42	9 ^b	179	113	1.1	0.6
San Jose, CA	20	40	9 ^b	170	87	1.1	0.5
Detroit, MI	21	15	4	170	214	1.1	1.2
Atlanta, GA	22	11	26	147	175	0.9	1.0
St. Louis, MO-IL	23	14	32	136	83	0.9	0.5
Columbus, OH	24	46	33	136		0.9	0.0
San Diego, CA	25	12	28	118	111	0.7	0.6
Nassau-Suffolk, NY	26	33		105	75	0.7	0.4
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL	27	38	22	105	25	0.7	0.1

Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI	28	44	41	105		0.7	0.0
Hartford, CT	29	43	20	84	82	0.5	0.5
Orange County, CA	30	36		81	53	0.5	0.3
Fort Lauderdale, FL	31	28	21 ^c	76	74	0.5	0.4
Houston, TX	32	45	31	71	76	0.5	0.4
Fresno, CA	33	30		66		0.4	0.0
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT	34	25		63	40	0.4	0.2
Miami, FL	35	21	21	62	90	0.4	0.5
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC	36	39	46	62		0.4	0.0
Jersey City, NJ	37	23	1 ^a	47	46	0.3	0.3
Orlando, FL	38	37	36	39	14	0.2	0.1
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA	39	34		36	6	0.2	0.0
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ	40	29	25	27		0.2	0.0
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL	41	35	30	26	25	0.2	0.1
San Antonio, TX	42	31	72	26	11	0.2	0.1
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	43	47		23	48	0.1	0.3

Austin-San Marcos, TX	44	32	65	17	0.1	0.0
Las Vegas, NV-AZ	45	41		16	0.1	0.1
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk-Danbury, CT		26			0.0	0.4
Providence - Warwick - Pawtucket, RI		27	37		0.0	0.4
Pittsburgh, PA			8			
Rochester, NY			14			
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA			15			
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton, PA			17			
Syracuse, NY			18			
Buffalo, NY			19			
Other MSA				4,412	21.0	12.9
NON-MSA				789	3.8	2.0

^a Part of New York MSA; ^b Part of San Francisco MSA; ^c Part of Miami MSA.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1991 and 2001.

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Stalin and His Legacy through the Lens of Time

Yuri Shapoval

In analyzing the figure of Stalin today we must also reflect on ourselves: what does this knowledge give us, who are living today? Adam Michnik, "Beda naroda ili ego vina?" *Novoe vremia*, 1993, no. 10.

Some carry his portrait around: they need his direct incarnation, including even the White Sea Canal. For others his stinking soul and evil principles are enough.

Valeriia Novodvorskaia, "Kumirnia zolotogo sna," *Stolichnye novosti*, 4–10 March 2003.

Surprisingly, there are still many riddles in Stalin's biography. One of them was solved by the Moscow playwright (historian by profession) Edvard Radzinsky. He determined the real date of the tyrant's birth—6 December 1878, not 9 December (21 December by the new calendar) 1879.

Here is another little-known fact. On 15 April 1973 the KGB head at the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Yurii Andropov, sent Leonid Brezhnev a note:

Leonid Ilich! Recently a document has been discovered in the archives of the KGB that, I believe, will be of interest to you. I am speaking about Stalin's remarks about the work of a commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of which you were a member. [The reference is to the Commission on the Reorganization of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service

of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, established on 9 November 1952 by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Iu.Sh.]

Almost all of I.V. Stalin's comments are fully relevant today, largely because they are universal and therefore applicable in all times.

Personally, I am much impressed by his expression that "Communists who frown upon spying and the work of the Cheka, *and are afraid of dirtying their hands* should be thrown headfirst into a well." By its form this idea is petty-Asiatic, but in essence, it is true even in a period remote from the cult of personality.¹

Stalin adhered to this "petty-Asiatic" idea his whole life. He threw not only Communists "headfirst into a well." According to reliable statistics, the Stalinist "sequestering" (not only for political motives) of inhabitants of the former USSR came to thirty-two million people, of whom at least ten million were Ukrainians. But, as we know, everyone is mortal. Dictators too.

To a certain extent Stalin hastened his own death. His maniacal suspiciousness in the last years of his life left him with no reliable protection. The chief of his bodyguard, Nikolai Vlasik, was imprisoned in the winter of 1952. At the same time his faithful personal secretary of almost twenty years, Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, was also removed.

During the night of 28 February–1 March 1953 the Kremlin leaders watched a movie, and then, as was their custom, went to Stalin's dacha. Lavrentii Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, Georgii Malenkov, and Nikolai Bulganin were present. The late dinner lasted until four in the morning. After his guests left, Stalin went to bed. Before going to sleep, he gave his servants the following instructions (not personally, but through a recently hired bodyguard, Ivan Khrustalov, whose death soon afterwards would give rise to the story that the "leader of nations" was murdered): "All of you go to sleep. I don't need anything. And I'm also going to sleep. I won't need you today."²

Stalin had a stroke that night in one of the rooms of the Blizhnia Dacha in Kuntsevo, near Moscow. His bodyguards found him late at night on 2 March on the carpet in the small dining room and eventually transferred him to a couch in the large dining room, where the "official" dinners were held. Beria and Malenkov arrived at the dacha at 3 a.m.

1. "Razvedka — sviatoc, idealnoe dlia nas delo," *Istochnik*, 2001, no. 5: 13.

2. Edvard Radzinsky, *Stalin* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 613.

Seeing Stalin, who seemed to be sleeping, Beria scolded the bodyguards not to panic. The seventy-four-year-old generalissimo was left to die.

It was too late when the doctors were finally called, even though in Moscow a special session of the Academy of Medical Sciences was convened to decide how to save the “father of nations.” Meanwhile, Beria, according to his son’s recollections, seeing his wife crying, said, “You’re being silly, Nina. His death saved your life. Had he lived another year, not one member of the Politburo would have been left among the living.” Beria’s wife replied, “This would not have been a big loss, not counting you, of course.”³

Stalin died on 5 March at 9:50 p.m. Svitlana Allilueva wrote about her father’s death:

Father died horribly and with difficulty.... God gives the righteous an easy death.... The agony was terrible. It smothered him in front of everybody’s eyes. At some moment—I don’t know if it actually happened, but it seemed so—evidently at the last moment, he suddenly opened his eyes and surveyed everyone standing around him. This was a dreadful look, either insane or bitter and full of terror before death and the unfamiliar faces of the doctors [Academician V. Vinogradov, who was Stalin’s doctor for many years, was in prison at the time—Yu.Sh.] who were bending over him. This look went around everyone for less than a minute. And then—this was incomprehensible and frightening, to this day I cannot understand and forget it—he suddenly lifted his left hand (which was moving) and either pointed upwards or threatened all of us. The gesture was incomprehensible but threatening, and it is unknown to whom it pertained.... In the next moment the soul, having spent its last ounce of strength, departed from the body.⁴

It was not only Stalin who was dying. An epoch of which he was the centre was passing into history. For some he was a wise and beloved leader, a world politician; for others, an undeniable criminal and murderer.

He left a legacy of which he could be proud. There was not a corner on the planet that did not know about his monster country with its primitive, sometimes inhuman, conditions of everyday life, concentration camps, and at the same time widely declared ideals of freedom from

3. Sergo Beriia, *Moi otets, Lavrentii Beriia: V koridorakh stalinskoi vlasti* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 2002), 315.

4. Svetlana Allilueva, *Dvadsiat pysem k drugu: Vospominaniia dochery* (Moscow: Zakharov, 2000), 15.

exploitation and the equality of all people. While it officially condemned aggression and war, it had a multimillion-man army and powerful weapons, and was ready to support by clandestine, including military, means “progressive” regimes in other parts of the world. While it condemned the deceitful actions of the “special services of imperialism,” it carefully cultivated its own punitive structures, which would be able to “strike” its enemies not only on its own territory but also abroad (let us recall the GPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB-organized assassinations of Leon Trotsky, the Ukrainian nationalists Ievhen Konovalts, Lev Rebet, and Stepan Bandera, and many other “undesirables”). While it constantly spoke out in support of the rights of unfree nations, it continuously expanded its own empire, the USSR, at the centre of which the development of national processes in the “union republics” was carefully monitored. Whole peoples were declared “counter-revolutionary” and deported, and the rest were kept subjugated by constantly stressing the threat of “nationalism” or “nationalist deviations” and eliminating or condemning the proponents of “nationalism.” This was particularly evident in Ukraine, which was a unique “polygon” in which the most brutal methods of suppressing the national-independence movement and any hint of separatism were tested.

An important part of his legacy was the “socialist camp.” He forced other nations—Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Germans, Romanians, and Bulgarians—to serve his utopia. The so-called civilized world hated his country, but it could not ignore it. Here is a characteristic example. On 20 June 1930 the United States declared an embargo on the import of forest products from the USSR, accusing the leadership of the USSR of exploiting forced labour in the extraction of these products. After protests by Moscow and a number of interested American companies (forest products from the Soviet Union were sold at dumping prices), the embargo was lifted. By the way, the United States recognized the USSR precisely in the tragic year of 1933 when millions of peasants were dying horrible deaths.

Stalin carefully developed the judicial system of the empire he ruled. His initiatives outlived their creator. Here are some examples. At the end of 1932 a passport system with compulsory registration of the place of residence was introduced. In April 1933 it was forbidden to issue passports to peasants. This situation would continue until 1974.

On 1 December 1934 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution proposed by Stalin “On the Procedure of Investigat-

ing Cases of Preparing or Carrying Out Terrorist Acts.” According to the resolution, the investigation period was shortened to ten days, trials took place without a lawyer or prosecutor, appeals or pleas for clemency were rejected, and sentences were carried out immediately after being passed. On 9 December 1934 Hryhorii Petrovsky signed a resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic “On the Introduction of Changes to the Criminal-Procedure Code of the Ukrainian SSR,” in which the above-mentioned propositions were taken into account. They became the basis of the total terror of the subsequent years and were revoked only in September 1953.

On 27 June 1936 a resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR banned abortions in order to “compensate” for the consequences of the famine of the early 1930s. Violators were punished with up to two years’ imprisonment. The resolution was annulled in November 1955.

A resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of 21 March in the bloody year 1937 introduced the academic degrees of candidate and doctor of science and the academic ranks of assistant, lecturer, and professor. This hierarchy and the classic atavism of Stalinist times, the Supreme Attestation Commission, exist to this day.

On 7 August 1932 a law on the protection of socialist property, written in Stalin’s own hand, appeared. For stealing collective-farm and cooperative property this law prescribed “death by shooting and confiscation of all property and, under extenuating circumstances, deprivation of freedom for no less than ten years and confiscation of all property.” Amnesty in such cases was ruled out. This law was in force until the mid-1950s.

A 1940 law on the collective responsibility of directors, head engineers, and heads of quality-control departments prescribed sentences of five to eight years for the manufacture of poor-quality goods and under-capacity production. It was in force until the 1950s. In 1935 a law lowered the age of legal responsibility for some crimes to twelve years. On 9 June 1947 a law was passed that prescribed twenty years’ imprisonment for uttering state secrets.

These examples—and I could provide many more—show that Stalin was “working for eternity,” creating for his regime political-legal norms that would hold society within fixed limits and would serve as means of subjugation and the basis of stability, which the bureaucracy desired.

Comparing Stalin to the sinister characters of the Renaissance, such as Cesare Borgia, Leon Trotsky wrote:

Stalin lacks the colour, personality, amplitude, imagination, and capricious magnanimity to be like a Renaissance superman. In his early youth, after he was forced to leave the seminary because of failing grades, he worked for a time as a bookkeeper at the Tiflis observatory. It is unknown whether he kept the accounts well. But he transferred the bookkeeper's calculation to politics and his relations with people. His ambitions and his hatred are subordinated to ruthless calculation. Renaissance people were bold; Stalin is cautious. He nurtures his hatred for a long time, until it turns into opposition. His vengeance has a gigantic scope because he stands not on the ground but at the peak of the greatest of all apparats. And Stalin has gained control of the apparat by being unflinchingly loyal to it. He betrayed the party, the state, the program, but not the bureaucracy.⁵

Yet Stalinist stability had a substantial downside for the bureaucracy. Stalin kept the bureaucracy in a state of tension, carried out periodic purges, and “changed the water” in the commanding party-state “aquarium.”

At last he was leaving the party, the great “order of knights” (by his own definition), capable in practice, not in words, of mobilizing millions of people for accomplishing any task, even one that was not ordered by common sense, necessity, or purpose. Even he, its leader, was able to survive with the help of the party apparat, that unique political instrument of leadership.

Once he read the following words in Karl Kautsky's *Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the Natural History of Revolution*: “The dictatorship of the proletariat very quickly proved its incompetence. It led to the quickest economic collapse of Russia. But the anarchy of this type paved the way for a dictatorship of a different kind, the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which is really nothing but the dictatorship of its leaders. Being the only strong organization, this party survived in a state of general chaos.” Reading this, Stalin jotted a note in the margin: “Scoundrel!”⁶ The reaction was symptomatic, since the “scoundrel” was right and Stalin knew this better than others.

5. Leon Trotsky, *Stalin* (Moscow: Terra, 1990), 1: 13–14.

6. See my *Liudyna i systema: Shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini* (Kyiv: Instytut natsionalnykh vidnosyn i politolohii NANU, 1994), 259.

Of course, death is always sudden, even when one is awaiting it. This was what the finale of Stalin's predecessor, Lenin, the founder of the party and the USSR, was like. Stalin prepared for this death in good time: he scattered the other competitors for Lenin's legacy to secure the leading, and eventually the key, role in the party-state hierarchy. He won that round and made himself Lenin's heir.

But at the end of his own life he made a fundamental mistake: he did not leave a dependable heir whom he could trust a hundred percent to preserve not only the system but also Stalin's memory. He spoke about his intention to retire only twice after the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, which took place in 1952. He also spoke of retiring before then, but members of the Central Committee knew that he was merely flirting and could not be believed. Everyone remembered the dreadful end of one of the candidates for succession, Nikolai Voznesensky. Because of this in November 1952 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) unanimously "forbade" him to retire.

For over thirty years Stalin built a system subordinate to him, guided primarily by his understanding of his own role in the system. And now the system would not let him go; it arrested and distorted his conceptions of time and the laws of a person's biological life, even if that person was "the leader of all progressive humanity." Moreover, not only did Stalin not think of a successor, but in the last months of his life he began to cast aside people who had served him with devotion for decades and remained faithful to him after his death. He considered Molotov an English spy and Voroshilov, someone else's spy. He rejected Mikoian because Mikoian had named Molotov as a possible successor. He even repulsed the "iron" and super-loyal Lazar Kaganovich.

All of them understood that Stalin was preparing another round of repressions. And the most influential of the possible successors, Beria and Khrushchev, reacted quite distinctively to their "teacher's" death. Beria, in advising his son not to visit Stalin's body, which was lying in state at the Hall of Columns of the Union Building, said, "Anything can happen. The people have lost their heads. Thousands of idiots are rushing to him, as if they did not have the opportunity to express their love for him while he was still alive. But he's dead, may the devil take him!"⁷ And that is

7. Beria, *Moi otets, Lavrentii Beria*, 316.

what happened: during the lying in state, by some counts up to 3,000 people were trampled to death or injured by the surging crowd.

The violinist David Oistrakh recounted that the country's best musicians took turns playing in the Hall of Columns. They also took their rest there. Behind a screen there were some stools and a table with sandwiches and tea. At one moment Khrushchev peeked behind the screen; his face was tired, unshaven, but contented. He looked at the outstanding musicians and quietly said, "With more gusto, boys!"⁸

At a joint session of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on 5 March, the following decision was taken: "Instruct G.M. Malenkov, N.S. Khrushchev, and L.P. Beria to ensure that Comrade Stalin's documents and papers, active and archival, are put in order."⁹ This meant that Stalin's "students" destroyed any "dubious" papers, particularly those that contained compromising information about them.

Nevertheless, on 9 March 1953 it was precisely Stalin's successors who carried his coffin from the Hall of Columns of the Union Building in Moscow. For three days, as the newspapers then wrote, "a live river of people constantly flowed" through the hall. And during those days "the outstanding masters of Stalin's style of work," as they were called by the contemporary press, continued their division of power, which they had started on 2 March. On 7 March *Pravda* announced that the joint session of the Plenum of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR confirmed the new composition of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, reducing it from twenty-five to ten members and abolishing the Bureau of the Presidium of the CC, which was set up on Stalin's initiative as his "pocket bureau" after the Nineteenth Party Congress, and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

The Presidium of the CC CPSU consisted of Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoian, Saburov, and Pervukhin. In other words, the Presidium that was active until the Nineteenth Party Congress of the CPSU was reinstated. Malenkov became the head of the Council of Ministers; his first deputies were Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. Let us note that the

8. Mikhail Arlov, "Legendarnaia ordynka," *Novyi mir*, 1994, no. 4: 28.

9. Radzinsky, *Stalin*, 608.

actual director of the Secretariat and the apparatus of the CC CPSU was Nikita Khrushchev, who had returned to Moscow from Ukraine in December 1949. This would soon give him the opportunity to wage a successful struggle for power and by September 1953 to head the CC CPSU.

On 9 March 1953 at 10:45 a.m. the funeral procession from the Union Building halted beside the Mausoleum on Red Square. The coffin, topped with the cap of the “generalissimo of the Soviet Union,” was removed from the cannon carriage and placed on an elevated platform. Khrushchev opened the meeting, which was addressed by Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov. This is how the TARS news release described the subsequent events:

The leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government, the leaders of brotherly foreign communist and workers' parties mount the stage of the Mausoleum. Comrades G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, N.O. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, and A.I. Mikoian lift the coffin and carry it into the Mausoleum, on the entrance of which are inscribed two immeasurably cherished and immortal names: LENIN and STALIN. A thirty-gun salute thunders out.... The Fatherland salutes the great father and teacher of peoples. Everywhere, from the Baltic coast to the Kurile Islands, throughout the Soviet land, all enterprises have stopped work, and all trains, cars, and boats have come to a standstill for five minutes.... The country deeply mourns its great loss. But Stalin's name, Stalin's cause are immortal.¹⁰

Next day, on 10 March, the Presidium of the Central Committee met. The secretaries of the CC CPSU Mikhail Suslov and Petr Pospelov and the editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, Dmitrii Shepilev, were invited to the meeting. At this meeting, only one day after the funeral, Georgii Malenkov (not Khrushchev!) already took a “treasonous” step in relation to the “father of peoples”: criticizing *Pravda's* account of Stalin's funeral, he detected certain political tendencies in it and pointed out that—to quote the notes of a participant in the meeting—“there were grave irregularities, many things occurred according to the personality cult.” Malenkov emphasized, “I believe we must put an end to the politics of the cult of personality.”¹¹ Three years later he would regret these words,

10. Ibid., 261–2.

11. Aleksandr Pyzhikov, *Khrushchevskaia “ottepel,” 1953–1964* (Moscow: OLMA-

when he would be persecuted as a member of the “antiparty group” by Khrushchev, who would use Malenkov’s formula about the harmfulness of the cult of personality.

Thus, the tyrant was dead, but his successors continued to live under the threat of arrest. Stalin’s legacy weighed on them. First of all, somebody had to be blamed for crimes in which the party and its leadership took part. Stalin had practiced the principle of “mutual guarantee,” requiring all the top leaders to sign execution lists. Secondly, the leader’s pupils learned their lesson well: competitors, whether immediate or eventual, had to be dealt with swiftly and mercilessly, especially when it came to leadership positions, not to speak of the leadership of the party or country.

Beria understood this. As we know, it was he who began the campaign to discredit Stalin’s legacy. On his initiative, on 27 March 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR decreed an amnesty for all prisoners sentenced up to five years. This amnesty freed 1,200,000 prisoners and put an end to 400,000 investigations. On 4 April 1953 Beria issued a decree pointing out that there had been grave violations of law in the investigative work of the Ministry of State Security: innocent Soviet citizens had been arrested, evidence had been fabricated, and various forms of torture had been used, including vicious beatings, handcuffing for twenty-four hours and the tying of hands behind the back, sleep deprivation for long periods, and keeping inmates naked in cells. The decree categorically prohibited the use of physical coercion and provided for the prosecution of agents guilty of torturing citizens.¹²

In April 1953 the people who had been arrested in connection with the Doctors’ Plot and the Mingrelian Nationalist Organization were freed. On 26 May 1953 the Presidium of the CC CPSU passed a decree on “The Question of the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.” It was based on a memorandum by Beria. He had prepared a similar memorandum on 8 May 1953 on the activities of the organs of the Ministry of State Security of the Lithuanian SSR. On 28 May 1953 the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine passed a resolution “On the Decree of the CC CPSU of 26 May 1953 on ‘The Question of the

Press, 2002), 41.

12. O. Bazhan, “Protses destalinizatsiï v Ukraini (druha polovyna 50-kh–pochatok 60-kh rokiv),” *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, 1999, nos. 1–2: 470.

Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR' and Comrade L.P. Beria's Memorandum to the Presidium of the CC CPSU," and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine passed a decree "On the Decree of the CC CPSU of 26 May 1953 'The Question of the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR' and Comrade L.P. Beria's Memorandum to the Presidium of the CC CPSU." The decree essentially acknowledged the large scale and the effects of the regime's brutal actions in Western Ukraine. In particular it stressed that "the struggle against the nationalist underground cannot be conducted only by means of massive repressions and Cheka-army operations and that the thoughtless use of repressions arouses only discontent in the population."¹³

Khrushchev too grasped much of what was going on and cleverly took over Beria's rehabilitation initiatives. Researchers interpret Khrushchev's motives in different ways. Some argue that he introduced de-Stalinization because of his own political-psychological inferiority complex, as a way of avenging the years of insults, humiliation, cruelty, and moral terror that he suffered quietly in the role of the simpleminded Nikita at the hands of Stalin. Let us recall the famine years 1946–47 when, as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, he asked the "father of peoples" for assistance for Ukraine and almost paid for this with his life. It is not inconceivable that this factor also affected Khrushchev's behaviour. It is also evident that Khrushchev was a politician cut of different, let us say, more humane, cloth than Stalin. The time he spent in Ukraine played a significant role in the formation of his anti-Stalinist attitudes. For almost twelve years, from 1938 to 1949, he worked far from Moscow and the constant jockeying for position, intrigues, sycophancy, lying, and denunciation that flourished in the capital and enfeebled even capable people like Malenkov.

One can agree with the English diplomat and scholar Edward Crankshaw, who wrote:

Here, as far as it was possible to be under Stalin, Khrushchev was his own man.... Finally he saw, also at first hand, the fearful suffering they were called upon to endure and the way in which, despite that suffering, they turned against the Germans.... There was no other Party chieftain, with the exception of A.A. Kuznetsov who went through the siege of

13. Lavrentii Beriia, *Stenogramma iul'skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty*, ed. A.N. Iakovlev (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratii, 1999), 47.

Leningrad and was quite soon afterward shot by Stalin, who experienced for so long and so vividly the realities of life in Soviet Russia under Stalin. I think it changed him.¹⁴

There was one more motive: in criticizing Stalin Khrushchev saw a means of strengthening his own authority and keeping power. He began by removing his competitors, especially those who knew much about his personal unsavoury actions during the Stalin period. At the same time Khrushchev did not forget to remove from the archives documents that discredited him.

In the struggle for Stalin's legacy Khrushchev at first used Stalinist methods. His most significant victory was to remove Beria, who was arrested on 26 June 1953 during a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU. On 10 July 1953 *Pravda* ran a press release about the Plenum of the CC CPSU that took place from 2 to 7 July and its decision to remove Beria from the CC CPSU and to expel him from the Party. The text of the resolution was sent to party organizations in the form of a secret letter of the Central Committee. In the same issue *Pravda* printed an announcement from the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR about Beria's removal from the posts of first deputy of the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and minister of internal affairs of the USSR, as well as the transfer of his case to the Supreme Court of the USSR for investigation. At the end of 1953 a news report appeared in the press stating that "in a closed court session the criminal case of L.P. Beria and others was examined according to the law of 1 December 1934," a law that had been abolished on 1 September 1953 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR. It was also reported that the court found that "the accused L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulov, V.G. Dekanozov, B.Z. Kobulov, S.A. Goglidze, P.Ia. Meshik, and L.E. Vlodzimirsky, taking advantage of their official positions in the organs of the NKVD-MGB-MVD, committed a series of the gravest crimes for the purpose of destroying honest cadres dedicated to the cause of the Communist Party and Soviet power." Furthermore, Beria was accused of "criminal contacts with foreign spy agencies." He and the other accused persons were sentenced to be shot; they were stripped of all military

14. *Khrushchev Remembers*, with an introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), 15–16.

ranks and medal and their property was confiscated. According to official records, the sentences were carried out on 23 December 1953.¹⁵

In September 1953 the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR issued a decree that gave the Supreme Court the power to review on the general procurator's recommendation the sentences of OGPU collegiums, NKVD troikas, and the special council of the NKVD-MGB-MVD of the USSR. At the same time the military tribunals of the MVD forces and the special councils of the MVD were abolished.

This work continued in subsequent years. In 1954 a central and local commissions were established to review sentences for political crimes between 1934 and 1953. In December 1955 a commission was formed to study the materials on the massive repressions of members and candidates of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress and other citizens between 1935 and 1940. In 1955 the Council of Ministers of the USSR passed Resolution No. 1655 "On the Work Status, Work Placement, and Pension Benefits of Citizens Wrongly Convicted of Criminal Responsibility and Eventually Rehabilitated." From 1 April 1954 to 1 April 1959 the number of political prisoners (counter-revolutionaries) decreased by a factor of 40.7 and their percentage among all prisoners fell from thirty-three to 1.2.

Other judicial acts were passed, the purpose of which, according to Adburakhman Avtorkhanov, was "to raise the party above the police and to liberalize the regime. Obviously, they did not change the nature of the Soviet penal system, but they minimized, or were supposed to minimize, the arbitrariness of the Stalinist system."¹⁶

Soon the most farsighted representatives of Khrushchev's circle began to complain that the criticism was not controlled: people were returning from imprisonment and describing what had happened, and how this or that person had behaved "until then," until the death of the tyrant. After the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, at which Khrushchev, despite warnings from his colleagues, delivered a secret speech about the crimes of the Stalinist era, and after the purge of the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov (in June 1956), a new attack on

15. "V Verkhovnom sude SSSR," *Izvestiia*, 24 December 1953.

16. Adburakhman Avtorkhanov, *Tekhnologiia vlasti* (Moscow: SP "Slovo" and Tsentri "Novyi mir," 1991), 452.

Stalinism was launched. This is evident in the work of the Twenty-second Party Congress (in October 1961).

The motives behind this Khrushchevian campaign have never been fully analyzed. However, it is quite obvious that it developed not only, and perhaps not mainly, as a logical result of earlier actions. In an interview with foreign journalists in 1957, Khrushchev already said that Stalin had achieved much in promoting Marxism-Leninism. The deterioration of the existing situation and the negative effects of unsound and eccentric reforms prompted Khrushchev to escalate the de-Stalinization process. Again, he needed some explanation for the situation, and the explanation was found in the past, in Stalinism, because at the time Lenin was still untouchable. It is understandable that the intelligentsia and those who had suffered repression accepted this line of argument with enthusiasm.

Then Khrushchev found the courage for a scandalous step: the Twenty-second Party Congress adopted a resolution to remove the sarcophagus containing Stalin's coffin from the Mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square. The event was described by a witness:

About 200 people were waiting around the Mausoleum. It was cold. Everyone thought that the sarcophagus containing Stalin's body would be carried out through the main entrance. Nobody paid attention to the wooden screens surmounted with electric lights to the left of the Mausoleum.... Some soldiers carried the glass sarcophagus through the side doors of the Mausoleum and loaded it into an automobile. Taking advantage of the fact that no one was bothering us, we walked to the left and stopped facing the screens. It was here that we saw soldiers digging a grave. At about 10:00 or the beginning of 11:00 a woman arrived (I think this was S. Allilueva).... Then a black car arrived, and an officer emerged from it.... After 11:00 the commanding officer returned to the car and drove away. After some time a man in a dark gray coat appeared in the square beside the screens ... and then the red-covered coffin was carried out.... At that moment a man in civilian clothes came up to us and politely asked us to leave Red Square.¹⁷

Thereafter, cities, villages, collective farms, factories, and so on that carried Stalin's name were renamed, and the destruction of statues, busts, and monuments built in his honour was completed. However, from the mid-1960s, when Khrushchev was a "private pensioner," Stalin began to

17. V. Strelkov, "Svidetelstvuii," *Argumenty i fakty*, 1988, no. 50.

talk “with the people” again through movies and books sanctioned by the Moscow ideologues. His image was cleverly edited: the figure dressed invariably in a field jacket and holding a pipe in his hand was presented as a strict, even brutal, but farsighted leader who had done many good things for the country.

The intelligentsia was first to understand what was happening. On 14 February 1966 the well-known scientists and cultural leaders Petr Kapitsa, Andrei Sakharov, Igor Tamm, Valentin Kataev, Viktor Nekrasov, Vladimir Tendriakov, Kornei Chukovsky, Oleg Iefremov, Mikhail Romm, Innokentii Smoktunovsky, Maia Plisetskaia and many others signed a letter to Brezhnev underlining the inadmissibility of Stalin’s rehabilitation. The letter stated: “Recently, there are some tendencies (in speeches and articles) in our press favouring the partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin.... So far we are not aware of any fact or argument that would indicate that the denunciation of the cult of personality was somehow wrong. On the contrary. The problem lies somewhere else. We believe that any attempt to whitewash Stalin is fraught with the danger of serious division within Soviet society.”¹⁸

The Kremlin, however, did not react to this letter. With Iurii Andropov’s appointment to the post of head of the KGB in the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 19 May 1967, the policy of “rooting out” dissent was reinforced, and human rights were increasingly violated.

In March 1968 a letter addressed to the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR protested the new wave of political repressions in the second half of the 1960s. It was signed by 139 people, twenty-six of whom were associates of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Among the authors of the appeal were the film director Serhii Paradzhanov, a laureate of the Lenin Prize; doctor of mathematical physics Andrii Lubchenko; the literary scholars Ivan Svitlychny, Hryhorii Kochur, Valerii Shevchuk, Lina Kostenko, Mykhailyna Kotsiubynska, Borys Kharchuk, and Zinovii Franko; candidate of historical sciences Mykhailo Braichevsky; and corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR Anatolii Skorokhod, Iurii Berezansky, Oleksii Sytenko, and Kyrylo Tolpyho. In April 1968 representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (close to 150 people) wrote a letter to the CC

18. M. Romm, *Ustnye rasskazy* (Moscow: Soiuz kinematografistov SSSR, 1989), 187.

CPSU protesting the closed trials of their colleagues in Kyiv, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk.

In the early 1970s an especially vigorous campaign to suppress the human-rights and national-independence movements was conducted in Ukraine. Meanwhile, in Moscow on 25 June 1970, a bust of Stalin by the sculptor Nikolai Tomsy was installed on Stalin's grave near the Kremlin wall. This was preceded by a discussion at a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU that was similar to the discussion in 1969 on whether Stalin's ninetieth birthday should be celebrated and an anniversary article published. Mikhail Suslov, Petro Shelest, Kiril Mazurov, Aleksei Kosygin, and Yurii Andropov insisted on publishing such an article and were opposed by Mykola Pidhirny, Arvid Pelshe, and Boris Ponomarov, who reminded their colleagues that during the Khrushchev period they were all involved in exposing the cult of personality. But the side in favour of publishing won.¹⁹

After Brezhnev's death in November 1982 and during Yurii Andropov's and Konstanin Chernenko's short rule, the devotion to the "leader of peoples" did not dissipate. It was latent, but perceptible. When Andropov came to power, a joke began to circulate in the USSR: "A Happy 1937 New Year, comrades!" There were grounds for this. We know that as head of the KGB, at Politburo meetings Andropov often introduced motions about particular people who were being persecuted. For example, on 6 May 1968 he wrote a letter to the CC CPSU in which he assessed Oles Honchar's novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral) as a "politically damaging work that propagates elements of nationalism and depicts Soviet reality in a distorted light."²⁰ On 19 September 1977 Andropov informed the CC CPSU about the "hostile activity" of the writer and film director Helii Sniehirov and his decision, which was approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, to start criminal proceedings against Sniehirov under Article 62, Section 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.²¹ Helii Sniehirov was arrested on 22 September 1977 and died as a result of torture on 28 December 1978. And there are many examples of this kind.

19. R. Pikhoia, "Vozhd kak brend," *Moskovskie novosti*, 2003, no. 8.

20. V.F. Verstiuk, O.M. Dziuba, and V.F. Repryntsev, *Ukraina. Vid naidavnishykh chasiv do sohodennia: Khronolohichnyi dovidnyk* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), 568.

21. Iu.Z. Danyliuk and O.H. Bazhan, *Opozytsiia v Ukraini: Druha polovyna 50-ykh–80-ti rr. XX st.* (Kyiv: Ridnyi kraj, 2000), 508.

Furthermore, it was Andropov who initiated the discussion of various anti-democratic measures. For example, he introduced the resolution “On Persons who Represent a Special Threat to the State in Wartime.” He was the author of the memorandum “On the Supplement to the List of the Most Important Information that Constitutes a State Secret,” which put new pressures on society. Under Andropov the Fifth Section, which monitored the mood of the intelligentsia, was expanded.

On 29 April 1969 Andropov sent a special letter to the CC CPSU with a plan to develop a network of psychiatric hospitals and to use it for protecting the political and social order. It was on the instructions of the KGB that the diagnosis of “creeping schizophrenia,” which enabled authorities to declare mentally ill any person they wished, was “grounded theoretically” in the 1960s. The number of inmates in special psychiatric hospitals grew quickly.²²

The terminally-ill Chernenko took an unambiguous political step when he restored the fanatical Stalinist Viacheslav Molotov’s party membership. This might have been the first step in returning to Stalin’s legacy, as the “Working Minutes of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on the Question of V.M. Molotov’s, G.M. Malenkov’s, and L.M. Kaganovich’s Rehabilitation” shows. Let me quote a passage from this unique document in its original language:

CHERNENKO: Beyond the daily news I would like to inform you about some letters that have arrived at my address. As you know, we have adopted a resolution on one of the letters. This was V.M. Molotov’s request to be reinstated as a member of the CPSU. I received V.M. Molotov and had a talk with him. He accepted our resolution with great joy and almost wept. Molotov said that this resolution was his second birth. Molotov is now ninety-three, but he is quite healthy and his speech is firm. He declared that the Politburo of the CC preserves and continues the work that the Party unflinchingly used to conduct. It is too bad, he said, that you work late hours, as we did. He declared that we were managing things right.

USTINOV: This is an important assessment on his part.

CHERNENKO: Molotov said that he does not understand people who because of an insult, go into opposition. He declared that he is aware of his mistakes and has drawn the necessary inferences. After our talk

22. See A. Iakovlev, “Spiski na arest byli gotovy,” *Moskovskie novosti*, 2003, no. 8.

Viktor Vasilevich Grishin at the Party's City Committee presented V.M. Molotov with his party card.

TIKHONOV: On the whole we did the right thing in reinstating him.

CHERNENKO: But after this the CC CPSU received letters from Malenkov and Kaganovich, as well as a letter from Shelepin in which he declares that at one time he was a consistent fighter against Khrushchev and presents a string of requests.

USTINOV: In my view Malenkov and Kaganovich should be reinstated in the party. After all they were activists and leaders. Let me be frank, were it not for Khrushchev, the resolution to expel these people from the party would not have been adopted. In general, the glaring scandals that Khrushchev permitted in respect to Stalin would not have occurred. Whatever one may say, Stalin is our history. No enemy has done us as much harm as Khrushchev with his policy on the past of our party and state, as well as on Stalin.

GROMYKO: In my view this pair should be reinstated in the party. They belonged to the party's and the state's leadership and for many years managed certain sectors of work. I doubt that they were unworthy people.

TIKHONOV: Perhaps we should return to this question at the end of the year or the beginning of next year.... Yes, were it not for Khrushchev, they would not have been expelled from the party. He besmirched and defamed us and our policies in the world's eyes.

CHEBRIKOV: Besides, under Khrushchev a string of people were illegally rehabilitated. The fact is that they were punished quite legitimately. Take Solzhenitsyn for example.

GORBACHEV:.... As for Malenkov and Kaganovich, I would also support their reinstatement in the party.

ROMANOV: Yes, these people are already old and can die.

USTINOV: In my assessment of Khrushchev's actions I, as they say, stand to the death. He has done us great harm. Just think what he did with our history, with Stalin.

GROMYKO: He struck an irreparable blow to the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the external world.

USTINOV: It is no secret that the Westernizers never liked us. But Khrushchev handed them arguments and materials that discredited us for many years.

TIKHONOV: And remember what he did to our economy! I myself worked at the Soviet of the National Economy.

GORBACHEV: And what about the party, he divided it into industrial and agricultural party organizations!

USTINOV: I would propose that we discuss one more question in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism: shouldn't we rename Volgograd Stalingrad? Millions of people would welcome that. But, as they say, this is something to ponder.

GORBACHEV: There are positive and negative sides to this proposal.

CHERNENKO: I think that for the present we shall limit ourselves to an exchange of ideas on all these questions. But as you understand, we shall have to return to them.²³

The situation changed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. In May 1985 at a celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, he mentioned Stalin's name with respect and was applauded. In 1986, in an interview with the newspaper *Humanité*, he categorically denied the existence of Stalinism and insisted that this was a concept invented by bourgeois propaganda in order to discredit socialism. Yet by the end of the following year, 1987, the initiator of perestroika, thanks to his naturally dialectical personality, yielded to pressure from intellectuals who demanded public penance from the party and the existing socio-political system, and sanctioned a new wave of disclosure. Those whom Khrushchev wanted, but did not have time, to rehabilitate (for example, Bukharin) and those whom he did not want to accept as "his comrades" (Kamenev, Zinovev, and others) were rehabilitated.

In March 1988 an unknown—and eventually notorious—lecturer, Nina Andreeva, protested against this in the press. Her argument went as follows: criticism of Stalin undermines the work of many generations. Even Churchill thought that Stalin was an exceptional person who was admired by the brutal era in which he lived. According to Andreeva, "industrialization, collectivization, and the cultural revolution, which raised our country to the rank of a world power, are forcibly squeezed into the formula 'cult of personality.' Everything is put into question.... Common sense, however, firmly protests against a one-colour depiction of contradictory events."²⁴

And yet the neo-Stalinists failed to cover up the evil essence of their idol's legacy under the formula of the contradictory development of history. The directions that society needed at the time were set. A

23. Ibid.

24. N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupatsia printsipami," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13 March 1988.

commission of the Politburo of the CC CPSU was struck in the fall of 1987 and began a further study of the materials connected with the repressions of the 1930s–1940s and the early 1950s. Information on the fabricated cases and trials of the Stalin period began to be published, as did the works of Western specialists on Stalinism, which previously had been carefully hidden in special collections. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Arkhipelag GULAG* (The Gulag Archipelago) was published in the USSR.

On 13 September 1990 the first and last president of the USSR signed a decree restoring the rights of all victims of political repression from the 1920s to the 1950s, which were unlawful and violated the standards of civil and socio-economic rights. The rights of peasants who were repressed during the collectivization period and of all other citizens repressed for political, social, national, religious, and other reasons from the 1920s to the 1950s were fully restored. It seemed that everything was going according to plan, crimes were being exposed, and things that politicians and sociologists had discussed among themselves, such as the conspiracy between Stalin and Hitler in 1939 and the collaboration between the NKVD and the Gestapo, were being confirmed.

This was surely the golden age of the Stalinist problematic. Social consciousness could not keep abreast of the massive volume of new facts. It looked as though the final nail would be driven into the coffin of Stalinism and its creator, that society would purify and renew itself, and live according to the laws of humanism, goodness, and justice.

It was precisely at this time that one of the journalists stated candidly that the critique of Stalin “at a certain point in the development of glasnost was a kind of ‘euphemism’ for a more serious, conceptual critique,” that is, a critique of the entire system, not of some period of its development.²⁵ It was no coincidence that the guillotine of criticism soon hung not only over Stalin but also over Lenin, whom Khrushchev dared not touch and whom Gorbachev vowed to respect. Soon, the conclusion that Stalinism is not a distortion but a logical extension of Leninism became axiomatic.

Here lay the qualitative difference between the Gorbachev and the Khrushchev periods of Stalin criticism. They were similar in that the worse the “architects of perestroika” fared, the more energetic was the criticism of Stalinism and the desire to explain the evident shortcomings

25. V. Kostikov, *Sumerki svobody* (Moscow: Ogonek, 1991), 4.

of the past. After the August 1991 events in Moscow and the Belavezha meeting in December of that year, which put an end to the USSR, its history definitely became the bloody history of the last empire on Earth.

The American professor Adam Ulam calls Stalin a banal and at the same time complex individual. He is banal insofar as he confirms the familiar aphorism “absolute power corrupts absolutely,” and complex insofar as “this aphorism does not explain why Stalin was able to create an historically unprecedented structure of personal rule and exercise a truly magical influence not only on his own people but also on the world public. This was a hypnosis that prevented people from seeing not only the characteristic inhumanity of Stalinism but also the obvious absurdity of the cult of personality.”²⁶

But the fact is that not only Stalin but also his critics “hypnotized” the public. Khrushchev took advantage of Stalin’s legacy to strengthen his power and to make the regime attractive. Brezhnev endowed Stalinism with remarkable features in order to secure his establishment ideologically and to prevent the destabilization of the system developed by Lenin and Stalin. Gorbachev—and the Gorbachevites even more so—turned to Stalin’s legacy in order to destroy it. The times were different, but in all cases the result was a certain pathos and rigour that did not allow a full understanding of the problem and, most importantly, did not allow a complete demystification and deconstruction of Stalin’s legacy. Again Stalin appeared on movie screens and the pages of various publications. But this was no longer the wise and farseeing leader, but a psychologically sick, bloodthirsty tyrant, a former agent of the tsar’s secret police surrounded by even worse companions in arms. Then new schemata appeared that did not come close to the truth but stirred those who believed that it was not the trials of the 1930s and 1940s, but the rehabilitations that were falsified.

In a 1975 conversation with the writer Feliks Chuev, Molotov said of the writer Kostiantin Simonov “Simonov is KVD.” Asked what KVD meant, he explained, “whichever way the wind blows” (*kuda veter duet*).²⁷ Many critics of Stalin’s legacy turned out to be such KVD. The philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko is a typical and perhaps most vivid example. In 1990 he

26. *My Liudyna i systema*, 269.

27. Feliks I. Chuev, *Molotov: Poludnerzhavnyi vlastelin* (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1999), 610.

wrote: "We do not have the right to be insincere, to hide the fact that what is Stalinist is Marxist, that Stalinism as a worldview cannot be overcome without overcoming the Marxist teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the classes, and the class struggle."²⁸ Today, in the framework of Putin's policy of reviving many Soviet values, Tsipko again enthusiastically defends the ideals of communism's "glorious past." This, obviously, breeds distrust of critics of Stalin's legacy.

Here is one reason why Stalinism does not cease to be a subject of social interest. Stalin was fated to be reanimated in the common post-Communist political and intellectual space, because the discussion on Stalin's legacy continues in this space.

On one side we can hear voices "from the people," of those who observe and feel the negative effects of the actions of the new (pseudo)reformers and say that the "order" that existed in the Stalinist state is necessary, that previously people did not steal on such a scale, and that it is time to get rid not of Stalinism but of those who think only about their own pockets and are unable to think of others.

On the other side we cannot ignore those who, as Aleksandr Iakovlev said, intentionally "promote a creeping restoration"²⁹ and declare that probably some people were repressed, but the stories about this are exaggerated, that famines, especially in Ukraine, were caused by the weather, not by the system, and that in general, as the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, once said, one cannot be in conflict with one's own history. The editor of the political section of *Russkii zhurnal*, Kiril Iakimets, wrote this about Stalinism: "How would Italians treat Mussolini and Spaniards Franco if the two were not associated with defeated fascism? In the same way, I assure you, that the French treat de Gaulle today. Gaullism in France is a perfectly viable conservative ideology. Stalin was never defeated. Stalin and Soviet man have ceased to be bugbears and have become symbols of order and power. Soon Stalinism in Russia will be analogous to French Gaullism."³⁰

Here are the reflections of the Russian writer Viktor Erofeev:

28. Aleksandr Tsipko, *Nasilie Izhi, ili kak zabludilsia prizrak* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1990), 37.

29. A. Iakovlev, *Krestosev* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 268.

30. Cited according to L. Pirigov and E. Lesin, "Stalin navsegda: Skoro li utverdit'sia v Rossii solidnaia konservativnaia ideologija?" *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 6 March 2003.

Whoever likes living in a state of execution and whipping, and believes in a childish idea of communism views Stalin's death as a tragedy. That death gave the country, which he had almost killed, a chance. It is a shame that we observe the fiftieth anniversary of the tyrant's death as an important event. It seems to me that the humiliation he inflicted on his people cannot be surpassed. I have travelled the world: there is no other people that has almost been exterminated by its leader, whose best members were killed, and yet continues to love and spin legends about that leader. What are we, a land of imbeciles?... Alas, so far Russia has not been de-communized. Everyone is awaiting the whip.³¹

In connection with Erofeev's evaluation, it is worth looking at two sociological studies of the historical memory of Russian citizens conducted in 1990 and 2001. In 1990 Stalin was considered to be one of the most unpopular historical figures: only six percent of respondents gave him a positive rating, while seventy-four percent gave Peter the Great and fifty-seven percent gave Lenin a positive rating. In 2001 the corresponding figures were 32.9, 90.2, and 39.9 percent.³²

Ukraine's contemporary political establishment avoids conflict with its own history, that is, an assessment of the fundamental historical-political problems that is necessary for the state. It cannot decide by what values to live, by what historical-political vector to lead the country into the future, and what to do with the Soviet, especially the Stalinist, past. It was only in February 2003, that is, eleven years after Ukraine's independence, that our Parliament held hearings about the famine-genocide of 1932–33. There are no statues of Stalin in Ukraine, but there are statues of Lenin and other Communist leaders, which seem to remind people not to rush into erasing the era of the "great turning point" from their consciousness. And there are some results. According to the all-Ukrainian surveys carried out by the Kyiv International Sociological Institute in 1991 and at the end of 2002, twenty and twenty-three percent of respondents, respectively, said that they "fully agree" with the statement "Stalin was a great leader," and seven and fifteen percent, respectively, said that they "agree rather than disagree" with that statement.³³

31. Cited according to V. Tsevtkova and A. Voznesensky, "Drugikh pisatelei u menia dlia vas net!" *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 6 March 2003.

32. Pikhoia, "Vozhd kak brend."

33. "Sotsiolohichna sluzhba Dnia," *Den*, 4 March 2003.

This is why those who recently thought that the Leninist-Stalinist problematic was almost exhausted are beset by doubt: is it really so? In conclusion let me turn to a sentence that Stalin underlined in the book *Kurs russkoi istorii* (A Course of Russian History): “Genghis Khan slaughtered many people, saying ‘The death of the conquered is necessary for the conquerors’ peace of mind.’”³⁴

Thus, the dictator knew perfectly well what he wanted. His opponents during his lifetime and his critics after his death knew it less well. Surely, a sufficient number of years have passed after his death for an adequate evaluation of his legacy and its still dangerous consequences.

In 2006 the fiftieth anniversary of Khrushchev’s famous anti-Stalin speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was observed. This raised the need to study the results of the de-Stalinization of the former USSR. The need is particularly evident in light of the recent news about the dedication of monuments to Stalin across Russia, particularly in Sakhalin, whose monument was supposed to have been erected in St. Petersburg, and about the opening of a Stalin museum, financed by local businessmen, in Volgograd.³⁵ It has also been announced that the memorial complex in Turukhan Raion, where Stalin had been exiled, will be restored.³⁶

Khrushchev’s great-granddaughter, the political scientist Nina Khrushcheva, asserted: “Yet nearly 50 years to the day from that speech, my great-grandfather has become a scapegoat for many of the perceived ills of post-communist, ‘democratic’ Russian society. And Stalin, the man he exposed as a brutal dictator who terrorized and oppressed the nation, is enjoying a virtual rehabilitation, with opinion polls revealing his shocking popularity, especially among the young.”³⁷

This is why Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress has not lost its emblematic character. Not only does it symbolize a “thaw,” although an ambivalent one, it also demythologizes a phenomenon that cannot be restored in any form if society really wants to maintain a democratic way of thinking.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Orest Zakydalsky

34. D.A. Volkohonov, *Triumf i trahediia: Politychnyi portret I.V.Stalina u 2 kn.* (Kyiv: Polityvydav Ukrainy, 1990), 2: 637.

35. See <<http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article346163.ece>>.

36. See Aleksandra Samarina, “Pamiatniki Stalinu marshiruiut po strane,” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 5 May 2006.

37. “Why Russia Still Loves Stalin,” *The Washington Post*, 12 February 2006.

The Nationalization of Identities: Ukrainians in Belgium, 1920–1950

Machteld Venken and Idesbald Goddeeris

By 1950 about 8,000 Ukrainians lived in Belgium. Some of them had settled there in the interwar period, others had arrived after the Second World War. With their presence, Belgium obviously ranked far behind the traditional destinations of Ukrainian immigrants, such as Canada, the United States, France, and Germany, but it hosted many more Ukrainians than other countries without special ties with Ukraine.¹

1. Despite the size of the Ukrainian community in Belgium, research on it is still in its infancy. In 1990 Mykola Kohut, who had studied at the Catholic University of Leuven and had been the president of the Ukrainian Learning Educational Society for over forty years, wrote a report “Vidomosti pro ukraintsiv u Belhii” for the Ukrainian Center for Social Research in New York. A summary of it was published as a chapter “Ukrainians in Belgium” in *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World: A Demographic and Sociological Guide to the Homeland and Its Diaspora*, ed. Ann Lencyk Pawliczko (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 214–30. Two M.A. dissertations on Ukrainians in Belgium have been defended at the Catholic University of Leuven: Janick Fierens’s “Oekraïense studenten aan de Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (1931–1951)” (1993) on Ukrainian students’ life at that university, and Vicky Hoogmartens’s “De Oekraïense immigratie in Belgisch-Limburg (1947–1997)” (1998) on the Ukrainian community in the Campine. Ukrainians are mentioned in Frank Caestecker’s study of Belgian refugee policy *Alien Policy in Belgium 1840–1940: The Creation of Guest Workers, Refugees and Illegal Aliens* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000) and in Idesbald Goddeeris’s study of the Poles in Belgium in 1945–50 *Polonia belgijska w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej* (Warsaw: Sempex, 2005). This article uses for the first time international academic literature to describe Ukrainian organizational life in Belgium. It also uses Ukrainian émigré periodicals and the archives of the Ukrainian Relief Committee, Volodymyr Popovych (its president for over thirty years), and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance. We rely also on interviews with Mykola Kohut and Omelian Koval, the president of the Ukrainian Relief Committee.

This article analyzes two aspects of the Ukrainian migration in Belgium. First, it reconstructs the waves of Ukrainian immigration to, and emigration from, Belgium, for not all Ukrainians settled permanently in Belgium. Secondly, it focuses on the identities of the Ukrainian migrants. Ukrainian nationalism underwent some essential developments in the first half of the twentieth century. Ukraine had proclaimed independence and obtained formal autonomy within the Soviet Union; Galicia and Transcarpathia, which had been under foreign rule, were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1945; and the population of Soviet Ukraine was Ukrainianized. In this article we examine how the inhabitants of these regions who emigrated to Belgium developed their identities. Through their organizations, which can be seen as expressions of common identities and exclusion, we define the most important identities among the Ukrainian immigrants and trace how they changed during the crucial decades between 1920 and 1950. Was there a common Ukrainian identity, and if so, when and how did it appear? Was it marginal or did it bridge the various divisions (social, historical, and geographical) among the Ukrainians in Belgium?

The Interwar Period

The Migration Process

In the interwar period several hundred, and perhaps as many as 1,000, Ukrainians arrived in Belgium.² This group was very heterogeneous and can be divided into four main categories: miners, political refugees, clergy, and students. The categories are not mutually exclusive: some miners, for instance, had fled Ukraine for political reasons.

The first group of Ukrainians arrived in Belgium as foreign labour for Belgian coal mines. At the beginning of the 1920s the Belgian coal

2. All statistics about Ukrainians in Belgium use the parameter of Ukrainian descent. They do not distinguish between clearly Ukrainian descendants (including those with Ukrainian roots who do not identify themselves as such) and those who declare themselves to be Ukrainian on the basis of subjective parameters such as attitudes and values. Moreover, in view of Ukraine's changing borders, a simple distinction of "those of Ukrainian descent" is problematic. The job registers of the Zolder coal mine illustrate the problem of identifying Ukrainian workers from territories outside the borders set by the Yalta Conference. In 1947 the mine administration called them Polish Ukrainians, Ukrainian Poles, or Balts. In this article we use linguistic and religious criteria for Ukrainian identity; for example, we regard interwar Polish citizens who spoke Ukrainian and were Greek Catholics as Ukrainians.

industry needed new workers: it had come out of the war intact and was even ready to expand after the discovery of new coal strata, but new social legislation, including the eight-hour working day, reduced labour productivity, and indigenous workers turned to other industries with better working conditions. Therefore the industry relied increasingly on foreign workers, such as Germans and Poles who had left the Ruhr area because of the German crisis, North Africans who had been forced to help France during the war and refused to return home, and Dutchmen and Italians who were recruited specifically to the Belgian coal mines. But there was still a labour shortage. When a big strike in Britain in 1926 raised the demand for Belgian coal, the mines organized collective recruitment in Eastern Europe. By 1930 almost 12,000 Poles, 3,000 Czechoslovaks, and a few thousand Yugoslavs, mostly Slovenians, worked in the Belgian coal mines. The economic crisis put an end to this recruitment drive, but in 1937 it was reactivated. About 3,500 Poles and a similar number of Czechoslovaks were employed in the coal mines. Some of them brought their families. In 1939 about 30,000 Poles lived in the Belgian coal-mining regions.

There were also Ukrainians among these East European miners. The Lviv scholar Stepan Kacharaba who analyzed the emigration from Western (Polish-ruled) Ukraine in the interwar period, counted 256 ethnic Ukrainians among the Polish recruits to the Belgian coal mines.³ Their number must have been even higher among the Czechoslovak recruits. While the Polish miners came mostly from Silesia, Pomerania, the Dąbrowa Bassin, and the Poznań region (only 1,700 miners were recruited in Galicia), most Czechoslovak migrants came from Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the poorest region of the country inhabited largely by Ukrainians. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine their exact numbers. Most sources classified the migrants by their citizenship, not their ethnicity. Moreover, the mines employed not only people supplied by collective recruitment, but also individual volunteers, such as Russian refugees, and even foreigners without residence permits. Finally, not all migrants settled in Belgium. Many of them were fired during the economic crisis in the early 1930s and returned to their homeland. The number of Polish miners decreased from almost 12,000 in September

3. Stepan Kacharaba, *Emihratsiia z Zakhidnoi Ukrainy (1919–1939)* (Lviv: Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet im. Ivana Franka, 2003), 349, 356.

1930 to fewer than 8,000 in May 1934. More than half, maybe up to two-thirds, of the Czechoslovak miners who had arrived in 1937 had left Belgium by December 1938.⁴

A second group of Ukrainians that arrived in Belgium in the interwar period consisted of political refugees. Some of them fled Subcarpathia after its assignation to Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919, but most of them belonged to the anti-Bolshevik emigration. In his monograph on the White emigration in Belgium, Wim Coudenys counts about 3,300 emigrants from Russia and the Soviet Union between 1919 and 1923.⁵ He does not mention Ukrainians, but several authors, such as Volodymyr Troshchynsky and Mykola Kohut deal with them.⁶ Most of the Ukrainian refugees had been soldiers in the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian Galician Army, or the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. Unlike the Ukrainian miners, most of the political refugees were intelligentsia and settled in Belgian cities. Unfortunately, there are no quantitative data.⁷

Belgian Redemptorists were responsible for a third group of Ukrainians in Belgium. In 1913 their order accepted Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's request to reassign members who had been active among Ukrainians in Canada since 1899 to Galicia, where they did missionary work for the Greek Catholic Church and founded six new monasteries.⁸

4. Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 15–26; Caestecker, *Alien Policy in Belgium*, 60–2, 123–4; Myroslaw Melnyk, *Les ouvriers étrangers en Belgique* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1951), 61–84.

5. Wim Coudenys, *Leven voor de tsaar: Russische ballingen, samenzweeders en collaborateurs in België* (Leuven: Davidsfonds, 2004), 325.

6. Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 217; Volodymyr Troshchynsky, "Vytoky taistorychna dolia mizhvoiennoi ukrainskoi politychnoi emihratsii v Evropi," *Ukrainska diaspora*, 1994, no. 5: 11.

7. Caestecker, *Alien Policy in Belgium*, 47, 69, 70; Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium"; Janina Samborska, "Ukraiñsi u Belhii: Problemy sotsialnoi adaptatsii," *Ukrainska diaspora*, 1995, no. 8: 145–51.

8. Father Achiel Delaere (1868–1939) began missionary work among Ukrainian immigrants in Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Armand Boni, *Pioniers in Canada: de Belgische Redemptoristen in de provincies Québec, Manitoba en Saskatchewan* [Brugge: De Kinkhoren, 1945], 278). In 1913 the Redemptorists started to build a network of six monasteries in Ukraine. In Galicia they were active in Holosko, Zboiska, Lviv, Ternopil, and Stanyslaviv. In Volhynia they had a building in Kovel (Lucianus Willem Ceyskens, *Louis Vangansewinkel [1892–1968], Redemptorist van Linde-Peer Missionaris onder de Oekraïners* [Peer: Uitgave V.Z.W. Heemkundige Kring Peer, 1945], 54; Richard

Thus several dozen Belgian Redemptorists lived in Galicia and Volhynia until their departure at the outbreak of the Second World War. They also convinced the Belgian Sisters of Mercy of Saint Vincent de Paul to open a representation in Galicia in 1922. These monasteries stimulated contacts and exchange programs with Belgium. About 300 Galician novices entered the convents of the Belgian Sisters. Most of them chose the enclosed convent in the East Flemish town of Deinze.

The last group, the students, came to Belgium also thanks to the Redemptorists, who had set up an exchange program at the Catholic University of Leuven that offered young Ukrainians—mainly young men—the opportunity to study in Belgium. Ukrainian students received a scholarship from the Comité du Foyer Universitaire Slave⁹ and were lodged in a Ukrainian student residence. Altogether, this program supported seventy-eight Ukrainian students in Leuven before the Second World War.¹⁰ By 1939 most of them had returned to Galicia, but those who did not had to stay in Belgium in the succeeding years.¹¹

Houthaev, *De gekruisigde Kerk van de Oekraïne en het offer van Vlaamse missionarissen* [Moorslede: Hohepied, 1990]; Don Lukie and Rita Chernoff, eds., *Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Ukrainian Rite Redemptorists, 1906–1981* [Winnipeg, Friesen Yearbooks, 1982]).

9. The committee was founded in 1926 and offered Russian young men opportunities to receive a higher education in Belgium. By 1928 seventy-two Russian students stayed at a boarding house in the city centre of Leuven. Many of them participated in the local Russian choir and orchestra. At the beginning of the 1930s, however, the number of Russian students declined and the number of Ukrainians, who also received help from the committee and lived only a few streets away, increased. Although the two student groups had much in common, there were some tensions between them. The Russians objected to the Ukrainians' insistence on Kyiv as the cradle of Russian culture and their agitation for Ukraine's independence. In 1933 the Russian students disapproved of a Ukrainian song and dance evening organized by the Ukrainian students in cooperation with the Catholic University of Leuven and convinced the university authorities to withdraw their official support of the event (Coudeny, *Leven voor de tsaar*, 74, 77, 79–82, 157).

10. Zenon Tatarsky, ed., *Liuvén 1930–1985: Ukrainski studenty u Liuvenskomu katolytskomu universyteti* (Toronto: Basilian Press and Tovarystvo kolyshnykh ukrainskykh studentiv Liuvenskoho katolytskoho universytetu, 2001) is a very informative account of Ukrainian student life at the Catholic University of Leuven. See also Vladimir Ronin, "L'Ukraine en Belgique (1814–1914) (Contribution to the First Ukrainian Symposium Organized by the Belgian Association for Ukrainian Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven [Louvain], 24 November 1994)," *Slavica Gandensia* 221 (1995): 54–9.

11. Of the Ukrainian students that could be traced later, forty-seven returned to Ukraine, eleven settled in Belgium, seven moved to other European countries, and three migrated overseas (Tatarsky, ed., *Liuvén 1930–1985*, 489–97). See also the information

In view of the incomplete information about certain groups, the continuous migration into and from Belgium, and the vague criteria for Ukrainian, it is impossible to give a quantitative survey of the Ukrainian presence in Belgium. Most scholars estimate the total number of Ukrainians in the interwar period at 600,¹² but they do not include the Ukrainian novices in Belgian convents. The latter numbered about 300 girls.¹³ Thus, a preliminary estimate of the total number of Ukrainians in Belgium between the wars amounts to 900 people. Thus, the Ukrainian emigration in Belgium was larger than in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and most other European countries. Only France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland hosted more Ukrainians, but these countries were much larger and closer the Ukrainian homeland, or had a special connection with Ukraine.¹⁴

Immigrant Organizations

Ukrainian immigrants set up a network of organizations in Belgium. An analysis of their activities and their internal (with each other) and external (with non-Ukrainian organizations) relations can show how their members identified themselves. Did the Ukrainians in Belgium share a Ukrainian identity, and if so, how did they define it? Or did they remain divided by social (intelligentsia versus workers), geographical (cities versus mining provinces), or regional (Galician, Subcarpathian, Russian) differences?

Organizations of the intelligentsia originated very early. The oldest ones were founded before the First World War. The Ruthenian Neutral Circle (Cercle Neutre Ruthène, or CNR), located in Liège, aimed to inform the Belgian public about the Ruthenians in Subcarpathia, Galicia, and Bukovyna. It continued its activities in the interwar period. Similar

in the student bulletin *Informatsiyni lystok: Natsionalnyi soiuz ukrainskykh studentiv u Belhii*, 1957, no. 4: 5–8 (copy located in TseSUS Archive, box 5, at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute).

12. Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 217; Volodymyr Pavlovykh Troshchynsky and Anatolii Andriiovych Shevchenko, *Ukrainci v sviti* (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 1999), 144; and Samborska, "Ukrainci u Belhii," 145–7. S. Bozhyk counted only about 300 Ukrainians in the interwar years (Volodymyr Kubijovyč, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* [Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1984], 1: 193).

13. Interview with Mykola Kohut on 15 September 2005.

14. Some more quantitative data can be found in Pawliczko, ed., *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World*, 117; and Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 56.

groups appeared in Belgium during the struggle for Ukrainian independence. The most important of them was the Diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian National Republic headed by Professor Andrii Iakovliv in Brussels. It defended Ukrainian interests and through a subsidiary soldiers' mission took care of the arriving soldiers and political refugees.¹⁵ The mission was dissolved in 1923, and its role was assumed by two organizations: the European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad (Fédération Européenne des Ukrainiens à l'Étranger, or FEUE) and the Society of Former Ukrainian Soldiers (Tovarystvo kolyshnykh ukrain-skykh voiakiv, or TKUV). FEUE represented the Council of National Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic (Rada narodnykh ministriv UNR) in Belgium. It maintained contacts with Symon Petliura in the 1920s and protested against the Polish pacification of Galicia in the 1930s. Some of its twenty members would play an important role in the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrainska natsionalna rada) after the Second World War. The veteran organization TKUV participated in Belgian parades and commemorations and published the periodical *Voiak* with the Royal War Museum in Brussels.¹⁶ The members of both organizations were participants in the failed project of an independent Ukrainian state. Although their hometowns were now in Czechoslovakia, Poland, or the Soviet Union, they shared a Ukrainian national identity.¹⁷

But they had no contacts with their countrymen in the mining regions of Belgium. The latter's organizations were completely different. They

15. Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 217–18; Symon Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia: Kulturna pratsia ukrainskoi emigratsii mizh dvoma svitovymi viinamy* (1942; reprint, Kyiv: Vyd-vo im. Oleny Telihiy, 1999), 2: 127; Oleksander Shulhyn, *Bez terytorii: Ideolohiia ta chyn uriadu UNR na chuzhyni* (1934; reprint, Kyiv: Iurinkom Inter, 1998), 273–336; and Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 111–14. Oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, the president of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Brussels since 1986, at 72 Charlemagne Avenue, on 30 and 31 March 2005.

16. For a picture of King Leopold III with a board member of the veterans' organization on the commemoration of the First World War, see Kohut, "Vidomosti pro ukrainsiv u Belhii," 11.

17. Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 223; Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 2: 127; Tatarsky, ed., *Liuvén 1930–1985*, 47; Troshchynsky and Shevchenko, *Ukraintsi v sviti*, 11; *Holos Khrysta Cholovikoliubstia* (*De stem van Christus Mensenminnaar, La voix du Christ Ami des Hommes*) 4, no. 1 (1946): 33 and 1949, nos. 7–8: 8–12; *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 October 1945. Oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, 30 and 31 March 2005.

were local in scope and regional in loyalty. Their members were bound by regional origin or family ties and lived in the same town or worked in the same mine. The Ukrainian Society (Ukrainska hromada), in Seraing, for instance, was founded by Galicians, and in spite of its name, excluded Subcarpathian workers. The workers' associations also had a very different program: their members gathered in bars and sometimes in parish and mining halls to sing and dance. Local authorities and mine managers, who wanted to keep the foreign workers in their mines and discourage mobility, supported them. The Belgian trade unions did not provide support specifically for Ukrainian miners: they had Italian, Polish, and Jewish branches, but no Ukrainian ones.¹⁸

The intelligentsia in the cities and the miners in the provinces both had contact with the Redemptorist Fathers. From 1924 a Belgian priest who had worked in Canada, Louis Van de Bossche (Bosky), ministered to Ukrainians in Belgium. From 1936 this work was done by two Redemptorists with missionary experience in Galicia: Jozef Deweerdt and Richard Costenoble.¹⁹ These priests, however, could not unite the provincial communities or bridge the gap between them and the urban circles in Brussels and Liège. Although they welcomed both Greek Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox to their services, they observed the geographical division: Costenoble served the cities while Deweerdt ministered to the Ukrainians in the provinces. Only on rare church occasions, such as Andrei Sheptytsky's two visits to Belgium, did the intelligentsia, miners, students, and clergy participated in common celebrations.²⁰

Nor did the students serve as a link between the dispersed Ukrainian communities. Their contacts were limited to the Ukrainian intelligentsia and Belgian sympathizers. They did not collaborate with the miners,

18. Caestecker, *Alien Policy in Belgium*, 269; Kohut, "Vidomosti pro ukrainsiv u Belhii," 10, 61. Oral sources: conversations with Mykhailo Khoma, the current vice-president of the Ukrainian Relief Committee; Andrei Bylyna, the grandson of the owner of the Ukrainian café in Seraing; and Andrei Haidamakha, born among Subcarpathian workers in the mining village of Eisdén, at the Frankopole Nostalgia Reunion of the Ukrainian Youth Association on 22–23 October 2005.

19. Houthaeve, *De gekruisigde Kerk*, 310–17.

20. Alfred Deboutte, *Leven van Richard Costenoble, Redemptorist 1885–1975* (Leuven: Deboutte, 1978), 149–51; Kohut, "Vidomosti pro ukrainsiv u Belhii," 18; and Zoriana Yaworsky Sokolsky, "The Beginnings of Ukrainian Settlement in Toronto, 1891–1939," in *Gathering Places: Peoples and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834–1945*, ed. Robert F. Harney (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1985), 279–302.

although they conducted similar activities such as folk dancing. From 1931 the National Union of Ukrainian Students (Natsionalnyi soiuz ukrainskykh studentiv, or NaSUS), a subsidiary of the international Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentralnyi soiuz ukrainskoho studentstva, or TseSUS), tried to draw the attention of the Western public to the Ukrainian question by means of choral and dance performances. NaSUS was integrated in the organization of foreign students in Leuven, and in 1938–39 Andrii Kishka headed the Circle of Foreign Students in Louvain (Cercle Internationale des Etudiants Etrangers).²¹

The intelligentsia in the cities and workers in the mining regions had their own organizations, which did not collaborate with each other. Of course, there were individual contacts; for example, some political refugees worked in the mines, but there was no interaction on the organizational level. Certain groups, such as the Redemptorist Fathers and the students, could have bridged these social and geographical gaps but did not do so. Apparently, Ukrainian descent was not the decisive factor in the construction of identities. Only the intelligentsia (students, soldiers, and politicians) that had supported Ukrainian statehood in 1917–22 had a concept of national identity. Although they called themselves Ukrainians, the Ukrainian miners identified themselves with a region of Ukraine rather than with Ukraine as a whole.²²

The Second World War and the First Postwar Years

The Migration Process

The migration movements of individual Ukrainians just before, during, and immediately after the Second World War are difficult to reconstruct. Some Ukrainians left Belgium; for example, some returned

21. Fierens, "Oekraïense Studenten aan de Katholieke Universiteit Leuven," 69–73 and 81–100; Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 1: 71, 304; Ronin, "L'Ukraine en Belgique," 54–9; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 January 1947.

22. Wsevolod Isajiw draws a distinction between folk community-type groups and nationality-type groups ("Definition and Dimensions of Ethnicity: A Theoretical Framework," in *Challenges of Measuring an Ethnic World: Science, Politics and Reality: Proceedings of the Joint Canada-United States Conference on the Measurement of Ethnicity, 1–3 April 1992* [Ottawa: Statistics Canada and United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1993], 411). While the former organizations manifest their regional identity in traditional folk dances, the latter express a collective Ukrainian identity in which immigrants from different regions feel at home. Folklore may serve a different function in different circumstances: the singing and dancing of the Ukrainian student ensemble, unlike those of the miners, were part of host society-oriented politics.

to the short-lived Carpatho-Ukraine (1938–39), while others, such as liberated German POWs (April 1945), streamed into the country. It is impossible to estimate their numbers.

The first large group of Ukrainians that arrived in Belgium consisted of about 1,500 young Ukrainian women. It arrived in the autumn of 1945 from German *Ostarbeiter* camps. To avoid compulsory repatriation from Germany to the Soviet Union, they had joined young Belgian men who had been either POWs (about twenty percent), voluntary workers, or conscripted labourers and were returning home. To circumvent Belgium's commitment to repatriate all Soviet citizens, they married their Belgian companions, received Belgian citizenship, and stayed in Belgium. Many of them had contacts with the Soviet embassy, which with help from the Belgian Communist Party, tried to locate them. The embassy even offered consulate passports to women who were not hostile to the Soviet system, enabling them to visit their families in the USSR.²³

Another homogeneous group of Ukrainians also found its way to Belgium. As before the war, Ukrainians came to study at the Catholic University of Leuven. In May 1945, after negotiating with the Red Cross and the Soviet Repatriation Mission, the Ukrainian Relief Committee (Ukrainskyi dopomohovyi komitet, or UDK) brought about twenty students from occupied Germany to Belgium. When the first Belgian consulate reopened in Wiesbaden at the end of 1947, individual Ukrainians could apply for studies in Belgium. From 1945 to 1950 altogether ninety Ukrainian students studied in Belgium, practically all of them on scholarships. Just as before the war, most students left Belgium after completing their studies. They did not return to Eastern Europe but migrated to several destinations across the Atlantic.²⁴

The largest group of postwar Ukrainian migrants were the displaced persons recruited in German POW camps for the Belgian coal mines

23. Iars Balan et al., *Zarubizhni ukraintsi: Dovidnyk* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991), 164; Lieselotte Luckx, "De gedwongen repatriëring van Sovjetburgers aan de vooravond van de Koude Oorlog (1944–1949)," (M.A. dissertation, University of Ghent, 2005), 153–70; Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen, *Politieke geschiedenis van België: Van 1830 tot heden* (Antwerp: Standaard Uitgeverij, 1990), 236; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 November 1945. Oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, 30 and 31 March 2005.

24. Of the ninety Ukrainians who started their studies between 1945 and 1950, only nineteen stayed in Belgium. The most popular destinations were Canada (23), the United States (19), and other European countries (15) (Tatarsky, ed., *Liuvén 1930–1985*, 489–97).

between 1947 and 1950. The Belgian mining industry had survived the war almost undamaged and faced a labour shortage. Initially, it employed German POWs, but international protest forced Belgium to look for other solutions. At the beginning of 1947 the Belgian mining industry agreed with American and British authorities to recruit workers among the DPs in their occupation zones. On 11 April 1947 the first transport of 429 DPs arrived in Belgium, and by the end of July 1947 almost 14,000 DPs were employed in the Belgian coal mines. The mine managers could not fulfil their promises of housing and family accommodation, and workers' enthusiasm fell rapidly. By the end of 1948 the transports stopped because the Marshall Plan undercut Belgium's competitive advantage. In the end, 22,477 DPs arrived between 1947 and 1951.²⁵ Half of them were Poles, and the second largest group (6,650) were Ukrainians²⁶ (see table 1).

The recruits were allowed to work only in the mines, but they retained all the rights of registered International Refugee Organization DPs and were promised naturalization and free access to the Belgian labour market after two years. But the promise was not honoured because the economic situation deteriorated. In 1949 the DPs could either continue working in the mines or move only to specific sectors, such as agriculture, domestic employment, and metallurgy. Competition with indigenous workers for the few jobs outside mining was fierce. According to a survey at the end of 1948, Ukrainian miners considered their working conditions intolerable, and more than half of them wanted to leave Belgium.²⁷ In April 1949 many DPs protested against their predicament

25. In July 1947 the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization, the predecessor of the International Refugee Organization, met the wishes of the Polish state to introduce the specific category "Ukrainians," thus separating Polish DPs from Polish Ukrainians. The Polish authorities were willing to accept the Polish DPs (including Polish Jews), but not Polish Ukrainians because they wanted to rid themselves of the Ukrainian minority in Poland (Ihor Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Population Migration after World War II," in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. Wsevolod W Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus [Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1992], 23). See also Jacques Vernant, ed., *The Refugee in the Postwar World: Preliminary Report of a Survey* (Geneva: High Commission for Refugees, 1951); and Marta Dyczok, *The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees* (Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's College, 2000), 74–112.

26. Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 119–25.

27. The survey was done by UDK, which asked its regional representatives to fill out a form for the local branches. Since at that time UDK still represented most of the

Table 1: Immigration of Ukrainian Miners to Belgium, April 1947–December 1951 (Number of Individuals)

April– June 1947 ^a	July– Dec. 1947 ^b	Jan.– June 1948	July– Dec. 1948	Jan.– June 1949 ^c	July– Dec. 1949	Jan.– June 1950	July– Dec. 1950	Jan.– Dec. 1951 ^d	Total ^e
1,000	4,519	726	338	38	11	6	5	7	6,650

^a The first transport arrived in Belgium on 11 April 1947 and brought 425 refugees to Belgium, among which UDK counted 340 Ukrainians. The second one, eleven days later, brought 135 young Ukrainian men. The third and fourth transports, on 27 April and 3 May respectively, brought 447 and 400 refugees to Liège, but there is no information on their nationality or ethnicity. However, *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii* later mentioned an overall number of 1,000 Ukrainians in the first four transports (1 May 1947, 15 May 1947, and 1 June 1947).

^b From mid-1947 the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO) registered the Polish Ukrainians separately. Their monthly statistical reports are presented here at semi-annual intervals (Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Population Migration after World War II," 54).

^c In 1949 the Belgian government brought the international recruitment programs to a standstill, because international competition threatened economic growth and employment opportunities. When they were restarted in 1951, few volunteers could be found (Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 124–5).

^d In 1951, with the dissolution of IRO, the collective transports and international data collection on the DPs came to an end.

^e Volodymyr Maruniak claims that 17,003 Ukrainians immigrated to Belgium from mid-1947 to December 1950. He counted 1,103 Ukrainians recruited in the British Zone and seventy-three from Austrian camps (*Ukrainska emihratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini*, 332–3). This confirms the fact that most of the Ukrainians came from the American Zone.

in front of the International Refugee Organization office in Brussels. The Belgian authorities reacted aggressively and arrested 170 Ukrainian demonstrators.²⁸

Ukrainian miners, the survey is the best indicator of their discontent. See *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 16 October 1949.

28. Frank Caestecker, *Vluchtelingenbeleid in de naoorlogse periode* (Brussels: VUBPress, 1992), 75–82, 145; idem, "Mineurs d'Europe centrale en Belgique," in *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en Belgique*, ed. A. Morelli (Brussels: Couleur livres, 2004), 166; *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 December 1950; and "Zvit holovy UDK v Belhii na IV richni zahalni zbory UDK, 10.6.48–15.5.49," Popovych (president of UDK, 1952–86) Archive at the Archives of the Catholic University of Leuven, Mgr. Ladeuzeplein 21, Leuven, Belgium, UDK file.

Given these restrictions, many Ukrainians left Belgium and migrated overseas, mostly to Canada and the United States, but also to Argentina, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Even the 170 Ukrainians who had been imprisoned in 1949 left Belgium. Thanks to the intervention of Baldwin I, who was crowned in July 1950, the Belgian government paid the refugees' passage to Canada in four transports between November 1950 and January 1951. Ironically, upon their arrival they were forced to work in gold mines.

It is impossible to give the exact number of Ukrainians who came to and left Belgium after the war. We attempt to estimate the number that came to Belgium in table 2. Adding up the number of Ukrainian DPs, women, students, and novices, we arrive at almost 8,500 individuals. We do not count some groups such as the pre-war emigrants who did not leave Belgium during the Second World War and individual Ukrainians who arrived immediately after being liberated from German POW and *Ostarbeiter* camps in April 1945. This is an estimate of the in-migration; it does not take into account the out-migration overseas.

Table 2: Estimated Number of Ukrainian Immigrants in Belgium, 1945–1950

DPs	6,650
Women	1,500 ^a
Students	90 ^b
Novices	150 ^c
Total	8,390

^a Estimated according to Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 218.

^b Tatarsky, ed. *Liuven 1930–1985*, 495–6.

^c Kohut, "Vidomosti pro ukrainsiv u Belhii," 33; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 7 November 1955

There are no statistics about the Ukrainians who left Belgium because most of them did so on an individual basis. Ukrainians who left Belgium in transports went mostly to Germany, where they joined their compatriots from other countries. Moreover, the Belgian Institute for Statistics does not refer to Ukrainians as a separate category.²⁹ For a general idea

29. The number of Polish and Soviet emigrants to Canada reached a peak in 1951–52

of the number of Ukrainians who left Belgium, we turn to UDK's annual report of July 1951, which states that besides the 1,500 women who arrived in 1945, there were about 4,500 Ukrainians in Belgium at the time. This means that about 2,500 Ukrainians had left Belgium.³⁰ In fact the number was higher, since the overseas emigration continued after July 1951 and desertion from the mines among DPs was fairly high.³¹ Only those who had big families or health problems, or had applied too late for the free transportation stayed behind.³²

Immigrant Organizations

Before the arrival of the Displaced Persons. Although the sources are silent on this, we can assume that the activities of most Ukrainian organizations declined during the Second World War. Isolated data show that the Ukrainians in Belgium interacted with both the Germans and the Allies. The Ukrainian National Committee in Belgium (Oekraïnsch

and declined abruptly after 1957, the last year of collective Canadian recruitment (Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 153).

30. The Belgian statistics yearbook does not report specifically on Ukrainian migration, which was included in the USSR category. Therefore, we have no idea how many Ukrainians were in Belgium at the time of the 1947 and 1960 censuses. We assume that prior to the overseas emigration there were 6,650 Ukrainian DPs, a pre-war emigration of between 200 and 500 Ukrainians, and a student group of twenty to fifty persons. Since we know nothing about the women who arrived in 1945, we leave them out of our discussion.

31. *Visti Ukraïnskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 3 April 1949 and 1 October 1950; and "Skhematychnyi zvit z pratsi UDK v Belhii v dilovomu rotsi 1950–51 (vid 21.6.1950 do 22.7.1951)," Popovych Archive, UDK file. Oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, 30 and 31 March 2005. In his annual report the president of UDK stated that fifty to sixty percent of the Ukrainians in Belgium wanted to leave ("Zvit holovy UDK-u na II richni zahalni zbory UDK, 1.6.1947/2–3," Archive Comité Ukrainien de Secours, Avenue Charlemagne 72, Brussels, "Richni zvyty, 1945–1950"). On desertion among DPs in Belgium, see Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 153; Albert Martens, *Les immigrés: Flux et reflux d'une main d'œuvre d'appoint la politique belge de l'immigration de 1945 à 1970* (Leuven: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 1976), 73; and Vernant, ed., *The Refugee in the Postwar World*, 100.

32. *Visti Ukraïnskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 December 1950; and "Zvit holovy UDK v Belhii na IV richni zahalni zbory UDK, 10.6.48–15.5.49," Popovych Archive, UDK file. The sources differ on the number of Ukrainians in Belgium: according to Kohut, 6,000 Ukrainians still lived in Belgium in 1951 ("Ukrainians in Belgium," 214–15); according to UDK estimates, their number fell to about 4,000 by 1955 ("Les Ukrainiens en Belgique fêtent leur X-e anniversaire," article in an unspecified Belgian newspaper, 1955, in the Popovych Archive, "Materiialy pro ukraïnske zhyttia v Belhii").

Nationaal Comiteit in België, the former FEUE) had contacts with the German institution that dealt with East European immigrants. Initially, it had to report to the Russian Institution of Trust for Belgium (Russische Vertrauensstelle für Belgien), but after protests the Nazis set up a parallel institution of trust for Caucasian and Ukrainian emigrants (Vertrauensstelle für kaukasische und ukrainische Emigranten in Belgien) in April 1943.³³ At the same time TKUV had contacts with the Ukrainian-Canadian allies. It was approached by the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association (Comité de l'Union des Combattants Ukrainienne de l'Armée Canadienne, or UCSA). In May 1945 the two organizations, together with the Ukrainian-American Soldiers, organized a celebration of the Holy Mother in Brussels.³⁴

After the war, a very different organizational framework took shape. The main concern of Ukrainian organizations was material support for the Ukrainians on Belgian territory. On 1 June 1945, on the initiative of the Ukrainian-Canadian allies, UDK was created in Brussels. Similar committees were set up in other countries. Ukrainian Canadians supported Ukrainian refugees in various countries of Europe. In 1944 the Canadian umbrella organization, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Komitet ukrainsiv Kanady, or UCC), succeeded in obtaining Canadian government support for a European relief fund, called the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (Fond dopomohy ukrainsiv Kanady, or UCRF), which along with the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (Zluchenyi ukrainskyi amerykanskyi dopomohovyi komitet, or ZUADK) financed the operations of the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) in London. The Belgian UDK was one of the first branches of CURB in Western Europe, and during the first three years of its existence it was almost entirely financed by its Canadian mother organization.³⁵

33. Wim Coudenys studied the Archives of the Aliens Department at the Ministry of Interior. Correspondence between the Nazis and both institutions of trust can be found in files 37C18 and 37C4 (Wim Coudenys, "Een caleidoscoop des levens. De vele gezichten van de Russische emigratie in België," *Koninklijke Zuid-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis. Handelingen* [Brussels, 2001], 263). See also Coudenys, *Leven voor de tsaar*, 252, 333.

34. "Invitation of UCSA and TKUV in 1944" and a TKUV document of 19 May 1945, Popovych Archive, UDK file.

35. Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, 99; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 15 April 1946.

UDK in Brussels was the first officially registered Ukrainian organization in Belgium. It received recognition and financial support from the Ukrainian immigrants in other countries. The Canadians managed to unite all factions of the Ukrainian-Belgian community around three common points: material aid, legal assistance, and contacts with Ukrainians in other countries. UDK became the umbrella organization for all Ukrainians in Belgium. Under the guidance of Mykola Hrab, a pre-war political refugee, and Mykola Demchuk, a student, it absorbed the interwar FEUE, cooperated closely with TKUV, the Redemptorist Fathers, and the Ukrainian students, and became the main Ukrainian organization in the mining regions. From October 1945 it published its own periodical *Visti*, which reported on its work among all these groups.³⁶ It also participated in the international activities of its mother organization in London; for example, it sent food parcels to the DP camps in Germany and Austria.

But UDK's primary purpose was to help Ukrainians in Belgium. Since it was registered, it was recognized as an intermediary by Belgian and international authorities. Although this did not bring it additional subsidies, UDK could work with Belgian firms to find jobs for refugees. By 1946 it covered the whole country with a network of nine local branches and boasted 535 members. In other words, more than half of the Ukrainians in Belgium belonged to UDK. This is a very high participation level: Polish organizations could mobilize no more than twenty to twenty-five percent of the Polish emigration in Belgium.³⁷ It is not clear to what extent its members found suitable jobs in Belgium. There were more opportunities in 1945–46 than in the following years: besides coal mines, agriculture, quarries, and forestry welcomed foreign workers. Apparently, this was not sufficient, and UDK also looked for jobs abroad. It also functioned as a mediator between the Ukrainian girls in Belgium and the Ukrainian sisters in Philadelphia and the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood of Canada.³⁸

36. *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 October 1945 and 1 January 1946; *Le Moniteur Belge*, 9 June 1945; and "Kasovy zvit UDK v Belhii, 1.6.1945–21.5.1947," UDK Archive, "Richni zvity, 1945–1950." Another Ukrainian journal in Belgium mentions the hegemony of *Visti* (*Tryzub: Orhan natsionalno-dержavnoi dumky* 1, no. 1 [September 1947]: 12–13).

37. Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 173; and oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, 30 and 31 March 2005.

38. *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 October 1945; 1 November 1945;

UDK cooperated closely with the Redemptorist Fathers. The latter regularly celebrated mass before UDK meetings, and UDK published the parish program in its *Visti*. As before the war, the Redemptorist Fathers served both the Greek Catholics and the Ukrainian Orthodox and organized Ukrainian religious life in the whole country. However, their monthly *Holos Khrysta Cholovikoliubtsia*, which began to appear in 1946, was aimed only at a Greek Catholic readership. In the same year the Redemptorists became part of the new international structure of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva, or UHKTs) and came under the leadership of Ivan Buchko, the apostolic visitor of all Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe. His conception of the Church's mission was consistent with the objectives of UDK: to unify the diaspora, stop forced repatriation, and promote relief activities.³⁹ Later the UHKTs created a subordinate general vicariate for all Ukrainian Greek Catholics in which Rev. Jacques Perridon and then Rev. Maurice van de Maele acted as the spokesmen for Belgium. The Redemptorist Fathers continued to minister to the Ukrainian Orthodox.⁴⁰

The interwar veterans' organization came under the UDK umbrella and used its *Visti* as a communication channel to attract new members. The campaign was not very successful, probably because Ukrainians had fought on both sides in the war: there were Ukrainian veterans who had fought in the Wehrmacht before deserting on French territory and those who had served in General Stanisław Maczek's First Armoured Polish Division.⁴¹

Students too could count on UDK's support, although they received aid also from other sources. The Belgian Committee of Assistance for East Slavic University Students (Comité Belge d'Assistance aux Universitaires Slaves Orientaux, or COBAUSO) provided scholarships to

15 April 1946; 15 June 1946; and 1 January 1947.

39. He expressed these ideas in his first pastoral letter of 30 November 1948 (Alexander Baran, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church," in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 151–2).

40. Dmytro Blazheiovsky, *Ukrainian Catholic Clergy in Diaspora (1751–1988): Annotated List of Priests who Served outside of Ukraine* (Rome: author, 1988), 241; Hoogmartens, "De Oekraïense immigratie in Belgisch-Limburg," 57; *Holos Khrysta Cholovikoliubtsia* 3, no. 4 (November 1948); and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 October 1945 and 15 April 1946.

41. The division was formed in 1942, and in 1944 it helped liberate cities in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. There are Ukrainian names on some of the 250 graves of its fighters at the war cemetery of Lommel in the Flemish Campine.

Soviet refugees. Moreover, the Apostolic Visitor Ivan Buchko bought a residence for students at the centre of Leuven.⁴² There was no religious division in NaSUS, but there was a Catholic Federation of Ukrainian Students, which admitted only Greek Catholic Ukrainians. Almost all of them were also members of NaSUS. As before the war, NaSUS belonged to the Circle of Foreign Students. But there was an important shift in its activities: they were no longer directed only at Belgians but also at the Ukrainian community. After the war the student choir and dance ensemble regularly performed for local UDK branches in mining villages, thereby contributing to the cohesion of the Ukrainian community.⁴³ This may be attributed to the common experiences of students and miners: most of them had been deported to Germany during the war and had refused to go back to Ukraine.

Only one group, the largest one, did not come under UDK's umbrella. Contacts with the newly arrived Ukrainian girls proved to be difficult. Initially, UDK lobbied on behalf of these women and protested against Soviet demands to repatriate them. Later however, UDK cut off contacts with them because it feared Soviet infiltration. The Soviet Mission forcibly organized some of these women into the Union of Soviet Patriots (Union des Patriottes Soviétiques), which included also interwar immigrants from Subcarpathia and other ethnic groups from the Soviet Union with communist sympathies, and published the Russian periodical *Patriot*.⁴⁴

The postwar organizational framework of the Ukrainian community in Belgium differed considerably from the interwar structure. The paramount need for aid and the means made available by overseas Ukrainian donors led to the formation of an umbrella organization. UDK tried to appeal to all Ukrainians in Belgium. It was successful in uniting Ukrainians with different professions, of different generations, and living in various places. Only the Ukrainian women who had married former Belgian POWs or workers in Germany remained unorganized. Nevertheless, the fault lines of the interwar

42. On Brouwerstraat. Since 1960 the Ukrainian Student Residence is at Halfmaartstraat 15.

43. Baran, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church," 153; Fierens, "Oekraïense studenten aan de Katholieke Universiteit Leuven," 58–60; *Obnova: Biuletyn Tovarystva ukrainskikh studentiv katolykiv*, 1947; *Tryzub* 5 (April 1948), 11; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 15 October 1945, 15 June 1946, and 1 January 1948.

44. Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 114. Oral source: interview with Omelian Koval, 30 and 31 March 2005.

period were bridged to a large extent. The Ukrainian ethnic or national element was now more prominent in the immigrants' identity than before the war. On the other hand, in 1945–47 Ukrainian organizations were focused more on the material needs of Ukrainians in Belgium and less on political life in Ukraine than they were in the interwar period.

The arrival of the Displaced Persons. Upon their arrival the Ukrainian DPs were integrated into the existing Ukrainian organizations in Belgium. Almost all of them joined UDK: by December 1948 the committee had 5,839 members. This is a very high rate of participation.⁴⁵ Through UDK the Ukrainian DPs started to collaborate with one of the two Belgian trade unions.

UDK accepted the General Christian Trade Union Federation's (Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond—Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens, or ACV-CSC) offer of cooperation in defence of the DPs' workers' rights. Along with Italians, Poles, Balts, Belarusians, and Yugoslavs, Ukrainians received a separate voice in the migrants' cell within the ACV-CSC. Iaroslav Pryshliak⁴⁶ reported on its work in the column *Do pratsi—Au travail*⁴⁷ in *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*. However, Belgian unionists and foreign workers had different objectives. The former wanted to control the influx of new immigrants and their employment in the labour market in order to protect their indigenous members, while the latter hoped that the union would improve their working conditions and protect them from repatriation. Unlike other immigrant groups, which were divided between the Christian and the larger socialist General Trade Union Federation of Belgium (Algemeen Belgisch vakverbond—Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique, or ABVV-FGTB), the Ukrainians all belonged to the Christian

45. UDK membership, which amounted to 535 in 1946, thus grew by 5,304 members. By December 1948 6,583 Ukrainian DPs had arrived in Belgium (see table 1). This means that more than eighty percent of the newly arrived DPs joined the UDK.

46. In the Archives of the Polish Security Apparatus Iaroslav Pryshliak is identified as a former soldier of the 14th Galician Waffen-SS Division. He was also active in 1947 as a secretary of UDK ("Sprawy ukraińskie. Komunikat Wiadomości Bieżących," Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, Ulica Towarowa 28, Warsaw, IPN BU 00231/309, 2: 157–9).

47. The ACV-CSC published one edition of *Au Travail* in Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and German. Later, only the Polish version *Przy Pracy* came out as an independent journal and the other versions became columns in immigrant papers (Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 138).

trade union. This unanimity shows that UDK was very influential among the newcomers.⁴⁸

While the Ukrainians presented a united front in relation to the host society, they were soon fragmented internally for political reasons. The newly arrived DPs brought with them their political experience in the DP camps in Germany, where there had been heated political controversy among Ukrainians with different historical experience, ideologies, social backgrounds, and faiths. As a result, two contrary processes took place. On the one hand, refugees from different parts of Ukraine learned to live and work together; on the other hand, political life became sharply polarized. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska holovna vyzvolna rada, or UHVR) and the Ukrainian National Rada (Ukrainska natsionalna rada, or UNRada) both claimed to represent the Ukrainian nation in exile. UHVR was created in mid-1944 on Ukrainian territory and included representatives from all Ukraine. In exile, however, it confined itself to the External Units of the OUN (Zakordonni chastyny OUN, or ZCh OUN), the largest political party abroad, led by Stepan Bandera. UNRada was set up in 1947 on the initiative of all the other political parties in exile and maintained strained relations with ZCh OUN. The youth organizations fell along this political fault line: Plast cooperated with UNRada while the Ukrainian Youth Association (Spilka ukrainskoi molodi, or SUM) was the youth wing of ZCh OUN. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva, or UAPT's) remained independent and above the political fray.⁴⁹

Soon, political rivalry in the DP camps started to influence relations in UDK in Belgium. From mid-June 1947 articles on affairs unrelated to Belgium in *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii* were

48. Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 136; Kohut, "Ukrainians in Belgium," 226; *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 June 1947, 1 July 1947, 1 December 1947, and 1 February 1948.

49. Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Emigré Community: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War," in *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945*, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (Aldershot, Hants, Eng. and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 222–3; Vasyl Markus, "Political Parties in the DP Camps," in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 113–15; Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, 98; and Ihor V. Zielyk, "The DP Camp as a Social System," in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 464–7.

borrowed from the nationalist *Ukrainska trybuna* and the liberal *Chas*.⁵⁰ In April 1948 the Bandera faction-linked SUM started the column “V pokhodi” (On the March) in *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii* and banned any news from Plast, which had previously appeared in the paper from time to time.⁵¹ This caused some controversy in UDK, and a group of interwar immigrants around Dmytro Andriievsky started its own periodical *Tryzub* (1947–48), which was similar in spirit to its namesake published by Symon Petliura in Paris (1925–40).⁵²

The substantial increase in the Ukrainian emigration in Belgium led to the establishment of UAPTs in Belgium. Its head, Archbishop Mykhail Khoroshy, arrived in September 1948.⁵³ In contrast to the relations among political organizations, the relations between the two Ukrainian churches were amicable. This may be attributed to a common enemy: the Russian Orthodox priest in Liège, Valent Romensky, who acted in the name of the Russian Exarch of the Ecumenical Throne in Western Europe,⁵⁴ but was not recognized by the Ukrainians (UDK President

50. For example, the patriotic article about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska povstanska armiiia, or UPA) on 15 October 1947 and about the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in *Chas* on 15 December 1947. From 1946 to 1949 the weekly *Ukrainska trybuna* was one of the most widely read newspapers. Eventually, it came under the control of the Bandera faction and reflected its program and activities. The more popular *Chas* was a general liberal nationalist periodical with a wide circulation, which published the leading émigré writers of different political affiliation. See Roman Ilnytzkyj, “A Survey of Ukrainian Camp Periodicals, 1945–50,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 277–87.

51. The scouting organization Plast did not put political ambition first, but rather embraced a harmonious education of body and mind. It cooperated with the schools in the DP camps and initially enjoyed more support than SUM. SUM had a political mission of national mobilization and recruited young people between eighteen and thirty years of age. Plast found it difficult to adapt its program to the third wave of emigration in 1949–51, but it was revived in the United States and Canada. See Daria Markus, “Education in the DP Camps,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 183; and Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emihratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po Druhii svitovii viini* (Munich: Akademichne vydavnytstvo P. Beleia, 1985), 277–9.

52. *Tryzub*, 1947, no. 9: 12–13 and 1947, no. 11: 6–7; *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 November 1947, 15 December 1947, 1 January 1948, 1 April 1948, 15 April 1948, and 4 September 1949.

53. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in West Germany, 1945–50,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, 168.

54. “Zvit holovy UDK v Belhii na III zahalnykh zborakh 1.6.1947–20.6.1948,” UDK Archive, “Richni zvity, 1945–1950.”

Kishka even advised the Belgian authorities to expel him). UDK had close ties with both Ukrainian churches. Its meetings always began with a Catholic and an Orthodox service, and every local branch had two vice-presidents, one from each denomination. The hierarchs of both churches supported each other; for example, Bishop Buchko attended the dedication of the Orthodox chapel in Maurage, Wallonia. The exact numbers of Greek Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox are unclear: of the 5,839 UDK members in December 1948, 1,924 declared themselves to be Greek Catholics and 1,040 Ukrainian Orthodox, but 2,875 members did not declare their affiliation.⁵⁵

The socio-cultural activities of UDK were not affected by the political polarization. In fact, they increased in scope as the newly arrived DPs and the interwar immigrants learned to work together. The pre- and postwar migrants also worked together in the Ukrainian Learning Educational Society (Ukrainske naukovo-osvitne tovarystvo, or UNOT), which arose in 1947 and set up Saturday schools for Ukrainian children. By 1949 UNOT ran twelve schools and taught 346 children the Ukrainian language, geography, history, and culture, using textbooks from Germany. Another example of this socio-cultural cooperation was the Ukrainian commercial cooperative Dnipro, established in 1948. It was founded by a newly arrived student with pre-war cooperative experience in Ukraine and an interwar immigrant with knowledge about the Belgian market.⁵⁶

By mid-1948 UDK's host society-oriented policy embracing all Ukrainians regardless their political profile was challenged by the DPs' divisive, homeland-oriented politics. While UDK's cultural, economic, and religious activities promoted community unity, the political groupings imported from the DP camps led to controversy, strife, and polarization. It was unclear which tendency would prevail.

55. We do not know why they did not declare their affiliation. They may not have identified with either church, or they may have been uncertain about the status of the two churches in Belgium. See *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 October 1948 and 1 November 1948; "Pravylnyk Dopomohovo komitetu v Belhii 20.6.1948," Popovych Archive UDK file; and "Skhemychnyi zvit z pratsi UDK v Belhii v dilovomu rotsi 1948-49," UDK Archive, "Richni zvity, 1945-1950."

56. Myroslav Semchyshyn, "Kooperatyvni orhanizatsii ukrainskoi emihratsii v Zakhidnii Evropi," in *Ukrainska kooperatsiia diaspori: Istorychnyi ohlad 1930-1995*, ed. Omelian Pleshkevych (Chicago and Kyiv: Ukrainska svitova kooperatyvna rada, 1996), 59; *Tryzub*, 1948, no. 4: 6; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 March 1948, 15 May 1948, and 15 June 1948.

The final split. UNRada, the legislative organ of the Ukrainian National Republic Government-in-exile, convened in occupied Germany in July 1948 and was recognized by all Ukrainian political parties. This event deeply affected the Ukrainian community in Belgium. In August 1948 sixty-two representatives of ten Ukrainian organizations in Belgium convened a coordination conference and recognized UNRada.⁵⁷ The First Congress of Ukrainians in Belgium, which was held in Brussels on 1 November 1948, aligned UDK's organizational structure with UNRada's and elected UDK's president, Andrii Kishka, head of the newly founded Supreme Council of Ukrainian Civic Organizations in Belgium (*Holovna rada ukrainskykh hromadskykh orhanizatsii v Belhii*, or HRUHOB). Each organization had a seat on HRUHOB, which functioned as the mouthpiece of UNRada in Belgium. Its office was located in a rented house at 7 Guimard Street in Brussels.⁵⁸

The Bandera faction of the OUN soon left UNRada. This split extended to Belgium. In March 1949 some activists accused UDK of political and ideological insubordination to UNRada. They charged UDK with favouritism for the Banderites and the Greek Catholics. Although President Kishka was politically neutral, they set up the UNRada Support Committee (*Komitet spryiannia UNRadi*). At the next general assembly in June 1949, Mariian Dzoba was elected president, but the supporters of UNRada, led by I. Skyba, did not recognize him and submitted an alternate list of the executive board. This sparked a final rift. The dissidents were expelled from the executive board of UDK—democratically, according to the Banderites, and unfairly, according to their opponents—and in September 1949 transformed the UNRada Support Committee into the Union of Ukrainians in Belgium for Supporting UNRada (*Soiuz ukraintsiv u Belhii spryiannia UNRadi*, or SUB), which was headed by Andriievsky and Kishka. Thus, the polarization that had taken place in the German DP camps recurred in Belgium as organizations realigned themselves along new political fault lines.⁵⁹ However,

57. The ten organizations were UDK, TKUV, UNOT, SUM, Plast, Dnipro, UHKTs, UAPTs, NaSUS, and the Union of Ukrainian Women in Belgium (*Obiednannia ukrainok u Belhii*, or OUB).

58. *Tryzub*, 1948, nos. 8–9: 14; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 September 1948 and 15 November 1948.

59. Polish security saw political identification with UPA as the cause for the split but mentioned also the generational conflict. For example, Andriievsky, who was about fifty-

the Banderites' objectives reached beyond traditional party activities: by means of social and cultural work, they wanted to gain control over the whole Ukrainian community in Belgium.

The Bandera camp consisted of the umbrella organization HRUHOB and six other Ukrainian organizations. Three of them had a monopoly in their area of public life. UDK remained the largest organization: by mid-1950 it had twenty-one local branches and 3,408 registered members. That year it became the sole Ukrainian representative in the Belgian Committee for Refugees and served as an intermediary between the Belgian state and individual migrants in distributing relief. Taking advantage of Plast's identity crisis, SUM became the representative of all Ukrainian youth in Belgium. In its official program it did not mention its affiliation with the Bandera faction but stressed loyalty to Ukraine and Christian moral values.⁶⁰ Dnipro, which had its head office at the same address as HRUHOB, was the only Ukrainian cooperative in Belgium.

The other three organizations had to compete with organizations headed by SUB. All of them were larger than their rivals. HRUHOB collaborated with the ACV-CSC, and all its 803 members were automatically affiliated with the Christian trade union.⁶¹ Secondly, OUB did not change its relationship with UDK and from November 1948 reported about its work in *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*. Finally, UNOT experienced a few years of instability because of the high remigration rate and the resignation of some members, but it remained the main Ukrainian educational organization in Belgium.⁶²

five years old, had to give up his position to the younger ex-soldier Pryshliak ("Sprawy ukraińskie. Komunikat Wiadomości Bieżących," Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, IPN BU 00231/309, 2: 157-9; and M. Demchuk, "Velyka manifestatsiia v Lezh," *Ukrainske slovo*, 18 September 1949).

60. "Programme 1-er Congrès des Travailleurs Ukrainiens en Belgique (31.10-1.11.1948)," Popovych Archive, UDK file; and "Union de la Jeunesse ukrainienne en Belgique / Verbond der Oekraïense Jeugd in België," *Le Moniteur Belge*, 30 July 1949. Since 1845 *Le Moniteur Belge* has been the official publication of the Ministry of Justice. It announces new laws and the registration of organizations.

61. HRUHOB's influence on Ukrainian syndicalism within the Christian ACV-CSC became clear when it enrolled all 803 of its male members. Members of HRUHOB became members of ACV-CSC automatically, without signing up individually. Other immigrant communities, such as the Polish one, had a lower degree of syndicalism because their members had to join the ACV-CSC individually.

62. Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 166; Semchyshyn, "Kooperatyvni orhanizatsii ukrainskoi emihratsii," 59-60; and *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 5 June

SUB, in contrast, presented itself as the national committee of Ukrainians in Belgium and opened its doors to all sympathizers of UNRada. By mid-1949 it had 650 members and the support of four organizations. Most but not all of their leading members had arrived in Belgium before the Second World War. Both UHKTs and UAPT were affiliated with SUB, although Kishka accused the Bandera faction of exploiting religion and gave this as the reason for the split. The third organization was TKUV, which the veterans of the Second World War did not join. Consequently, its membership remained more or less the same as in the interwar years. The last SUB member organization was the Ukrainian affiliate of the socialist trade union ABVV-FGTB. It was organized in 1949 as a competitor of the union controlled by the Bandera faction. ABVV-FGTB, however, was less active in the recruitment of immigrants, and the Ukrainian workers were represented by a Polish unionist, Władysław Dehnel.⁶³

Thus each Ukrainian camp was tied to a different Belgian trade union. In making their choice they did not take into account the ideological differences between the Belgian unions: HRUHOB was not manifestly a Christian democratic organization, and SUB did not have a socialist profile. The heir of UDK simply continued to work with the trade union that UDK had joined, and SUB chose the only other major union available. The Belgian trade unions became drawing cards in the competition between the Ukrainian organizations. HRUHOB was more successful here. Thanks to its affiliation with ACV-CSC, HRUHOB became associated with the Christian pole in the polarized Belgian society.⁶⁴ As a result, by 1948–49 it became evident that the Bandera

1949, 15 February 1950, 1 July 1950, 15 July 1950, 1 November 1950, and 7 January 1951.

63. Dehnel attacked UDK in his general letter of August 1950, criticizing UDK because it took up a political agenda and in this way reversed its original idea of embracing all elements of Ukrainian society. See *Visti Ukrainiskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 15 April 1950 and 1 October 1950; M. Demchuk, "Velyka manifestatsiia v Lezh," *Ukrainske slovo*, 18 September 1949; *Belgian Monitor*, 30 July 1949 and 18 February 1950. On Dehnel, see Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 142–4.

64. Polarization is the division of society according to political ideology. In the second half of the twentieth century there was a Roman Catholic, socialist, and liberal pole in Belgium. Labour unions, schools, companies, and even sport clubs affiliated themselves with one of these poles.

faction had captured the dominant role in Ukrainian community life in Belgium.

The rivalry between HRUHOB and SUB culminated in several lawsuits involving the Ukrainian house in Brussels and a fight in the little Walloon municipality of Hanzi-Pomerolles near La Louvière. In 1948 Kishka, who headed UDK, had rented with private funds a house for UDK on Guimard Street. When he was not re-elected president, he refused to transfer the lease to the next board and to leave the house. A Belgian judge ruled against him four times, but Kishka vacated the house only in the 1950s when he migrated to Canada. By that time UDK had already established itself at another address, at 72 Charlemagne Avenue. The other incident, in Hanzi-Pomerolles, is a good example of the hostility between UDK and SUB. After the UDK branches in Hanzi-Pomerolles and Péronnes-Resse switched to SUB, some local UDK members beat up Mykola Trembach, the SUB president in Hanzi-Pomerolles. Seven of them were found guilty and were sentenced by the court in Mons. As a result, UDK and SUB attacked each other in the press: UDK in *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii* and SUB in *Ukrainski visti* and *Ukrainske slovo*. Their articles did not address ideological issues but merely vilified the other side.⁶⁵

One organization remained on the sidelines in the controversy. The student union NaSUS continued its attempts to bridge the growing division in the Ukrainian community. Its choir, for instance, performed at both UDK and SUB celebrations. In 1949 NaSUS decided to change its executive each year, electing alternately proponents of the Bandera and the Melnyk factions. Two years later it elected a unity executive led by the Third Force (Tretia Syl'a).⁶⁶

The dispute in UDK clearly marked a shift from a united to a polarized Ukrainian community in Belgium. The rift has not healed to

65. The paper *Ukrainske slovo* expressed the ideas of the Melnyk faction of the OUN and was published in Paris from 1948. *Ukrainski visti* was the voice of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (Ukrainska revoliutsiina demokratychna partiia, or URDP) and supported UNRada until the 1960s. See Ilnytskyj, "A Survey of Ukrainian Camp Periodicals, 1945–50," 277; Kulyk, "The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Emigré Community," 224; Maruniak, *Ukrainska emihratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii*, 277–9; *Visti Ukrainskoho dopomohovo komitetu Belhii*, 1 April 1950, 1 May 1950, 1 August 1950, 10 December 1950; and *Biuletyn Soiuzu ukrainsiv u Belhii*, 31 March 1950.

66. From then on the members wore a golden three on their student hats (Tatarsky, ed., *Liuvn 1930–1985*, 118–19). *Biuletyn Soiuzu ukrainsiv u Belhii*, 31 March 1950.


this day. It was caused by Ukrainian organizations outside Belgium, primarily the Bandera faction, which tried to capture the leadership in the community. The fault lines that emerged cut across social divisions such as generations and classes, although SUB represented mostly pre-war immigrants while UDK consisted mostly of DPs. Previous polarizing factors, such as regional identities, were pushed into the background. The Ukrainian community in Belgium, which was developing a common national identity, was split by a political dispute that polarized the whole Ukrainian diaspora.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian emigration in Belgium changed fundamentally in the first half of the twentieth century. In the interwar period different types of immigrant organizations appeared at different places of settlement. In provincial mining areas, folk community-type groups of economic immigrants sprang up. They expressed a regional identity and received support only from mine managements. In the cities organizational life was based on nationality-type groups consisting of Ukrainian political refugees from different parts of Ukraine. They received minimal support from the Belgian government. After the Second World War, the united Ukrainian relief effort overcame the geographical dichotomy of the emigration in Belgium. Although UDK appealed to all Ukrainians, it did not represent the largest group of new Ukrainian immigrants, the women who married Belgians who had worked in Germany during the Second World War. The mass influx of DPs in 1947–48 caused a change in the priorities of UDK. From a defensive umbrella organization focused on integrating newcomers, UDK became a partisan player in the larger political dispute splitting the postwar emigration. The Ukrainian community in Belgium became polarized between two political blocs, which used contacts with the host society to increase their influence. As more than half of the Ukrainian population in Belgium emigrated overseas and no new immigrants arrived, the Ukrainian community in Belgium was doomed to remain divided.

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Iosyp Stadnyk, Director and Actor of the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv in 1941–1942

Svitlana Maksymenko

Iosyp Dmytrovych Stadnyk (b. 18 March 1876 in the village of Valiava, Peremyshl County, Galicia, d. 8 December 1954 in Lviv) is a well known figure in the history of the Ukrainian theatre of the first half of the twentieth century. He began his theatre career in 1894 as an actor in the Ruska Besida Theatre (Teater tovarystva Ruska Besida) in Lviv. A skilful organizer, actor, director, translator, and pedagogue, Stadnyk headed many Ukrainian theatrical groups in Galicia. A whole dynasty of actors is connected with him: his wife, Sofiia, and children, Stefa, Iarema, and Sofiia (Zabolotska), were all talented actors. In 1947 Stadnyk was arrested by agents of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR and unjustly sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for "working for the enemy" in 1941–44 as a member of the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv (Ukrainskyi teater mista Lvova). This accounts for the fact that for many years his name did not appear in Soviet theatre studies. This article is a first attempt to give a detailed analysis of Stadnyk's work as a play director in Lviv from 1941 to 1942 and thus refute the charges of Soviet theatre scholars that the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv collaborated with the German occupation authorities.

The Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv was founded on 1 July 1941 in German-occupied Lviv.¹ In the fall of 1941, when Galicia

1. Archives and special collections of documents about the theatre during the Second World War have become accessible to historians only after Ukraine's declaration of

became part of the Generalgouvernement, the Germans changed its name to the Lviv Opera Theatre (Lvivskyi opernyi teatr, or LOT). The theatre had four sections: opera, ballet, operetta, and drama, and had a staff of about 600 people. During its brief lifetime (until 19 June 1942) it staged twenty-four plays (mostly Ukrainian and world classics), eighteen operas and operettas, five ballets, and two ballet evenings. The intense work of this professional theatre was not prompted by any special sentiments of the occupation authorities, who were governed only by pragmatic considerations—to provide their soldiers and allies with artistic recreation. Grasping the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet mood of Galician Ukrainians, the officials of the German Propaganda Department, which oversaw the theatre, treated Galicia as a former territory of the Austrian monarchy and interfered in the theatre's internal affairs less than former Polish and Soviet censors. The theatre was managed by two directors: a Ukrainian director—A. Petrenko (from July 1941 to June 1942) and V. Blavatsky (from June 1942 to June 1944)—and a German director—F. Weidlich (from August 1942 to September 1943) and Horst-Tanu Margraf (from February 1944). The Germans had miscalculated, for the theatre they financed in fact worked ideologically against them. A foreign spectator perceived the performances of the Lviv theatre very differently from a Ukrainian spectator: the first missed the powerful national subtext that the latter grasped. As Valerii Haidabura asserts, “the theatre that the enemy engaged to serve its needs was oriented at communicating with its own people.”²

So far there are no in-depth studies of Stadnyk's contribution as an actor and play director to the development of the Ukrainian theatre. The most recent reference books—*Mystsi Ukrainy*, ed. A.V. Kudrytsky (Kyiv: Ukrainska entsyklopediia, 1992) and *Mystetstvo Ukrainy: Biohrafichnyi*

independence. Until recently information about the activities of the Lviv theatre could be found only in publications outside Ukraine: Hryhor Luzhnytsky, ed., *Nash teatr: Knyha diiachiv ukrainskoho teatralnoho mystetstva*, 2 vols. (New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto: Obiednannia myststiv ukrainskoi stseny, 1975, 1992); Valerian Revutsky, *Neskoreni berezyltsi Iosyp Hirniak i Olimpiia Dobrovol'ska* (New York: Slovo, 1985); and idem, *V orbiti svitovoho teatru* (Kyiv, Kharkiv, and New York: M.P. Kots, 1995).

2. V. Haidabura, “Stsenichne mystetstvo v Ukraini periodu nimetsko-fashystskoi okupatsii,” *Ukrainskyi teatr XX stolittia*, ed. Nelli Korniienko et al. (Kyiv: Vyd-vo LDL, 2003), 323. For a detailed discussion of this question, see my “Lvivskyi Opernyi Teatr 1941–1944 rokiv: Dyskursyvnyi analiz suchasnykh doslidzhen istoriyiv teatru Polshchi ta Ukrainy,” *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Serii mistetstvoznavstva*, vyp. 5 (2005).

dovidnyk, ed. A.V. Kudrytsky (Kyiv: Ukrainska entsyklopediia, 1997)—tell us the following:

He completed Polish drama studies. From 1894 to 1913 he was an actor and play director at the Ruthenian People's Theatre in Lviv (its director in 1906–13) and at the M. Sadovsky Theatre (1917–18). From 1913 to 1939 (with interruptions) he headed professional Ukrainian troupes in Galicia, the I. Tobilevych Theatre (1933–35), the Lesia Ukrainka Ukrainian Drama Theatre in Lviv (1939–41), the drama theatre in Drohobych (1944–45), and the Lviv Theatre of Miniatures (1945–47)... He taught at the M. Lysenko School of Music and Drama in Kyiv (1917–18), the drama school at the M. Lysenko Higher Musical Institute in Lviv (1922–24), and other studios and schools. His students include A Buchma, M. Krushelnytsky, Ie. Kokhanenko, and Ia. Helias.³

The entries for Stadnyk's wife, Sofiia, daughter Stefa, and son, Iarema, also omit any mention of the war years. Thus the Soviet myth is continued in Ukraine's most authoritative reference books: there is no mention of Stadnyk's illegal arrest and the dates of his work in Drohobych are false (he began to work there in 1943).

Stadnyk's work in the theatre has been studied by his contemporaries: Dmytro Antonovych, Stepan Charnetsky, Hryhor Luzhnytsky, Mykhailo Rudnytsky, and Valerian Revutsky. In the 1950s and 1960s Stadnyk's name appeared in Soviet accounts of the history of the Ukrainian theatre. He was mentioned in R. Pylypchuk's chapter "Teatr na zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemliakh" (The Theatre in West Ukrainian Territories) and Iu. Kostiuk's chapter "Stvorennia novykh teatralnykh kolektyviv u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSS" (The Founding of New Theatrical Collectives in the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR) in the two-volume collection *Ukrainskyi dramatychnyi teatr*, ed. M.T. Rylsky (Kyiv: AN URSS, 1965 and 1959). R. Pylypchuk was also the author of the entry on Stadnyk in *Teatralnaia entsyklopediia*, ed. S.S. Mokulsky, vol. 4 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsyklopediia, 1965).

One of the first Soviet researchers of Stadnyk was Leontyna Melnychuk-Luchko, the author of *Ternystym shliakhom* (On the Road of Thorns) (Lviv, 1961). The people's artist of the USSR Marian Krushelnytsky's article in the paper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, *Radianska Ukraina*, was crucial in reinstating Stadnyk's name in Soviet theatre studies, although it was not reprinted in Krushel-

3. *Mystetstvo Ukrainy*, 556.

nytsky's collection of recollections and articles, compiled by V. Rusaniv (1969), because of an oversight. In it Stadnyk's grateful pupil pays tribute to his master without mentioning his activities during the German occupation and his arrest. He places Stadnyk alongside I. Hrynevetsky, K. Rubchakova, V. Iurchak, and Sofiia Stadnyk. "The war interrupted the master's work, and in the postwar period he was fated to work only for a short while in one of the new Lviv theatres."⁴ The author had to pretend that he did not know anything about Stadnyk's activities during the Second World War.

Petro Medvedyk wrote the entry on Stadnyk in *Ukrainskaadianska entsyklopediia*, ed. M.P. Bazhan, 2d ed., vol. 2 (Kyiv: Holovna redaktsiia URE, 1984) and a series of articles on him but so far has failed to produce the long-awaited book for which the Stadnyk family lent him its photographs and documentary materials. Mykhailo Rudnytsky, a well-known Ukrainian writer, translator, scholar, and a professor of Lviv University, devoted separate sketches to Stadnyk in his *U naimakh v Melpomeny* (In the Service of Melpomene) (Kyiv, 1963) and *Neperedbacheni zustrichi* (Unforeseen Encounters) (Lviv: Kameniar, 1969), but did not mention the war years. In her *A muzy ne movchaly: Lviv, 1941–1944 roky* (But the Muses Were not Silent: Lviv, 1941–1944) (Lviv: Zerna, 1996) and *Lvivska opera* (The Lviv Opera) (co-authored with Vasyl Pylypiuk, Lviv: Svitlo i tin, 2000), the Lviv musicologist Oksana Palamarchuk writes about the plays staged by Stadnyk during the war. Valerii Haidabura for the first time discusses Stadnyk's arrest and some fragments from the last years of his life in *Teatr, zakhovanyi v arkhivakh* (The Theatre Concealed in Archives) (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1998) and his theatrical work in Lviv during the war in *Teatr mizh Hitlerom i Stalynym: Ukraina, 1941–1944. Doli mysttsiv* (The Theatre between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine, 1941–1944. The Fates of Artists) (Kyiv: Fakt, 2004). Stadnyk's musical drama repertoire in the 1920s is thoroughly studied by Olena Bonkovska in her *Lvivskiy teatr tovarystva "Ukrainska Besida," 1915–1924* (The Lviv Theatre of the Ukrainska Besida Society, 1915–1924) (Lviv: Litopys, 2003). Stadnyk is mentioned briefly as an associate of the Institute of Folk Creativity during the German occupation of Lviv in Serhii Shnerkh's *Nezmovkna pisnia* (Unsilenced Song) (Lviv:

4. M. Kryshelnytsky, "Zhyttia, viddane mystetstvu," *Radianska Ukraina*, 9 September 1962.

Te-Rus, 2001) and in the fifth volume of *Istoriia ukrainskoi muzyky, 1941–1958* (The History of Ukrainian Music, 1941–1958) (Kyiv: Instytut mystetstvoznavstva, folklorystyky ta etnologii im. M. Rylskogo NANU, 2004). My articles “Sprava ioho zhyttia” (His Life’s Task) in *Prostsenium*, 2001, no. 1, pp. 20–35, and “Frahmenty kryminalnoi spravy Iosypa Stadnyka no. P-19658 arkhivu USBU u Lvivskii oblasti” (Fragments of Iosyp Stadnyk’s Criminal Case No. P-19658 in the USBU Archive of Lviv Oblast) in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka. Pratsi Teatroznavchoi komisii* 255 (2003), pp. 641–65, deal with Stadnyk’s work in the Lviv city theatre in 1941 and 1942 and his trial after the war.

My attempt to disclose the least studied period of Stadnyk’s theatrical career—the two years he devoted to the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv during the German occupation—is based on reviews in the press at the time, articles published outside Ukraine (mainly in the collection *Nash teatr*), and archival materials connected with Stadnyk’s criminal case. To draw an objective picture of his life and work in that period one must distance oneself from accounts left by both his admirers and opponents. A colourful and influential figure, Stadnyk had plenty of both.

Hryhor Luzhnytsky, a historian of the theatre, wrote the following about Stadnyk’s war period: “After the fall of Poland in 1940–43 Stadnyk worked as a play director and actor at the Lviv Opera Theatre, but left it as a result of misunderstandings in 1943 [actually in June 1942—S.M.] and accepted the position of director of the Ukrainian theatre in Drohobych. There is no accurate information about Stadnyk under the second Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine.”⁵ At the same time the author admits that Stadnyk “did not have special admirers during his life.” He mentions D. Antonovych and S. Charnetsky, who “treated him very differently, but neither was completely objective and fair.”⁶ In another article Luzhnytsky explains: “The actors did not like him because, as an ‘entrepreneur,’ he did not always fulfil his obligations; the ‘entrepreneurs’ did not like him because he was ruthless towards others; and finally, the champions of true art did not like him because to succeed at the box office. Stadnyk often staged what was popularly called ‘grease’ (*shmir*).

5. H. Luzhnytsky, “Iosyp Stadnyk,” in *Ukrainskyi teatr: Naukovi pratsi, statii, retsenzii* (Lviv: Lvivskyi natsionalnyi universytet im. I. Franka and Ukrainskyi vilnyi universytet, 2004), 2: 98. First published in *Kyiv* (Philadelphia), 1955, no. 5: 225–8.

6. *Ibid.*, 95.

But today, from the perspective of so many years, one can say with certainty that it is simply impossible to imagine the Ukrainian theatre without Stadnyk."⁷

The history of the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv began with two productions staged by Stadnyk. The theatre opened with S. Hulak-Artemovsky's *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem* (Zaporozhian beyond the Danube) on 19 July 1941, and this was followed by M. Starytsky's *Oi, ne khody, Hrytsiu* (Don't Go to Parties, Hryts). Both productions remained in the company's repertoire to the very end and were favourites with the general spectator. The brilliant actor Ivan Rubchak won a place in the history of the Ukrainian theatre in Galicia back at the beginning of the twentieth century also as an opera singer (an example of Stadnyk's school of the synthetical actor) for his rendering of Karas's role in Hulak-Artemovsky's operetta.

Accustomed to the experimental conditions of an itinerant theatre, Stadnyk was able to mobilize the new collective and prepare two jewels of the national theatre under difficult war conditions in Lviv. Today this achievement should be seen as a civic act of a life-long defender of Ukrainian culture.

Volodymyr Blavatsky assessed the production of Starytsky's play in this way:

We had the stage set for *Oi, ne khody, Hrytsiu* designed by the artist Borysovets back under the Soviet regime. Now Stadnyk finished his production and soon the Lviv spectators had an opportunity to see this play on the stage. Its best feature was Borysovets' very beautiful stage set, particularly for the first act; it simply captivated the eye. The folk costumes, which were very authentic in style and carefully prepared, were no less beautiful. As for the staging of the play, one can argue at length about it. Not all actors played their roles satisfactorily. The talented Helias particularly failed to overcome all the difficulties of Hryts's role, and the director, probably, was largely responsible for this. But in spite of some shortcomings in the directing and acting, the play was quite a success and survived in the repertoire for three full years.⁸

Unfortunately, when the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv opened, the Lviv newspapers published only short informational notices

7. H. Luzhnytsky, "Z istorii ukrainskoho teatru," in *Ukrainskyi teatr*, 2: 106. First published in *Kyiv* (Philadelphia), 1953.

8. V. Blavatsky, "Try roky 'Lvivskoho opernogo teatru,'" in Revutsky, *V orbiti svitovoho teatru*, 191.

about its performances. Longer articles and reviews appeared later, beginning in mid-1942. In this respect, Stadnyk, who worked in this theatre only until June 1942, was unlucky.

A reviewer with the pseudonym Lvovianyn described the successful launching of the new theatre in *Krakovski visti* in these words: "The first volley consisted of popular plays such as *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem*, *Oi, ne khody*, *Hrytsiu*, *Natalka Poltavka* (Natalka from Poltava), and *Marusia Bohuslavka*. No matter how old they may be, they always attract a large audience and ensure box-office success. They are also enjoyed by German soldiers, who attend the Ukrainian performances in quite large numbers and enthusiastically applaud Ukrainian songs and dances."⁹

On 28 August 1941 Stadnyk for the first time staged Ivan Franko's play *Ukradene shchastia* (Stolen Happiness). One of the first reviews of the premiere contains a contemporary interpretation of Franko's drama, which takes place "around 1870 in a foothill village called Nezvanychi":

One can argue for a long time about who is the positive character and who is most blameworthy, if one can talk about blame. Here is a piece of life, of real life with pulsating blood in which the human passions are not moderated by love of one's neighbour but, on the contrary, are excited by egoism, which tries to win happiness even if for a moment and at the cost of another's happiness....

In Ms. Luzhnytsky's appearance and interpretation Hanna Zadorozhna fully justifies the rarely seen strength of feeling with which her former lover, Mykhailo Hurman, tries to snatch her from the arms of her unloved husband. Mr. Soroka has created an interesting type of a kind person who would have worked quietly all his life if fate had not cast him into a whirlpool of human passions. Mr. Helias's M[ykhailo] Hurman is an example of a man who can be consistent in "stealing his happiness back." All three roles are performed at a high level. Mr. Pazdrii as Oleksa Babych and Ms. Serdiukova as his wife, Nastia, are a perfect neighbourly couple. Many a real reeve would have been jealous of Mr. Rubchak's appearance and "management." Mr. Iakovliv, as always, is very good. The young wives, boys, and girls created a colourful backdrop for the tragedy of three characters. *Director Stadnyk's staging is very painstaking.*¹⁰

9. Lvovianyn, "Teatralna sprava u Lvovi," *Krakovski visti*, 7 September 1941.

10. ob (Osyp Bodnarovych), "Ukrainskyi Teatr m. Lvova. 'Ukradene shchastia,'" *Lvivski visti*, 30 August 1941. The emphasis is mine—S.M.

The reviewer shows a very interesting contemporary treatment of Franko's drama, which in 1941 sounded like a tragedy of all three people, who are "hostages" of fate. The attempt to steal back what has been lost leads to irredeemable events. How is this conception of the play, familiar to both spectators and the director, not new?

Krakivski visti also gave the play a positive review:

The next piece is a serious play—Ivan Franko's drama in five acts *Ukradene shchastia* under the direction of I. Stadnyk. One must acknowledge that the staging of *Ukradene shchastia* shows much care, and the performers of the main roles (Ms. Luzhnytska, Mr. Soroka, and Mr. Helias) have created perfect characters. Similarly, the performers of the secondary roles are up to their task: Mr. Pazdrii and Ms. Serdiukova as a pair of neighbours, Mr. Rubchak as reeve, and Mr. Iakovliv. There was some anxiety about attendance, but it proved to be groundless: at the first two performances of this drama the public has completely filled the auditorium.¹¹

The staging of Johann Strauss's operetta *Der Zigeunerbaron* (The Gypsy Baron) was Stadnyk's fourth production at the Lviv theatre. Its premiere took place on 14 October 1941 and it confirmed the director's many-sided talents. J. Schnitzer's libretto is based on M. Jókai's work. The music is by J. Strauss. The translation was done by Ie. Olesnytsky and I. Stadnyk. The conductor was Ia. Barnych; the choirmaster, N. Hornytsky; the play director, I. Stadnyk; his assistant, O. Iakovliv; the choreographers were O. Sukhoveska and R. Herynovych; and the music director was L. Turkevych.

After its premiere Osyp Bodnarovych submitted an enthusiastic article to *Lvivski visti* in which he stated that the premiere of *Der Zigeunerbaron* "exceeded all our expectations."¹² The reviewer praised Stadnyk for restoring a valuable European operetta to the Lviv stage and, more importantly, for inculcating in the Ukrainian audience a taste for and an appreciation of J. Strauss's works.

Thanks to its melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic richness *The Gypsy Baron* is one of the best and most difficult of Strauss's operettas. To perform it properly is no easy task. The Ukrainian theatre in Lviv overcame all the difficulties. It is hard to decide what should be singled

11. Lvovianyn, "Teatralna sprava u Lvovi," *Krakivski visti*, 7 September 1941.

12. Met (Osyp Bodnarovych), "Z teatru. 'Tsyhanskyi baron,'" *Lvivski visti*, 16 October 1941.

out first, because all the acts, the individual roles, the music, decorations, and ballet, *all were harmonized into one artistic whole*. Without doubt, the success of the performance depended first of all on the music director, who did his job faultlessly. Both the choir, which is the greatest asset of the whole opera, and the orchestra were brought to a high artistic level, for which the conductor Ia. Barnych and the choirmaster N. Hornytsky are undoubtedly responsible. *In general all the group scenes are at a level of which the best theatres might boast*. Of the soloists L. Chernykh (in the role of the Gypsy Czipra) deserves first place for her voice and acting. Every particular tone of her beautiful mezzo-soprano sounded full and finished. Ie. Pospieva (in the role of Sáffi) can overcome the difficulties of every aria with her voice and shows great singing possibilities. I. Poliakov fitted the role of the gypsy baron in every respect. With his soft tenor, his acting, and his whole presence he quickly wins the public's sympathy. Always consistently merry and joking, I. Rubchak in the role of Kálmán Zsupán has especially many opportunities to display his humour and wit. B. Pazdrii is an artist with a wide range of possibilities. We admired not only his skill as a comic but also the metallic tenor of his voice in the role of Conte Carnero. Ia. Helias effectively re-created the silhouette of the majestic Count Homonay. O. Bentsal-Karpiakova compensated for some vocal shortcomings with her youthful charm, attractiveness, and acting skill. The other actors were also almost flawless: V. Karpiak (in the role of Ottokár), N. Lisovska (her interpretation perhaps exaggerated Mirabella's character), I. Hirniak (in the role of Pali), and V Shasharovsky (as Józsi). The ballet performance deserves special mention. The ensemble is still struggling with problems of the developing stage, but its young, fresh talents promise a bright future.¹³

The editor-in-chief of *Lvivski visti* concluded his review of the premiere with the observation: "the hall, which was filled to capacity with the public, including prominent Ukrainian citizens and representatives of the military and civil authorities, often rewarded the actors with vigorous applause."¹⁴

The resonance of Stadnyk's production was so great that three days later the same paper printed another article on the operetta by the composer Borys Kudryk, who paid more attention to the musical value of the work. "*The Gypsy Baron*, written in 1885, together with *The Bat*, which was written eleven years earlier, constitutes the peak of Strauss's

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

theatrical work.... And now since the 14 of this month we have been listening with special feelings to the renewed *Gypsy Baron* under the leadership of conductor Ia. Barnych and performed partly by talents from Dnieper Ukraine who settled in Lviv during Soviet captivity and partly by old and young local talents. Its success is great and really worthy of the work."¹⁵

During his visit to Lviv on 21 October 1941, General Governor Hans Frank with Governor Liasz and his retinue attended a performance of the operetta. On 19 June 1944 *Der Zigeunerbaron* would be the last performance put on by the Lviv Opera Theatre.

In his memoirs Volodymyr Blavatsky acknowledges that "with some reservation about the mass scenes, the production of *The Gypsy Baron* has to be counted as a success. I. Stadnyk's production of *Gypsy Love* was weaker, and yet these two operettas were quite a success, and *The Gypsy Baron* even set a record in the number of performances."¹⁶ Here Blavatsky, who disliked Stadnyk and saw him as a rival, undervalues his production of *The Gypsy Baron*. In his recollections of the founding of the Lesia Ukrainka Theatre in Lviv by the Soviet authorities in 1939, Blavatsky also misrepresented the actors' attitude to Stadnyk: "Disregarding the actors' negative attitude to him [Stadnyk—S.M.], I decided to include him in the building of the new theatre, believing that at such a moment I should not dwell on past misunderstandings."¹⁷ I have studied the files of Stadnyk's criminal case no. P-19658 in the USBU archive of Lviv Oblast, which include numerous testimonies from actors who had worked with Stadnyk. Not all of them liked Stadnyk, but all of them recognized his professionalism and authority as a master of the stage who deserved the high reputation he enjoyed.

During their work in LOT relations between Blavatsky and Stadnyk changed radically: from a grateful pupil Blavatsky rose to director of the ensemble. Furthermore, their views on the theatre and their methods of working with actors were different. Stadnyk professed an actors' theatre (building his production mostly on an ensemble of experienced actors), while in 1941–44 Blavatsky dreamed of establishing a director's theatre

15. Borys Kudryk, "'Tsyhanskyi baron' na halytskii stseni," *Lvivski visti*, 19–20 October 1941.

16. Blavatsky, "Try roky 'Lvivskoho opernoho teatru,'" 187.

17. V. Blavatsky, "Spohady," in Revutsky, *V orbiti svitovoho teatru*, 164.

with which he became infatuated during his one-year stint at the Berezhil theatre in 1927–28. Their relations during the brief period they worked in the Lviv theatre could also be called a generational conflict: Blavatsky had reached the age of maturity (he was forty-one) while Stadnyk had exceeded the age of retirement (sixty-five).

On the occasion of the theatre's 200th performance, *Lvivski visti* published an interview with LOT's "literary officer" (chief of its literature department), Hryhor Luzhnytsky, who summarized its work in the following way: "First we put on our ancient *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem*. This was on 19 July 1941. The production was staged by our well-known theatrical activist and senior actor Iosyf Stadnyk. Up to now the operetta has been performed on our stage fourteen times; *The Gypsy Baron*, nineteen times; and *Oi, ne khody, Hrytsiu*, fifteen times."¹⁸ The numbers show that these operettas staged by Stadnyk were the theatre's most popular productions. Popularity is not always an index of quality, but in this case the praise Stadnyk received from reviewers for his professionalism, his knowledge of the material, and his personal style of directing testifies to the artistic level of the operettas. In *The Gypsy Baron* Stadnyk combined opera singers (L. Chernykh, Ie. Pospieva) with the brilliant dramatic and opera actor Ivan Rubchak and the young dramatic actor Ia. Helias, forming universal and sythetical actors for the future. Listing the better actors of the 1941–42 Lviv theatrical season, Luzhnytsky mentions: "Rubchak and Stadnyk are the seniors of our Dramatic Theatre. Here we also find names such as L. Kryvytska, V. Blavatsky, A. Sovacheva, N. Luzhnytska, V. Levytska."¹⁹

At first Blavatsky proposed that Stadnyk switch from director to actor, and when Stadnyk refused to do so, he fired him in June 1942.

At the beginning of July 1942 *Krakovski visti* provided some interesting statistics in the information column: "On 1 July this year the director of the Lviv Opera Theatre, Mr. Petrenko, the play director Mr. Iosyp Stadnyk, the conductor Ia. Barnych, the actors Holitsynska, Lisnovska, Mariia Hirniak, and Iosafat Horniatkevych, the singers Olena Dmytrash and O. Hrytsky, and about twenty members of the choir, ballet,

18. "Iuvilei Lvivskoho opernoho teatru: Rozмова z literaturnym kerivnykom teatru, d-rom Hr. Luzhnytskym," *Lvivski visti*, 12–13 April 1942.

19. Ibid.

and technical support left their positions.”²⁰ It is difficult to determine the exact number of people who left and the real reason for their dismissal in such numbers. During the war, work in the theatre guaranteed at least a minimal level of sustenance. The author of the news item was wrong about Barnych. According to Blavatsky, “Almost without exception, Ia. Barnych was always the conductor of the operettas.”²¹

The premiere of Franz Lehár’s operetta *Zigeunerliebe* (Gypsy Love) on 16 May 1942 was the last performance directed by Stadnyk in wartime Lviv. The set designer was M. Irshov; the ballet master, Ie. Vihiliev; the costume designer, Ie. Olesnytska; the conductor, Ia. Barnych; and the concertmaster, O. Holynska. The correspondent of *Krakovski visti* gave the production a negative review. He pointed out that Stadnyk had first staged this operetta in 1919. We may assume that the director staged a “copy” of his previous production or was experiencing a crisis connected with his future firing. We have no reason to question the reviewer’s judgment that there was nothing new in the performance:

The obsolete, banal libretto, which has very few witty remarks, can no longer excite anyone. For this reason a production of such an operetta now requires more than ever before stronger, good, vibrant voices, an opera personnel. On this side the new production of Lehár’s operetta fell far short. First of all this applies to the male roles, especially to the main role of the Gypsy Józsi, sung by V. Karpiak, who may have a voice, but his voice is raw, untrained, and simply unsuited for the operetta. The beautiful showpiece aria at the end of the first act, for which every singer receives a hurricane of applause, was rendered in such a way that one had to plug one’s ears.... Oddly enough, most of the life, spirit, and operetta mood on the stage was introduced by performers of secondary, episodic parts: the always excellent, one-of-a-kind Stefa Stadnyk in the role of the fifteen-year-old Jolán with her young partner S. Zaliesky (Kajetán) and the unrivalled I. Rubchak in the role of Mihály. As temptress Stadnyk captivated the audience with her youth and temperament, Rubchak with his acting talent and tuba bass. Among the male performers let me also name B. Pazdrii, who did his job as the landowner Dragotin.²²

The reviewer advised the actress O. Kalchenko “to continue her training, particularly to develop her voice in the higher register and to improve her

20. “Zakinchennia sezonu v Opernomu teatri,” *Krakovski visti*, 7 July 1942.

21. Blavatsky, “Try roky ‘Lvivskoho opernogo teatru,’” 189.

22. “Z teatru. ‘Tsyhanske kokhannia’ F. Lehara,” *Krakovski visti*, 24 May 1942.

acting.” He wished the leading actress of the dramatic ensemble, Vira Levytska (in the role of the widow Ilona) success at becoming an “operetta diva,” since she possessed “all the qualifications” for it.²³ The reviewer commented that the mass scenes were static, and only the choruses sounded “powerful and confident.”²⁴

In less than a year, from 19 July 1941 to 1 June 1942, Stadnyk staged five productions that confirmed his high professionalism and the cohesiveness of the actors’ ensemble. Some of the actors, including I. Rubchak, Sofiia Stadnyk, L. Kryvytska, and V. Blavatsky, had developed under his influence. Although these productions were not premieres (Stadnyk had staged them before in Galicia’s itinerant theatres), his creative approach and search for a new conceptual interpretation of the classics (as with I. Franko’s *Ukradene shchastia*), as well as a stable level of competence, from the very beginning guaranteed the theatre’s high rating.

In 1941 Stadnyk reached the age of sixty-five, an age of professional maturity, a settled style, and a confident mastery of the profession. “He was not a standard director who forces the actor to follow blindly the director’s instructions. On the contrary, for Stadnyk every actor had to be creative, had to express himself individually. This was the beginning of the school of actors-professionals.... Only stronger individuals benefited from this approach and eventually became prominent figures of the Ukrainian stage.”²⁵

I was able to find information in the Lviv press for 1941–42 about only two roles played by Stadnyk the actor, but these roles are indicative of Stadnyk’s acting talent and skill. The two roles are Harpagon in J.-B. Molière’s play *L’Avare* (The Miser) and Prince Menshikov in B. Lepky’s play *Baturyn*. Both plays were directed by Blavatsky.

There were two articles about the production of *L’Avare*. One of them was devoted exclusively to an analysis of Stadnyk’s rendering of Harpagon’s role. The premiere of Molière’s comedy in the dramatic department of the theatre took place on 27 September 1941. In his review in *Lvivski visti* Roman Slyvka implies that Stadnyk’s Harpagon was more interesting than Blavatsky’s, who alternated with Stadnyk:

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Luzhnytsky, “Iosyp Stadnyk,” 99.

Although the times and people, literary trends and ideas change, human vices always remain the same: malice, hypocrisy, avarice.... *The Miser* that the Ukrainian Theatre has produced with alternate casts is really a fine display of high artistic values, which our theatre has contributed to Lviv's cultural life. In particular, one cannot pass in silence the great success that the coryphée of Ukrainian theatrical life and Galicia's theatrical creativity, Mr. Iosyp Stadnyk, has achieved in this comedy. The Harpagon executed by Stadnyk during the performance on the 29 of this month is such a thoroughly realistic character that the spectator viewing Molière's comedy automatically finds familiar figures in his everyday life: they are not made up with theatrical characterization but are immediately brutal with their human vices. Stadnyk does not philosophize on the stage, he does not try to find a psychological excuse for Molière's hero, he does not exaggerate him to provoke the viewer's antipathy to the negative character. Harpagon is alive in Stadnyk's rendering and, because of this, the viewer does not feel aversion to him as to a so-called "black character," but accepts him as life has shaped him, as the actor has depicted him. To ridicule the miserly type wherever it might be and whoever it may be—Stadnyk has succeeded in this 100 percent. The long monologue at the end of the fourth act—and monologues are usually boring and most troublesome to the best actors—in I. Stadnyk's interpretation turned out to be, perhaps, the best part of the comedy. The public rewarded Mr. Stadnyk's performance with frequent deserving applause while the stage was open.²⁶

Undoubtedly, the creative ability of Stadnyk the actor was noticed by the public and contributed to the theatre's successful start. But the main point is that it squelched any suspicions among his enemies that Stadnyk had no acting talent. One can gather from Slyvka's review that Stadnyk's treatment of Harpagon was novel precisely in the fullness of the artist's humanity on the stage. Stadnyk contradicted here Pushkin's accusation that Molière's *Miser* is merely miserly and nothing more.

One can assume that Stadnyk arrived at his interpretation of Molière's hero with the help of a well-known Polish actor, Ludwik Solski, who staged *L'Avare* in 1924 at the Little Theatre in Lviv and appeared in the main role himself. It was one of the Polish master's finer achievements. On 5 June 1924 *Kurjer Lwowski* wrote this about his performance:

Solski in Harpagon's role is like a snail confined in a shell of passion. He touches the world but does not master it; he looks but does not see;

26. R. Slyvka, "Skupar," *Lvivski visti*, 31 October 1941.

he observes what does not exist; he acts but to no effect. This is a perfect school of passion, enriched, enlivened, finished, and constructed in a masterly fashion. On the background of posture and grimace—the bent knees, the terrible limping, the wrinkled face, the suspicious, constantly troubled, hungry, devouring look—Solski creates a whole series of psychic transformations and displays a full gamut of feelings—malicious satisfaction, amorous banter, short-sighted slyness, obedience and desperate rebellion or wailing—while he resolves the whole conflict in a masterly way in the preamble of the drama to which he only reduces access, arresting and harmonizing the comic and the serious with a definite tone of integrity.

I have been able to find a photograph of Ludwik Solski in this role at the Central Theatrical Museum in Warsaw. Even the old photograph conveys authenticity: one remembers a face such as this for the rest of one's life. One cannot forget it. I can only say that with unique, God-given feeling the actor has grasped the essence of his character and “reincarnated” the Miser. The pursuit of lucre is branded on him as on a wax mask.

This role played by Solski became legendary even during his lifetime, and Stadnyk could hardly have missed an opportunity of seeing Solski on stage. It is not a question of imitation: Solski's genius could have served only as a prompt, a key to an understanding of the nature of avarice, which turns people into caricatures, cripples, or tragifarcical figures. Even Stadnyk's enemies asserted that his successful portrayal of Harpagon could be explained by the fact that he had lived in the stipulated conditions as a theatrical entrepreneur. One can hardly expect a better “review”!

In her book of memoirs Lesia Kryvytska, who worked with Stadnyk and played his partner in *L'Avare*, describes the image Stadnyk created in this comedy. Of course, she could not speak directly about the Ukrainian Theatre of the City of Lviv—the topic was proscribed by the Soviet regime. But her observations and fragmentary descriptions of individual scenes are interesting.

It is hard to judge Stadnyk's amplitude as an actor in his youth when he played Khlestakov and Moor, Golokhvostov and Osvald, Tartuffe and Zhadov at the same time. By the time I worked with him he played character roles and did so with particular success.

I shall never forget his truly artistic theatrical creation such as Harpagon in Molière's comedy *The Miser*. I appeared in this play with Stadnyk many times. I played Elisa, Mariane, and Frosine, while Stadnyk, as far as I can remember, always played Harpagon.

This was truly a unique miser, a maniac, a slave to his only passion, the passion for gold, a fanatic of accumulating. The artist made a profound reading of the character and found an interesting external depiction of the role.²⁷

Kryvytska paints the external appearance of Harpagon-Stadnyk at the beginning of the play and as the plot develops:

A slightly bent figure; wandering, tiny eyes, like a rabbit's; withered, old hands, which he rubs all the time as if they were frozen. On his head is an old, dirty, black cap; at the end of his nose, framed glasses; his grey hair is unkempt.... Stadnyk immediately began his first dialogue with the servant Cleante-Leflesh in a very rapid tempo. His words and phrases flew like peas from a bag, and the rate increased until at the end of the scene, starting with Harpagon's words, "From whom did you steal?" the dialogue turns into a linguistic fireworks in which, however, every word is distinct, clear, and understandable—the artist's diction was flawless.²⁸

Stadnyk played one more negative character—the enemy of the Ukrainian people, Prince Menshikov, in the dramatization of B. Lepky's novel *Baturyn*. Here is what the reviewer O. Bodnarovych wrote about the play: "I can speak about the acting of almost all the actors only in words of praise. Here, above all I must mention B. Pazdrii, who as Nis has effectively reproduced the acting colonel of Pryluky, and I. Stadnyk, *who with his characteristic temperament rendered the bloodthirsty and cruel Menshikov.*"²⁹ The play's key idea of Cossack resistance to the invader hinted at the German occupation of Ukraine, and the play was very popular. After the twelfth performance the German department of propaganda in Lviv demanded that the play be stricken from the repertoire. The Germans may have detected a dangerous analogy in the enemy that Stadnyk had created.

In the absence of fuller analyses, the notices in the press about the roles Stadnyk played in 1941–42 can only give us a hint of the potential he could not realize because of the difficult conditions of life and work.

The theatre critic, Hryhor Luzhnytsky wrote: "As an actor Stadnyk reached his peak only a few times. His best artistic creations were

27. L. Kryvytska, *Povist pro moie zhyttia*, 2d ed. (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1965), 91.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Met (Osyp Bodnarovych), "Z teatru," *Lvivski visti*, 27 September 1941. The emphasis is mine—S.M.

Molière's miser, Karl Gutzkow's Uriel Akosta, and Tokeramio in Melchior Lengyel's *Taifun* (The Typhoon). In these roles Stadnyk was truly creative, did not imitate anyone, and his interpretation of the images was his own, and it was perfect."³⁰

Stadnyk was fated to work in Galicia, where he consistently created fine examples of Ukrainian theatrical art in opposition to the authorities, whether they were Austrian, Polish, Soviet, or German. Someone else would have given up, would not have endured. But not Stadnyk! The persistent struggle demanded strength and gave birth to enemies. But the maestro did not despair. He loved the theatre, people, and Ukraine. A student of the actors' studio in Lviv in 1940 recalled that "Stadnyk was very good, he loved us students. He never yelled at us, even when we deserved it. During acting classes he always only pleaded: 'Do it this way, I know you can do it!' After that, how could we, actually fifteen- to sixteen-year-old children, not try!?' Stadnyk was like a father to us, a good father, but demanding. Of all the lecturers the students liked him best."³¹

In his essay on Iosyp Stadnyk "Shukach skarbiv" (The Treasure Hunter), Mykhailo Rudnytsky wrote that the artist was a life-loving man, an unwavering optimist, and dreamed of writing a book of memoirs. "For many years he kept notes, jotting down artists' names, titles of plays, and the names of the accursed places where 'his' theatre stopped during its tours. He kept a systematic list of productions that had an unvarying success and noted down when the applause could be attributed to the talent or popularity of the actor and when to advertising or simply to the kindness of the public, which regardless of the play's quality, attended the performances every evening."³² According to Rudnytsky, Stadnyk had no intention of complaining in the unwritten memoirs, but he confided to Rudnytsky:

If only I were a journalist! I'd write how for many years, from morning till night, we had to scurry about, as in a trance, how we lost our mental equilibrium at the very thought of the evening performance because we did not have what was required for the stage! If our theatre at the time could have performed in Lviv for six months of the year, if we could have paid the actors enough, so that they would not have

30. Luzhnytsky, "Iosyp Stadnyk," 99.

31. My interview with Tetiana Shuster, 21 May 2005.

32. Rudnytsky, *Neperedbacheni zustrichi*, 59.

to worry where they would sleep tomorrow and what they would eat ...
eh!³³

In his *V naimakh u Melpomeny* Rudnytsky defines his understanding of Stadnyk's acting individuality:

In his young years he instantly transfigured himself into a young bachelor in ethnographic plays, hopped along in a dance, and sang along. With the same ease he could glue on a long beard when one of the older actors suddenly fell ill. He remembered the texts of plays and all the numbers of the budget very well. This was impressive, all the more so because his diction, careful and distinct, presented every word as on a platter. Professional routine often neglected the efforts to create a deeper theatrical impression. And yet the spectator, who wanted first of all to hear what was being said on the stage, approved of the actor's conscientiousness.³⁴

To restore the "forgotten" pages of the artist's creative biography and to realize Stadnyk's unrealized dream to write about "those years" is the duty of contemporary theatre scholars.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Taras Zakydalsky

33. Ibid.

34. Rudnytsky, *V naimakh u Melpomeny*, 60.

To Act or To Doubt: The Doctrine of Conscience in Inokentii Gizel's Treatise *Peace with God for Man*

Larysa Dovha

“Make a fool pray to God, and he'll smash his forehead”—this is how folk wisdom expresses the idea that one should observe a mean in all things. It is unlikely that today anyone would think of applying this saying to “spiritual matters” and especially to the religiosity of Orthodox Christians, whose spirituality is based on ascetic-monastic practices, praying communication with the Creator, maximal self-renunciation in life, and the subordination of one's own will to God's will. And yet at the time of the reform of the Orthodox Kyiv Metropolitanate¹ by Petro Mohyla and his circle, who tried to build a strong, disciplined church with a well-educated clergy capable of caring for and proselytizing the population, Ukrainian theologians began to call for moderation in expressions of piety, for they realized that a person with a paralyzed will, that is, a person who has been taught that all secular life is unconditionally evil, will not be able to find a place for himself either in seventeenth-century society² or in the renewed church. Unable to realize

1. On the reform of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, see A. Zhukovsky, *Petro Mohyla i pytannia iednosty tserkov* (Paris: Ukrainyskyi vilnyi universytet, 1969) and V.M. Nichyk, *Petro Mohyla v dukhovnii istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Znannia, 1997).

2. The leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church understood that life in rapidly changing circumstances demanded of their contemporaries an ability and desire to meet the challenges of the times, to understand and assess all the relevant conditions and factors, and to make their own choices in complex and sometimes extreme situations. Without rejecting the rule that in general prayer and renunciation of the world is the

himself in earthly life, doubting and “smashing his forehead” against the excessive fear of transgression, such a person is in a permanent conflict with himself, reacts inadequately to his environment and hence is rejected by it, and finally falls into despair, which is truly a mortal sin. Thus, it became urgent to change the approach in assessing earthly life: instead of forcing life into the Procrustean bed of traditional Orthodox morality³ and thus draining it of its vital power, to change the dimensions of the “bed” by renouncing the excessive rigidity of the moral doctrine. To do so it was necessary, in Jacques Le Goff’s words, to separate “church time,” that is, sacred time, which was devoted to prayer and religious practices, and “merchant time,”⁴ that is, profane time, which was left for attending to purely earthly problems, and to lift the brand of unconditional sinfulness from everything that took place in the latter, that is, that occurred of one’s own will according to human desire and need. In acknowledging that although human beings are inclined to transgressions and mistakes, they do not commit sin with every thought, word, and action that is directed at earthly existence, the church had to teach priests and laymen to distinguish grave (mortal) sins from pardoned ones and sinful acts from ordinary, everyday activities in society, which shape man’s life space, create material goods, perpetuate the species, and serve family and personal interests.

surest path to salvation, the theologians of the Mohyla circle changed their mind about the status of an active Christian attitude to secular life and pointed out that it was possible to find the “narrow path” to the Heavenly Kingdom without renouncing this world. They justified this position by arguing (1) that family and secular life are from God, hence we should not neglect them but should try to fulfill God’s plan to the best of our ability, and (2) that God does not call everyone, but only the elect, to the ascetic life, hence one should not foolishly take vows that one will not be able to keep. On this question, see my “Sotsialna Utopiia Inokentiiia Gizelia,” in *Ukraina XVII st.: Suspilstvo, filozofia, kultura*, ed. Myroslav Popovych et al. (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005), 227–66.

3. Examining the question of the moral teachings of Eastern Christianity, Sergei Bulgakov emphasized that “Orthodoxy does not have an autonomous ethics ... it is an image of the soul’s salvation drawn in religious-ascetic terms. The religious-ethical maximum is attained ... in the monastic *ideal*.... Orthodoxy does not have different scales of morality, but applies one and the same scale to different conditions in life. It does not have different moralities, a secular and a monastic one; the difference is a matter of degree, of quantity, not of quality” (S. Bulgakov, “Etika v Pravoslavii,” in his *Pravoslavie* [Moscow: Folio, 2001], 215).

4. Jacques Le Goff, “Au Moyen Age: Temps de l’Eglise et temps du marchand,” in his *Pour un autre Moyen Age: Temps, travail et culture en Occident* (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), 46–65.

The existential principle of this distinction is conscience, which compares every action with a certain ideal standard and pronounces a verdict about the nature of the behaviour, the necessity or permissibility of the given actions, and the conformity of its own moral character with the chosen model. Because of its relativity, the "moral standard" cannot create a constant that will be correct in all circumstances of life; hence, conscience finds itself in a very difficult situation: every time when the will prefers some object or action and inclines reason to accept and realize this preference, conscience should act as a kind of judge that classifies actions and strivings and then selects the exact article from a great code of laws by which they should be judged. Conscience constantly seeks the golden mean, which is equally distant from complete permissiveness and promiscuity on the one hand and the full fettering of the will on the other hand. This is a complex task, which believers do not always succeed in resolving: sometimes they "smash their forehead" and sometimes they completely forget to "pray to God." Hence conscience should invoke reason, which relies on knowledge of the formal criteria for distinguishing good and evil, to assist intuition in assessing concrete situations. The refurbished moral doctrine, which was set forth in special handbooks⁵ for priests and laymen, served as a formal criterion for such a distinction. In the handbooks we find detailed lists of sins, as well as analyses of various everyday situations and causes that can justify sins that are committed in certain extreme situations in violation of church prescriptions;⁶ for example, a soldier's violation of the commandment "thou shalt not kill" in battle.

5. At the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries Catholic theology also faced an urgent necessity to develop criteria for the moral assessment of different life situations. Such questions were examined and set forth in various treatises, the most popular of which was Herman Busembaum's *Medulla theologiae moralis Facili ac perspicua methodo resolvens casus conscientiae*, first published in 1645. Moral theology finally became established as an independent theological discipline in the mid-sixteenth century, mainly because a separate course on applied ethics was introduced into the curriculum of Jesuit schools (see Josef Ignasi Saranyana and Jose Luis Illianes, *Historia teologii*, trans. Piotr Rak [Cracow: Merlin, 1997], 289). In the Orthodox tradition the first work on moral theology was Inokentii Gizel's treatise *Myr s Bohom choloviku* (1669), which in its formal part largely followed the Catholic models (Jan Pryszynt, "Ze specyfiki prawosławnej myśli moralnej," in his *Historia teologii moralnej* [Warsaw: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1987], 303–6).

6. Here the "juridical-legalistic" nature of seventeenth-century moral theology and in particular of Gizel's treatise is vividly manifest.

The first important attempt by Orthodox theologians to help their congregation in this matter was the treatise *Myr s Bohom choloviku* (Peace with God for Man) by the archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery and rector of the Kyiv Mohyla Collegium, Inokentii Gizel (1600–83),⁷ which was published in Kyiv in 1669. As he points out in the introduction, the author's purpose is to teach "people of every vocation to overcome sin and purge conscience, to observe God's commandments and multiply the virtues" (blind fol. 28r).⁸ In trying to make his doctrine more accessible and useful to the reader, Gizel at the very outset defines the basic concepts or key terms, which lie at the very foundation of Christian ethics. He explains, "What is conscience? Will? Grace? Justification? and Desert?" (1). The first concept receives more attention than the other ones. Conscience, in contrast to the will, is not an attribute ("spiritual power") of "the rational soul," but a capacity for independent judgment, that is, "self-examination or wise judgment about oneself by which one judges whether it is fitting or unfitting for one to do something, and whether what one has done is good or evil" (2).

To make such a "wise judgment" it is helpful to have knowledge of the nature of sin and of all its varieties. Naturally, before laying out the full array of sins, the author explains what sin is, and why and how people sin. In Gizel's opinion sin⁹ is a handicap of the will, a wrong

7. For biographical data on I. Gizel, see V.M. Horobets and Ia. M. Stratii, "Gizel," in *Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia v imenakh. XVII–XVIII st.*, ed. V.S. Briukhovetsky (Kyiv: KM Akademiia, 2001), 168–70; and N.F. Sumtsov, "Innokentii Gizel," in his *K istorii iuzhno-russkoi literatury XVII veka*, vyp. 3 (Kyiv: Tipografiia G.T. Korchaka-Novitskogo, 1894).

8. Henceforth the page numbers of *Myr s Bohom choloviku, ili pokaianniie sviatoie, pryryriaiushcheie Bohovi cholovika ...* Typom yzobrazhennoie blahosloveniem i ispravleniem Innokentia Gizielia (Kyiv: Typohrafiia Kyievo-Pecherskoi lavry, 1669) appear in parentheses.

9. In the treatise we find the following broad definition of sin: "a voluntary violation of God's commandments or an utterance, action, or desire contrary to God's commandments. But since there are two kinds of commandments, not only those prohibiting evil but also those prescribing goodness ... hence sin altogether is not uttering that which, according to God's commandment, should be uttered, and not doing that which, according to God's commandment, should be done, and not desiring that which, according to God's commandment, should be desired and loved" (24). Compare this with Ioanykii Haliatovsky's definition of sin as a "violation of God's imperative" (I. Haliatovsky, "Hriky rozmytiy," in his *Kliuch rozuminnia*, ed. I.P. Chepiha [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1985], 375).

choice that was made at one time by Adam and since then has been constantly repeated by people on Earth. But the choice of the first human beings, who gave in to temptation, is transmitted to humanity only as a potential inclination, not as a necessity. Original sin is completely washed away by the sacrament of baptism, and no Christian is personally responsible for it. Every person makes his own fresh choices in life according to his own will, and these may be good or evil, although the human will, as a reflection of the divine image in man, cannot desire evil as evil, but only as an imagined good. It is precisely for this reason that people bear personal responsibility for freely committed sins. People are also free to rid themselves of sin just as they are free to sin. "And although this will of ours is quite weak," Gizel wrote, referring to St. Augustine, "it is still very useful for our salvation, since God Himself requires a man's own will for his justification" (blind fol. 6r).¹⁰

Yet, no person is without sin, hence everyone has to confess and cleanse himself. But some people commit "mortal" sins, "falling away from the source of spiritual life" and divine love and "inflicting death upon the soul" (25), while others have "pardonable" sins, which "besides sickness," do not afflict the soul with death, "and even the righteous do not live on Earth without them" (25). The social aspect plays a prominent role in Gizel's treatment of sin. He is also quite aware of the fact that people are physical beings and very dependent on the circumstances of earthly life. Without bypassing the seven mortal sins, "the main ones (pride, greed, lust, gluttony, envy, anger, and sloth)" (206), he believes that the gravity of the sin depends not only on the character of the transgressor but also on the circumstances of the action, and particularly on whether it is done intentionally or not. If one sins intentionally and the damage is great then the sin is mortal, but if one sins unintentionally, without being aware of sinning, and the damage is not great then the sin is pardonable. According to Gizel, the key role in this process belongs to the human will, conscience, and awareness of the meaning of one's own action. Fleetingly he proposes the idea that the free will is dependent not only on divine providence but also on the concrete circumstances

10. The importance of a person's "good will" in the task of his salvation is noted by Antonii Radyvlovsky: "No one will be saved without his own will, (for we have free will). He wants us to desire the good so that when we desire, He too might desire to fulfill in us His eternal divine intention" (A. Radyvlovsky, "Slovo na nedilii 24 po Soshestvii Sviatoho Dukha," in his *Vinets Khrystov* [Kyiv, 1688], fol. 314).

of life. He enumerates six reasons that make a mortal sin a forgivable one or even “no sin at all”: “powerlessness,” “ignorance,” “lack of judgment,” “valid reason,” “permission,” and “necessity” (32). The most important of them is necessity, which can even justify two sins against God’s commandments: “the wrongful appropriation and retention of another person’s things if one is in extreme want ... since in extreme necessity all things are in common” (32–3) and “killing, if it occurs in the rightful defence of one’s own or one’s neighbour’s life” (32–3). As for the other mortal sins, no excuses are envisioned for them for there is no urgent need that can compel a person to become a heretic, commit adultery, bear false witness, or swear false oaths.¹¹

Responsibility for a sin is diminished by ignorance of the circumstances or the possible consequences of an action, which leads to a false assessment of the situation and the adoption of the wrong decision when good intentions lead to pathetic results. The obfuscation of the mind or, to put it simply, madness also diminishes responsibility for sin, because in this state a person is not governed by his own will but by alien forces. A sin may be mitigated by external circumstances when a divine commandment is violated unintentionally under compulsion. A person is absolved if his will and conscience resist the action he is forced to perform.

The archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery points out that people sin not only by their “actions” but also in their “heart,” by their “mouth,” and by their “disposition or custom” (35).¹² Although sins of action are the most noticeable, they are not always the gravest. The worst sins, which are most difficult to justify, according to the author of the treatise, are committed through bad habit or custom since it is one’s character that determines one’s behaviour or thinking and since custom by example or instruction is passed on to others and prompts them to sin. No less grave are the sins of the heart since they lead to inner break-

11. Gizel sees only one cause of these sins—external coercion. But he does not release the conscience of responsibility even when “the exerted coercion is very great” (33).

12. On this question Ioanykii Haliatovsky accepts the traditional position that people sin “with the five senses,” in particular, “by sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch,” which in effect comes to sins of action. He also singles out three ways of committing a sin—out of weakness, ignorance, or anger—and analyzes these factors as the core of sin, not as circumstances that can decrease or, on the contrary, increase, the degree of responsibility (Haliatovsky, “Hrikhy rozmaytiy,” 377–8).

down, which leaves no room for divine grace or illumination in the soul and thus deprives the person of any support in life. Gizel includes the sins of the heart among the gravest sins¹³ because they contravene the fundamental Christian values of faith, hope, and charity. Were we dealing with philosophy, not moral theology, we could speak of this doctrine as a cordocentric one, for it is in the heart, according to our Kyivan thinker, that a person “serves or does not serve” God: believes or doubts,¹⁴ hopes for the better or falls into despair,¹⁵ humbly submits or demonstrates haughtiness.¹⁶ And he attributes the role of a severe but just judge, who incessantly monitors all of a person’s deeds and assesses them according to the criterion “sinful or righteous,” to conscience, which has the capacity “to observe itself, judge itself, and legislate or counsel itself” (2). Since conscience differs from person to person, people’s actions also differ.

In Gizel’s opinion the best conscience is the so-called “peaceful” or “right and true” conscience, which can distinguish good and evil according to “the natural law” and “God’s commandments” and then gives a just assessment of actions and always inclines the will to choose the good. People who possess such a conscience easily see where they have deviated—for in a pure soul a sin is as visible as the smallest blot on a white tablecloth—and rush to purge their conscience through confession and repentance. A sense of inner peace and harmony is characteristic of such people. They are always at “peace” with God and themselves, make prudent judgments, and constantly try to avoid bad thoughts and actions. They can be wise counsellors and just judges for others.

13. Haliatovsky treats them as everyday, that is, pardoned sins. To be pardoned they do not need to be enumerated at confession but merely repented at the daily evening prayer.

14. The sins against faith consist of doubts about specific articles of Orthodox doctrine, the reading of heretical books “with complete seriousness” (66), and superstition, that is, belief in dreams and attempts to learn what the future holds.

15. The sins against hope are excessive reliance on God’s mercy (indifference to good deeds!) and reluctance to inherit eternal bliss, that is, despair. Haliatovsky also assesses the latter as a grave mortal sin that is committed out of anger against the Holy Spirit, “where a person despairs of God’s mercy and has doubts about his own redemption” (Haliatovsky, “Hrikyh rozmaytyi,” 379).

16. The sin against love is doing what is good not to increase God’s glory but to attain worldly goods.

The worst conscience is the “false and erring” conscience, which “falsely judges how one should or should not do something, asserting evil to be good or good to be evil” (2). Presenting the will with such a deformed view of what should be desired and what should be avoided, the erring conscience leads to the willing of a social evil as a good-for-myself. People with such a conscience usually also have no doubts about their choices, not because they readily detect the smallest spot on their conscience, but because they do not even try to find it. They have no inclination at all to repentance and live according to their own judgment, without God’s grace. Such people are regarded as antisocial: by violating the established lawful order they help to undermine “the common good.” Hence they must answer not only before God but also before an earthly court.

But for Gizel the world is not longer divided into black and white (sinful and righteous). Between the extremes he finds endless gradations, people who have an immanent desire for goodness and perfection but cannot attain them because of objective circumstances or an inability to judge these circumstances correctly. Such people need advice and spiritual guidance to stay on the narrow path of salvation in this life without falling into despair, excessive trust in God’s grace, or exaggerated dependence on their own powers.

The author singles out three such intermediate types of conscience: “verisimilar,” which assesses actions correctly but may err in choosing their motives; “uncertain,” which cannot decide whether to do something or not; and “suspicious or fastidious,” which doubts everything and sees evil everywhere, “and judges even what is not sinful to be sinful” (2).

In themselves all three are not inclined to evil but each one has some shortcomings or handicaps in the independent¹⁷ search for the good, choice of motivation, or the assessment of one’s own behaviour and the behaviour of one’s milieu. People with a “verisimilar” conscience turn out to be the most “socialized,” capable of forming their life position by themselves and actively (mostly positively) influencing the life of the community, that is, of assuming the responsibility for building the

17. Whenever Gizel speaks of man’s independent actions as a positive phenomenon he presupposes that they are independent only in relation to other people’s influence or social and natural factors and that they necessarily take place with the help and support of God’s will. Without such help life “according to one’s own judgment” is an unconditional sign of a “false and lost” conscience, that is, of a final choice of the path of evil.

common good. Such people are quite pragmatic and rarely have doubts in a situation demanding a choice, but they are governed by reason more than by the heart, often err and even commit mortal sins by accepting false, erroneous motives or values as true. It is quite easy for these people to reform themselves since they can soberly assess the results of their actions and then repent and improve. They need clerical help on the way to purification and salvation mostly in the form of a formal confession, forgiveness of sins, and advice in choosing ways to atone for the graver transgressions. In the latter situations the priest acts not as a physician but as a good judge, who after weighing the evil deed indicates the "sufficient action," which is appropriate for the given case, that is, both sufficient and feasible.

The "uncertain" conscience is the cause of passivity in a person who excessively avoids sin. People with this kind of conscience function normally within the limits of customary, fixed behavioural stereotypes and social opportunities but become lost when it is necessary to make the slightest choice and fail to move the will into action, although in general they do not prohibit it from acting. The task of producing action belongs fully to the will and reason, which require a suitable moral evaluation of the alternative courses of action but do not receive it because the confused conscience cannot give such an evaluation. As a result, frequently no action is taken and sometimes this is also a sin. In social life such people mostly adopt a neutral position, and in allowing others to make the choices, they may favour the "unjust" opinion of the "majority." In the spiritual sphere these people need a priest's help not only to have their sins forgiven but also to set them on the right path. Here the priest should act both as a judge and as a prudent counsellor, who helps them choose the right path in various ambiguous situations.

Life is hardest for those who have a "fastidious" conscience, that is, a conscience that has doubts about everything and sees demonic forces at work everywhere, and therefore completely paralyzes both will and reason.¹⁸ Gizel believes that it is easy to distinguish people of a good ("peaceful") and a disturbed ("fastidious") conscience. The first are prudent and consistent in their decisions and actions, they "judge prudently according to the counsel and understanding of experienced

18. "Here disturbance of the soul indicates illness and grief over sin or the will to sin where in fact there is no sin nor inclination to it" (595).

people” (593). The others constantly return to one and the same question, are uncertain what is and is not morally right, and therefore, contrary to the truth and “contrary to the understanding of all those who judge correctly,” often condemn themselves at the slightest suspicion of transgression. This kind of person “vacillates and is fastidious in his conscience and greatly tormented by his thoughts” (596). In view of the complex nature of the case, which is regarded in the treatise as a special type of illness that demands spiritual drugs, the author devotes a separate chapter to the “fastidious” conscience in which he analyzes its causes and methods of curing it.

In the author’s words, an individual characterized by a “fastidious conscience” falls as it were into a childish terror, which prevents reason from choosing the truth, while the fear of committing a mistake and falling into sin paralyzes the capacity to decide and to act. Today we call this an inner personal conflict,¹⁹ and it is handled by psychologists. In the seventeenth century this task was assigned to the clergy, and a prolonged conflict was assessed as a sin. The sufferer requires a wise, pious, and experienced priest, who knows how to reassure the soul, “assuage the discomforts of conscience, cure its maladies, and lead it to divine grace” (65).

The troubled conscience afflicts its owner, his milieu, and even the priest who is in charge of his salvation with cares and unpleasant problems. The main symptoms, according to Gizel, are: (1) the individual loses inner peace and is filled with fear and doubt, which torment reason, damage psychic powers, and incapacitate the sufferer; (2) reason is obfuscated so it can neither recognize the truth nor evaluate it, and one becomes like an insane person; (3) one invents sins where, in fact, there are none, and this leads to an increase in the number of sins of thought; (4) one becomes unstable: one begins something, reconsiders it, abandons it, and then returns to it; (5) the person falls into longing and sadness, which burden the heart and make one weak (“timid”),²⁰ preventing one

19. One of the contemporary definitions of “inner personal conflict” is as follows: “a strong negative experience provoked by a prolonged struggle of the structures of a person’s inner world, which reflects contradictory ties with the social milieu and obstructs the making of decisions” (A.Ia. Antsupov and A.I. Shipilov, *Konfliktologiya* [Moscow: UNITY, 2004], 316).

20. Afraid of everything, such a person “could have already done much good thanks to his natural gifts and good habits and talents, but remains disgusting and useless” (598).

from performing good deeds and even diverting one from prayer and divine worship; and (6) failing to find a reliable support in life, one falls into despair, which is a mortal sin.

The author of the treatise considers the phenomenon of the "fastidious" conscience to be not a personal, but a social, problem that demands an explanation of its causes and a search for ways to neutralize them. Incidentally, in his opinion the proposed methods of "treating" the disease are directly dependent on its origin and nature. Let us trace the course of his thinking by summarizing it in a table:

Causes	Nature of causes, effects	Curative measures
Melancholy ("the mind acquires an inclination to fastidious and fearful thought") (598)	Innate ("arising from the cold in the body in which it developed, also from natural fear") (598)	Focus attention on joyous and virtuous things and thoughts and avoid sad thoughts
	Acquired (arising either from fear, which "by injuring the head also damages the power of thought" or from excessive sorrow or from "over-scrupulous thought" (598)	Observe the mean in all affairs (for example, in reading), and try not to associate with other melancholics but to associate with people of a "peaceful" conscience
Imprudent exhaustion of the body through excessive fasting and other exercises	Excessive exhaustion leads to acquired melancholy	Do not take an oath and do not accept such "excessive exercises" (599) without the advice and blessing of a priest ²¹
"Inexperience in affairs or ignorance" (599)	Because of ignorance of where one should actively intervene, a person remains "timid" and incapable of learning the truth	Learn to recognize things that are beneficial to the soul (599)

21. Before giving his blessing to such a spiritual "feat," a priest should weigh carefully the physical and psychological capacities of the person who asks for this, and if they are insufficient, should advise the person to change the form of his asceticism to a more suitable one.

Causes	Nature of causes, effects	Curative measures
Pride and excessive confidence in one's own reason	"In spite of being confused in his understanding" (599), a person does not want to seek advice from others, but considers his own understanding better than that of others	Submit one's reason to the judgment of other, more experienced people
Thoughtlessness	For the slightest reason a person "rejects certain understanding and changes opinion" (599)	Maintain "constancy" in affairs, taking care always to finish what you have started
Frequent repetition at confession of previously confessed sins that one did not repeat	This leads conscience to doubt whether the sin was pardoned and to strive excessively "for protection from the slightest inclination and an unreasonable search for justification" (600)	Never to repeat the same confession, ²² and never try to be too righteous ("extremely righteous" [600]) by seeking certainty about one's justification ²³
Diabolical temptation	It can "arouse a movement of melancholic vapours, which can stir up thought and bring it to confusion and unseemly fear" (600)	To uproot such diabolical temptations one should use the "spiritual sword," that is, prayer and frequent Holy Communion (repentance and the Eucharist)

22. Interestingly enough this prohibition applies only to people with a "fastidious" conscience. People of a "peaceful" conscience, according to Gizel, may confess repeatedly for the sake of "some kind of spiritual benefit."

23. Gizel points out that this striving is opposed to human nature itself, which because of natural limitations, cannot attain full perfection and cannot be justified through itself but only with God's supernatural help and in measure to Christ's gift. An excessive desire for perfection can lead imperceptibly to heretical or blasphemous views.

Causes	Nature of causes, effects	Curative measures
<p>God's punishment for some sins (first for pride, hope in one's powers, mistreatment of others, etc.)</p> <p>Trials sent by God to perform a greater feat and a good greater than salvation (601)</p>	<p>This is the only case in which the "fastidious" conscience is a positive factor. By this trial God can stop a person with an evil will from doing evil, for it is better not to act at all than to be on the leash of an evil will.</p>	<p>In this case one should meekly accept everything that God gives, carry one's cross without complaining, and subordinate one's own will to God's</p>

Besides special "prescriptions" for every particular "malady of the conscience" the author of the treatise singles out also the "prophylactic" measures that are common to all cases of "fastidious" conscience. The universal measures are: (1) to resolve before God and all the saints henceforth: (a) to desist as much as possible from all sins (601), (b) to strive with God's help to live well and to begin all of one's undertakings with "judgment, ... good intentions, and caution" (602), (c) to avoid bad thoughts and idleness; and (2) recalling this resolution from time to time ("only without a superfluous thought added to it ... but briefly and infrequently" [602]), to carry out these God-pleasing projects confidently without backing away from them for some uncertain reason. And finally, Gizel points to the most effective way to any healing—prayer, both one's own and other people's, asking God to comfort the agitated conscience of one's neighbour. "Since we never know what to do in an incomprehensible situation" (602), the only thing we can do is to seek God's advice on our misfortunes and to turn our eyes to Him in prayer.

In analyzing this table let me note that the author of the treatise first studies the natural causes of the misfortunes that beset conscience (today we would call it the psyche) and points out that it is necessary to observe the mean in everything—in intellectual work, prayer, and fasting—in order not to injure "the power of thought" (today we would say not to bring about a nervous or psychic breakdown). Of course, it would be wrong to attempt treating this as a kind of secularization of ideas about

man and his actions. But undoubtedly the Kyiv theologian shifts the emphasis that was characteristic of Orthodox ethical doctrine toward a more objective assessment of man's essence, first, as a social being that cannot exist outside society and hence should act according to its laws and, secondly, as a natural being whose physical and psychic (spiritual) possibilities are limited by natural facts, conditions of life, and so on. The realization that the "narrow path" to salvation may be unique and quite unrepeatable for each person, since people are very different in character, opportunities, behaviour, life strategy, and so on, leads to the relativization of Christian moral doctrine, the construction of a new ideal of the pious Orthodox Christian who is able to lead an active life in the world by accepting common sense and the advice of "prudent people" as a guide and by adhering not so much to the letter as to the spirit of God's law and precepts.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Taras Zakydalsky

Review Articles

Re-assessing Dovzhenko's Black Holes

George O. Liber

Roman Korohodsky. *Dovzhenko v poloni: Rozvidky ta esei pro maistra*. Kyiv: Helikon, 2000. 352 pp.

In memory of Roman Korohodsky (1933–2005)

Black holes are regions of space created by collapsing massive stars that reach such a dense state that nothing, not even light, can escape from their intense gravitational pull. Inasmuch as they do not emit any electromagnetic radiation, scientists can detect them only by indirect means. To this day the life of Alexander Petrovych Dovzhenko (1894–1956), the most prominent Ukrainian film director of the twentieth century, contains many black holes. We do not know for certain what happened within these biographical black holes. His films and published writings have been heavily censored. People who knew him and his circumstances have died and their memories of him have been irretrievably lost. Published recollections about him, such as the memoirs of his first wife, Varvara Krylova,¹ have been edited to meet the demands of the Soviet regime. Many documents, moreover, have been destroyed. Important parts of Dovzhenko's archive at Moscow's Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva, or RGALI), such as his letters and diaries, remain closed until January 2009. The Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (Arkhir

1. See Varvara Dovzhenko, "Naidorozhche, vichne," in *Polumiane zhyttia: Spohady pro Oleksandra Dovzhenka*, comp. Iu.I. Solntseva, ed. L.M. Novychenko (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1973), 141–7.

Prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii) and the archives of the Russian and Ukrainian intelligence services (the FSB and the SBU) hold important documents concerning Dovzhenko, but the authorities have designated them “top secret” and have withheld them from most researchers. Because of these problems Dovzhenko’s biography remains incomplete.

The Soviet state constructed a set of myths about Dovzhenko after his death, including the stories that he supported the Bolsheviks during the revolutionary period, became a good communist and atheist, enthusiastically introduced socialist realism into his films, and never entertained any doubts about the Soviet order. Dovzhenko became the “positive hero” of Soviet filmmaking.

During Gorbachev’s glasnost in the 1980s, studies of Dovzhenko underwent extensive revision. With access to freshly opened archival materials at RGALI and at the Central State Archive-Museum of Literature and the Arts (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv-muzei literatury i mystetstva, or TsDA-MLM) in Kyiv, we have learned much about the filmmaker’s past. Although the new materials have led to a new appraisal of Dovzhenko’s life and career, investigators have not been able to fill in all of the black holes in his past.

In the 1980s Roman Korohodsky² emerged as one of the most prominent critics of the Soviet interpretation of Dovzhenko’s life. He published not only numerous articles about the filmmaker’s life and art but also a number of Dovzhenko’s heretofore unpublished works, which reveal his fragile state of mind in the late 1920s. Most importantly, he has sought to uncover by indirect means the content of Dovzhenko’s black holes.

Korohodsky’s book is not a biography but a collection of eleven essays dealing with Dovzhenko, many of which appeared in small and obscure Ukrainian journals and newspapers. The first essay was penned in 1981 and the last in 2000. The author published the overwhelming majority of them in the late 1980s during glasnost and shortly after Ukraine’s declaration of independence. They contain many repetitions. Still they give a coherent, although not a full, account of Dovzhenko’s life. Oleh Buriachkivsky’s excellent introduction sets the tone.

Korohodsky’s work attempts to peel away the filmmaker’s many public masks and investigate his “real” life. He challenges previous

2. For a brief sketch of Korohodsky’s life, see Myroslava Pinkovska, “Ukrainske sontse Romana Korohodskoho,” *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 30 July–5 August 2005 (available at <www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/50737>). I am grateful to Vitaly Chernetsky for this reference.

ideological interpretations of Dovzhenko as a good communist and (after 1991) as a good nationalist. Instead of employing a hagiographical approach, Korohodsky presents the film director as an individual with flaws and contradictions, a member of the creative intelligentsia who lived under the constant threat of arrest and execution, and a compromiser. Relying on many new archival revelations and interviews with survivors of the first half of the twentieth century, Korohodsky was one of the first researchers to claim that Dovzhenko had served in the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in 1918 and 1919. After being captured by the Cheka in August 1919, Dovzhenko never spoke the truth about his past. From August 1919 until his death in November 1956, he remained a prisoner of the Soviet order, which sought to exploit his creative genius. In the book Korohodsky persuasively develops this theme.

One of Korohodsky's greatest accomplishments is his analysis of Dovzhenko's eighteen letters to Olena Chernova.³ Here, he reveals Dovzhenko at one of his most vulnerable emotional stages—when he had completed *Zvenyhora* (1928) and started to work on *Arsenal* in the late 1920s. The political controls of the new Stalinist order began to restrict the implementation of his artistic vision. As the political pressures on Dovzhenko intensified, he teetered on the edge of a mental breakdown and revealed his turbulent inner life to a confidant. To his credit, Korohodsky suggests that all documents concerning Dovzhenko, even the compromising ones, should be published. Not only will they present a fairer picture of Dovzhenko, a flawed human being much like the rest of the human race, but they will demonstrate how the totalitarian aspirations of the Soviet system deformed the moral and creative character of a highly intelligent man. Many of these documents will make Dovzhenko look less than heroic, but open defiance of the Stalinist order would have cost him his life.

Because of the social and political chaos of the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary periods, as well as Dovzhenko's intentional obfuscations, many details of his activities between 1919 and 1923 remain undocumented. Korohodsky zeroes in on the problem areas in the filmmaker's life and shows us what may have occurred within these black

3. Korohodsky, *Dovzhenko v poloni*, 73–128.

holes. Unfortunately, some of his proposals are unconvincing or unsupported by the evidence.

Dovzhenko as a Borotbist

Contrary to Korohodsky, Dovzhenko was never a long-term member of the Borotbists, the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (Ukrainska partiia sotsialistiv-revoliutsioneriv, or UPSR). If he was a Borotbist, it was only for a short period just before the Borotbists merged with the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (Komunistychna partiia [bolshevykiv] Ukrainy, or CP[B]U) in March 1920.

When the revolution broke out three years before, Dovzhenko, a teacher in Zhytomyr, became a member of the UPSR. V.V. Bobienko, a former archdeacon of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, claimed at an NKVD interrogation to have heard him speak at a meeting in Sosnytsia in the summer of 1917: "he appeared on behalf of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, he stood for the independence of Ukraine and agitated on behalf of the Central Rada."⁴

Dovzhenko spent the last four months of 1917 and most of 1918 in Kyiv. He became a teacher at the Seventh Higher Primary School in Kyiv in September 1917 and audited courses at the Kyiv Commercial Institute (Kyivskyyi komertsiiyny instytut, later the Kyiv Institute of the National Economy) and at the newly founded Ukrainian State Academy of Arts (Ukrainska derzhavna akademiia mystetstv), where he sought to become a professional artist.⁵ In Kyiv Dovzhenko lived through the major events of 1918: the Central Rada's proclamation of Ukrainian independence on 22 January; the occupation of the city by the Red Army under Mikhail Muravev's command on 9 February; the subsequent execution of thousands of Ukrainians for supporting the Central Rada; the entry of the German army into the city on 3 March; and Skoropadsky's ascension to hetman of Ukraine. In early 1918 Kyiv's streets ran red with blood. We do not know how Dovzhenko survived.

4. Viacheslav Popyk, ed., "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, 1995, nos. 1-2: 238.

5. Derzhavnyi arkhiv mista Kyieva (DAMK), 153/5./2508, fol. 16, contains Dovzhenko's third-semester (fall 1918) transcripts from the Commercial Institute. See also Mykhailo Kovalenko and Oleksii Mishurin, eds., *Syn zacharovanoi Desny: Spohady i statti* (Kyiv, 1984), 110.

Dovzhenko most likely met Oleksander Shumsky and Vasyly Blakytyn, the future leaders of the Borotbist Party, at the Commercial Institute during the three semesters (fall 1917 and spring and fall 1918) he studied there. He chaired the student union and helped organize a large city-wide demonstration in the fall of 1918 protesting the drafting of students into the army. As the students left the demonstration, Skoropadsky's troops fired into the crowd killing twenty and wounding almost a hundred students.⁶ Dovzhenko's organizational abilities probably impressed Shumsky and Blakytyn, who later paved his way into the CP(B)U. Until the mid-1920s they remained his major patrons and mentors.

After overthrowing Skoropadsky in December 1918, the Directory quickly lost its support. Many peasant detachments that had joined the Directory's army in order to oust Skoropadsky abandoned Symon Petliura. The uneasy alliance between the urban-centered Ukrainian nationalists and the peasants came to an end. Chaos reigned. As the Red Army advanced, the Directory abandoned Kyiv in early February 1919. The UNR barely survived, controlling only small slivers of territory for short periods of time. Over the next two years the seat of its government constantly shifted.

Dovzhenko lived in Kyiv during the first Bolshevik occupation in February 1918 but not during the second Bolshevik occupation from 5 February 1919 to the end of August 1919. Fragmentary memoirs and a few documents provide a framework for reconstructing the most undocumented period in Dovzhenko's life.

Defending the Ukrainian revolution, Dovzhenko left Kyiv with Petliura's forces in February. By the summer of 1919 the Directory controlled only a small territory. From July to November 1919 Kamianets-Podilskyi, 300 kilometers southwest of Kyiv, served as its temporary capital. There Dovzhenko met the humorist Ostap Vyshnia, the poet Volodymyr Sosiura, and the artist Anatol Petrytsky, all of whom had also retreated with the Directory.⁷ They became his closest friends for life.

6. Marco Carynnyk, "Alexander Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 12-13; and Mykhailo Kovalenko, "Z dovzhenkovoï krynytsi," in *Syn zacharovanoi Desny*, ed. Kovalenko and Mishurin, 27.

7. Varvara Oleksiivna Hubenko-Masliuchenko and Larysa Mykolaivna Petrytska, the widows of Ostap Vyshnia and Anatol Petrytsky, informed Korohodsky of this fact in the early 1960s. See Korohodsky, "Zadushenyi holos: Shkits do portreta vidomoho i

On 19 September 1919 the Red Army overran Zhytomyr, and shortly afterwards the Cheka captured Dovzhenko with "weapons in hand." In 1939 he claimed that the Cheka released him after an investigation, implying that the secret police could not find any evidence against him.⁸ But according to documents published in Ukraine in 1995, a revolutionary court on 27 December 1919 ascertained that he voluntarily joined Petliura's army and returned to the areas controlled by the Red Army in order to engage in "counter-revolutionary" activity. The court considered Dovzhenko an enemy of the newly founded Bolshevik order and sentenced him to imprisonment in a concentration camp until the end of the Civil War. Because prominent Borotbists intervened on his behalf with the Russian Communist Party's provincial committee, the Cheka court did not carry out Dovzhenko's sentence.⁹ It is unclear if documents providing details concerning the negotiations to release him exist. The identities of the Borotbists who won his release are unknown,¹⁰ but Blakytyn and Shumsky may have played important roles in the case.

After the successful third Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine in late 1919, the leaders of the Borotbists decided to dissolve their party and join the CP(B)U, hoping to Ukrainianize it from within. In late March 1920, the Fourth Congress of the CP(B)U voted to admit into its ranks approximately 4,000 Borotbists, including leaders such as Blakytyn, Shumsky, Hryhorii Hrynko (Grigorii Grinko), and Panas Liubchenko.

The Communist Party accepted the former Borotbists with great caution. On 25 March 1920, at a meeting of the Provisional Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, the party's leaders ordered Communist organizations in the provinces to accept as members, first of all, those men and women who had joined the Borotbist Party before General Anton Denikin's invasion in August 1919, and, secondly, those who had joined the anti-Denikin underground afterwards.¹¹

nevidomoho Dovzhenka," *Slovo*, 1991, no. 12: 5.

8. "Anketa, vstupaiushchego kandidata v chleny VKP(b), zapolnennaia A.P. Dovzhenko (20 November 1939)," RGALI, 2081/1/944, fol. 2.

9. "Zakliuchenie po delu no. 112 na Dovzhenko Aleksandra Petrovicha, 25 let," in "Pid sofitamy VChK-DPU-NKVS-NKDB-KDB," ed. Viacheslav Popyk, *Dnipro*, 1995, nos. 9-10: 22; published also in Korohodsky, *Dovzhenko v poloni*, 37-8.

10. In the summer of 1998 I did not receive permission to work at the State Archive of Zhytomyr Oblast.

11. "Protokol no. 1: Zasedaniia komissii po likvidatsii i vliianii byvshei partii

Dovzhenko did not fit either category. As a member of the Directory's armed forces, he may have fought against Denikin's forces, but I have not been able to find any evidence that he ever became a Borotbist.¹² Although the Borotbists emerged from the UPSR, the political party that first attracted Dovzhenko in 1917, they broke with the Directory in late 1918.¹³ In 1919 Dovzhenko and the Borotbists fought on opposite sides.

Given his support of the UPSR between 1917 and 1919 and his arrest in 1919, Dovzhenko could not have become a member of the Communist Party in 1920 except under the Borotbist umbrella.¹⁴ He could have come under this umbrella only if Blakytyny and Shumsky, who occupied important positions in the CP(B)U after the merger, had pulled strings on his behalf.¹⁵

In the course of the Revolution and Civil War, very similar people, as Andrea Graziosi points out, "sharing often identical backgrounds, could evolve in diverging ways."¹⁶ Different choices often led people in opposite directions, but these paths also intersected. Blakytyny, Shumsky, and Dovzhenko emerged from the same cloth, but the first two chose the Borotbists, then the Communists, while Dovzhenko elected to remain a Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary.

Although these choices generated much brutality in battle, the Borotbists and the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries differed only slightly in terms of ideology. Both claimed to fight on behalf of the toiling people in the countryside, for local control, for Ukraine, and for

kommunistov borotbistov v partiiu kommunistov-bolshevikov Ukrainy ot 3-go aprelia 1920-go goda," Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kyiv, 39/4/237, fol. 102.

12. I examined TsDAHOU, 43/1/3, 6, 10, 13, 19, 35, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 54, 56, 77, 82, 85, 88, 96 and could not find any trace of Dovzhenko as a Borotbist.

13. TsDAHOU, 43/1/3, fols. 1a-1b; and 43/1/44, fols. 9-11.

14. The only evidence we have that Dovzhenko became a member of the Communist Party is his letter of 31 July 1922 to the Central Committee of the CP(B)U in which he reveals his party-card number as 172255. The original document remains in TsDAHOU, 1/6/37, fol. 26. It is published in the book under review (p. 58).

15. As a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Borotbists), Shumsky led the struggle against Skropadsky and the Directory in the Zhytomyr and Kyiv provinces in 1918 and 1919. See "Dovidkova karta, Aleksandr Iakovlevich Shumsky," TsDAHOU, 39/4/237, fols. 1 and 5.

16. Andrea Graziosi, *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1996), 76.

a free world.¹⁷ Both political parties demanded a radical redistribution of land to the poorest peasants. The major issue that divided the two groups was their relation to the Bolsheviks. The Borotbists sought to ally themselves with this predominantly Russian party, while the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries opposed it. An individual decision to support this or that party was often arbitrary and conditioned by accidental circumstances.

Blakytny and Shumsky realized the tragedy of Dovzhenko's predicament. They, especially Blakytny, liked Dovzhenko¹⁸ and recognized his organizational abilities. By gaining his release from the Cheka and by pulling him into the Borotbist ranks on the eve of its merger with the Communist Party, they saved him from an uncertain fate. If Dovzhenko became a member of the Borotbists, it was only during the last hours of their existence as an independent political party.

Dovzhenko as a Secret Agent

Korohodsky is right to point out the importance of Dovzhenko's Cheka imprisonment in late 1919 and to ask what happened during his incarceration. Did the secret police torture him physically or mentally? We do not know how he was treated or how he responded to his treatment. Except for his letters to Olena Chernova, in which he indirectly discussed this period, he did not leave any documentary evidence on these questions.¹⁹

In his 1939 autobiography, Dovzhenko alluded—albeit vaguely—to these months of isolation, pain, doubt, and uncertainty: “I paid for the mistakes of my raw mind and passionate heart with months of suffering and serious reflection.”²⁰ Unfortunately, he did not include any details. The four-month period (August–December 1919) is the darkest black hole in Dovzhenko's biography and Korohodsky proposes some interesting insights into what the young man may have experienced physically and psychologically at the time. The author concludes that Dovzhenko's imprisonment caused him to fear arbitrary rearrest throughout the rest of his life and forced him to compromise with the Soviet authorities.

17. *Ibid.*, 76–7.

18. See Lidiia Vovchok-Blakytna, “Tov. Vasyl i Sashko,” *Vitchyzna*, 1984, no. 1: 164.

19. Roman Korohodsky, ed., “18 lystiv Dovzhenka pro kokhannia,” *Kultura i zhyttia*, 21 November and 4 December 1996. See his assessment of the letters in the book under review (pp. 73–128).

20. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 8; Carynyk, “Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography,” 12.

After his release Dovzhenko hid what had happened to him; he then rewrote some parts of his past. He told some of his friends that he had voluntarily left the Ukrainian nationalists and joined the Bolshevik cause. With the exception of his closest friends, such as Vyshnia, Sosiura, and Petrytsky, who had been his comrades-in-arms in the nationalist camp, few knew of Dovzhenko's actual activities during the revolution. To my knowledge, no one recorded them.

It is unclear what Dovzhenko did in Zhytomyr from late December 1919 to June 1920. According to official accounts published in the late Soviet period, between December 1919 and April 1920, Dovzhenko served in the War Commissariat of Zhytomyr province, then worked as a literacy instructor on the staff of the Soviet Ukrainian Forty-fourth Rifle Division. By April he headed the Zhytomyr party school.²¹ All this is highly unlikely and a part of Dovzhenko's post-1956 canonization. But what did he do in this period? We do not know.

In mid-1920 he started to work as secretary of the social education administration in the newly Sovietized department of education of Kyiv province. On 16 April 1921, Hryenko, the Ukrainian commissar of education and a former Borotbist, ordered Dovzhenko to Kharkiv for "temporary work abroad" with Shumsky, whom the Politburo appointed the Soviet Ukrainian ambassador to Poland.²²

Assuming that Dovzhenko arrived in Kharkiv by the end of April, we have no records attesting to his activities in the period between April and late July 1921, when Ukraine's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs designated him as the head of the general department of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic's embassy in Poland. He arrived in Poland in mid-September 1921 and worked there until February 1922, when the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs transferred him to Berlin. After the Ukrainian Politburo recalled him on 30 July 1922, he received its permission to stay in Germany in order to study art. After a year's study, Dovzhenko returned to Ukraine in July 1923. His diplomatic career in Warsaw and Berlin was short and undistinguished.

21. This information most likely originated from the party questionnaire he filled out in 1939 (RGALI, 2081/1/944, fol. 3) and from his 1939 autobiography (RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 10; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 13).

22. Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlyady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy (TsDAVOVUU), Kyiv, 166/1/174, fol. 79.

For all of Shumsky's and Blakytny's influence, it seems incredible that Ukraine's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would choose Dovzhenko, a man with a "counter-revolutionary" past and no diplomatic experience, to represent the newly established republic abroad. Although he may have studied German privately in elementary school, and German, French, and English at the Commercial Institute, his foreign-language proficiency remains uncertain.²³ Until 1921 he had never travelled beyond the boundaries of the Ukrainian provinces. On the surface it would appear that the Commissariat made a surprising, even foolish, choice in appointing Dovzhenko, a very minor Soviet official, to such an important post. But one must note that the new Commissariat had few Ukrainians in its ranks and its leaders hoped to present a "Ukrainian" face to the world. Dovzhenko fitted the bill.

In addition to his friendship with Shumsky and Blakytny, he also possessed a number of personal and political assets. He was an excellent speaker and a charismatic individual. Born into a peasant family, he identified himself as a Ukrainian and spoke the language. Although many Communist veterans of the Revolution and Civil War disdained Dovzhenko as a "Ukrainian nationalist" and "counter-revolutionary," in the context of the new post-revolutionary realities he could play a useful role. Given the political fragility of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Germany, Dovzhenko's career abroad would encompass more than just diplomacy.

Dovzhenko became a revolutionary diplomat dedicated to undermining the political and social order in Poland and Germany after Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Riga with Poland in March 1921. Revolutionary diplomacy combined the efforts of two new institutions, the Communist International and the Foreign Section (Inostrannyi otdel, or INO) of the Cheka, in seeking to overturn the postwar political order. Unlike traditional diplomacy, revolutionary diplomacy took advantage of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ignite a worldwide revolution.

To account for the lapses in Dovzhenko's biography, especially his "disappearance" from April to July 1921, Korohodsky conjectures, without providing sufficient evidence, that he secretly worked during that time for the security organs, either the Cheka's INO or the Comintern.²⁴

23. On Dovzhenko's learning German in elementary school, see Ia. Nazarenko, "Ego shkolnye gody," *Raduga*, 1964, no. 9: 149; on his learning the other languages, see his Commercial Institute transcripts, DAMK, 153/5/2508, fols. 4, 5, 16v.

24. Korohodsky, *Dovzhenko v poloni*, 16–64. I have examined the archival documents

This fascinating but as yet unproven hypothesis has some plausibility. Dovzhenko's diplomatic responsibilities allowed him to travel freely in Poland and in Germany, where he made contacts and met people who could have provided him with "special" information. Three of the films he made later—*Sumka dypkuriera* (The Diplomatic Pouch) (1926), *Aerograd* (1935), and *Proshchai, Amerika* (Goodbye, America) (1950)—attest to his interest in and knowledge of the world of espionage.

But Dovzhenko's positions, activities, and films do not prove that he worked as an intelligence officer. Although he undoubtedly cooperated with the INO and the Comintern and complemented their work, collecting information was an integral part of his duties as a "revolutionary" diplomat.

Dovzhenko's absence between April and late July 1921 may be explained by his preparations to accompany Shumsky abroad. To fulfill his responsibilities he had to learn Polish. His command of Russian and Ukrainian would have been useful in the context of his duties, but he had to master Polish if he was to deal with Poles. When he was posted to Germany in February 1922, he certainly took intensive German-language lessons. Although he may have learned some German in elementary school and at the Commercial Institute in 1917 and 1918, he would have needed greater competence in German to understand the lectures in art and art history that he attended in Berlin.

Dovzhenko and Bazar

One of Korohodsky's greatest accomplishments in this collection of essays is his assessment of the impact of the Soviet massacre of Ukrainian nationalist troops at Bazar in 1921 on Shumsky's career and then on Dovzhenko, his client. This event exposed Dovzhenko's political vulnerability within the new Soviet order.

In late October 1921 one of Petliura's lieutenants, General Iurii Tiutiunyk, mobilized over one thousand Ukrainian volunteers from Polish internment camps and slipped across the border into Soviet Ukraine. Shumsky learned of the plan six weeks before the offensive and passed the information on to the appropriate Soviet authorities.

Forewarned, on 17 November 1921, Soviet General Grigorii Kotovsky's troops surprised and defeated this group near the village of

he cites, but inasmuch as their contents are vague, I do not believe that they prove his case.

Bazar in Zhytomyr province. The Red Army killed 250 insurgents in battle and captured almost 500. On 21 November 1921 the Soviet captors offered to spare the lives of the prisoners who joined the Red Army. The 259 who refused were immediately executed in cold blood.²⁵

In December 1921 news of the slaughter spread beyond Soviet Ukraine.²⁶ Not only did it outrage anti-Communist groups throughout Europe, but it surely repulsed the thousands of Ukrainian soldiers still interned in Poland. Moreover, it possibly alienated the former Borotbists in the Communist ranks. These executions, in effect, undermined Shumsky's mission to reach out to the Ukrainian nationalist community in Western Europe.

On 30 November 1921 Shumsky—unaware of the executions—sent a coded message to Ukraine's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Kharkiv suggesting that instead of being shot, the Bazar prisoners should be put on trial like the previous show trials of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in order to discredit their cause.²⁷ Despite its careful wording, Shumsky's letter isolated him not only from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, but also from the Ukrainian Politburo. Communist hardliners, who were already undermining the former Borotbists, stepped up their campaign after Shumsky's message. The ambassador's memorandum, Korohodsky points out, exhausted Communist patience with the former Borotbists. When Shumsky became vulnerable in 1922, so did his former Borotbist clients working in the Soviet Ukrainian embassy in Warsaw. Shortly after Shumsky's memorandum Dovzhenko and almost all former Borotbists left the Polish capital, some for other diplomatic postings, others for Ukraine.

Dovzhenko's association with Shumsky placed him under the scrutiny of the security organs. His political reliability and loyalty came into question for the second time in two years. He experienced one demotion

25. I.Z. Pidkova and R.M. Shust, *Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Heneza, 1993), 1: 42, 217. The best accounts of this massacre are: Vasyl Veryha, *Lystopadovyi reid* (Kyiv: Vyd-vo im. Oleny Telihiy, 1995) and N. Udovychenko, ed., *Druhyi zymovyi pokhid: Lystopadovyi reid Bazar* (Kyiv: Fundatsiia im. O. Olzhycha, 1995).

26. "An Extraordinary Committee of Inquiry, appointed by the Soviet to investigate the recent incursion of General Petliura's troops into the Ukraine, has, it is reported, adopted a resolution that the 360 men captured by the Red Army be shot" ("Imperial and Foreign News Items," *The Times* [London], 23 December 1921).

27. TsDAVOVUU, 4/1/569, fols. 171–2v; cited by Korohodsky, *Dovzhenko v poloni*, 56.

after another, culminating in the loss of his party membership in the summer of 1923 during one of the party's periodic post-revolutionary purges (which at this point did not entail subsequent arrest). That year, the Communist Party began to punish high-ranking members who criticized its line. The party also disciplined those who, like Dovzhenko, were suspected of harbouring dissenting thoughts. His ties to Shumsky and the shadows of Bazar would haunt him and colour many of his subsequent actions. Korohodsky's introduction of the role of Bazar in Dovzhenko's biography presents an excellent assessment of the future filmmaker's relationship with his powerful patrons in the early 1920s, patrons who saved him but would later endanger him.

Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography

One of the most surprising weaknesses in Korohodsky's analysis is his acceptance of the veracity of Dovzhenko's 1939 autobiography, which has been published in many versions after Dovzhenko's death. Autobiographies generally do not recount the complete truth.²⁸ Most importantly, the copy of the 1939 autobiography held at TsDA-MLM in Kyiv, which Korohodsky uses, is incomplete.²⁹ Inasmuch as this document does not include several critical paragraphs and remains isolated from the larger Dovzhenko archive at RGALI in Moscow, it does not allow the author to assess this autobiography comprehensively and critically. By relying on the TsDA-MLM autobiography, not the RGALI original, Korohodsky could not evaluate its origins, Dovzhenko's relationship with Stalin, or his anti-Semitic remarks.

Contrary to common opinion, the 1939 autobiography is not a literary autobiography. Instead, it is a long autobiographical statement appended to a questionnaire (*anketa*) that was part of Dovzhenko's 1939 party application.³⁰ Although Dovzhenko never submitted the application, it represents one of his best efforts to accommodate himself to the Stalinist system.

28. See Laura Engelstein and Stefanie Sandler, eds., *Self and Story in Russian History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

29. The complete Russian-language original remains at RGALI, 2081/1/381. Marco Carynyk translated this text into English and published it in full in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 7–27. The original, unfortunately, has never been published in Ukraine or in Russia in either the Ukrainian or Russian languages.

30. Compare RGALI, 2081/1/381 (see footnote 6) and RGALI, 2081/1/944 (footnote 8).

In the fall of 1939, months after the Soviet political establishment's ringing enthusiasm for his last film, *Shchors*, Dovzhenko decided to reapply to the party. In the 1930s, as in the 1920s, all party applicants had to submit an autobiography, which constituted, along with letters of recommendation and a questionnaire, an integral part of the application package. Each biography had to include information on the applicant's social background, his activities on behalf of the proletariat during the Revolution and Civil War, the development of his worldview, the process of his conversion to communism, and the identification of those who had helped his ideological rebirth. The most important section in the autobiography described the process of the applicant's conversion to communism.³¹ The applicant narrated his life story as a journey toward the development of his proletarian consciousness, as a radical political transfiguration of an anti-communist Saul to a communist Paul. Writing in a confessional mode, he had to admit to all anti-Bolshevik acts and mistakes in his past. Any other biographical details were irrelevant.³²

In his 1939 autobiographical statement, Dovzhenko carefully selected his facts and confessed to his past mistakes in order to be readmitted to the Communist Party.³³ But despite his best efforts, he failed to prove his communist credentials. Inasmuch as the Communist Party's Central Control Commission sought to use the applicant's autobiography to evaluate the contours of his political consciousness, Dovzhenko's eloquently written autobiography did not reveal a coherent communist world outlook. It fell short of a proper communist autobiography.

Born in 1894 to a poor, illiterate peasant family near the town of Sosnytsia in the Chernihiv province, he lived—or so he claimed—on a homestead of seven or seven-and-a-half desiatins of mediocre land. Dovzhenko's father, a member of the Cossack estate, supplemented his

31. Igal Halfin, "From Darkness to Light: Student Communist Autobiography during NEP," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45, no. 2 (1997): 219–20.

32. Halfin, "From Darkness to Light," 211–12. See also his *Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

33. He admitted that "I had been expelled while still abroad for failing to send in my papers for clearance. Actually I had sent in my papers. They were lost at the Central Committee and accidentally found under a bookcase several years later, as I learned from V. Blakytyn, the newspaper editor and Central Committee member, the day before he died" (RGALI, 2081/1/381, fols. 12–13; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 15–16). This unverifiable claim remains suspect.

income from farming by working as a carrier and as a tar extractor. Twelve of his siblings died before reaching adulthood.³⁴

Dovzhenko's parents sought to overcome their family's poverty by sending young Sashko to the primary and the advanced primary schools in Sosnytsia and then on to the teacher's college in Hlukhiv. Here, Dovzhenko's narrative raises questions. He claims that he chose teacher's college because he "had the right to take the entrance exam for it and because it granted scholarships of 120 rubles per year."³⁵ But he did not win a scholarship. For his first two years at the college he worked as a tutor to make ends meet. According to his 1939 autobiographical statement, his father even "sold a desiatin of land; he cut it off from his heart."³⁶ Although this action appears out of character for a poor peasant, Dovzhenko's statement clearly asserts a lack of any economic or class advantages in his family origins, a major concern for the Central Control Commission even after the Communist Party began to admit those with intelligentsia and better-off-peasant backgrounds into its ranks in the late 1930s.

Despite the new policy on party membership, Dovzhenko still downplayed his status at the teacher's college, his literacy, and his transition from the peasantry to the intelligentsia. He characterized the atmosphere at the college as "very oppressive" and Hlukhiv as "small and narrow-minded." Not surprisingly, his account dismisses the college as a training ground for "well-behaved, politically illiterate, and naïve teachers for advanced primary schools."³⁷

Although he claimed to have abandoned his family's religious beliefs and become an atheist at the teacher's college, his political outlook did not mature correspondingly. He graduated from the college in 1914 as "a politically ignorant youth of nineteen and a half who could teach school."³⁸

According to his statement, he reached adulthood without a clear political orientation. He admitted that he did not possess any coherent idea of the class struggle or Marxism. Instead of describing his long road

34. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 1; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 7.

35. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 4; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 9.

36. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 4; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 9.

37. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 4; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 9.

38. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 5; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 10.

to communism, Dovzhenko undermined his application to the Communist Party by concentrating on his relationship to Ukraine.

Reporting his experience at the Hlukhiv Teacher's College, he admits reading Ukrainian-language journals and newspapers smuggled from Austria-Hungary into the Russian Empire. Teachers at the college prohibited students from speaking Ukrainian; "they were making us into Russifiers of the country. In the Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces later we even received extra pay, eighteen rubles per month, I think, for Russifying the countryside."³⁹

In this passage, Dovzhenko reveals that he became a nationally conscious Ukrainian and developed a political outlook defined predominantly by national, not class, differences. Despite his criticism of tsarist nationality policies, his statement highlighted his concern for Ukraine, an unwise move during the witch hunts for Ukrainian "nationalist deviations" in the 1930s.

As a member of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, a small group of men and women hovering between the uneducated and illiterate mass of Ukrainian-speaking peasants and the assimilative attractions of the Russian intelligentsia, Dovzhenko imagined himself as a representative of the Ukrainian people. As such, he wanted a radical transformation of the national, political, and social inequalities in the Ukrainian provinces. In his 1939 autobiography, he admits his allegiance to Ukrainian nationalism at the outbreak of the Revolution.⁴⁰

By 1939, when Dovzhenko wrote this apparent *mea culpa*, reports on his political past and his reaction to the political and cultural situation in Ukraine filled thick files at the headquarters of the Ukrainian NKVD. A small circle of the Communist elite knew of his anti-Bolshevik sympathies and allegiances during the revolutionary period.⁴¹

In seeking readmittance to the party that had expelled him in 1923 the filmmaker had to draw a fine line. He had to admit to his nationalist past, but at the same time he had to downplay and whitewash his nationalist activities. He could not provide a complete explanation of his

39. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 5; Carynnyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 10.

40. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fols. 7–8; Carynnyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 11–12.

41. In 1995–96 and the summer of 1998 I did not gain access to these archival materials. Volodymyr Popyk published selected documents from these files (see footnotes 4 and 9).

political actions between 1917 and 1920. An unexpurgated account would have condemned Dovzhenko to political marginalization if not to arrest and even execution.

In answering the personal data questionnaire appended to his 1939 party application, Dovzhenko did admit that he served in the Army of the UNR, headed by Symon Petliura, after the uprising against Hetman Skoropadsky, but he did not say for how long or at what rank. He declared that he had never participated in any battles against the Red Army.⁴² He disclosed that the Cheka had arrested him in 1919, but claimed that this security organ released him after an investigation, implying that it could not find any evidence against him and that it exonerated him of all charges of “counter-revolution.”⁴³ Surprisingly, he did not expand on the security organ’s reconsideration of his case in his autobiographical statement.

The party’s Central Control Commission certainly had access to information about his arrest. Dovzhenko may have foolishly thought that it would not investigate his case thoroughly after his confession that the Cheka had investigated him. Instead of describing his political journey to communism, he explained how he joined the Borotbists.

By 1939, after the deaths, suicides, and trials of several prominent Borotbists, Dovzhenko had to justify his membership in this political party. In doing so, he adopted a self-critical tone in his autobiographical statement:

Early in 1920 I joined the Borotbist party. This action, wrong and unnecessary as it was, happened in the following way. I had very much wanted to join the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine but considered myself unworthy of crossing its threshold and so joined the Borotbists, as if entering the preparatory class in a gymnasium, which the Borotbist party, of course, never was. The very thought of such a comparison seems absurd now.⁴⁴

In recounting his journey to the Communist Party after having joined the Borotbists, Dovzhenko did not provide any description of his conversion in his autobiographical statement. Instead, he expressed his disillusionment with the Ukrainian nationalist cause: “The world had

42. “Anketa,” RGALI, 2081/1/944, fol. 2.

43. *Ibid.*

44. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 10; Carynnyk, “Dovzhenko’s 1939 Autobiography,” 13.

proved to be much more complex than I had imagined. Ukraine proved to be more complex too. It had plenty of its own and foreign masters, who spoke excellent Ukrainian, and the lordlings with whom I associated in my search for truth turned out to be a sorry lot of ignoramuses, charlatans, and traitors. I fled from them with a profound feeling of disgust and bitterness."⁴⁵

In his autobiographical statement he implied that he had become a member of the CP(B)U primarily because of his disillusionment with Ukrainian nationalism, not because the party offered him a new vision of the world. He admitted his political ignorance:

I knew nothing about communism, and if I had been asked who Marx was, I would have probably replied that he was a book publisher. Thus I entered the revolution through the wrong door. I was unfortunate enough not to have heard a single great spokesman of the October Revolution. I hadn't read a single Marxist book, which would have shown me the light and properly directed my actions.⁴⁶

After acknowledging his ignorance, he failed to state when he started to read Marxist literature or how it forced him to re-evaluate his past. Although Dovzhenko divulged his nationalist sympathies and anti-Bolshevik actions, his autobiographical statement did not expound upon his conversion to communism. The filmmaker's silence on this critical issue called the sincerity of his commitment to the communist cause into question. Here, Dovzhenko revealed himself as a political opportunist.

It was important to prove his communist credentials. By the end of the 1930s, high party officials claimed that the Borotbists, Bolshevik allies during the Civil War, had been "double-dealers" and "counter-revolutionaries." In January 1936 Pavel Postyshev, the Ukrainian Party's all-powerful second secretary and Stalin's emissary, asserted that the former Borotbists within the Communist Party's ranks established an All-Ukrainian Borotbist Centre, which hoped to prepare an armed uprising against the Soviet government in Ukraine. In July 1938, *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, the party's main theoretical journal, accused the Borotbists of being from the very beginning agents of Ukrainian nationalism and foreign imperialist powers.⁴⁷

45. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fols. 8-9; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 12.

46. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 8; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 11-12.

47. Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of a Decade of Mass*

These accusations forced Dovzhenko to distance himself from the Borotbists in his autobiography. In order to renew his membership in the Communist Party, he focused on the evolution of his personal relationship with Stalin.

Surprisingly, Korohodsky does not deal with Dovzhenko's complex relationship with Stalin, who took a serious interest in the Ukrainian filmmaker. Criticized severely in Ukraine in late 1932 after the release of his film *Ivan*, Dovzhenko moved to Moscow in early 1933. In a letter to the general secretary he asked Stalin "to protect me and to help me develop creatively. Comrade Stalin heard my plea. I am profoundly convinced that Comrade Stalin saved my life. If I had not appealed to him promptly, I would have certainly perished both as an artist and as a citizen."⁴⁸

Dovzhenko described his first meeting with Stalin in early 1934 as a turning point in his life:

When I came away from him I saw that the world had changed for me. With his paternal solicitude Comrade Stalin had lifted from my shoulders the burden of many years' standing when I had felt creatively, and therefore politically, inferior, a feeling instilled in me over many years by my environment. My subsequent four meetings with Comrade Stalin strengthened my spirit and multiplied my creative ability. I made *Shchors* on the advice of the great teacher.⁴⁹

These fawning passages suggest that Dovzhenko became Stalin's client and that he established ties with the Communist Party's inner circle. Instead of depicting his political conversion to communism in his 1939 autobiographical statement, Dovzhenko attempted to wrap himself in Stalin's mantle. He may have imagined that mentioning his highly-placed "friend" would win him a party card.

Dovzhenko's long-term relationship with Stalin highlights the filmmaker's flaws, contradictions, and illusions. The twenty-year relationship and Dovzhenko's accommodation with the Stalinist order can be divided into three phases.⁵⁰ During the first phase from 1933 to 1935,

Terror (1929–1939) (New York: Praeger, 1960), 95–8.

48. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 24; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 24.

49. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 26; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 25.

50. See my "Adapting to the Stalinist Order: Alexander Dovzhenko's Psychological Journey, 1933–1953," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 7 (2001): 1097–116. See also my *Alexander Dovzhenko: A Life in Soviet Film* (London: British Film Institute, 2002).

when he filmed *Aerograd*, he acclimatized himself to the Soviet leader's new and brutal political mores. Because he viewed placing his own visions on screen as his primary mission, he constructed his relationship with the secretary general on the basis of illusions. During the second phase, between 1935 and 1939, as Dovzhenko prepared his film *Shchors*, Stalin's charismatic spell on him weakened. By the beginning of 1944, after Stalin's condemnation of his *Ukraina v vohni* (Ukraine in Flames), the filmmaker critically re-examined his fantasies regarding the most powerful man in the Soviet Union. Although Dovzhenko did not abandon all of his illusions, he confronted most of them.

Stalin the patron and Dovzhenko the client established a Byzantine relationship. At times, it appeared as if they played the roles of father and son, at other times, teacher and student. As is the case with such connections, unequal power defined the Stalin-Dovzhenko relationship.

Like all prominent individuals living in this highly volatile and capricious era, Dovzhenko feared for his life. Having experienced Bolshevik imprisonment in 1919, he expected arrest, imprisonment, exile, or execution in 1932 and 1933 after criticisms of *Zemlia* (Earth) and *Ivan* appeared in print. He had two choices: to accept a fate determined by others or to exercise what little control of his future was possible. He chose the second option. Under very trying circumstances, Dovzhenko sought to deal with his turbulent and unpredictable environment by establishing for himself the overarching illusion of control, the illusion that he could manipulate political circumstances in his own favour. In the three phases of Dovzhenko's relationship with Stalin, illusions and preference falsifications⁵¹ underpinned the filmmaker's strong motivations to maintain some control over his life and work environment.

In the first phase, Dovzhenko feared Stalin but imagined that he could get on the Party leader's "good side." Stalin's cordiality encouraged this illusion. In the second phase, he realized that his position was precarious. In creating *Shchors* with the compromises Stalinist censors

51. According to Timur Kuran, preference falsifications seek to manipulate "the perceptions others hold about one's motivations or dispositions." An individual employing this method of self-presentation continuously creates a false impression by "living the lie." He projects an outward image approved by those in authority (Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995], 4).

demanded, he realized how little he could control his own immediate political environment. With the arrests of his closest friends, he experienced psychological trauma, which eroded his illusions and engendered preference falsifications to camouflage his doubts about the claims represented by the Stalinist order. In the third phase, Dovzhenko—in response to the war's tragic losses—imagined that Stalin wanted to know the “truth” as Dovzhenko saw it in his screenplay *Ukraina v vohni*.

After Dovzhenko's meeting with Stalin and the Politburo on 30 January 1944, at which Stalin harshly criticized *Ukraina v vohni*, the filmmaker feared for his life for the third time.⁵² But despite his anger, Stalin did not arrest Dovzhenko. Instead, he divested the filmmaker of his civic and creative responsibilities. Most importantly, he prohibited Dovzhenko from returning to Ukraine, his creative inspiration.

The film director feared letting Stalin down, and yet intentionally or unintentionally, he disappointed the party leader. Stalin, however, protected the filmmaker. In return, Dovzhenko became Stalin's client. He could live, he could create, but he could not express all of his visions on the screen. Forced to reside in Moscow, he lived in a golden cage, but a cage nevertheless. His creative (however restricted) interpretations of the truth, his illusions, and preference falsifications made life under Stalin's protection bearable.

Stalin's death ended Dovzhenko's illusions about the party leader's “paternal solicitude.” The filmmaker hoped that he would be able to return to Ukraine and to regain his position as a cultural intermediary between the Ukrainian cultural elite and Moscow's commissars. But this was not the case. In the last years of his life he celebrated one last illusion, the illusion of Ukraine. Disappointed over not returning to Ukraine, he descended into nostalgia and a rewriting of his past. All of his illusions, including those about Stalin, of being a cultural mediator between Moscow and Ukraine, and about Ukraine, helped Dovzhenko to adjust to Soviet reality.

52. The first time he feared for his life was in 1919, during his Cheka imprisonment; the second time, in 1932–33, after the brutal criticisms of *Ivan*. In his 1939 autobiography he also recounts how in 1920, after he had joined the CP(B)U and during the Polish-Soviet conflict, Józef Piłsudski's Polish troops sentenced him to a mock execution and how they made him stand as a live target during a crossfire during a crossfire (RGALI, 2081/1/381, fols. 10–11; Carynyk, “Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography,” 13). But it is unclear if these incidents really happened or whether they are a product of Dovzhenko's imagination.

Most importantly, Korohodsky did not see the last two paragraphs appended to the RGALI autobiography. Here, Dovzhenko criticizes unnamed Jewish colleagues (calling them Yids) who led the Communist Party cell at the Kyiv Film Studio. Inasmuch as he claimed that they would block his admission to the Communist Party, he did not submit his application. He concluded these paragraphs, written on 2 May 1940, with the following words: "And so I decided to create the cause of Lenin and Stalin for the people according to the voice of my heart and my mind, without having anything to do with despicable tradesmen whom I despise as much as they hate me. The time will come when people will curse the lies told by these betrayers of Christ, Lenin, and Stalin."⁵³

These anti-Semitic remarks are an integral part of Dovzhenko's complex relationship with the Jewish community in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union, another black hole in the scholarship concerning Dovzhenko.⁵⁴ Korohodsky, who possessed a Jewish background, did not have the opportunity to assess the complete RGALI autobiography and to provide a context for the filmmaker's comments. Inasmuch as his informed speculations concerning the aftereffects of Dovzhenko's traumatization at the hands of the Cheka in 1919 constitute a masterful assessment of the development of a prominent intelligent's "captive mind" within the Stalinist order, it is unfortunate that the author did not gain access to the RGALI autobiography until his book was in press.

Despite these shortcomings, Korohodsky's work is the first serious analysis of Dovzhenko produced in post-1991 Ukraine. The author reveals the filmmaker as a flawed man, as someone who experienced serious traumatization in 1919 and realized that the sword of Damocles always hung over him. His assessment of Dovzhenko's emotional landscape represents an important contribution to Ukrainian scholarship on the filmmaker.


Although Korohodsky did not succeed in evaluating all of Dovzhenko's black holes, his openness, his courage in raising difficult questions and accepting unpleasant answers, and his painstaking search for the truth behind the filmmaker's Soviet image make this book a major

53. RGALI, 2081/1/381, fol. 28; Carynyk, "Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," 27. Carynyk's comment that the strikeouts in these two paragraphs were apparently not Dovzhenko's (p. 27) is very important.

54. I have made a preliminary attempt to place Dovzhenko's anti-Semitic comments in context in my *Alexander Dovzhenko: A Life in Soviet Film*, 171–7.

accomplishment in Dovzhenko studies. Anyone interested in the fate of Ukrainian culture in the twentieth century must read this fascinating collection of essays.

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Migration from and to Ukraine at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

Serge Cipko

Olena Malynovska. *Mihranty, mihratsiia ta ukrainska derzhava: Analiz upravlinnia zovnishnimy mihratsiiamy*. Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo NADU, 2004. 235 pp.

Krystyna Iglicka, ed. *Migration and Labour Markets in Poland and Ukraine / Mihratsiia i rynky pratsi Polshchi i Ukrainy*. Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2003. 118 pp.

Agata Górny and Paolo Ruspini, eds. *Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. xix, 283 pp.

Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynskiy, Nancy Popson, and Blair A. Ruble, *Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004. 183 pp.

S. Pirozhkov, E. Malinovskaya [Olena Malynovska], and O. Khomra. *Foreign Labor Migration in Ukraine: Socio-Economic Aspect*. Kyiv: National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, National Institute of International Security Challenges, 2003. 134 pp.

In late 2005 the Kyiv International Sociological Institute conducted a poll of 2,021 inhabitants of Ukraine, which included a question on emigration. In response to that question, 25.6 percent of the respondents said that they considered the problem of emigration from Ukraine to be critical and another forty-three percent said that they regarded it as serious.¹ It is clear from this poll that there is little indifference to the topic of emigration in Ukraine and for good reason. Many of its inhabitants, responding to economic and other pressures, have left the country in search of opportunities abroad. Estimates of how many Ukrainian citizens

1. "Poll: USA Recorded Language Split in Ukraine," REGNUM News Agency, 3 April 2006.

have been living abroad in the last year or so vary, but some of them run as high as seven million.² Although the estimate of seven million is too high, there is no doubt that the true figure is nonetheless in the millions, the low millions, rather than hundreds of thousands.

Since it attained independence in 1991, Ukraine has confronted a number of challenges, including the demographic one. Over the past decade or so the republic has experienced a gradual drop in its population. Thus, between 1989, when the last Soviet census was conducted, and 2001, when the all-Ukrainian census was carried out, Ukraine's population declined by over three million, from 51,700,000 to 48,457,000. It has continued to dwindle since then, falling to 47,056,163 by 1 August 2005.³ Apart from a falling birth rate, emigration has played its role in this drop of over four million people. Prior to Ukraine's declaration of independence migration was directed eastward, to other Soviet republics, rather than to the West, but after 1991 the destinations to which Ukrainians emigrate *en masse* have significantly increased.

In Western Europe, for example, the traditional centres of Ukrainian settlement such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium, have been supplemented by newly emergent ones, such as the Mediterranean quartet of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. In recent years a number of studies have appeared that analyze the phenomenon of large-scale emigration and the challenges that it poses to Ukraine and other countries in Europe. Indeed, the very appearance of such works in Ukraine is quite a novel development, for, as Olena Malynovska, a former head of the Department for Migration and Refugees of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Migration and currently an associate of the Ukrainian National Institute for International Security Problems, notes, studies on Ukrainians abroad were not encouraged in the Soviet period. In her *Mihranty, mihratsiia ta ukrainska derzhava: Analiz upravlinnia zovnishnimy mihratsiiamy* (Migrants, Migration, and the Ukrainian State: An Analysis of the Management of External Migrations), Malynovska contrasts the research on population movements conducted

2. See, for example, "Ukrainians Increasingly Vulnerable to Human Trafficking," *Associated Press Newswires*, 2 August 2005, which quotes Ukrainian Youth and Sport Minister Iurii Pavlenko as saying that there are about seven million Ukrainians living abroad.

3. *Interfax Ukrainian News*, 13 October 2005.

during the closed Soviet era with the greater knowledge that is publicly available about such topics since Ukraine's independence.

The book encompasses subjects such as refugees, repatriation, emigration, as well as immigration to Ukraine. It examines migration from a legal perspective, presenting an analysis of the laws that govern it and the mechanisms for managing it. Some attention in the study is also devoted to Ukrainian-Russian bilateral migration, which stretches back to the early Soviet period. Malynovska notes that after independence the Ukrainian population was temporarily bolstered by the return of migrants from Russia, but the balance was redressed by the middle of the 1990s when the number of Ukrainians migrating to Russia exceeded the number entering Ukraine. Thus, in 1994–98, 636,000 people migrated to Russia from Ukraine, but only 270,000 individuals came to Ukraine from Russia (pp. 76–8). Malynovska suggests that more Ukrainian migrants might have returned to Ukraine had the Ukrainian government done as much as the Russian authorities to facilitate repatriation (p. 165).

Russia has been the primary destination of Ukrainian emigrants, although, as I have noted, the total number of Ukrainians working abroad is elusive. The estimates, as Malynovska shows, range from two million to seven million citizens: figures on the higher side are quoted by some politicians (p. 104). There has been some variance in the pattern of emigration from Ukraine: some countries have lost their importance as destinations and others have gained it. Israel and Portugal are two cases in point. Emigration from Ukraine to Israel encompassed more than a hundred thousand people in 1990–91, but seven years later, in 1998, the number was under twenty thousand (p. 86). In the 1990s emigration from Ukraine to Portugal was not as substantial. In 1999 there were only 127 Ukrainian immigrants registered there. By 2002, after an amnesty program was introduced, the number of legal immigrants jumped to 65,000 (p. 105). Recent estimates put the number of (legal and illegal) Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal at 200,000 or more.⁴

Malynovska touches on similar themes in her contribution to the bilingual English-Ukrainian book *Migration and Labour Markets in Poland and Ukraine / Migrants i rynki pracy Polshchi i Ukrainy*, edited by Krystyna Iglicka. Here she draws attention to such achievements as

4. See, for example, "UGCC in Portugal" [press release, 23 April 2006] at <<http://www.ugcc.org.ua/eng/press-releases/article;3402/>> (accessed on 8 May 2006).

Ukrainian national migration legislation based on international legal norms. Liberal laws on Ukrainian citizenship and on refugees were passed, she observes, and international agreements concerning human rights were signed (p. 84). However, the challenge of the 2000s, argues Malynovska, is not a massive influx of immigration, but the loss of population owing to a falling natural growth rate and emigration. Malynovska observes that while the influx of people into Ukraine from other former Soviet republics exceeded two million over ten years, mostly because of repatriation, “it fell significantly to around 50 thousand in 2001” (p. 81). The Ukrainian state, she maintains, has not been able to reinforce laws on Ukrainian citizenship with assistance to Ukrainians who wished to leave other former Soviet republics. This inability led to “tangible human losses, since many ethnic Ukrainians and other nationalities and one-time emigrants from Ukraine, who left their places of previous residence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia wanting to return to their motherland, immigrated to Russia instead of Ukraine because in the former, despite numerous difficulties, they received support and help in resolving settlement and employment problems, etc.” Thus, “most ethnic Ukrainians formerly residing in Kazakhstan and other CIS republics ... immigrated to the Russian Federation” (p. 82).

This has been Russia’s gain and Ukraine’s loss, she suggests. Malynovska notes that Russia, like Ukraine, has been facing a low natural growth rate and recognizes that to preserve its current population size of 145 million (2002) it would have to admit almost fifty million immigrants in the next fifty years. This means, according to Malynovska, that Ukraine and Russia are rivals in a competition for immigrants. Moreover, “the possibility that some of the Ukrainian population will emigrate to Russia, especially if social and economic conditions domestically do not improve, constitutes a serious threat to Ukrainian society” (p. 85). In order to meet such a challenge, Malynovska calls for establishing a National Migration Service as a single coordinator for migration policy. It would perform a myriad of migration-related administrative functions at various levels (p. 88).

The editor of *Migration and Labour Markets in Poland and Ukraine / Mihratsiia i rynky pratsi Polshchi i Ukrainy*, Krystyna Iglicka, a social demographer and since 2002 the director of the Migration and Eastern Policy Program at the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw, discusses a different kind of challenge—the challenge faced by the European Union (EU) in the growing number of legal and illegal immigrants from non-EU

countries. "Nowadays," she writes, "we are witnessing the emergence of a unified EU immigration policy, about to become a binding set of laws and documents not only for its present members, but also for candidate countries." Poland represented what she calls a "third country," but after its accession to the EU in 2004 it replaced Germany as the union's eastern frontier, and its "main partner from the other side of the frontier" is "Ukraine, whose population of approx. 50 million may become the main source of migrant labour for European labour markets, and especially for the Polish one" (p. 9).

Oleksandr Khomra, who heads the Division of Socio-Economic and Demographic Security at the National Institute of International Security Problems of Ukraine, contributed an article titled "The Emigration Potential of the Western Borderland of Ukraine." He elected to study the border regions, namely, Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia), Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, and Volyn Oblasts, because of "their location along the main path of European integration" and because "their populations are more strongly connected to the European system of values, due to the fact that these territories were, prior to the Second World War, parts of Central European countries and have intensive cross-border ties" (p. 90). In seeking to assess the emigration potential of the borderland in the "period preceding the European Union's eastward enlargement" (*ibid.*), Khomra draws on the results of a 1999 survey titled "Cross-border Cooperation and Labour Market in Regions, Members of the Carpathian and Buh Euroregions" (p. 92). Based on 475 questionnaires distributed in that zone, the results showed that 67.1 percent of the respondents intended to go abroad for work while another 11.8 percent were undecided. Asked where they were willing to work, nearly a third (thirty-two percent) answered that they could "realistically see themselves working" in Poland and seventy-four percent cited the Czech Republic. Neighbouring Russia was cited by only 7.1 percent of the respondents, fewer than one of the overseas destinations; and 9.1 percent of the respondents said that they would go to the United States and/or Canada to work. Khomra says that there was "no significant difference in opinions about labour migration between women and men" (*ibid.*).

In 1998 it was estimated that as many as 700,000 people from Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi Oblasts were "temporarily employed abroad," accounting for "about eighteen percent of the total working population of these regions" (p. 98). Regardless of where they go, Khomra argues, Ukraine "suffers losses from each emigration,"

mainly from “the emigration of well-qualified specialists.” These specialists are trained in Ukraine only for their skills to be used abroad. In his opinion, “Ukraine has to stop providing free training to professionals who migrate to highly developed countries for permanent residence.” Ukraine should “require the host countries of migrants whose education was funded by Ukrainian taxpayers to compensate Ukraine for their training. The compensation has to cover the total investment in their human potential and has to be calculated not on the basis of the costs of education in Ukraine but according to international prices” (p. 110).

The Czech Republic has emerged as one of the major recipients of Ukrainian immigration. In her contribution to *Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited*, entitled “Current Ukrainian and Russian Migration to the Czech Republic: Mutual Similarities and Differences,” Eva Janská, a research fellow in the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development at Charles University in Prague, asserts that the Czech Republic receives more documented foreign workers with work permits than any other country (Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and forms a migratory “buffer zone” between the West and the East (p. 49). “Among the post-communist countries,” writes Janská, “the Ukrainian migrant community, together with Slovaks, is by far the largest in the Czech Republic” (p. 50). Ukrainians comprised a quarter of the (211,000) foreigners who had residence permits as of 31 December 2001 (p. 50). Russians, who comprised one-fifteenth of the legal foreign residents, “significantly differ from Ukrainians ... as they hold a much higher share of permanent residence permits...[and] are more likely to be involved in white-collar types of work” (p. 50), observes Janská. Among Ukrainians young men predominate (their wives and children are left behind in Ukraine), and although they are relatively highly educated, “they are employed mostly in unskilled occupations, predominantly in construction” (p. 54). Janská found that married migrants usually intend to return to Ukraine. The Ukrainian migrants made “minimal attempts to lead an ‘organized’ social life” (p. 55) and were not as closely knit as the smaller Russian group.

In the same collection Krystyna Iglicka’s “The Revival of Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Poland” discusses Ukrainians as both an “old” minority and a “new” immigrant group in that country. In 1988 the Ukrainian minority was said to number 300,000; it was about as large as the Belarusian and the so-called “local people” communities, but smaller than the 600,000 German minority. Iglicka also presents later estimates

of the national minorities from assorted sources that are lower (p. 134). At the time Ukraine declared independence and on the eve of the new large-scale Ukrainian immigration to Poland, a number of Ukrainian organizations in Poland were still active, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church was beginning to experience a "real renaissance" (p. 144). Iglicka notes that the immigrant group that has come recently has contributed positively to the Polish economy but also has been associated with crime, including armed robbery and homicides. From the beginning of the 1990s to 1996 Ukrainians ranked first among migrants with work permits, and from 1996 to mid-1999 they were second after the Vietnamese (p. 145). In 1993–98 they ranked first among foreigners with permanent residence permits in Poland (p. 146). At the turn of the twenty-first century some Ukrainian seasonal workers and petty traders have been considering permanent settlement in Poland (p. 145).

Iglicka points out that "the territorial distribution of Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches coincides with where the 'new' Ukrainians live" (p. 146). This proves that "networks between [the] 'old' and 'new' groups play an important role in the spatial formation of the latter" (p. 147). She predicts a decrease in the number of petty traders and an increase in the number of seasonal workers. Iglicka also believes that there will be greater integration of the Ukrainian migrants, although some of them treat Poland as "a transit stop on their way to the West" (p. 148). One of her observations is that Ukrainians do "not seem as 'ethnically oriented'" as the Armenians who have come to Poland. This may be because of "Soviet propaganda's greater success in Ukraine than Armenia" or because "contrary to Armenians [who are in Poland as political refugees], Ukrainians come to Poland [of] their own free will" (p. 153).

While Ukraine has experienced considerable out-migration, it has also been the destination of a significant number of migrants over the last decade and a half. Malynovska has alluded to this topic in several of her works. In *Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv* she examines the topic in greater detail with five other authors, two of whom (Blair A. Ruble and Nancy Popson) are on the staff of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and three of whom (Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Yaroslav Pylynskyi) are, like Malynovska herself, from Ukraine. They note that over a period of ten years almost two million people have come to Ukraine seeking permanent residency. Most of them are ethnic Ukrainians and their offspring living outside Ukraine. At the same time, the authors assert, a

similar number of people left Ukraine for post-Soviet states, mainly Russia, and another 600,000 left for Western Europe and North America (p. 2). In 2004 the number of applications for permanent residence has increased, and the “number of people adopting Ukrainian citizenship substantially surpassed the number relinquishing Ukrainian citizenship.” Thus, Ukraine is “is increasingly attractive to foreigners and persons without citizenship” (p. 1). The number of Asian and African immigrants to Ukraine—a group the authors call nontraditional because “they do not represent ethnic groups that historically have lived in Ukraine or the former Soviet Union”—has increased. In 2001 an estimated 15,000 individuals from Asian and African countries resided permanently in Kyiv, accounting for about 0.6 percent of the capital’s population (p. 10). A significant number of them are Vietnamese and Afghans. The Vietnamese began to come to Ukraine after an intergovernmental agreement was signed in 1981 to help relieve unemployment in Vietnam. Kyiv-based companies such as the Darnytsia Silk Plant employed Vietnamese, who have stayed on in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. Afghans came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (pp. 16–17).

A survey showed that nearly forty percent of the immigrants, many of them illegal, came to Kyiv for economic reasons (to find a well-paying job, better living conditions, a good education, or medical care), while more than a quarter (for example, from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Angola) came for political and other reasons in search of asylum. Others came to study or to rejoin their family or are transit migrants (p. 25). The authors found that “regardless of current economic hardships in the Ukrainian state, Ukraine is economically attractive and a desirable destination for many immigrants from a number of Asian and African countries” (p. 33).

In the studies under review, it is possible to discern a number of trends as far as migration goes. It is clear, for example, that emigration has occurred on a scale that was unanticipated and raises concern. The theme of Ukraine’s declining population received some publicity during the March 2006 general election campaign. According to *The Independent* of London, during the campaign Ukraine’s former prime minister Iulia Tymoshenko, “the amazingly glamorous ‘princess’ of the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine [*sic*],” was “embarking on a political comeback with a guaranteed vote-winner.” She was urging “all Ukrainians to take immediate action to help raise population numbers. Go straight home and

work on it.”⁵ Ukraine’s predicament is not unique: leaders of other countries have drawn attention to plummeting fertility rates and have recommended analogous solutions. Two years earlier an article entitled “So, Will You Do It for Your Country?” in the Melbourne newspaper *The Age* remarked that Prime Minister John Howard of Australia “[recently] strode into the bedroom” and urged Australia’s childless men “[c]ome on, come on, your nation needs you.”⁶

The difference between the two countries is that Australia’s population problem arises from a low birth rate, while Ukraine’s arises from emigration. Why have so many people been leaving the country since independence? The authors of *Foreign Labor Migration in Ukraine: Socio-Economic Aspect*, published in Kyiv in 2003 provide part of the answer. They cite unemployment, underemployment, and delays in the payment of salaries as some of the reasons for emigration (p. 5). And, of course, there is a demand for Ukrainian labour in European and other countries. A Ukrainian immigrant in Portugal described as a trained engineer who, like many of his compatriots, worked in construction told a reporter a few years ago that he was earning about \$400 U.S. a month, not a very large sum, but at least he was paid on time and could remit \$150 home to his family.⁷

Although Ukraine bears a financial losses from its investment in the education of people who apply their skills in another country, the republic benefits from emigrants’ remittances. It is difficult to say how much is being remitted on an annual basis because, as the authors of *Foreign Labor Migration in Ukraine* note, much of the money reaches Ukraine through unofficial channels. Many migrants simply bring the cash home themselves (p. 92). However, in 2003 Ombudsman Nina Karpachova said in a special report to Ukraine’s parliament on “The State of Observance and Protection of Human Rights of Ukrainian Citizens Abroad” that Ukrainian migrants earn over two billion hryvnias a month and recommended that the system of money transfers from abroad be simplified and that fees for such bank services be reduced.⁸ An Agence France Presse

5. John Walsh, “Btw,” *The Independent*, 11 March 2006, p. 23.

6. *The Age*, 15 May 2004.

7. “Welcome to Portugal—Especially if You Are Ukrainian,” in *EuroViews* at: <<http://manila.djh.dk/portugal/>> (accessed 6 May 2006).

8. “Ukrainians Abroad Earn Hr. 2 Bn per Month,” *Eastern Economist Daily*, 3 April 2003.

report on emigration from Ukraine in February 2006 referred to Ukrainian migrants as “a key resource for their country’s economy, bringing in an annual 19 billion dollars (15.9 billion euros) in remittances.” A lower estimate is presented by Malynovska, who suggests that the currency remittances from Ukrainians abroad amount to between four and six billion dollars a year.⁹

The authors of *Foreign Labor Migration in Ukraine* also allude to the lack of organization among the Ukrainians who have migrated *en masse* to the Mediterranean countries. They rarely contact legal institutions or NGOs in the countries of work to protect their rights. “Practically no assistance on the part of Ukrainian non-government organizations is provided,” and “[o]nly the Communist Party of Ukraine interacts with the Communist Parties of Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece, trying to establish trade unions of Ukrainian hired workers in these countries.” They note that in Italy and Spain local trade unions “stand for complete recognition of illegal labor migrants” (p. 94). The authors found that Ukrainian labour migrants communicated infrequently with representatives of the diaspora living permanently in their countries of work (p. 98).

It should be noted, however, that the study appeared only a couple of years after Ukrainian migrants began to arrive *en masse* in countries such as Spain and Portugal. Much has changed since 2003. First, the majority of the newcomers were illegal immigrants on arrival and therefore may not have been keen to establish ties with organizations. The longer their stay in the respective countries and the more advanced their legalization process, the more community organization seems to develop. In Spain, for example, where there were about 200,000 Ukrainians in 2004, according to community activist Teodor Barabash,¹⁰ a number of organizations have appeared recently. An umbrella organization, the Federación de las Asociaciones Ucránianos en España, was established not in the Spanish capital Madrid, but in the eastern coastal city of Valencia to unite the various associations across the country and maintain ties with the Ukrainian embassy.¹¹ It is a member of the Toronto-based Ukrainian

9. Olena Malynovska, “Caught between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy,” at <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=365>> (accessed on 11 May 2006).

10. *El Mundo*, 25 November 2004.

11. On its home page the embassy provides a list of fourteen associations. See “Ukrainski asotsiatsii v Ispanii,” at <<http://www.embucrania.org.es/ukr/asossiasii.php>>

World Congress (UWC). Umbrella organizations representing communities in Greece, Italy, and Portugal are also affiliated with the UCW.

In 2003 the authors of *Foreign Labor Migration in Ukraine* had already observed that in the four Mediterranean countries a process of legalization was underway for those migrants who had jobs, means of support, and no criminal record. In Portugal after five years migrants with a work visa can apply for a residence permit. In Italy, to retain their Ukrainian employees homeowners support family reunification and enrol their employees' children in schools (p. 123).

The population transfers that have been in effect in Ukraine and other former Soviet states have significantly altered the complexion of the Ukrainian diaspora. As a result of the recent wave of immigrants from Ukraine to Spain, which hitherto had only a tiny Ukrainian community, as well as a smaller migration (10,000) to Argentina in 1990–2000,¹² the number of Ukrainians in Spanish-speaking countries (Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Spain, and Argentina) may have almost doubled and should exceed half a million. The number of Ukrainians in Portugal is quickly approaching that of Brazil (estimated at 200,000 in 1989 and much higher in recent estimates). The spring 2006 newsletter of the World Congress of Ukrainians noted that “a year ago contact was established with Ukrainians in Mozambique,”¹³ a colony of Portugal until 1975 where Portuguese is still the official language.

The Ukrainian communities in English- and French-speaking countries may not have doubled, but nonetheless they have grown. The emigration of Ukrainians to the United States since 1991 was one of the subjects discussed at the Petro Jacyk Memorial Symposium entitled “Diaspora and Homeland in the Transnational Age: The Case of Ukraine,” which took place at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute on 20–21 March 2003. Oleh Wolowyna noted that in the United States between 1991 and 2001 “there were about 56 thousand [legal] immigrants of Ukrainian ethnicity. If one were to consider all the legal migrants from Ukraine during this period, this number would increase to 135,000, with

(accessed on 7 May 2006).

12. See Ezequiel Texidó, “El acuerdo bilateral celebrado entre Argentina y Ucrania,” in *Acuerdos bilaterales de migración de mano de obra: Estudios de casos*, ed. Eduardo Geronimi, Lorenzo Cachón, and Ezequiel Texidó (Geneva: Sector de la Protección Social, Programa de Migraciones Internacionales, Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, 2004), 135.

13. *Biuletén Svitovoho kongresu ukrainsiv*, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 4.

Jews constituting a large component of the migration stream. If one added up the 56 thousand legal, ethnic Ukrainian migrants, and the ethnic Ukrainian temporary visa-holders who stayed, the total number of the Fourth Wave would vary between 100 thousand and 120 thousand individuals.”¹⁴

The number of immigrants from Ukraine to Canada over the same period was smaller, although it was significantly higher than in the previous three or so decades. This can be inferred from Ihor Stebelsky's study of post-1991 Ukrainian immigration to Canada, which shows that between 1991 and 2003 about 30,000 people came to Canada from Ukraine as permanent and, to a much lesser extent, temporary residents.¹⁵ In the United Kingdom the Ukrainian community has more than tripled, if the estimate of “possibly up to 100,000 Ukrainians in the UK as a whole,” reported in 2004,¹⁶ is to be believed. The post-1991 immigration of Ukrainians to French-speaking countries is smaller and dwarfed by the flow of migration that has been directed to countries such as Italy and Greece, which hitherto never figured as important places of Ukrainian settlement.¹⁷

European states that already had large Ukrainian minorities have seen their numbers supplemented by newcomers from Ukraine. The Czech Republic, one of the two successor states to the former Czechoslovakia, had few Ukrainians on its territory prior to the breakup in 1993: most dwelled in the Prešov region of Slovakia. Now it is a major recipient of Ukrainian migrant labour. According to a BBC Monitoring European report, in 2004 “foreigners who stayed in the Czech Republic permanently or the holders of long-term residence permits made up about 1.8 per cent of the Czech Republic's population.” The largest group, it continued,

14. “First Petro Jacyk Memorial Symposium Discusses Diaspora-Ukraine Relationship” at <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/na/na_jacyk_symp_03.html> (accessed on 7 May 2006).

15. Ihor Stebelsky, “Chetverta khvyliia iak skladova chastyna ukrainskoi diaspori v Kanadi: Demohrafichna perspektyva,” *Ukrainskyi vymir* (Nizhyn) 2, no. 4 (2005): 4–19.

16. “TUC Report Reveals Grim Exploitation of Ukrainians,” *The Guardian*, 9 March 2004.

17. Nina Karpachova, Ukraine's ombudsman, attributes the lower number of Ukrainians in France to the fact that that country “exercises remarkably effective control over migration processes on its territory and employers are strictly accountable for using illegal labor” (“Status of Observance of Ukrainian Migrant Workers' Rights in the Receiving Countries,” at <http://www.ombudsman.kiev.ua/S_Report1/gl2_5.htm> [accessed on 26 June 2006]).

“were Ukrainians—more than 78,000, followed by Slovaks—47,000 and Vietnamese—34,000.”¹⁸ Ukrainians also formed the largest group of foreigners residing in the country without a proper permit—almost seventy percent of the overall figure, according to a recent report, and the largest number of deported foreigners—more than 6,000 in 2005.¹⁹ It was announced in late 2005 that in order to curb illegal immigration, the Czech Interior Ministry was planning to open employment offices in Ukraine and other countries to recruit workers for Czech companies. Agence France Presse reported that “[a]ccording to some estimates, more than 100,000 Ukrainians work in the Czech Republic, including some illegally, making them the biggest group of foreigners in the country.”²⁰ The Czech Republic has a total population a little over ten million. In neighbouring Slovakia estimates of recent immigrants from Ukraine run as high as 60,000 and in Hungary, 30,000.²¹

In Poland, there were an estimated 100,000 Ukrainians working in the country at the turn of 2006,²² but reports in 2005 anticipated that once a new agreement between the Polish and Ukrainian governments came

18. “Czech Cabinet Adopts Plan to Help Settled Foreigners to Integrate,” *BBC Monitoring European*, 4 January 2006.

19. “Illegal Migration Poses Threat Despite Decline—Czech Aliens Police,” *BBC Monitoring European*, 2 February 2006.

20. “Czech Government Considers Foreign Offices to Curb Illegal Immigration,” Agence France Presse, 13 December 2005 and “Czech Employment Offices Might Appear in Ukraine,” *Unian*, 13 December 2005.

21. See O. Malynovska, *Ukraina, Ievropa, mihratsiia: Mihratsii naseleattia Ukrainy v umovakh rozshyrennia Ie.S.* (Kyiv: “Blank-Pres,” 2004), 11. Organizations in both countries are affiliated with the Ukrainian World Congress, in the case of Slovakia through the Association of Ruthenians-Ukrainians in the Slovak Republic (Soiuz rusyniv-ukraintsiv Slovatskoi Respubliky) and in Hungary through the Society of Ukrainian Culture in Hungary (Tovarystvo Ukrainskoi kultury v Uhorszhchyni). See the home page of the Ukrainian World Congress at <http://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/UWC_members/index_ua.html>. It should be noted that while Ukrainians may be entering Slovakia, both Ukrainians and Slovaks have been migrating to Hungary. Thus, of the 31,000 work permits issued by Hungary’s employment office in 2001, 6,600 were given to Ukrainians and 3,100 to Slovaks (“Hungary Risk: Labour Market Risk,” *Economist Intelligence Unit—Risk Briefing*, 11 October 2005). After Slovakia joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, about 9,800 Slovakian citizens registered to work in Hungary, compared to 1,600 who were issued work permits in the first four months of 2004. By December 2004 Hungary’s Employment Office also had issued 8,800 work permits to Ukrainians (*MTI—EcoNews*, 23 March 2005).

22. *Polish News Bulletin*, 1 February 2006.

into effect as many as 200,000 Ukrainians could be migrating to Poland in the course of the following year. "Ukrainians who in the past worked illegally in Poland between April and October as fruit and vegetables pickers will now be able to take up all sorts of jobs in the agri-sector legally," a BBC Monitoring European report declared in July 2005. "Legal jobs would also be offered to Ukrainian women working as cleaners, house workers and baby-minders" for whom the Polish government wanted "to set a tax-free income level." Moreover, the accord would allow "Polish businessmen to employ highly qualified Ukrainian experts," who "could be employed in Poland for 1.5 years."²³ The newcomers would reinforce the already large Ukrainian community, which, as noted, in 1988 was said to number 300,000, although more recent counts have put the figure considerably lower. Poland's Ministry of the Interior and Administration asserts that, based on the 2002 national census, there were 27,172 citizens of Ukrainian origin in the country.²⁴ The low figure is questioned by some minority leaders. The *Polish News Bulletin*, for example, reported in 2005 that "[a] number of Ukrainians living in Poland believe that the fact they are poorly represented results from polonization imposed on them."²⁵

While the number of Ukrainians in the Visegrád Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, all of which joined the European Union in 2004) has been growing in the 1990s, in another corner of Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, the Ukrainian community has contracted somewhat. A significant number of Ukrainians in Bosnia emigrated, many of them to Canada. The newcomers have joined the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada both as parishioners and clergy. In 2005 it was noted that ten priests from former Yugoslavia currently minister to the Ukrainian Catholic faithful across Canada; six of the ten serve parishes in the province of Alberta.²⁶ Sizable communities remain

23. "Up to 200,000 Ukrainians Could Find Legal Work in Poland in 2006," *BBC Monitoring European*, 1 July 2005.

24. "Characteristics of Ethnic and National Minorities in Poland," at <http://www.mswia.gov.pl/index_eng_wai.php?dzial=10&id=56#GERMANS>.

25. "Ethnic Constitution May Suppress Some Problems and Raise Others," *Polish News Bulletin*, 2 May 2005. In 2003 Myron Kertychak, a community activist in Poland, said that he believed that there were between 250,000 and 300,000 Ukrainians in Poland, but that the number of nationally conscious Ukrainians was much smaller (*Holos Ukrainy*, 25 February 2003).

26. The figures were presented by Fr. Anton Tarasenko, the pastor of St. George the

in the former Yugoslavia. The Hina-Croatian News Agency reported in 2005 that Croatia has a population of 5,500 Ukrainians and Ruthenians, 3,100 of whom live in Vukovar-Srijem County, including 1,100 in Petrovci. The community, the agency said, was celebrating eighty-five years of cultural activity with a concert and dances in Petrovci, near Vukovar in eastern Croatia.²⁷ In Serbia, the local Ukrainian community at the time of Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasiuk's visit there on 24–25 January 2006 was said to encompass 5,500 Ukrainians and nearly 14,000 Ruthenians.²⁸ An April 2006 announcement on the home page of the Canadian Association of Ukrainians from Former Yugoslavia noted that having approved a European charter on regional and minority languages, the Serbian government would give Ukrainian and nine other languages (one of which is Ruthenian) official status in Serbia from 1 June of that year.²⁹

There are also newcomers from Ukraine in the Balkans, including trafficked women in the infamous international sex trade. In 2001 the *New York Times* called Macedonia “a major point in a network of trafficking in women, mostly from the former Communist bloc,” and related the story of a Ukrainian woman “from the Black Sea port of Odessa” who “was lured to Macedonia by a group of Serbs who offered unspecified work abroad” and was forced into prostitution. The newspaper noted that most of “the women who have been rescued and repatriated in recent months have come from the poorest countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.” The International Office of Migration, it continued, “said about 70 percent of the 300 women it had sent home recently were from Moldova. Others came from Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Belarus.” There were as many as 2,400 to 2,600 such women in Macedonia at a given time,³⁰ and, of course, large

Victorious Ukrainian Catholic Parish in Edmonton, at a banquet held in St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral's Parish Hall on 25 September 2004 in honour of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the priesthood of Fr. Mihajlo Planchak, who had come to Canada from Bosnia in 1989 and is now the cathedral's pastor.

27. “Ruthenians, Ukrainians Mark 85 Years of Cultural Activity in Croatia,” *Hina-Croatian News Agency*, 9 January 2005.

28. “Predstavnyk ukrainskoi derzhavy zustrivsia z ukrainskoiu ta rusynskoiu diasporamy Serbii,” at <<http://kobza.com.ua/content/view/1291/58/>>.

29. “Ukrainska mova — odna z ofitsiinykh mov v Serbii,” at <http://www.koukyu.ca/html/ukrajinska_mova.HTM>

30. “Macedonia Village Is Center of Europe Web in Sex Trade,” *The New York Times*,

numbers in other countries across the globe as well. In June 2006 the United States Department of State released its latest report on the trafficking in persons in which Ukraine was described as a source country for "men, women, and children trafficked internationally for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor." It said that reports of internal trafficking continued while the number of destination countries used by traffickers had increased in 2005. Poland, Russia, and Turkey were singled out as primary destination countries, while other major destinations included the Czech Republic, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, and the United Kingdom.³¹

Because of the breakup of states such as the former Yugoslavia and the USSR and the emergence of new states, Ukrainians are now found in more countries than ever before. It is interesting to note that in one such state, the unrecognized Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, a region which broke away from Moldova in 1990, Ukrainians form a share of the local population second only to Ukraine in the world. A census conducted there in November 2004 showed that Ukrainians constituted 28.8 percent, Russians 30.3 percent, and ethnic Moldovans 31.9 percent of the region's 555,500 inhabitants.³² The republic of Moldova conducted its own census that same year, which showed that of the republic's 3,389,000 inhabitants, 283,400 or 8.4 percent were Ukrainians. The official count indicated that overall the proportion of ethnic Moldovans had increased since the 1989 Soviet census, while that of Ukrainians had decreased by 2.9 percent and that of Russians (who numbered 198,100 in 2004) by 4.0 percent. The total population of Moldova has dropped by 208,000 since the last census of 1989. The reduction is explained by emigration and a low birth rate.³³ By way of comparison, before the dismemberment of Moldova, the Ukrainian inhabitants of the former Moldavian SSR numbered 600,366 in 1989, constituting 13.84 percent of the republic's total population (4,337,600).

28 July 2001.

31. See "Ukraine" in U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report* (June 5, 2006) at <<http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65990.htm>> (accessed on 8 June 2006).

32. "Moldovan Dniester Region Publishes Census Data," *BBC Monitoring Ukraine and the Baltics*, 7 September 2005.

33. "Ethnic Moldovans Make Up 76.1% of Moldovan Population," *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 17 May 2005.

The decrease in the Ukrainian minority in Moldova appears to be part of a pattern that can be observed in other former Soviet republics. In Belarus, for example, Ukrainians formed 2.9 percent of the republic's population in 1989, but that proportion dropped to 2.4 percent (237,000 people) in the first post-Soviet census conducted in 1999.³⁴ In Russia Ukrainians numbered 4,362,872 in 1989 and 2,943,471 according to the all-Russian census of 2002. In Kazakhstan 896,240 Ukrainians were counted in 1989 and 547,052 ten years later in 1999 (3.65 percent of the total population).³⁵

The studies under review have provided a clear overview of the trends and problems associated with Ukrainian migration from Ukraine and to Ukraine, in the post-1991 period. They have also shown how migration patterns have been shifting recently. Case studies of countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic provide good insights into the status and adaptation of Ukrainian migrants in those countries.

As the process of legalization of unauthorized migrants advances and organizational efforts evolve, one can expect future studies to encompass more issues such as institutions, voluntary associations, the immigrant press, and diaspora-homeland ties. Intra-diaspora links, too, may emerge as a subject of study as these evolve and membership in the Ukrainian World Congress continues to expand. In 2005, when the Slovak news agency Slovenska Tlacova Agentura (SITA) announced that the umbrella organization Association of Ruthenians-Ukrainians in the Slovak Republic would be joining the Congress, it noted that "Slovakia will be the thirtieth country to enter the Ukrainian World Congress."³⁶

Meanwhile, media reports continue to show the varied destinations of Ukrainian migrants. In January 2006, for example, the *Turkish News Digest* announced that since 2003 Turkey has issued 16,483 work permits to foreign citizens, 1,091 of whom were Ukrainians.³⁷ In 2005 Borys Tarasiuk met with Mohammed Abdulrahman Shalgam, secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International

34. "Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia respubliki Belarus," at <<http://www.belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/main2.htm>> (accessed on 8 May 2006).

35. "Ethnodemographic Situation in Kazakhstan" at <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Mes/pdf/51_cap1_2.pdf> (accessed on 8 May 2006).

36. *SITA Slovenska Tlacova Agentura*, 12 August 2005.

37. "Turkey Issues 16,483 Work Permits to Foreigners since 2003," *Turkish News Digest*, 16 January 2006.

Cooperation. During their talks, the issue of “appropriate guarantees of the rights of around 3,000 Ukrainians working at Libya’s medical establishments” was discussed.³⁸

In 1991 Ukraine joined the family of independent nations and, like many other sovereign states, has a multi-generational diaspora. In terms of numbers and geography, this diaspora is larger and more dispersed than ever before.

38. “Tarasiuk Discusses with Ukrainians in Libya Their Work Conditions,” *Ukrainian News*, 20 December 2005.

A New Explanatory Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language

Valerii Polkovsky

Viacheslav Tymofiiiovych Busel, comp. and ed. *Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainskoi movy*. Kyiv and Irpin: Perun, 2002. 1440 pp.

The role of dictionaries in lexicological, semantic, and semasiological research cannot be overestimated. Despite their inevitable shortcomings, well-compiled dictionaries present a snapshot of a definite time period in lexical development; more importantly, they help to enrich and preserve the language for which they have been compiled.

For “international” languages such as English, journals and dictionaries of neologisms are published almost annually, and they go so far as to document the shift of a given word from British to American English and vice versa. Although they require tremendous material support and a staff of experienced lexicographers and researchers, up-to-date English-language dictionaries provide for a certain breadth of language development as they “synchronize” the language to meet current needs.

Dictionaries are even more important in transitional societies, especially those emerging from a prolonged communist or socialist period and embracing Western ways of life. Transitional or post-communist societies often lack the support of lexicological research and skilled specialists to compile up-to-date dictionaries. Such societies also have an urgent need for dictionaries to distinguish the nonce and permanent status of new words such as neologisms.

Methodology

To arrive at definite and verifiable conclusions I shall compare *Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainskoi movy* (VTSSUM) with the academic eleven-volume *Slovnyk ukrainskoi movy* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970–1980) (SUM). The first stage of my research will consist in displaying the neologisms that appeared between 1980 and 2002 and demonstrating the thoroughness and scrupulousness of VTSSUM compilers. In the second stage I rely on my own research to show what neologisms could be included in VTSSUM and might be considered for

future editions of the dictionary. My assessment does not cover material from the 2003–2006 period, which lies outside the dictionary's parameters.

The constraints of a review article prevent me from presenting a thorough examination of *SUM*, which was completed five years before perestroika. The intent of the compilers was to offer for the first time a comprehensive and thorough presentation of the Ukrainian-language lexicon. The dictionary was published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and the Institute of Linguistics. It registered 134,000 words and, besides definitions, gave examples of usage from literary sources and the press. Compiled in the stagnant years of the Brezhnev regime, the dictionary, obviously, could only include a politically correct lexicon. It omitted certain words linked with religious beliefs, sexual discourse, and Ukrainian national pride. Yet it remains the most authoritative source on the Ukrainian-language lexicon and is still widely used in North American universities.

VTSSUM

Registering 170,000 words and word combinations, this dictionary is dedicated to the tenth anniversary of Ukraine's proclamation of independence (1991–2001) and is recommended by Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science. Its compiler, project leader, and chief editor is V.T. Busel. His small team of editors-lexicographers include M.D. Vasyleha-Derybas, O.V. Dmytriiiev, H.V. Latnyk, H.V. Stepenko, and L.P. Tiutiunyk. The dictionary includes a one-page preface, general information on the dictionary and the composition of word entries, a list of the main acronyms or abbreviations in the dictionary, and the Ukrainian alphabet. A short resume states that the dictionary "combines academic completeness of the language lexicon with the laconic form of a one-volume edition." The compilers declare that it includes the recent lexicon of the last ten years.

The compilers of the dictionary present first the literal meaning of a word and, secondly, its figurative meaning, even if the latter is more widely used and acceptable than the former. Semantically speaking, this is the most concise and justified approach: it leads to better understanding of the primary or nuclear meaning of a word and then to a better grasp of its figurative meaning. The terminological meaning, if available, follows the two previous meanings. The authors extensively use the synonymic way of defining word meaning. They also attempt to present

phraseological expressions in which a given word appears, although obviously this is a complicated task in dictionaries of this kind. Leaving behind the ideologically motivated limitations of *SUM*, which they used as their point of departure, the compilers tried to include in *VTSSUM* the most common new words used in everyday life, politics, economics, computer technology, and cultural life.

The new dictionary finally reinstates the letter 'g' in the Ukrainian language (pp. 204–5).

New Words, Word Combinations, and Expressions

Considering their very limited financial resources and the small group of co-workers, the authors did a truly magnificent job.

First let us see what words that were previously banned from public discourse and dictionaries are registered in the new dictionary. These are not neologisms in the strict sense. An example of this is *banderivtsi* 'Banderites—Members of the military-political formations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Western Ukraine in 1942–1954' (p. 36). Although Communist propaganda constantly charged the *banderivtsi* with horrible crimes, the word was not included in *SUM*. The metaphoric meaning of *banderivets* or *bandera* is not included in *VTSSUM*. The word is used in certain East Ukrainian circles and in Russia as a derogatory term referring to the people of Western Ukraine.

To the four words associated with America in *SUM* (vol. 1, p. 38): *amerykanets* 'male American,' *amerykanka* 'female American,' *amerykanskyi* 'American, adjective,' and *amerykantsi* 'Americans,' *VTSSUM* (pp. 15–16) adds: *amerykanizatsiia* 'Americanization,' *amerykanizovanyi* 'Americanized,' *amerykanizm* 'Americanism,' *amerykanizuvaty* 'to Americanize,' *amerykanizuvatysia* 'to become Americanized,' *amerykanist* 'Americanist,' *amerykanistyka* 'Americanistics,' and *amerykanistka* 'female Americanist.' But it does not contain the colloquial or slang derogatory *amerykos*. The word *ikebana* 'ikebana' appears for the first time in *VTSSUM* (p. 395). *VTSSUM* contains a new meaning for *kanadka*: 'fur coat with a hood (for seamen, polar people)' (p. 413).

Neologisms, which appeared to describe new facts and a new way of life, are registered in *VTSSUM*: *limitchyk* is a colloquial term for a worker who is hired by an enterprise on the basis of his limited passport' (p. 490). *Likvidator* is a 'liquidator of the effects of the Chornobyl accident' (p. 490), but *chornobylets* itself is not registered. Some new words that appear only in the new dictionary are: *vietnamky* 'light footwear in the

form of a sole with a thong between the first and second toe' (p. 127); and *hala-kontsert* 'gala concert' (p. 171). Some words that are used in diaspora Ukrainian are registered in the dictionary for the first time: *hvyntokryl* 'helicopter,' *hvyntokrylyi* 'of helicopter, adjective' (p. 175); *hrand* 'grand — the first part of complex words that means: famous, great, large'; *hrand-dama* 'grande dame'; *hrand-dysk* 'grand disc'; *hrand-motel* 'grand motel'; *hrand-opera* 'grand opera'; *hrand-hotel* 'grand hotel' (p. 196); and *hran-pri* 'Grand Prix' (p. 158). Neologisms like *hrant* 'grant,' *hrantodavets* 'grant giver' (p. 158); and *daidzhest* 'digest' (p. 207) are included as well.

In the entry for *velykyi* 'big, great, etc.' new word combinations appear: *velyka polityka* 'big politics — about important foreign-policy problems'; *velyka presa* 'big press — printed publications of big monopolies'; *velykyi biznes* 'big business — about big monopolies'; and *velykyi ekran* 'big screen — about mass screening of movies in cinemas on an ordinary screen (in contrast to a TV screen)' (p. 80).

It is interesting to compare the entries for *dyplomatychnyi* 'diplomatic' in the two dictionaries. In *SUM* the only word combination with *dyplomatychnyi* is *dyplomatychnyi korpus* 'diplomatic corps,' which is defined as 'the set of representatives of other countries accredited by the government of a country' (vol. 2, p. 281). In *VTSSUM* *dyplomatychnyi korpus* is defined as '(1) in the broad sense, all the diplomatic personnel (with family members) of a diplomatic representation, and (2) in the narrow sense, only heads of diplomatic representations' (p. 222). *VTSSUM* contains many more word combinations, including *dyplomatychna poshta* 'diplomatic mail,' *dyplomatychni klasy* 'diplomatic classes,' *dyplomatychni ranhy* 'diplomatic ranks,' *dyplomatychnyi imunitet* 'diplomatic immunity,' *dyplomatychnyi akt* 'diplomatic act,' *dyplomatychnyi ahent* 'diplomatic agent,' *dyplomatychnyi kurier* 'diplomatic courier,' *dyplomatychnyi protokol* 'diplomatic protocol,' *dyplomatychnye pravo* 'diplomatic law,' and *dyplomatychnye predstavnytstvo* 'diplomatic representation.' This example shows the kind of thorough and scrupulous work the compilers did to reflect contemporary language use in the new conditions of statehood.

VTSSUM adds many previously unregistered words starting with the prefix *anty* 'anti,' such as *antydepresant* 'antidepressant.' It registers 124 such words while *SUM* has only fifty-two.

Many combinations of truncated adjective + noun (sometimes + another adjective) have appeared recently and are registered in *VTSSUM*; for example, *Ievrobank* 'Eurobank,' *Ievrobachennia* 'Eurovision,' *ievrovaliuta* 'Euro (currency),' *Ievrohrupa* 'Eurogroup,' *ievrodepozyty* 'Eurodeposits,' *ievrodolary* 'Eurodollars,' *ievrokard* 'Eurocard,' *ievrokredyty* 'Eurocredits,' *ievroliniia* 'Euroline,' *ievronoty* 'Euronotes,' *ievroobli-hatsiia* 'Eurobond,' *ievrorakety* 'European rockets,' *ievrorynok* 'Euro-market,' *ievrostratehichniy* 'Eurostrategic,' and *ievrochek* 'Eurocheque.' *SUM* did not register a single word combination with *ievro*. It contains only twenty word combinations starting with *bio* (vol. 1, pp. 187–8), while *VTSSUM* contains 114 (pp. 52–4). In *SUM* we find forty-six words starting with *kino* 'cinema' (vol. 4, pp. 165–6), while in *VTSSUM* we find 141 (pp. 429–30). The number of word combinations with first components *tele* 'TV,' *stereo* 'stereo,' *video* 'video,' and *foto* 'photo' increased dramatically.

Many new internationalisms, borrowed mostly from English, are registered for the first time in *VTSSUM*: *imidzh* 'image' and *imidzhmeiker* 'image maker,' and the Ukrainian inventions *imidzhevyi* 'of an image, adjective' and *imidzhmeikerstvo* 'image making' (p. 396); *impichment* 'impeachment' (p. 396), which appeared in political discourse during Leonid Kuchma's presidency; *menedzher* 'manager,' *menedzheryzm* 'managerism,' *menedzhment* 'management' (p. 518); *ofshor* 'off-shore' and *ofshorni* 'off-shore, adjective' (p. 692), but not *ofshorka* 'off-shore, informal.' *Importnyi* 'imported' appears in *SUM* (vol. 4, p. 21), but not in the combinations that are registered in *VTSSUM*: *importna kvota* 'import quota,' *importna litsenziia* 'import license,' *importnyi depozyt* 'import deposit,' and *importnyi lizynh* 'import leasing' (p. 396). Although the terms *investytsiia* 'investment' and *investytsiinyi* 'investment, adjective' are not new and were fixed in *SUM* (vol. 4, p. 24), they did not appear in combinations such as *investytsiinyi bank* 'investment bank,' *investytsiini vytraty* 'investment expenses,' *investytsiini kompanii* 'investment companies,' *investytsiinyi sertyfikat* 'investment certificate,' *investytsiinyi fond* 'investment fund,' *innovatsiini investytsii* 'innovation investments,' *intelektualni investytsii* 'intellectual investments,' *kapitalni investytsii* 'capital investments,' *portfelni investytsii* 'portfolio investments,' and *priami investytsii* 'direct investments' (*VTSSUM*, p. 397). Similarly, *servis* 'service' already appears in *SUM* (vol. 9, p. 128), but not in the combinations we find in *VTSSUM*: *servis-karta* 'service card,'

servis-tsestr 'service centre,' and *servis-period* 'service period' (p. 1115). Some other borrowings from English that are registered only in the new dictionary are *slohan* 'slogan' (p. 1150), *praim-taim* 'prime time' (p. 918), *promouter* 'promoter' (p. 979), *khaivei* 'highway' (p. 1337), *tok-shou* 'talk show' (p. 1254), *elektorat* 'electorate' (p. 259), *elektyvnyi* 'elective' (p. 259), *sponsor* 'sponsor,' *sponsoriv* 'sponsor's,' *sponsorstvo* 'sponsorship,' and *sponsorskyi* 'sponsor, adjective' (p. 1177). *VTSSUM* registers the nouns *kserokopiia* 'Xerox copy,' *kseroks* 'Xerox' (p. 470), and the verb *kseryty* 'to xerox.' The urgent need to develop names for new objects and operations, as well as the corresponding adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, drives this process of borrowing and adaptation.

Social Problems

Economic and social change in Ukraine has been attended by many "evils of capitalist society," which have led to the introduction of a suitable terminology in which to discuss them. One of the biggest problems is homelessness. *VTSSUM* registers the word *bomzh* 'bum — Colloquial. Person without a definite place of residence' (p. 59). This is a direct borrowing of the Russian acronym *bomzh* — *bez opredelennogo mesta zhitelstva*. The word has become so popular and widely used that the compilers of the dictionary could not bypass it. It is not only colloquial, for it is used quite often in the press.¹ There are native Ukrainian equivalents for *bomzh*: *bezdomnyi*, *bezprytulnyi*. But *bomzh* carries the load of being without the famous *propyska* (seal in the passport about one's residency and concrete address). *Bomzh*, which is a creature of Soviet-era bureaucrats, preserves the link with the Soviet period in which the Constitution guaranteed people housing, although many did not have it. Although homelessness is not something new, the terminology connected with this phenomenon was not promoted during the Soviet period.

By the time the dictionary appeared, other words with the root *bomzh-* were in wide use: *bomzhykha* 'homeless female,' *bomzhuiuchy* 'bumming,' *bomzhatnyk* 'shelter for the homeless,' *bomzhara* 'bum, derogatory for homeless,' *bomzhyzatsiia* 'the process of widespread homelessness,' and *bomzhuvannia* 'the state of being homeless, a homeless way of life.' Which

1. See, for example, Dmytro Brovkin's article "Chas 'parkuvaty' bomzhiv," *Den*, 8 August 2000.

of them should have been included in *VTSSUM*? *Bomzhykha*, probably, as the female equivalent of *bomzh*. As for the others, I am not sure that they are used widely enough to be included.

The problem of increased use of drugs in Ukraine is drawing public attention. Words built by combining the root *narko* 'drug' with another word (noun, adjective, and so on) became popular. *SUM* registers the following words containing *narko*: *narkoman* 'drug addict,' *narkomaniia* 'drug addiction,' *narkomanka* 'female drug addict,' *narkotyzatsiia* 'spread of drug use,' *narkotyzovanyi* 'under the influence of drugs, adjective,' *narkotyzuvaty* 'to drug,' *narkotyky* 'drugs,' *narkotychnyi* 'drug, adjective,' and *narkotychno* 'in a drugged way, adverb.' *VTSSUM* also lists these words, as well as *narkobiznes* 'drug business (production and distribution of drugs)' and *narkohipnoz* 'hypnosis enhanced with drugs or sedatives' (p. 578). The following words beginning with *narko* are in common use but remain unregistered: *narkokurier* 'drug courier,' *narkodiler* 'drug dealer,' *narkomafiia* 'drug mafia,' *narkobaron* 'drug baron,' *narkodilok* 'drug wheeler-dealer,' *narkozaleznyi* 'drug dependent,' *narkokartel* 'drug cartel,' and *narkopromyslovisyt* 'drug industry.' *Nark* 'Jargon. Drug addict' is also not in the dictionary.

Another set of words connected with a social problem can be found in *SUM*: *alkoholizm* 'alcoholism,' *alkoholik* 'alcoholic, noun' *alkoholichka* 'female alcoholic,' *alkoholichnyi* 'alcoholic, adjective' *alkohol* 'alcohol,' and *alkoholnyi* 'alcoholic, adjective' (vol. 1, p. 34). The word *alkash* 'Slang. Excessive drinker' was used in the 1970s and 1980s, but it was not included in *SUM*. It appears in *VTSSUM*, but other slang words with the root *alk*—*alkonavyt*, *alk*, and *alicy*, do not. Obviously, a transitional dictionary cannot immediately include all the new words and expressions, especially youth slang, common jargon, and professional terminology. A definite time-based test for word usability is required to eliminate nonce words.

Technology

Ukraine's technological development is reflected in *VTSSUM*. For example, it contains words with the component *avto* that are not found in *SUM*: *avtovidpovidach* 'answering machine,' *avtoamator* 'auto-amateur,' *avtoban* 'autobahn,' *avtobudivnyi* 'autobuilding,' *avtobuduvannya* 'autobuilding, noun,' *avtovaktsyna* 'autovaccine,' *avtovlasnyk* 'car owner,' *avtovodii* 'car driver,' *avtovokzal* 'bus station (terminal),' *avtodyspetcher* 'auto dispatcher,' *avtozapravka* 'gas station,' *avtoklub*

'auto club,' and so on (another 135 words). In *SUM* there are twenty-six words beginning with *aero*, while in *VTSSUM* there are sixty-five.

The fourth volume of *SUM* (1973) does not contain any term connected with computers,² while *VTSSUM* records *kompiuter* 'computer,' *kompiuteryzatsiia* 'computerization,' *kompiuternyi* 'computer, adjective,' *kompiuterna hramotnist* 'computer literacy,' *kompiuterna prohrama* 'computer program,' *kompiuterna hra* 'computer game,' *kompiuterna merezha* 'computer network,' *kompiuternyi virus* 'computer virus' (p. 446) and *khaker* 'hacker' (p. 1338).

Deideologization

The authors of the new dictionary eliminated ideological connotations, which distorted the meaning of words. In *SUM*, for example, *rusyfikatsiia* 'Russification' is defined in the following way: 'In tsarist Russia the introduction by force of the Russian language, culture, and so on among national minorities' (vol. 8, p. 911), while *VTSSUM* simply says: 'The introduction by force of the Russian language, culture, and so on' (p. 1090). By removing the restrictive phrases 'in tsarist Russia' and 'among national minorities' the authors convey the word's general meaning, allowing us to apply the term to the Soviet regime too. In *SUM kazyno* 'casino' is defined in this way: 'In capitalist countries it is a gaming house or restaurant with stage entertainment' (vol. 4, p. 71), while in *VTSSUM* it is simply 'A gaming house with a restaurant' (p. 410).

In the new dictionary the business lexicon is deideologized. While *SUM* explains *biznes* 'business' as 'Colloquial. Commercial, stock-exchange, or entrepreneurial activity as the source of lucre in the capitalist world' (vol. 1, p. 179), *VTSSUM* defines it as 'economic, commercial, business, or entrepreneurial activity aimed at obtaining a profit' (p. 51). According to the former, *biznesmen* 'businessman' is 'a big wheeler-dealer, merchant, entrepreneur' (vol. 1, p. 179), and according to the latter, he is 'a person who engages in a profitable venture (business)' (p. 51). *VTSSUM* explains that *aktsyz* 'excise tax' is 'a type of indirect tax on products of mass consumption (sugar, vodka, tobacco, etc.), which entrepreneurs include in the retail price' (p. 13). In *SUM* a similar explanation is introduced with the phrase 'in capitalist

2. We can ignore *elektronnoobchysliuvahnyi* 'electronically calculated' (vol. 2, p. 471) because it is not based on the root *kompiuter*.

countries' (vol. 1, p. 32). The definitions of *aktsiia* 'share,' *aktsioner* 'shareholder,' and *aktsionernyi* 'shareholder, adjective' differ in a similar way in the two dictionaries.

Business Terminology

The new dictionary contains entries for new business terms that are currently used in Ukraine and expanded entries for business terms that were listed in the preceding dictionary. Some examples of completely new entries are: *marketynh* 'marketing,' *marketynhovi* 'marketing, adjective' and *marketoloh* 'marketologist' (p. 510).

The *VTSSUM* entry on *akredytyv* 'letter of credit (L/C)' (p. 11) begins with the same explanation as the *SUM* entry (vol. 1, p. 28) and then goes on to list the types of contemporary letters of credit used today: *avizovanyi akredytyv* 'aviso L/C,' *dokumentarnyi (tovarnyi) akredytyv* 'documentary (commercial) L/C,' *hroshovi (tsyrkuliarnyi) akredytyv* 'monetary (circular) L/C,' *akredytyv iz chervonoiu smuhoiu* 'red-stripe L/C,' *kompensatsiyni akredytyv* 'compensatory L/C,' *nepodilnyi akredytyv* 'indivisible L/C,' *nepokryti akredytyv* 'non-covered L/C,' *perekaznyi (transferabelnyi) akredytyv* 'transferable L/C,' *podilnyi akredytyv* 'divisible L/C,' *pokryti akredytyv* 'covered L/C,' and *revolvernyi akredytyv* 'revolving L/C.' The *VTSSUM* entry for *dohovir* 'treaty, agreement' includes new word combinations: *depozytarnyi dohovir* 'depository agreement,' *korespondentskyi dohovir* 'correspondent agreement,' *kredytnyi dohovir* 'credit agreement' (p. 233), as does the entry for *hroshi* 'money': *depozytni hroshi* 'deposit money' and *elektronni hroshi* 'electronic money' (p. 199).

The *hryvnia* entry in the new dictionary is enlarged by adding two new definitions: '(3) Monetary unit of the Ukrainian National Republic (1918–20). (4) The national currency of Ukraine since 2 September 1996' (p. 197). Another submeaning of *karbovanets* was added to its entry: 'A temporary monetary unit of Ukraine after the proclamation of independence, which was in circulation from 1991 to 1996' (p. 416). One cannot but admire the *VTSSUM* compilers for their efforts to reflect the richness of the new business lexicon in post-Communist Ukraine.

Shortcomings

The *VTSSUM* does not register some widely used neologisms that reflect certain Ukrainian phenomena. Words that are connected with a specifically Ukrainian context are especially interesting and should definitely be included in any dictionary of contemporary Ukrainian. *SUM*

contains some terms connected with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: *afhanets* 'male Afghani,' *afhanka* 'female Afghani,' *afhanskyi* 'Afghani, adjective,' and *afhantsi* 'Afghanis.' To these *VTSSUM* adds: '*afhani* 'Afghani — a monetary unit of Afghanistan (p. 28), but it omits *afhantsi* 'Soviet soldiers, now Ukrainian citizens, who participated in the military campaign in Afghanistan,' a word that is widely used in the mass media today. The informal name of the country, *Afhan*, also should have been included. In *SUM* (vol. 2, p. 448) *dushman* is defined as 'Dated. Oppressor,' and in *VTSSUM* (p. 253) as '(1) Used of a member of military formations that fought in Afghanistan against government and Soviet troops in the ranks of the opposition (1979–89). (2) Colloquial. Robber, bandit.' To some extent the derogatory *dukh*, plural *dukhy* 'Afghani fighter(s) resisting the Soviet occupation' are used in contemporary Ukrainian discourse but do not appear in *VTSSUM*.

VTSSUM lists *chornobyl* 'mug-wort, artemisia' (p. 1381), but not *chornobylskyi* 'Chornobyl, adjective' or *chornobyltsi* 'Chornobyl residents or liquidators of the Chornobyl catastrophe from various parts of the former Soviet Union.' Oddly enough, *perebudova* 'perestroika' is missing. Foreign religious ranks, such as *aiatola* 'Ayatollah' (p. 29), are included, but not *heneralnyi sekretar* (*TsK KPRS*) 'general secretary (of the CC CPSU).'

Slang

VTSSUM reflects the use of slang or jargon in everyday discourse only to a very limited extent. It lists the slang term for money, *babky* (p. 30), and some of the slang terms for American dollars, *baky*, *baksy* (p. 34) and *kapusta* (p. 416), but not *bablo* or *zelenyi / zelen*. It registers some slang that is not found in *SUM*; for example, *lokh* 'a stupid person, simpleton; a naïve or gullible person' and *kynuty lokha* 'to deceive a simpleton' (p. 496), *ment* 'militiaman,' *mentovka* 'militia headquarters or militia car or truck' (p. 518), *pornukha* 'pornography,' *pornobiznes* 'pornography business,' and *pornofilm* 'pornographic movie' (p. 881). *VTSSUM* adds a fifth meaning of *vedmezhatnyi* to the four presented in *SUM* (vol. 1, pp. 315–16), 'a thief who robs bank safes' (p. 80).

Unfortunately, much of the current widely used slang is not registered in *VTSSUM*: *bazar* 'conversation,' *filtruvaty bazar* 'to think before talking,' *zhaba davyt / dushyt* 'to be envious or jealous,'³ *valyty* 'to fail

3. But the phrase appears in the first edition of Svitlana Pyrkalo's *Pershyi slovnyk*

someone as on an exam,⁴ *dilovar* ‘an excessively materialistic, profit-minded person,’ *distavaty* ‘to get under someone’s skin,’ *dubovyi* ‘uneducated, stupid,’ *viddavaty kintsi* ‘to die, to kick the bucket,’ *vidtiahatsia*, *vidtiahnutysia* ‘to have a really good time,’ *vidyk* ‘video,’ *vrubuvatysia* ‘to understand,’⁵ *hivniuk* ‘shitty (unworthy) person,’ *hopnyk* ‘a young person who belongs to a group that is distinguished by its love of money, dislike of hippies and other informal groups, prison romanticism, and low intellect,’⁶ *horiuche* ‘wine, vodka (literally, fuel),’ *dakh* ‘protection,’ *dakhuvaty* ‘to protect,’ *dakhuvannia* ‘the process of protection,’⁷ *demokratyzator* ‘police stick,’⁸ *zhuchok* ‘bugging device,’ *zabyty* ‘to ignore, not to pay attention,’⁹ *zamoryty cherviachka* ‘to eat something,’ *znimaty* ‘to pick up a woman, make a casual acquaintance with a woman,’ *braty na zub* ‘to drink,’ *lymon* ‘a million monetary units,’¹⁰ *khavka*, *khavchyk* ‘food,’¹¹ *narkota* ‘drugs,’ *oblom* ‘unexpected failure; laziness,’¹² and *univer* ‘university.’¹³ Under *davaty* ‘to give’ the dictionary omits the word’s slang meaning ‘to grant sexual favours.’

I do not think that all slang should be included in an explanatory dictionary, only the most popular slang. It is difficult to draw the line between what should and should not be included.

Sports Terminology

VTSSUM lists some sporting terms that do not appear in *SUM*, including *beisbol* ‘baseball,’ *beisbolist* ‘baseball player,’ *beisbolnyi* ‘baseball, adjective’ (p. 46), *biatlon* ‘biathlon,’ *biatlonist* ‘biathlete,’

ukrainskoho molodizhnogo slenhu (Kyiv: AT “VIPOL,” 1998), 24.

4. This meaning is not new. It was used among students in the 1970s and 1980s: *Vin mene zavalyv* ‘He failed me,’ *Chy zavaliuie tsei vykladach?* ‘Does this lecturer fail anyone?’

5. As in *Ty vrubavsia v tekst?* ‘Did you understand the text?’

6. As defined by Svitlana Pyrkalo in *Zelena Marharyta. Molodizhnyi roman. Slovnyk ukrainskoho molodizhnogo slenhu* (Kyiv: Dzherela M, 2002), 181.

7. A calque from the Russian *krysha* ‘roof.’

8. Pyrkalo, *Pershyi slovnyk ukrainskoho molodizhnogo slenhu*, 21.

9. *Ibid.*, 25.

10. *Ibid.*, 41; and Pyrkalo, *Zelena Marharyta*, 216.

11. Pyrkalo, *Zelena Marharyta*, 271.

12. *Ibid.*, 230.

13. Used widely since the 1970s.

biatlonistka 'biathlonist, female' (p. 50), *bob* 'bobsled,' *bobslei* 'bobsled,' and *bobsleist* 'bobsledder' (p. 57).

Sex

VTSSUM covers many words connected with sex that do not appear in *SUM*; for example, *vahina* 'vagina,' *vahinalnyi* 'vaginal,' *vahinizm* 'vaginism,' *vahinit* 'vaginite' (pp. 71–2), *herpes* 'herpes' (p. 179), *erehovanyi* 'erected,' *erektor* 'erector,' *erektiia* 'erection' (p. 266), *libido* (p. 488), and *trypernyi* 'gonorrhoeal' (p. 1268). The *SUM* entry on *seks* 'sex' (vol. 9, p. 114) is supplemented with new word combinations: *seks-boiovyk* 'sex action movie,' *seks-bomba* 'sex bomb,' *seks-klub* 'sex club,' *seks-kultura* 'sex culture,' *seks-menshist* 'sexual minority,' *seks-symvol* 'sex symbol,' *seks-film* 'sex movie,' and *seks-shop* 'sex shop' (p. 1112). The entry on *erotyka* 'erotica' is also updated and corrected. In *SUM* it consists of the following definitions: '(1) Excessive sensuality, heightened sexual excitement. (2) In the arts open and sometimes crude depiction of love or sexual life' (vol. 2, p. 486), while *VTSSUM* says: '(1) Sensuality, sexuality. (2) Works of literature and art, full of sensuality, devoted to the depiction of its manifestations. Psychological aspects of sexuality, its development and manifestation in communication, fashion, art, etc.' (p. 266).

Acronyms

Apart from the list of linguistic abbreviations in the introductory part, the new dictionary does not contain a list of acronyms. It explains the word *izoliator* 'isolation cell' (p. 394), but not the acronym *ITU* (*izoliator tymchasovoho utrymannia* 'a temporary confinement cell' in which under the Communist regime people were held for various violations, especially drunkenness, for up to fifteen days).

Phrases

Some phrases in *VTSSUM* appeared previously in *SUM*; for example, *lyzaty ruky komu* 'literally, to lick someone's hand; meaning to cajole someone, to toady' (p. 486; vol. 4, p. 484, respectively), while others appear only in *VTSSUM*: *v lapu (na lapu) davaty* 'literally, to put in a paw (on a paw); meaning to bribe, to tip, to pay someone extra for something' (p. 480). Many phrases are not listed in either dictionary; for example, *lyzaty sraku (sraku lyzaty)* 'literally, to lick ass; meaning 'to

toady without limits, in a most humiliating way,' and *srakolyz* 'literally, ass licker, meaning toady.'

Conclusion

It is impossible to present in a strictly systematic way all the changes in a modern society's lexicon, especially when the society is emerging from a communist/socialist period, and it is difficult to review a project of such scope. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any reviews of this dictionary in Western journals. I cannot but praise the compilers of the new dictionary for their amazing job. The dictionary is an indispensable tool for those teaching and studying contemporary Ukrainian, especially at an advanced level, Ukrainian for business and professional communication, and so on. It should be used in lexicological courses and in research on post-totalitarian lexicons. It is the most complete linguistic reflection of contemporary Ukrainian available today.

Synopsis:

A Collection of Articles in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut

In *Synopsis*, twenty-two historians of Ukraine from five countries pay tribute to their friend and colleague, Dr. Zenon E. Kohut. The volume begins with an appraisal of Kohut's career, work, and impact on historical studies by the Kharkiv historian Volodymyr Kravchenko and ends with a selected bibliography of Kohut's works. The contributions examine topics from the Middle Ages to the Soviet period. Especially well represented in the volume are studies in historiography, the early modern period, and Ukrainian-Russian relations.

When a Festschrift for Dr. Zenon E. Kohut, director of the Canadian Institute of the Ukrainian Studies, was being planned, *Synopsis* came quickly to mind as a title. Not only is Zenon Kohut currently working on the famous seventeenth-century work and its context, but the *Synopsis* stands at the onset of modern Ukrainian-Russian relations that have been the major theme of his scholarly oeuvre. From his groundbreaking work *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy* through his numerous essays on forms of identity in early modern Ukraine and Russia to his analysis on historiography, he has chosen large topics and brought to them order and clarity.

Also published as a special issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* Volume 29, Numbers 1-2, the *Synopsis* can be purchased for \$44.95 (as a hardcover book edition) or \$28 (as a *JUS* issue).

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SYNOPSIS

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF
ZENON E. KOHUT

edited by Serhiy Plokhyy and Frank E. Sysyn

Lubomyr Wynar and the Ukrainian Historical Association

Thomas M. Prymak

Liudmyla Sakada. *Ukrainskyi istoryk: Heneza, tematyka, postati*. New York and Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo im. Oleny Telihiy, 2003. 325 pp.

Liubomyr Wynar. *Ukrainskyi istoryk: 40 rokiv sluzhinnia nauksi 1963–2003. Statti i materialy*. New York and Ostroh: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo, 2003. 421 pp.

Lubomyr Wynar (b. 1932) has been a controversial and influential figure within the circles of Ukrainian émigré scholarship since his first appearance on the scene in the late 1950s. Of Ukrainian “displaced person” (DP) background, he is an extremely prolific author and is well known as an eminent professor of library science at Kent State University in Ohio and a professor of history at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He was also the founding editor of the émigré historical journal, *Ukrainskyi istoryk* (The Ukrainian Historian), a specialist on the life and work of the dean of Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), a productive contributor to the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and a critic of Soviet Ukrainian and Russian historical scholarship throughout the period of the “Long Cold War.” Moreover, throughout his long career as a bibliographer and historian, Wynar was also very active in American ethnic studies and compiled a number of important bibliographies and guidebooks in this field; for many years, he edited the Ohio bibliographical journal *Ethnic Forum*. In Ukrainian scholarship, however, he is best known as the president of the Ukrainian Historical Association (Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo) and the editor of its journal, *Ukrainskyi istoryk*.

The two books under review here give a good idea of the scope and importance of Wynar’s work as the association’s president and the editor of its journal. The volume by Liudmyla Sakada outlines the history of the journal, gives us much information about its major themes and philosophical principles (not to say ideology), and tells us something about the central figures of its sponsoring organization, the Ukrainian Historical

Association. The second volume is a collection of Wynar's programmatic articles published in the journal from its founding in 1963 to 2003. Both of these volumes were published on the fortieth anniversary of the first publication of the journal in 1963 and are commemorative volumes of a sort.

The idea of a professional historical journal published in the West in the Ukrainian language (an idea that was simply inconceivable before the DP emigration with its relatively high proportion of educated people and cultural activists), was, in fact, conceived and brought into being by Wynar himself. At the time that Wynar launched the journal, he was only thirty-one years of age, but was already fairly well known in Ukrainian historical scholarship: he was the author of two brief but highly specialized Ukrainian-language books on major personalities of the Cossack era and a short monograph in English connected to his work as a librarian and bibliographer, the *History of Early Ukrainian Printing* (1962). He was assisted in his journal endeavors by his former mentor in Ukrainian history at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Oleksander Ohloblyn (1899–1992), who before the Second World War had been a professor of Ukrainian history at Kyiv University. Ohloblyn, who in emigration became a leading historian of the Mazepa era and eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ukraine, advised Wynar on the organization and content of the projected journal and wrote a number of important articles for some of its first issues. The inaugural issue contained Ohloblyn's programmatic piece "Zavdannia ukrainskoi istoriografii na emihratsii" (The Tasks of Ukrainian Historiography in Emigration). This article stressed that that journal should try to preserve the best traditions of Ukrainian national historiography developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and act as a "supplement" and "corrective" to the work that Soviet Ukrainian historians were then cautiously doing in the oppressed European homeland. Other early supporters of and contributors to *Ukrainskyi istoryk* included the second major Ukrainian émigré historian of the Cold War era, Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko (1884–1973), a specialist on Kyivan Rus' and the eighteenth-century settlement of Southern Ukraine, who contributed memoir materials as well as scholarly articles; Marko Antonovych (1916–2005), who specialized in the national movement of the nineteenth century; Vasyl Dubrovsky (1897–1966), who was an orientalist and specialist on the Turkic peoples of the steppes and the Caucasus; Roman Klymkevych, who was primarily a genealogist; Mykhailo Zhdan, who specialized in the earlier periods of Ukrainian history; and Lubomyr's brother, Bohdan Wynar, who was interested in

bibliography and economic history. From the very beginning the journal devoted much space not only to research articles on the various periods of Ukrainian history but also to criticism of Soviet scholarship and biographical materials about Ukrainian historians, both pre-revolutionary and émigré. For example, in the very first issue there appeared an obituary of the famous Ukrainian bibliographer and librarian, Volodymyr Doroshenko (1879–1963), who towards the end of his life published a whole series of articles on the life and work of Hrushevsky. Bibliography and historiography, especially works on Hrushevsky, were to remain strong points in the journal's profile throughout the period of the Cold War.

At the time *Ukrainskyi istoryk* was founded many voices in the Ukrainian emigration expressed doubts as to whether an émigré and immigrant community such as the Ukrainian one, which despite the DPs, included a relatively small number of professional historians, could support a truly scholarly journal. For example, the historian of political thought, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky (1919–84), believed that occasional collective volumes or *zbirnyky* published by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States (Ukrainska vilna akademiia nauk, or UVAN) would adequately fill the needs of Ukrainian historians in the West. But Wynar persisted, arguing that a regularly appearing independent journal, complete with full research articles, reviews, and scholarly obituaries, and not linked to either UVAN or its rival, the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, or NTSh) would be irreplaceable.

On a somewhat different level, there was also a danger that Wynar's background, close to the Melnyk faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, or OUN) would give the journal too much of a nationalist "party" character. But with the help of Ohloblyn and several other contributors who did not support the OUN (both Ohloblyn and Polonska-Vasylenko favoured the monarchist or Hetmanite movement), this danger was in some part avoided and *Ukrainskyi istoryk* never became a "party" organ in the narrow sense of the term.

Taking Hrushevsky as his model, in his programmatic articles in *Ukrainskyi istoryk* Wynar clearly distinguished between "national" historiography, which he strongly supported, and "nationalistic" historiography, which he ostensibly rejected. The general idea here was that Ukrainian historians in the West should reject both the "party-minded" history then being promoted in the USSR and also the nationalist extremism of certain cultural and political figures then active in the West.

Of these two dangers to independent Ukrainian historical scholarship, the Soviet Russian one was obviously most pressing. Thus the basic thrust of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* was usually directed against the official-type Communist histories then being produced in the USSR. It was argued at the time that Ukrainian history, as it was then taught and studied in Soviet Ukraine, was not free to describe accurately the historical experience of the Ukrainian people. It largely ignored the national aspects of this experience and simply could not develop as an independent discipline that sought the truth about the past and thus served the national interests of the Ukrainian people. This task could only be accomplished by émigré historians in the Western world, working free of party control and government censorship.

“Fact” also played an important role in Wynar’s general philosophical position and historical methodology. From his early years, it seems, Wynar was always committed to a “Rankean” historical methodology in which, so he believed, the careful collection of both well-established and newly discovered “facts” and their dispassionate arrangement in a historical narrative naturally led to objectivity and to the progress of “historical science” (*istorychna nauka*). A firm faith in objectivity, progress, and science exudes from much of Wynar’s discourse, both written and spoken, and was a key element in the journal’s *raison d’être*. It was, in fact, a patent rejection of both Soviet ideology with its exclusivist claims to science and also of the usual Western Russocentric criticism of Ukrainian scholarship as being nationally biased.

During its early years a pattern was established in *Ukrainskyi istoryk* that was to characterize the journal for a very long time. In particular, certain themes received more attention than others. Of course, this was mostly due to the limited pool of contributors upon which the editor could rely. Thus ancient Ukraine of the Scythians received much attention because a prominent contributor, Oleksander Dombrovsky (b. 1914), specialized in ancient Greek history. Wynar himself, Ohloblyn, Rev. Oleksander Baran (1926–2005), and others focused on the Cossack period, and Ohloblyn and Theodore Mackiw (b. 1918) explored the era of Hetman Mazepa. Rev. I. Nazarko studied church history, and Wynar himself, as well as others, analyzed the work of various Ukrainian historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially Hrushevsky’s life and work. Wynar also recruited some of his colleagues in library science to join the Ukrainian Historical Association. Thus librarians and bibliographers like Lev Bykovsky (b. 1895) and Dmytro

Shtohryn (b. 1923) contributed extensively to the journal. The former published memoir materials and obituaries of prominent members of the 1917 generation. In addition to this, a score of prominent veterans of the national movement or of public life in the “Old Country” recounted their experiences and recalled their acquaintances in a special section devoted to memoirs. Much of the material dealt with the revolutionary period. Another section was reserved for previously unpublished documents and letters, especially those of prominent Ukrainian historians. Occasionally, the heads of some of the leading Ukrainian academic institutions, such as Omeljan Pritsak (b. 1919–2006) of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Volodymyr Kubijovyč (1900–85) of the European branch of NTSh, and George Luckyj (1919–2002) of UVAN and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, contributed to the journal.

The geographic distribution of the contributors largely reflected the geographic dispersion of the DP emigration in the postwar period. The largest centres of this emigration produced the largest number of contributions to the journal. Thus the United States, the main base of the Ukrainian Historical Association, accounted for the largest number of contributions, most of which originated in New York, New England, and the Midwest. During the early years there was also a significant number of contributions from Colorado, where several important Ukrainian intellectuals, including Bykovsky, Bohdan Wynar, and Lubomyr Wynar (for a time) had settled and established a branch of UVAN. Many contributions came from Canada: from Montreal, where Wynar’s close collaborator and fellow supporter of the Melnyk fraction of the OUN, Marko Antonovych, lived; Ottawa, where several important Ukrainian scholars lived and worked; and Winnipeg, which was the home of the Canadian branch of UVAN, founded by Dmytro Doroshenko, and until the 1970s was known as the unofficial capital of Ukrainian Canada. Several Winnipeg UVAN members, including Oleksander Baran and Oleh Gerus made more than one contribution to the journal. It should be noted that certain representatives of the early economic emigration to Canada, such as Vladimir Kaye-Kysilewskyj, who had begun his academic career in the 1930s, and Paul Yuzyk, who flourished during the 1950s and 1960s, participated in the work of the Ukrainian Historical Association. This phenomenon had no counterpart in the United States: historians from the early economic emigration, including Wasyl Halich, who, like Kysilewskyj, had begun his career in the 1930s, and John Reshetar, who, like Yuzyk, published his best work in the 1950s and the 1960s, took no

part in building the Ukrainian Historical Association. As for Europe, its contributions to the journal were more plentiful in the first few years and declined thereafter as the centres of Ukrainian émigré intellectual life moved steadily to North America. Only a few contributors stayed behind; for example, the specialist in Bukovynian history, Arkadii Zhukovsky (b. 1922) in France. From South America, in particular, Argentina, Wynar received some support from the encyclopedist and Melnyk-faction activist Ievhen Onatsky (1894–1979), but little else. Australia and other parts of the world took very little part in the work of the Ukrainian Historical Association and *Ukrainskyi istoryk*.

It seems that the Ukrainian Historical Association and its journal had some effect on the historical profession in the USSR. This appears to have been the case even during the journal's early years. Thus the appearance of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* in the West in the early 1960s was immediately noted by Ukrainian historians working in Soviet Ukraine. Of course, under Soviet conditions of censorship and control of scholarship most Soviet Ukrainian historians had no possibility of examining at first hand the work of their ostensible "rivals" in the West, but, as Sakada points out (p. 49), as early as 1966 a leading Soviet Ukrainian historian, Fedir Shevchenko (1914–95), bravely remarked on the existence of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* in the leading Soviet Ukrainian historical organ, the Kyiv-based *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Ukrainian Historical Journal), thus informing a wide circle of his sheltered colleagues that their compatriots in the West were indeed still active. This must have had some effect upon the morale of the hard-pressed Soviet Ukrainian scholars.

In the early 1970s, however, political conditions in Ukraine took a definite turn for the worse. After 1972 a series of purges and dismissals brought an end to the fragile cultural flowering that had occurred under the protection of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, Petro Shelest. With Shelest's fall, two of the three major Soviet Ukrainian historical journals were closed down completely and Kyiv's surviving *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* filled its pages with dreary articles on party history and the achievements of the Soviet system. Thus by 1978, in a second important programmatic article published on the pages of *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, Ohloblyn felt compelled to state that his original program had to be amended: Ukrainian historians in the West now had to go beyond "supplementing" and "correcting" the work of their Soviet colleagues; they had to assume the entire burden of

preserving the traditions of Ukrainian national historiography by themselves. Indeed, it was generally believed that only the embarrassing existence of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* in the West induced the Soviet authorities to tolerate the continued publication of the Ukrainian-language *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* at a time when they either suppressed or completely Russified most other Ukrainian-language scholarly journals.

While Ukrainian historians under Soviet rule were suffering these severe blows, their colleagues in the Ukrainian Historical Association were coming under new pressures. By the 1970s the generation of 1917, many of whom had made significant contributions to *Ukrainskyi istoryk* during the late 1960s, had largely passed away. In spite of Wynar's best efforts, the pool of prospective memoirists and contributors was growing ever smaller. The number of younger scholars in the West interested in writing Ukrainian history was small, and many of them could not write fluently in Ukrainian. Thus the Ukrainian Historical Association faced a severe generational crisis.

At this time Wynar did his best to recruit new contributors to the journal. Although the original emphasis on Ukrainian-language material was maintained, occasional articles and reviews in English were welcomed. A new generation of historians began to contribute to *Ukrainskyi istoryk*. Thus the late 1970s and the 1980s saw the first contributions of younger historians such as Oleh Gerus of the University of Manitoba, John-Paul Himka, who eventually joined the University of Alberta, and the author of these lines, who was a product of the University of Toronto. Other members of this generation, such as Alexander Sydorenko of Arkansas State University, eventually took a prominent role in the further development of the journal. Moreover, in the early 1980s Wynar tried to expand *Ukrainskyi istoryk* thematically and the journal began to advertise itself not only as a historical periodical but also as a general journal of Ukrainian studies, which including literature, language, and politics within its mandate. The results were mixed. Although a few articles on literature appeared in *Ukrainskyi istoryk* after 1983, the journal always retained its original emphasis on history.

On the twentieth anniversary of the journal's founding Wynar published another programmatic article listing the practical tasks of the Ukrainian Historical Association and Ukrainian historians in the West. He enumerated them as follows: (1) to research the central themes of Ukrainian history, which are directly related to world history, (2) to propagate in world historiography Hrushevsky's national scheme of

Ukrainian history, which draws a clear distinction between Ukrainian and Russian history and claims Kyivan Rus' for Ukraine alone,¹ (3) to actively combat Soviet falsifications of Ukrainian history, (4) to seek out and publish new archival materials available in the West, (5) to cooperate with various professional historical and Slavist associations in Europe and the United States, (6) to aid various Ukrainian émigré scholarly institutions active in the West, and (7) to promote Ukrainian history courses at universities in countries where there were large Ukrainian immigrant populations.² This program was extremely ambitious, and by the end of the 1980s it was fulfilled only to a very small extent.

However, thanks to political changes in Eastern Europe, the late 1980s and early 1990s marked a new stage in the history of the Ukrainian Historical Association and *Ukrainskyi istoryk*. The progress of “restructuring” and “openness” in Soviet Ukraine soon led to new contacts between Ukrainian historians in the West and those in the European homeland. By 1990 a number of new contributors from Ukraine appeared on the pages of *Ukrainskyi istoryk*. Some of the first were Viktor Zaruba, who was interested in historiography and the biographies of important historians; Serhii Bilokin, who was researching Soviet Ukrainian history, especially the purges and the famine of 1932–33; and Ivan Dzyra and Volodymyr Serhiichuk, who had a wider variety of interests, including Cossack history. Later on, the Kyiv-based historian, Ihor Hyrych, who shared many of Wynar’s methodological approaches and intellectual interests, especially his interest in Hrushevsky, became one of the most frequent contributors to the journal.

The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Ukraine led to even closer contacts and more contributions from the European homeland. By the mid-1990s, *Ukrainskyi istoryk* which for many years had come out in only one or two rather thin issues a year, turned into a truly thick journal with many different kinds of contributors

1. Doing this, Wynar believed, would free Ukrainians of an “inferiority complex” toward Russian historiography, a phenomenon that in his opinion was promoted by Russian émigré historians, who advanced the Russian scheme of East European history. It should be noted that three of the most influential Russian émigré historians working in the United States since the 1930s—George Vernadsky of Yale, Michael Florinsky of Columbia, and Anatol Mazour of Stanford—actually traced their origins to Ukraine.

2. Liubomyr Vynar, *Ukrainskyi istoryk: 40 rokiv sluzhinnia nautsi 1963–2003. Stati i materialy* (New York and Ostroh: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo, 2003), 203–4.

and articles. Historiography remained a central theme, with much attention devoted to Hrushevsky, but new themes, such as the Ukrainian experience under the Soviets, began to be explored in detail. Eventually, prominent Ukrainian historians, like the eminent archeologist and specialist on Kyivan Rus', Mykhailo Braichevsky (1924–2001), and the specialist in “source studies” (*dzhereloznavstvo*), Mykola Kovalsky, joined the editorial board. New centres of the Ukrainian Historical Association were founded in various parts of Ukraine, especially the western and central parts of the country, and the journal became much more available there. By 2004 the Ostroh-based historian, Alla Atamenenko, who is especially interested in Ukrainian émigré historiography, joined the journal as a co-editor, and Wynar began the process of transferring the editorial offices to the Ostroh Academy in Volhynia. The hope was that the traditions cultivated for so many years by Ukrainian historians in the West would now be fully adopted and continued by historians in Ukraine.

The new books by Liudmyla Sakada and Lubomyr Wynar contribute greatly to the elucidation of this story. They document its various phases, point out the obstacles that had to be overcome and, in part, show how the members of the Ukrainian Historical Association coped with them. Of course, there were some shortcomings. During the most difficult days of the Cold War social and economic history were largely missing from the pages of *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, the histories of the Ukrainian communities in the Americas were hardly touched upon, and except for some polemics, the history of Soviet Ukraine was largely ignored. It is notable, for example, that before the journal was enlarged in the 1990s, thanks to the contributions of historians from independent Ukraine, not a single article was devoted to the Great Famine of 1932–33, arguably one of the most important events in the history of the Ukrainian people in modern times.

At the same time it should be noted that several of the most important and influential Ukrainian historians in the West during the Cold War contributed little or nothing to *Ukrainskyi istoryk*. Thus, for example, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky of the University of Alberta, Omeljan Pritsak, who held the Hrushevsky Chair of Ukrainian History at Harvard, and Roman Szporluk, who succeeded Pritsak in this position, all had very little contact with the journal.³ Also, during the early years of the

3. In spite of his academic title, Pritsak, in particular, was somewhat hesitant in promoting the Hrushevsky legacy, which Wynar was so prominent in advancing. He was also the target of some criticism by Wynar because of what Wynar believed was his

journal's existence, many of the surviving veterans of the Ukrainian democratic socialist movement, scholars like the former Galician Radical Matvii Stakhiv (1895–1978), who were the logical heirs of the Hrushevsky tradition, declined to contribute to the journal, which in spite of Wynar's best efforts, adhered to a fairly conservative and even "nationalist" or "statist" interpretation of Hrushevsky's legacy. Later on, younger heirs of this ideologically left-wing tradition, like John-Paul Himka and Bohdan Krawchenko, contributed very little or nothing at all to the journal. Somewhat more surprisingly, other historians of the younger generation who lacked this left-wing tilt, in particular, Orest Subtelny (b. 1943), who published his well-received "national" survey, *Ukraine: A History*, in 1988, and Paul Magocsi (b. 1945), who finished his rival "territorialist" *History of Ukraine* in 1996, both refrained from contributing even a single substantial article to *Ukrainskyi istoryk*. Similarly, Zenon Kohut, who specialized in the later Hetmanate and Frank Sysyn (b. 1946), who concentrated on the Khmelnytsky revolution, both of whom were associated with Harvard during the Pritsak era and later found employment with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, declined to publish in the journal. Finally, appearing mostly in the Ukrainian language, the contributions of Wynar and his collaborators were largely restricted to the narrow circle of Western scholars who could read Ukrainian. Thus during most of the Cold War, the effect of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* on the wider community of Western scholars engaged in the study of Eastern Europe was slight.

The true legacy of the Ukrainian Historical Association became clear only after the events of 1991. With the emergence of intellectual freedom, Ukrainians in the homeland, who were unfamiliar with Western languages, could easily read *Ukrainskyi istoryk* and the other Ukrainian-language publications issued by the Ukrainian Historical Association. Many of them were clearly impressed with the ideas and interpretations that were new to them and supported enthusiastically Wynar's "national" program for Ukrainian historical scholarship. This is a process that has continued and grown for at least fifteen years and shows no sign of weakening.

Over the course of some forty years the Ukrainian Historical Association and its journal have evolved through a number of stages.

Ukrainskyi istoryk began as a tentative project, a mere bulletin of sorts, with a limited number of contributors, many of whom were already quite elderly. But these pioneers persevered and produced a steady stream of new documentation and historical literature about Ukraine. From almost the beginning it proved impossible to put out a real quarterly, and usually only one or two issues appeared per year. Nevertheless, the journal came out fairly regularly and maintained a regular journal format of articles, review articles, memoirs and letters, reviews, and important obituaries in almost every issue. As early as the late 1960s, very valuable and substantial special issues were devoted to the life and work of Hrushevsky (1966) and to the Ukrainian revolution (1967). Also the Ukrainian Historical Association occasionally published historical titles under separate cover, sometimes reprinting longer articles from *Ukrainskyi istoryk*.⁴ Works by Lubomyr Wynar, Ohloblyn, Mackiw, Bykovsky, and the archeologist Iaroslav Pasternak (1892–1969) all appeared in this format. Two of the most notable titles were the full-colour *Istorychnyi atlas Ukrainy* (Historical Atlas of Ukraine) by I. Teslia and E. Tiutko (1980), which was an original work of scholarship, and *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi: Bibliographic Sources 1866–1934* (1985), edited by Wynar, which was a reprint of some very rare bibliographies of Hrushevsky's works as well as a bibliography of works about him. In later years Wynar also made a serious effort to collect and reprint Ohloblyn's more important works. This effort began in 1995 with the publication of that historian's *Studii z istorii Ukrainy: Statti i dzherelni materialy* (Studies in Ukrainian History: Articles and Source Materials).

Thus the association and the journal survived the difficult transition to the 1980s with new publications, as well as the addition of a new generation of contributors. Moreover, the journal greatly expanded after 1989 because of the favourable political changes in Eastern Europe. Thereafter, three very bulky commemorative volumes, which contained many new contributions from Ukraine, were devoted to Hrushevsky, and the treatment of Soviet Ukrainian history became somewhat more extensive. The sections on other periods of Ukrainian history also made some progress and work on émigré historiography and historians continued to expand. In the last few years the association and the journal

4. The reprintings did not add to the fundamental body of research on Ukrainian history but attracted attention by appearing separately in the university library catalogues.

have made a fairly successful transition to work in Ukraine itself. By 2004 it was clear that Wynar and his colleagues had remained true to their original purposes. The dedicated labours of the small band of Ukrainian émigré historians who in the early 1960s bravely set out to thwart the oppressive academic and propaganda apparatus of the Soviet state, to overcome the prejudices of Russocentric Western scholarship, and to set Ukrainian national historical scholarship on a firmer footing were not in vain. Their legacy continues to flower in today's Ukraine, and, in turn, finally shows some signs of affecting Western historical writing about Eastern Europe.

Book Reviews

Myroslav Shkandrij, ed. *The Phenomenon of the Ukrainian Avant-garde 1910–1935: Catalogue for an Exhibition Organized and Circulated by the Winnipeg Art Gallery. Le Phénomène de l'avant-garde ukrainienne 1910–1935: Catalogue de l'exposition itinérante organisée par le Musée des beaux-arts de Winnipeg. Fenomen ukrainskoho avanhardu 1910–1935: Kataloh vystavky, orhanizovanoi Vinnipezkoiu kartynnoiu halereieiu*. Winnipeg: Winnipeg Art Gallery, 2001. 196 pp.

The question of the Ukrainian avant-garde is still contradictory and controversial for there is no established view on its origin, distinctive features, laws of development, and so on. Nor is there agreement on which artists belong to Ukrainian art. Hence the catalogue of the exhibition “The Phenomenon of the Ukrainian Avant-garde 1910–1935” is one more argument for interpreting this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian national culture.

The fact that this publication appeared outside Ukraine is particularly important, since it is non-Ukrainian art scholars who tend to analyze samples of the Ukrainian avant-garde in the framework of the history of Russian art. The following two studies can serve as examples of this: the album by K. Ruhrberg, M. Schneckenburger, C. Fricke, and K. Honnef, *Kunst des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Köln, London, Madrid, New York, Paris, and Tokio: Taschen, 2000) and Mikhail Iu. German's *Modernizm: Iskusstvo pervoi poloviny XX veka* (St. Petersburg: Azbuka-klassika, 2003). The first publication presents Kazimir Malevich and Vladimir Tatlin, and mentions also Vasyl Yermilov, but as Russian painters. In particular, it says that “the background of Russian folklore peeks through” in the works of Malevich's early period (p. 164) and that Tatlin was an artist who stood at the origins of modern Russian plastic arts (p. 446). Similarly, German does not even point out Malevich's and Tatlin's, as well as David Burliuk's, contributions to Ukrainian art, but treats their work and avant-garde art in general only in the Russian context (p. 207). Let us note that these publications came out in the twenty-first century.

On the other hand, it was non-Ukrainian researchers who put the concept of the Ukrainian avant-garde into scholarly circulation. The French art scholar André Nakov introduced it at his exhibition “Tatlin's Dream” in London in 1973.

The American John Bowlt emphasized the distinctive qualities of the Ukrainian avant-garde. In his monograph *Khudozhniki russkogo teatra 1880–1930: Sobranie Nikity i Niny Lobanovykh-Rostovskikh* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1990), he proposed the thesis that “Ukrainian painters played an essential role,” and to be more precise that “many modernist painters and designers who were often called Russian in the West were, strictly speaking, of non-Russian origin, and their work was heavily indebted to national traditions outside the geographical boundaries of Great Russia” (p. 50). Undoubtedly, the key art centres were “Moscow and St. Petersburg, rather than Paris and New York, but we must not forget the local roots and traditions, particularly when we are talking about Ukraine” (p. 50). Taking the work of Alexandra Ekster as his example, Jean-Claude Marcadé discovered national sources in the Ukrainian avant-garde (D.O. Horbachov, *Ukrainskyi avanhard 1910–1930 rokiv: Albom* [Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1996], 8). Horbachov believes that “the Ukrainian dimension has unlocked a series of mysteries for Western scholars of the avant-garde” (*The Phenomenon*, 36). I should point out that his album was the first publication in Ukrainian art scholarship to present the works of world-reknown avant-garde painters in the Ukrainian national context.

Thus the grand project of the travelling exhibition and catalogue under review are a logical continuation of both the scholarly research and the popularization of this development in the history of Ukrainian culture.

In the course of the year the works from the National Art Museum of Ukraine and the Ukrainian State Museum of Theatre, Music, and Film Arts, as well as private collections in Ukraine and Canada, were exhibited successively at the Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Edmonton Art Galleries.

The accompanying texts of the catalogue describe the whole development of the project from its conception, organizational stages, “the work behind the curtains,” to its full realization. Because of the representative nature of the project, all parts of the catalogue—from its title on the cover, table of contents, introduction, and set of scholarly articles, to the list of exhibits and exhibition participants, organizers, and sponsors—are reproduced sequentially in English, French, and Ukrainian.

The catalogue opens with a “Message from the Presenting Sponsor” and “Acknowledgements” from the directors of the Winnipeg Art Gallery and the National Art Museum of Ukraine. The high-quality reproductions of the selected canvasses of the Ukrainian avant-garde are preceded by five studies by well-known scholars, which complement each other in describing the origins and the development of the phenomenon and particularly of the artistic ideas of the post-revolutionary period in the history of Ukrainian art.

In the “Introduction” Myroslav Shkandrij reflects on what at first glance appears to be a paradoxical feature of Ukrainian art—the synthesis of predominantly peasant structures with forms of urban avant-garde-futurist sensibility.

What is peculiar of the artistic developments of the 1920s is the dialogue of the Western and Eastern avant-gardes and their mutual enrichment (p. 19). Thanks to this dialogue, agrarian Ukrainian art blended with the futurism of the urban worldview.

Shkandrij proposes a series of interesting and convincing observations about the nature and form of traditional folk art, which served as the basis of the Ukrainian versions of new artistic tendencies, such as cubism, futurism, and primitivism, which were represented by painters of the most disparate tastes: Alexander Archipenko, Malevich, Maria Syniakova, Viktor Palmov, Ekster, Burliuk, Vadym Meller, Anatol Petrytsky, Yermilov, the Boichukists, and others.

The laconic generality of the avant-garde is receptive to the most varied interpretations. And yet any abstract form belongs to a context of certain systemic dimensions, for the artistic process is not an unrelated flux. For example, the elemental force of Picasso's compositions is received through the prism of exotic African art, while Van Gogh's paintings suggest stylized linear Japanese motifs. The deep and contextual reception of the Ukrainian avant-garde also had a certain materializing point of reference and system of characteristics.

The definition of radical-modern art as self-sufficient and consonant with the revolutionary period fails to provide an exhaustive answer about its content and essence. It is necessary to outline the soil from which avant-garde art and its Ukrainian version spring.

The soil is thought to be the construct of the Ukrainocentric world. Among the characteristic features of Ukrainian modernity are the mythologization of the past and the actualization of folklore in combination with "the vigorous and 'revolutionary' aesthetic of the avant-garde" (p. 20). Thus the avant-garde painters expressed hope in the re-creation of a spiritually "conductive" world. Abstract models were depicted by the matter, form, and primary element, which constitute the universe. Liudmyla Kovalska cites Palmov, who argued that "the consumer of art ought to actively experience art by taking part in the artist's creative work, by completing the image that has been adumbrated in simplified form" (p. 45). The avant-garde called for participation and completion by each recipient. Art was to provide only a stimulus to the structuring of universal being in which each person was to be the builder of his own macrocosm.

The theses of the avant-garde are not proved like algorithms but are accepted on faith as sacred truths. The primitiveness of avant-garde works lies in their incorporality. Hence the theoreticians encountered a very difficult task—to link these archaic bodiless images logically with the universally human and even everyday view of the world.

The discovery of Malevich's period became possible when art scholars took into account not only revolutionary slogans but also archaic beliefs and folk fantasies. Shkandrij points out that Malevich's images are very similar to the dolls in the villages of Podillia with which he was familiar: instead of a face they

had a black cross (p. 21). Shkandrij describes a replica of a Podillian doll, which was on display at the exhibition and is depicted in the margin of the article. The editor's helpful decision to emphasize the symbolic element guides perception into a certain channel and reminds one of the character of the period and the history of Ukrainian post-revolutionary culture. According to Shkandrij, folk art and especially elements of mural painting and embroidery, these primordial sacred symbols, are organically integrated in the painter's avant-garde canvases: "the cross, for example, has decorative, ritualistic, and symbolic functions: it symbolizes salvation and protection. In combination with the vase and the bird, it represents the tree of life" (p. 21).

Thus one cannot but agree with the author when he supports Horbachov's statement on the necessity for a thorough study of Podillia's little-known folk art: the geometrical decorative paintings in Podillian homes, the astral signs of the Easter eggs, and the patterns of woven skirts—all the things that served as a base for Malevich's suprematist style (p. 21).

In her article "Rupture or Continuum? Ukraine's 'Avant-garde' in Search of a System," Myroslava Mudrak speaks about the synthesis of folk-art traditions with European tendencies that formed the basis for the Ukrainian national avant-garde. This researcher differs essentially with the previous author on the general division of art into Eastern and Western. Unlike Shkandrij, who opposes Eastern and Western, Mudrak locates Ukrainian art at a geographical and artistic watershed in an isolated marginal position, that is, between the East and the West (p. 26). Her statement about the marginality of Ukrainian art seems more convincing: it rests on the simple fact that "the Ukrainian avant-garde is like no other" (p. 25). "Brazen showmanship and extreme experimentation, the quintessential hallmarks of the West European avant-gardes, are here commuted to an enterprise that taps into a rich reservoir of established popular and fine art traditions, especially the artistic legacy of the Byzantine and Baroque periods" (pp. 25–6). Mudrak points to Mykhailo Boichuk as one of the most vivid examples of the harmonious blending of European tendencies with native sources. Turning to the stylization exemplified by Byzantine iconographic imagery, Kyiv frescoes, and proto-Renaissance paintings, he freely interpreted Western "isms" and various theories of form deconstruction (p. 28).

The author isolates the period of "industrial" aesthetics as a period that aspired to shape a new human psychology through art. The industrial tendency of art gave rise to a new work—the object-fetish. This approach to art in the period of functionalism was realized most vividly in Yermilov's works. Hence Mudrak has every reason to call the whole period of the Kharkiv avant-garde "the Yermilovian period" (p. 23). As we know, by means of mass art this painter was able even in the totalitarian period to create the illusion of a holiday in his street decorations in Kharkiv and to inscribe organically his own artistic principles in the industrial world.

Another thoughtful conclusion of this article is that the role of the avant-garde in Ukrainian art was to rescue “art from the merciless destruction of cultural-aesthetic memory and [place] it in company with the historical mission of the avant-garde—to advocate pure experimentation and discursive argumentation for affirming positive ... engagement with contemporaneity” (p. 29). Here Mudrak has outlined what others had not detected, namely, the function of the avant-garde, which was not only to reinterpret national art but also to construct a kind of hermetic dome over it.

Mudrak divides the period of the Ukrainian avant-garde into two parts. The first phase is the early “formalistic” period, which treated formalistic art as an autonomous and self-sufficient phenomenon (p. 26). Describing the second, “functional” phase of the avant-garde, the author points out that in the twenties “the debate around art centred on its station as a social, economic, and spiritual mechanism in a society” (p. 28).

The controversy between the main opponents, avant-gardism and realism, that took place in the 1920s was of a polemical, rather than a conflictual, nature. Hence it promoted the development of theoretical and practical works. And yet this great potential of the modern wave of Ukrainian art was eventually destroyed. The artists’ works and family archives suffered the same tragic fate as the artists themselves.

Svetlana Ryabicheva’s article “The Spetsfond (Special Collection)” adds variety to the catalogue’s articles, for she examines the problem of the Ukrainian avant-garde from a different point of view. She looks at the history of the collection of works that constitutes “a large part of the national heritage and is significant in both artistic and historical terms” (p. 31). The article also describes the psychological conditions and the historical circumstances in which the works were painted. Then it treats the paintings as revelations that the artists of the first third of the twentieth century strived to convey to us.

The researcher underlines that most of the exhibits have come down to us thanks to the enthusiasm and conscientious work of museum staff who realized their true artistic value and their significance for Ukrainian culture and strived to preserve them regardless of the political climate and the ideological demands.

Ryabicheva reminds us that it was Horbachov who began restoration work on and the systematic study of this cultural layer (p. 32). Shkandrij also notes that Horbachov “began ‘rehabilitating’ some of the forbidden works when he was the museum’s chief curator in the seventies” (p. 20). By the 1980s some of these works “began to appear regularly in various thematic and monographic exhibitions that took place not only in Ukraine but also beyond its borders” (p. 32).

The author of the next article in the catalogue is Dmytro Horbachov himself, a charismatic figure in Ukrainian art studies. His “The Exuberant World of the Ukrainian Avant-garde” is partly a summary of the conclusions of his above-mentioned fundamental monograph combined with a study of the characteristics

that led to the transformation of Ukrainian art. Horbachov studies an interesting new problematic of the art of the first third of the twentieth century—the source of its plastic transformations. The main factors that led to these radical changes, according to the author, were the Secession and cubism, which guided artists to cosmism, the profound idea of man's involvement in universal energy, the archaic period, and authentic Ukrainian sacred art (p. 36).

As the art scholar points out, the Ukrainian avant-garde developed on the basis of folklore. The starting point of artistic interpretation was neoprimitivism, which not only absorbed the rich, vivid colours of the folk *lubok* prints but was also inspired by the poetics of European, especially French, painting. These features are particularly striking in the works of Syniakova (p. 38), who had a strong influence on Yermilov, Borys Kosariev, and Heorhii Tsapok. The painters Burliuk, Malevich, and Ekster, as well as the Russian neoprimitivists Natalia Goncharova and Mikhail Larionov, took part in group exhibitions with Syniakova (p. 38).

Horbachov examines the national discourse of the avant-garde in the stream of the cultural processes and the interaction among artistic groupings of the post-revolutionary period. In particular he talks about the Link (Kiltse) and the 7+3 groups, the Association of Revolutionary Art of Ukraine (Asotsiatsiia revoliutsiinoho mystetstva Ukrainy, or ARMU), and its offspring, the Union of Contemporary Artists of Ukraine (Obiednannia suchasnykh myttsiv Ukrainy, or OSMU). When all the branches of art joined in the revolutionary euphoria, the theatre responded with sophisticated innovations. Horbachov mentions the artists who worked in the theatre and adopted the ideas of constructivism: Ekster, Vadym Meller, Petrytsky, and Oleksandr Khvostenko-Khvostov (pp. 39–40).

As one of the expressions of the period, universal constructivism spread to various branches of visual art. For example, Yermilov applied the constructivist principle to book design. His use of *plakhta* fragments and folk kilim patterns in book covers and other objects are well known. Horbachov studies another work devoid of ornamentation, the layout of the journal *Avanhard*, concentrating on its compositional structure, which follows the principle of repetition found in folk weavings and uses printed elements, which “appear throughout the pages as though multiplying and sending forth new shoots; they resemble the rich texture of the *plakhta* (skirt), the colourful part of a peasant woman's festive dress” (p. 40).

The strategy of the avant-garde consists of the means of mastering the imagination. It uses a double content to define modernity: interchangeable planes one of which explains and contradicts the other. Attuned to the psychological components of Malevich's works, Horbachov sees in them the struggle of two principles—urban laconicism, which inclined him to the black-white spectrum, and rural festiveness expressed in the colours of the rainbow (p. 37).

Thus the artists outlined the new face of the post-revolutionary period, engraving all its nuances in their works, although the means of attaining sharpness permitted them to be remarkably diverse—from archaic and primitivist interpreta-

tion and constructive form-creating to spectral colours. In the 1920s applied constructivism developed on a wide front and “made its mark on architecture, the art of the poster, advertising, book graphics, and design” (p. 40). Historical processes and dramatic collisions influenced the emotional tone of painting.

Palmov vividly depicted the multicoloured nature of the period in which Ukrainian art flourished. Horbachov notes the psychological richness of his works: “His colour-painting—a dramatic confrontation of life’s vivid colours that darken before the face of death—is inspired by the hopes and is marked by the tragedies of the revolutionary period” (p. 39).

Liudmyla Kovalska continues the theme of spectralism in the next article, “Viktor Palmov and the Ukrainian Avant-garde.” She proposes the thesis that the painter was organically connected with the general flow of the innovative processes in the 1920s. Palmov’s theory “has affinities with the ideas of Kandinsky, particularly concerning the language and effect of colour. He also echoes the ideas of Fernand Léger” (p. 45).

Analyzing the painter’s work, Kovalska dwells on important aspects that reveal the sources behind his works. They include the influence of oriental art, Moscow neoprimitivism, and Ukrainian peasant art, his work in industrial arts, and participation in theoretical polemics. In particular, Palmov’s theoretical principles are based on the contemporary discoveries of physics. They are grounded so solidly that they represent not only the painter’s position but also a scientific tendency in the study of colour. “Palmov developed his own system of realism, which he called the realism of colour painting” (p. 45).

It was precisely colour painting in its pure form, in isolation from other problems of painting, that made it possible to solve the problems of colour. The author of the article reminds us that colour painting was strictly Palmov’s own achievement: “a genuine innovator who travelled undiscovered artistic paths, Palmov always aspired to a large degree of independence and freedom from external influences” (p. 46).

The catalogue *The Phenomenon of the Ukrainian Avant-garde* provides a unique basis for further studies of well-known avant-garde practitioners in the little-known context of a national culture and, on the whole, of such an unusual phenomenon as the Ukrainian avant-garde. The authors have grasped the global upheaval of consciousness that took place in the first third of the twentieth century when art was formed anew from primary imagery, local and strictly constructive blots that were sharpened and made convincing in their national expression on their native soil.

The division of the illustrative material in the catalogue demands comment. The appearance of sculptures at the beginning seems somewhat accidental. It would have been useful to distribute the reproductions according to some principle: according to genre, chronology, or artistic tendency. For example, in his monograph *Ukrainskyi avanhard 1910–1930 rokiv: Albom*, Horbachov

organized the reproductions into about a dozen periods, starting from the Secession and symbolism and ending with surrealism and expressive realism.

At the same time it is worth mentioning the presentation of graphic works in the catalogue. One-colour prints are printed in colour on a level with paintings and this makes it possible to use more informative tones. The variety of tones produced by black pencil, India ink, or printer's paint is important in graphic art, especially in Bohomazov's futuristic drawings and Sofia Nalepinska-Boichuk's woodcuts. The tone, texture, and the coloured nuance of the paper, even if it has changed with time, contribute to the general emotional reception of the work.

In describing the art processes the authors of the catalogue turn again and again to the activities of the artistic groups in the 1920s. For example, Shkandrij underlines that the Boichukists were the most influential members of ARMU (p. 22). Horbachov and Kovalska touch on the processes that took place in the context of ARMU and OSMU. The specialists do not mention the Association of Artists of Red Ukraine (Asotsiatsiia khudozhnykiv Chervonoï Ukrainy, or AKhChU), although the exhibition includes the triptych *Life* by Fedir Krychevsky, who was for a time the president of the association. Perhaps this omission is an echo of the wide discreditation of AKhChU, which back in the 1920s was viewed as a branch of the Association of Russian Revolutionary Artists (Asotsiatsiia khudozhnikov revoliutsionnoi Rossei, or AKhRR). This was false, but it eventually became an established stereotype.

Let me point out some purely technical shortcomings. In Burluik's surname, the letter "iu" becomes "ia" (p. 85) and "a" (p. 87). In the pseudonym of the poet-futurist Oleksii Kruchonykh (his real surname is Krucheny) the "u" is replaced by "iu" (p. 85). The Ukrainian titles of Petrytsky's works "Portrait of Writer Hordii Kotsiuba" and "The European (For the ballet *Red Poppy*)" are interchanged (pp. 163 and 165). This error is repeated in the Ukrainian list of the reproductions (p. 193).

These imperfections do not spoil the positive impression the catalogue makes and the intellectual and aesthetic pleasure it gives the reader. Its cover is elegant, the presentation of the illustrative and theoretical material is harmonious, the layout is neat, and the polygraphy is of a high quality. The reproductions are representative of the leading trends in Ukrainian national art of the first third of the twentieth century, and the accompanying scholarly studies create a suitable interpretational field and, moreover, outline the directions of further studies.

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Translated from the Ukrainian by Taras Zakydalsky

Gabriele de Rosa and Francesca Lomastro, eds. *L'età di Kiev e la sua eredità nell'incontro con l'Occidente*. Atti del Convegno, Vicenza, 11–13 aprile 2002. Rome: Viella, 2003. 357 pp.

Italian scholars have never shown a particular interest in Ukraine, either its past or its present. That is why the recent studies carried out over the course of the past few years by the Institute for Research in Social and Religious History (Istituto per le ricerche di storia sociale e religiosa), founded in 1975 in Vicenza and directed by Gabriele de Rosa, one of Italy's most renowned historians, are to be welcomed. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Institute turned its attention to the study of religion in Eastern Europe. In December 1990 it organized a conference on religious faith in communist countries. Then in the last few years it promoted two very important international conferences in Vicenza: the first, in April 2002, concerned the role played by Kyivan civilization in the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe, and the second, in October 2003, covered the issue of the 1932–33 *Holodomor*. My review deals with the proceedings of the first conference.

The collection under review contains a number of papers ranging from the early Middle Ages to the modern period, including also, to some extent, the twentieth century. A topic such as Kyivan civilization has to be studied over many centuries. The papers focus on the history of religion in the broadest sense of the term: theological disputes, popular spirituality, church institutions, and the relationship between the state and the church. I do not have the space to do justice to all the collected papers, many of which are extremely erudite and original. Each scholar covers a single aspect or a specific historical moment of the relationship between Western Catholic civilization and Orthodox Christianity in Eastern Europe. The specifically theological and doctrinal issues—primarily the *filioque* controversy whether the Holy Spirit descends solely from the Father or from the Father and Son—are discussed in fine detail by Cesare Alzati, one of the very few Italian medieval historians who study the eastern part of the European continent. Cesare Alzati shows how the difference between the two ecclesiastical traditions was already quite evident in the first centuries of the Christian era and how, moreover, the papacy considered attempts of reunion to be a return of the Orthodox schismatics to traditional obedience. It was only in the apostolic letter *Egregiae virtutis* on 31 December 1980 and in other solemn declarations by the Polish pope, John Paul II, that the Roman Catholic Church acknowledged the dignity and importance of the Eastern tradition and the need to achieve a real integration between the two religious worlds.

One should not underestimate the historical fact of the conversion of the East Slavic peoples to Christianity during the reign of St. Volodymyr, mainly under the influence of Byzantium and the Eastern church. Volodymyr Rychka maintains that the Church of Kyiv had an autonomous status and its own ties

with the Catholic world. He deserves praise for questioning the claim of many Russian and Soviet historians that the newborn Russian church had ties only with Byzantium. However, the cult of St. Clement, the first-century Bishop of Rome, and similar religious phenomena are not sufficient evidence to justify the thesis that Kyivan Rus' played "an entirely independent role in the dialogue of interciviliation between the Christian Orient and the equally Christian West" (p. 69). Rychka comes closer to the mark when he discusses the complex international situation in which the conversion of Rus' to Christianity took place, that is, the presence not only of the Eastern and Western churches, but also the fact that "Islam was in full bloom in that period, its influence stretching to eastern and northern Europe, and Judaism was already established among the Khazars" (p. 65). There is, at any rate, no doubt that the oriental Slavs fell under the religious sway of the Church of Constantinople. Indeed, the true historic originality of Kyivan Rus' lies in its political and diplomatic history, with its multifaceted and close ties, including dynastic ties, with the countries of central and western Europe. Rus' not only developed a splendid and distinctive material and cultural civilization, but it was also accepted in medieval Europe as a full-fledged member of the family of Christian states, a situation which was never to be repeated.

How deeply felt and how widespread was the Christian religion which Volodymyr forced upon his people? Liudmyla Filipovych is quite right when she writes that "the pagan heritage was not only simply destroyed or cast aside; it was slowly marginalized, replaced, exploited where necessary, subdued, and assimilated. What happened was that two completely different systems of concepts and ideas converged into one single ethnic organism, resulting in what was called a system of 'two faiths,' that is, religious syncretism" (p. 146).

After the Mongol invasion the Catholic world and Orthodox Slavia remained separate and distant from each other for a long period of time, until the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438–39) tried to achieve the religious unification of Christians of Europe. The leading figure in that momentous, yet ultimately unsuccessful, attempt at reunion was Metropolitan Isidore of Kyiv, and Maria Pia Pagani has written a fascinating essay about him. It is a well-known fact that upon his return to Russia, Isidore was banished to a monastery and deposed for the sin of favouring union with the Roman church, and his rival Iona was elected metropolitan. After his death in 1464 Iona was venerated as an authentic representative of the national and Orthodox tradition (on his cult, see G. Lenhoff, "The Cult of Metropolitan Iona and the Conceptualization of Ecclesiastical Authority in Muscovy," in *Speculum Slaviae Orientalis. Muscovy, Ruthenia and Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages*, vol. 4 of UCLA Slavic Studies, New Series, ed. Vyacheslav V. Ivanov and Julia Verkholtantsev [Moscow: Novoe izdatelstvo, 2005], 122–43). The failed attempt at reunion contributed to widening the gap dividing the two religious worlds. Only a few years later the Christian world experienced a much greater and irreparable tragedy, which marked the entire

modern period. The Turkish conquest of Constantinople and the fall of Byzantine civilization were, as Maria Pia Pagani observes, the fatal consequences of the mistakes and procrastination of the papacy and the West, which were unwilling to mount an armed resistance to the Islamic threat.

A few years later Pope Paul II was certain that the arranged marriage between the Muscovite sovereign Ivan III and the Byzantine princess Zoe Paleologus would ensure Rome's influence over the Russian court. It can be argued that this undertaking was conceived and implemented in too naïve and clumsy a fashion for it ever to have been successful. Indeed, Zoe was accompanied to Moscow by a papal nuncio bearing a Latin cross. Ivan III called upon Metropolitan Philip, who opposed the bringing of a Catholic cross into the city. Furthermore, in 1472 Zoe married the Grand Duke of Moscow according to the Orthodox rite.

The essays in this book highlight both the papacy's desire for dominion, which is evident in its treatment of reunification as a return of schismatics to the Roman church, and the dogmatic and chauvinistic closed-mindedness of the Russian clergy, which was intent on defending its identity and privileges. There is, however, a very important aspect of the spiritual history of the Slav Middle Ages, which is essential and must be emphasized. The heretical movements and religious dissenters in Novgorod and in Moscovia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are worthy of closer study. It is no coincidence that the so-called *strigolniki* movement, which extended to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, originated in the Republic of Novgorod, which was open to contacts with the West. Another important phenomenon was the very lively debate in Russian monasteries in the first half of the fifteenth century between those who advocated (*stiazhateli*) and those who rejected (*nestiazhateli*) the church's possession of material wealth. The defeat of the most sensitive and tolerant elements in the Russian religious circles was a historical catastrophe, which led to the hard line taken by the official church and its gradual subservience to political power. The end of Novgorod's independence, that is, the fall of the Russian state that had regular economic and cultural contacts with the Baltic region and the Germanic states also contributed to Russia's religious impoverishment. In the West incessant reform movements and numerous heretical movements stimulated the renewal of the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages and the modern period.

What role did Ukraine play in this ongoing conflict and the rare moments of dialogue between the East and West? Did Kyiv, which was definitely in the Orthodox camp, manage to promote a meeting of minds between the two worlds? In an essay devoted to relations among the Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants in Ukraine during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Natalia Iakovenko shows how, in spite of bitter doctrinal disputes, everyday relations among members of the different religious denominations were imbued with a certain degree of tolerance. This can be seen, for example, in the number of mixed marriages among the middle classes and the aristocracy. How can one explain

such widespread tolerance? Natalia Iakovenko advances the hypothesis that “this way of thinking arose under the influence of Protestantism. It is at any rate quite clear that this philosophy contrasts bitterly with the stance taken by the Orthodox churches and, in particular, with the constant sermons of both Catholic and Orthodox priests, who preached that it was a sin to mix rites and to maintain close ties with people of another religion” (p. 193). This is undoubtedly true. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the issue of religious tolerance in Ukraine at the beginning of the modern period should be studied against the backdrop of the broad historical context in which the civilization of Kyiv developed from the end of the Middle Ages.

In 1362 the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Algirdas, defeated the Golden Horde in a memorable battle, freeing vast lands in eastern Europe from the Tatar yoke. This was the beginning of a new era for Ukraine, in which its historical development would be quite different from Russia’s. For almost three centuries after that battle, Kyiv belonged first to Lithuania’s and then to Poland’s sphere of influence. Although historians of the medieval and modern periods tend to underestimate its historical importance, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania played a fundamental role in the geopolitics of eastern Europe from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the modern period. Indeed, it is not too much to assert that from a geopolitical point of view the Grand Duchy was the most important state in eastern Europe. It was a multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multireligious country. As early as 1512 Johannes Stobnica, a professor of Cracow University, noted that the Lithuanians and Ruthenians lived together side by side, each speaking its own language and following its own religion (the Lithuanians remained pagans for a long time).

In Rzeczpospolita, which arose out of the union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1569, the tradition of religious and cultural pluralism, which was the hallmark of the two states, persisted for many years. Even the Ukrainian Orthodox Church benefited from the historical context in which it operated, a context that was quite different from the closed-minded and rigid environment of Moscovia. Ukrainian theologians came into contact with a sophisticated culture, incidentally acquiring a knowledge of Latin. Occasionally, they even had direct contacts with the West, which was fairly accessible. The difference between the cultural conditions in Muscovy and Ukraine are vividly illustrated by the career of the printer Ivan Fedorov, who was persecuted in his own country for printing sacred books but in Lviv was able to print the *Bukvar* (1574), the first reading manual with non-religious texts.

Even after the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 and the union with Russia, Ukrainian theologians continued their contacts with the West and the rich intellectual tradition of their seminaries and academies. After annexing the part of Ukraine that had been under Poland’s influence, Russia came into closer contact with Western civilization and began to reform its culture, using the new ideas mainly to consolidate the military power of the state. Feofan Proko-

povych's (1681–1736) career is a striking example of this trend. After graduating from Catholic boarding schools in Poland he had acquired a solid grounding in humanism in Rome and in Protestant theology in Switzerland. Upon returning to his homeland, he became one of the most powerful bishops in the Russian Church and an energetic supporter of the fierce despotism of Peter the Great.

It was also thanks to the Polish-Lithuanian civilization, of which it was for a long time an integral part, that Ukraine was able to play the role of cultural liaison between western and eastern Europe. From a political and social point of view, however, its ties with Poland proved much less advantageous. The oppression of Ukrainian peasants was perhaps the saddest aspect of Warsaw's long dominion over Ukraine. After the First World War, Poland's obtuse policies, completely oblivious to the national rights of the Ukrainian minority, poisoned relations between the two peoples. As Oxana Pachlovska noted in her study of the relations between the two countries, the so-called *Lex Grabski* of 1924 (named after Stanisław Grabski, the Polish minister of education) prohibited the use of Ukrainian in schools and abolished the chairs of Ukrainian studies at Lviv University. Another interesting paper on the relations between Poland and Ukraine was written by Jerzy Kłoczowski. This is an exceedingly important issue, because Europe's peaceful and democratic future depends largely on the full political, economic, and military integration of both these countries into the European Union and NATO. So far neither Western politicians nor Western public opinion seem to understand this.

Sante Graciotti, a philologist, rightly calls attention to the courageous alarm sounded by the Russian historian Iurii Nikolaevich Afanasev at the increasing cultural and political isolationism of Russia, which imprisons it in obsolete imperialist myths of the tsarist period (p. 219). While it may be true that a "pluralistic Ukraine, with a full-fledged domestic debate, accustomed to dealing with diverse opinions, can be considered a possible broker between the East and the West in terms of European integration" (p. 220), it is difficult to envision exactly how this political and cultural prospect could come about. The political and the religious situations in Poland and Ukraine are such that they can offer little hope for the immediate future. To restrict the discussion to the religious sphere, which is the main focus of the book under review, it must be said that unfortunately, the Polish Catholic Church, which had been a bulwark of freedom under communism, is now writhing in the grip of reactionary movements and obscurantism. The current situation in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as described by Anatolii Kolodnyi, is equally bleak. Mr. Kolodnyi's proposal that the state promote religious unity in Ukraine is worse than bad. "In protecting its integrity and in seeking to lay the foundation for a national revival, the state has rightly declared that it has misgivings regarding the situation of Orthodox Christianity and favours the creation of a united Orthodox Church that could work together with the state for the good of the Ukrainian nation" (pp. 261–2).

This is a truly monstrous idea, calling for a return to Cesaropapism and the abolition of freedom and democracy in Ukraine.

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Serhii Plokhly and Frank E. Sysyn. *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003. xvi, 216 pp.

With the passing of Bohdan Bociurkiw in 1998, Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokhly inherited the status of the West's leading interpreters of the role of the Ukrainian churches in nation building. Note that my assessment contains a discreet restriction to the West. Later I shall point out the shortcomings of writing analyses of contemporary events from a distance of several thousand kilometres. But first let me outline this book's contents and its many strengths.

The book is a collection of five essays by Sysyn and six by Plokhly with a co-authored introduction. All, except one of the essays, have appeared elsewhere. The "interaction of religion, state, and nation in contemporary Ukraine is a theme that runs through the essays" (p. xv). Unlike "vanity anthologies," in which authors collate disparate studies simply in order to publish another "book," this collection constitutes a very coherent and much needed compilation. One of the articles, on the establishment of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, does not, of course, focus on modern Ukraine, but it includes several sections that do.

The introduction notes how the religious question had been marginalized by most Sovietologists. Consequently, many scholars were unprepared to analyze the religious renaissance of the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially as regards Ukraine. As the authors point out, "for students of how state building, nation building, and religion interact, Ukraine constitutes one of the most important cases studies at the dawn of the twenty-first century" (p. x). Nonetheless, they partially overstate their case when they assert: "the religious situation has both been influenced by, and had a considerable impact on, state-building processes and relations among national groups in independent Ukraine" (p. xi). On the basis of my year of work in Ukraine (1999–2000) and my extensive visits there since 1990, I would question the extent to which the "religious situation" has influenced the "state-building processes." While its impact in parts of Western Ukraine may have been considerable, this is hardly true for the rest of the country. The fact that religion has appeared on the program of only one (in 1997) of the eight annual conferences on contemporary Ukraine organized by the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa is indicative of this.

Visitors to Ukraine realize that except for Lubomyr Husar in Western Ukraine, religious leaders are generally marginal figures. And if one recalls that church attendance throughout large parts of Ukraine is on par with that in Quebec, this should not come as a surprise.

The first two essays, both by Sysyn, deal with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the pre-history of the Autocephalous Ukrainian Church. The first article cites the debate between Georges Florovsky, who assessed Mohylan scholasticism as “sterile progeny,” and authors like Ivan Vlasovsky, who viewed it as one of the “great accomplishments that arose from challenges to the Ukrainian religious genius” (p. 1). It is to be hoped that someone will soon produce a study showing how the “Ukrainian baroque tradition” was a necessary and dynamic accommodation to historical circumstances, which nonetheless was derivative in nature and provisional in value. Later in the piece we find the statement: “Desire to obtain political influence and find favour with the ruler explains the Union of Brest to a considerable degree” (p. 16). Without in any way downplaying the importance of political factors in motivating the Union, the purely religious dimension of the Union cannot be ignored. Ipatii Potii was, after all, a proficient theologian. This is why a reference to Borys Gudziak’s magisterial work *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (1998) should have been included in the article. In fact, one searches in vain for a reference to Gudziak anywhere in this book.

Speaking of works that should have been cited, it is surprising to find what is essentially a 1950s coffee-table book, Hryhor Luzhnytsky’s *Ukrainska Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, listed as a “basic work on Ukrainian Church history” (p. 5, n. 7 and p. 28, n. 7), while Johannes Madey’s *Kirche zwischen Ost und West: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ukrainischen und Weissruthenischen Kirche* (1969) and Osyp Zinkewych and Andrew Sorokowski’s *A Thousand Years of Christianity in Ukraine: An Encyclopedic Chronology* (1988) receive no citations whatsoever.

The third piece is an excellent summary and analysis of the events surrounding the genesis of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada. It also provides some fascinating information regarding the Russophile reaction to the rise of the new church.

The next article, which examines “the influence of international politics on the Soviet decision to liquidate the [Ukrainian Greek Catholic] Church” (UGCC), correlates a wealth of information and fresh analysis. The only jarring assertion comes near the end of the piece where Plokyh writes: “If the Vatican had gone along with the United States and Great Britain on the decisions reached at Yalta and Potsdam, it could probably have avoided the liquidation of the UGCC” (p. 72). While Plokyh immediately qualifies this speculative remark, the qualification actually shows that this speculation is groundless. To suggest that anything could have prevented the liquidation of the UGCC in the postwar period is analogous

to proposing that under certain circumstances Stalin might have allowed for an independent Ukraine!

Sysyn's statement in his article "The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR," first penned in 1983 when nobody could have dreamed of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, testifies to his acumen: "it is clear that substantial numbers of Orthodox believers in Ukraine see themselves as Ukrainian Orthodox and that numerous believers would be attracted to a movement to establish a Ukrainian Orthodox Church if it were feasible to do so" (p. 75). Indeed, today even the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the most Russified of Ukraine's Orthodox communities, contains significant pockets of clergy and faithful who not only display Ukrainian patriotism but also (quietly) long for autocephaly. The piece goes on to illustrate in detail Bohdan Bociurkiw's assertion that for certain non-Ukrainians "[a]s in the secular sphere, so, too, in ecclesiastical life the very concept of 'Ukrainization,' let alone independence, has assumed a 'nationalist' and 'subversive' connotation" (p. 87). Indeed, it is this fact that has prejudiced so many Orthodox around the world against any concession towards Ukrainian autocephaly. The desire to be more Ukrainian as opposed to Russian—on *Ukrainian* territory—is viewed as somehow illegitimate.

The rest of the book chronicles and analyzes Ukrainian ecclesiastical developments from 1989 to 2000, primarily on the basis of press reports and other published materials, although personal interviews with protagonists in Ukraine are occasionally cited. I am particularly pleased to find in one volume such a handy summary of events, which are slowly fading from memory. Everything that the authors write about Orthodoxy in Ukraine conforms to my own reading and experience in the area. Plokhly's article "Between Moscow and Rome: The Struggle for a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate," however, made me realize that there are certain limitations in relying on printed sources. For an accurate analysis of current events published accounts need to be supplemented with personal experience. The following remarks are based on my experience in Ukraine from 1990 to 2005.

Under the section heading "Discontent in Ukraine," Plokhly summarizes an article by Nestor Hodovany-Stone, "A Prisoner on Mount St. George," published in *News from Ukraine* (January 1993), thus: "Hodovany-Stone claimed that Archbishop [Volodymyr] Sterniuk, the former leader of the clandestine UGCC in Soviet Ukraine and a martyr for the faith, was under the surveillance of the people who had come from Rome together with Cardinal Liubachiv's'kyi [Lubachivsky]; and that Sterniuk was, in fact, a prisoner of the Vatican in the metropolitan's residence on St. George's Hill in Lviv" (p. 151). Plokhly goes on to discuss the issue of UGCC's relations with Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which emerged during this conflict between Sterniuk and certain members of Lubachivsky's entourage. But over and beyond the disagreements that were bound to emerge between two groups that had been separated for almost fifty

years (incidentally, Hodovany-Stone was hardly a competent interpreter of the problems), the real issue was a clash of competencies. Sterniuk was without doubt the true—and charismatic—leader of the UGCC, a fact recognized by all. However, certain members of Lubachivsky's entourage, owing to their own vested interests, were committed to propping up the expatriate cardinal (whom, incidentally, the pope himself had hoped to see replaced). They were able to prevail and to confine Sterniuk for one simple reason: they had the financial (Western) resources to control the situation. Without similar resources, Sterniuk was not able to challenge newcomers such as the Western-born vice-chancellor, who had arrived in Lviv as part of Lubachivsky's entourage and gave rise to appalling strife. One can imagine the extent of this strife when one recalls that in spite of his poor command of Ukrainian, this vice-chancellor was delegated to resolve issues concerning several hundred clergy and other personnel. Examples of his incompetence could be multiplied.

Again Plokyh seems to be unaware of some important facts when he follows his remarks on the Hodovany-Stone affair with the statement: "This was not the first time that the archbishop had created problems for the church authorities and the Vatican. The first instance occurred in 1990, during the proceedings of the quadri-partite commission of Vatican, Moscow, Ukrainian Orthodox, and UGCC representatives in Lviv. At that time Sterniuk left one of the proceedings in protest against Vatican representatives' attempts at concluding a deal with Moscow at the expense of the UGCC" (p. 152). This statement not only overlooks the boldness and integrity of Sterniuk's action, but also its historical significance. One of the key "Vatican representatives," was none other than Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn and his assigned task was to thwart a full re-emergence of the UGCC as a *church*, as opposed to "discrete communities of the Byzantine Rite." If Lubachivsky's right-hand man, Msgr. Iwan Dacko (Ivan Datsko), was able to save the Catholic Church's credibility after the demise of the quadri-partite commission and ultimately prepare for Lubachivsky's return to Lviv in 1991, it was only because Sterniuk had courageously left the commission's meeting, thereby exposing its mendacity.

A host of such facts could be adduced to fill out Plokyh's analysis. For example, when UGCC faithful protested outside St. George's Cathedral in Lviv in 1994 with signs reading "Lviv is for Galicians, not for dealers from overseas" (p. 153), they were expressing more than the predictable suspicion of local stalwarts towards newcomers. Some of the newcomers from overseas were indeed little more than "dealers," if not in goods than at least in power. Plokyh's article also contains several factual errors; for example, it is false that Bishop Isidore Borecky of the Toronto Eparchy "continued ordaining married men as Ukrainian Catholic priests despite the Vatican's wishes to the contrary" (p. 154). In fact, the "Vatican's wishes" had been communicated to Bishop Borecky so forcefully after his first public ordination of a young candidate in 1969 that until

his death in 2003 he never again ordained a married man. Instead, he was forced to send candidates to Josyf Cardinal Slipyj in Rome to be ordained, and after the latter's death in 1984, he began asking *underground* bishops in Ukraine to ordain them. Ironically, deacons from Western democracies, where the Catholic Church was free, had to travel to a totalitarian state, where the UGCC was illegal, to practice rights guaranteed by the Second Vatican Council.

On the whole Sysyn and Ploky have done scholars a great service in publishing these essays in a convenient collection, and no one interested in Ukrainian Christianity should be without it.

Peter Galadza

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Myrna Kostash. *All of Baba's Great Grandchildren: Ethnic Identity in the Next Canada*. Saskatoon: Heritage, 2000. 45 pp.

Janice Kulyk Keefer. *Dark Ghost in the Corner: Imagining Ukrainian-Canadian Identity*. Saskatoon: Heritage, 2005. 52 pp.

For over ten years the Mohyla Lecture Series has provided a forum for prominent Ukrainian-Canadian scholars and intellectuals to share their ideas about topics related to Ukraine or about issues that pertain to the Ukrainian experience in Canada. Hosted by the Prairie Centre for the Study of Ukrainian Heritage at the University of Saskatchewan, the lectures have been given by such notable figures as Dr. Zenon Kohut (1995), Rev. Dr. Myroslaw Tataryn (1996), and Dr. Dmytro Cipywnyk (2000). Some lectures, including Myrna Kostash's in 1999 and Janice Kulyk Keefer's in 2004, have been made available in beautiful book form by the Heritage Press, the publishing arm of the Prairie Centre for the Study of Ukrainian Heritage. Undoubtedly, bibliophiles will be delighted by the exquisite design of Kostash's *All of Baba's Great Grandchildren: Ethnic Identity in the Next Canada* and Kulyk Keefer's *Dark Ghost in the Corner: Imagining Ukrainian-Canadian Identity*. But ultimately it is the content of both lectures that illustrates why these authors have earned their reputations as consistently astute commentators on Ukrainian-Canadian identity.

Beginning in 1977, with the publication of *All of Baba's Children*, Myrna Kostash has made a career-long commitment to writing works of creative non-fiction that address her interest in Ukrainian-Canadian ethnicity, as well as the politics of feminism, socialism, regionalism, nationalism, and transnationalism. The impressive topical breadth of Kostash's oeuvre is clearly evidenced by such books as *Long Way From Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada*

(1980), *No Kidding: Inside the World of Teenage Girls* (1987), *The Next Canada: In Search of the Future Nation* (2000), and her most recent *Reading the River: A Traveller's Companion to the North Saskatchewan* (2005). Readers, however, who have followed the development of her work on ethnic identity—chronicled in *All of Baba's Children*, *Bloodlines: A Journey Into Eastern Europe* (1993), and *The Doomed Bridegroom: A Memoir* (1998)—will take particular interest in *All of Baba's Great Grandchildren*, which marks a self-conscious return to the ideas that launched her career.

Divided into four parts (“Beyond Identity Politics,” “On the Margins,” “Knowing Ourselves,” and “The Next Generation”), Kostash’s lecture is at once objectively journalistic and subjectively impassioned, and, like her other writing, *All of Baba's Great Grandchildren* demands an engaged and attentive reader. The lecture opens as Kostash revisits, albeit briefly, debates about how cultural diversity is experienced, defined, and perceived by both individuals who live in “the vague place called the ‘margin’” and those who belong in the equally ambiguous “white” mainstream (p. 8). Her argument here, which becomes the overarching theme of the entire lecture, is that the national community requires not concretized categories of difference, but rather the recognition and practice of a “politics of resemblance” (p. 38). Our ongoing challenge is, according to Kostash, to welcome “the constant encounter and engagement” with “new otherness” (p. 36). But where, she asks, turning her attention to Ukrainian-Canadian ethnicity, are the Ukrainian-Canadian “others”? Where “are the Ukrainian-Canadians who come after [her], after deficit slashing and program extermination, after webnets and Coca-Colonization of everything, after Ukrainian independence and Koka-Kola in the sidewalks of Kyiv?” (p. 13). How “does one go on being Ukrainian-Canadian in *their* world? Does it still matter, in the so-called global village, that hyphen is a kind of hinge between two equally compelling identities?” (p. 13).

Is it possible, in other words, for Ukrainian Canadians to keep their “otherness” alive while resisting categorization in either the “white” mainstream or the ghettoized margin? Avoiding firm pronouncements on how Ukrainian-Canadian ethnicity should be experienced and expressed by the next generations, Kostash makes the broad suggestion that “each new generation of Canadian has to think through its own relationship to the past and to its own civic desires” (p. 37). But as she reports on a series of conversations with “20- and 30-some-things” of Ukrainian descent, including Nestor Gula, editor of the English-language, Toronto-based Ukrainian-Canadian magazine *Zdorov*, Kostash hints at her own complex preferences vis-à-vis the future of Ukrainian ethnicity in Canada. While she understands why “Ukrainian-Canadians still generally go along with the popular view of themselves as colourful, dancing, *horilka*-tippling hunkies recently arrived from a wheat farm in Saskatchewan” (p. 30)—there is “no getting around,” after all, “the psychological *insecurity* of a community that

has periodically lived under a cloud in Canada as ‘enemy aliens’ in the Great War, ‘Reds’ in the 1930s, anti-Communist extremists in the 1950s, and aging, anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi collaborators in the 1980s and 1990s” (p. 32)—she nonetheless seems to value Ukrainian-Canadian community activism, knowledge of Ukrainian history, and ongoing engagements with Ukraine over “song and dance” expressions of culture. And, as she makes clear in her concluding references to filmmaker and writer Marusia Bociurkiw and artist Tanya Rusnak, it is the next generation of artists who will play the lead role in re-imagining Ukrainian-Canadian ethnicity: artists, she believes, will rebuild “a Ukrainian-Canadian self that does not erase *baba* and *dido* but refigures them in the new cultural materials handed to a new generation” (p. 41).

Much longer and, by virtue of its length, more substantial than *All of Baba's Great Grandchildren*, Janice Kulyk Keefer's Mohyla Lecture takes a different approach to exploring Ukrainian-Canadian identity, one that is shaped by her background as a creative writer and, even more so, as a literary scholar. A professor in the School of English and Theatre Studies at the University of Guelph, Kulyk Keefer has published monographs (*Reading Mavis Gallant*, 1989; and *Under Eastern Eyes: A Critical Reading of Maritime Fiction*, 1998), short story collections (*The Paris-Napoli Express*, 1986; *Transfigurations*, 1987; and *Travelling Ladies*, 1990), poems (*White of the Lesser Angels*, 1986), and novels (*Constellations*, 1988; *Rest Harrow*, 1992; and *Thieves*, 2004). Unlike Kostash, she waited many years before she began writing about her ethnicity (in *The Green Library*, 1996; and *Honey and Ashes: A Story of Family*, 1998). More explicit in its theorization of ethnic identity, *Dark Ghost in the Corner: Imagining Ukrainian-Canadian Identity* makes clear Kulyk Keefer's notion that an active, ongoing engagement with Ukraine is the key to maintaining a distinct Ukrainian Canadian identity.

Focusing primarily on paintings by William Kurelek and Natalka Husar, Kulyk Keefer draws attention to the presence of “ghostly” figures in both Ukrainian-Canadian artists' work and she suggests that these figures, as embodiments of “the old country that haunts the new” (p. 12), are emblematic of the “ghostly” presence of Ukraine in the Ukrainian-Canadian imaginary, a presence that is in danger of being obliterated. Troubled by many Ukrainian Canadians' tendency to sever ties with Ukraine, choosing instead to fashion a “radically incomplete” (p. 22) model of ethnicity that privileges “cuisine and costume” (p. 19), she insists, not unlike Kostash, that Ukrainian Canadians must know their history. And history for her includes not only the “success” stories of Ukrainian Canadians or the “stories of injustice undergone by *nashi* here in Canada” (p. 15) but also, and indeed much more importantly, the long list of “catastrophes” (p. 19), the “unadulterated tragedy” (p. 35) of Ukraine's past. The Shevchenko Foundation's recent establishment of the Kobzar Literary Award becomes an example of Ukrainian Canadians' “occlusion of Ukraine” in their

social and cultural activities (p. 14). Analyzing the language used to describe the objectives of the award, Kulyk Keefer laments the fact that in the “actual description of the prize ... there is no mention at all of Ukraine” (p. 13), and she is equally distressed by the omission of a hyphen in the Kobzar Literary Award Web page between “Ukrainian” and “Canadian.” For her the hyphen is indispensable because it “links [Ukrainian Canadians] to today’s and tomorrow’s Ukraine as well” (p. 22).

The portions of *Dark Ghost in the Corner* that explore at length and in depth Kurelek’s and Husar’s work are, arguably, the richest portions of Kulyk Keefer’s lecture. In her analysis of Kurelek’s “Manitoba Party” (1964) and several of Husar’s paintings, including “Heritage Display” (1985), “Pandora’s Parcel to Ukraine” (1993), and “Horseshoes and Waves” (2001), she makes a compelling argument for the ways in which Ukraine haunts these artists’ work. “Kurelek’s power as an artist,” she writes, “stems from his acknowledgment of the dark ghost in the corner, [and] his efforts not to exorcise or ignore her, but to wrestle from her a sense of the roots of his being” (p. 29). Similarly, Husar, whose work “is permeated by the ‘dark ghost in the corner,’” practices an “aesthetics of unease” (p. 32) that both portrays and grapples with the “splits and multiple roles a single person can exhibit” (p. 42). Concluding with a brief discussion of the 2004/2005 elections in Ukraine and of a performance by the Virsky Dance Troupe, which she attended several weeks before the Orange Revolution, Kulyk Keefer reiterates her approval of both Kurelek’s and Husar’s engagement with Ukraine in their art. Insofar as the dance performance seems to her a “museum-like” expression of culture, the Orange Revolution reminds her that Ukrainian Canadians must remain connected to and involved in the “soul of today’s Ukraine” (pp. 49–50).

And so, like Kostash, Kulyk Keefer positions the artist as a key figure—a model and an inspiration—in the process of re-imagining Ukrainian-Canadian identity. But Kostash, whose very title draws attention to a new generation (“Great Grandchildren”) in a new context (the “Next Canada”), is alone in her call for newness and regeneration. Despite Kulyk Keefer’s explicit “longing for an evolving dialectic to replace the fossilized dichotomy between the old world and new, tradition and history, past and future” (p. 50), she implicitly reaffirms that dichotomy. Her lecture’s title tellingly refers to imagining (not *re*-imagining) Ukrainian-Canadian identity, and her lecture itself tends to freeze Ukraine in a tragic historical tableau (foregrounding Chernobyl and the Great Famine-Terror, not to mention “abandoned family, assassinated kobzars, [and] grossly corrupt governments” [p. 51]). By exclusively focusing on Ukraine’s past catastrophes and horrors, Kulyk Keefer inadvertently reinforces reductive binary oppositions (Canada-dream-present / Ukraine-nightmare-past) that undermine the cross-cultural understanding she ostensibly seeks. Ghosts, to be sure, should not be forgotten, but if Ukrainian Canadians, especially those of the next generation, are to hitch their

identity, via the hyphen, to Ukraine, they must also be given the permission and the tools to see beyond that country's dark past and into its bright future.

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Kate Brown. *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. xiv, 308 pp.

Kate Brown's excellent study of Right-Bank Ukraine between the end of the revolutionary struggles and the end of the Second World War stands out among the growing number of books focusing on the Soviet periphery. The reader is first enticed by the author's exquisite writing, much of it in the first person, and the feeling of presence created by her talent for describing landscapes and people. Then the reader becomes immersed in Brown's sophisticated argument, which relates the seemingly marginal experiences of an agrarian borderland to political and social sea changes that defined twentieth-century Europe.

Brown, whose principal focus is on the region's Polish minority, shows how a multi-ethnic borderland, where Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, and Germans co-existed for centuries, became what she calls a "Ukrainian heartland." Her main thesis is that this ethnic purification was not carried out by one state or ideology. Rather, the Soviet and Nazi social engineers, as well as Ukrainian and Polish nationalist guerillas, all wanted to re-organize this "backward" region along national lines. All these forces used violence in their attempts to transform the villagers' local, traditional, and often hybrid identities according to a modern and abstract concept of nationality. Brown concludes that these attempts were part of a European-wide trend of "creating distilled nation-space for modern governance" (p. 230).

One could argue, as Mark von Hagen and Eric Lohr do, that it was really the First World War that launched ethnic mobilization in the region. But the author's narrative of how the mosaic of cultures in the Right Bank became homogenized begins with the start of the Soviet nativization program in the early 1920s. Although Brown covers practically the same ground, her microhistorical treatment differs from the bird's eye view provided in Terry Martin's *The Affirmative Action Empire*. She shows, for example, how Soviet bureaucrats soon found it difficult to "fix nationality in place" in a region where masses of peasants spoke Ukrainian, but practiced Roman Catholicism. Were they to be counted, educated, and governed as Poles who had lost their language or as Ukrainians who had lost their religion? In 1925 the Soviet authorities decided that these peasants were, after all, ethnic Poles, and this resulted in an increase in the number of Poles in Ukraine from 90,300 in 1923 to 369,612 in 1926 (pp. 42–3).

Still, the Bolsheviks found it difficult to govern their western borderland. To use Brown's elegant metaphor, they believed in apparitions such as class and nationality, while the local peasants continued to believe in demons and wood nymphs (p. 54). The countryside remained woefully undergoverned and "backward," and national schools and village councils did not seem to further its Sovietization. The slow tempo of forced collectivization in the Marchlevsk Polish Autonomous Region, for instance, underscored the failure of the Soviet civilizing mission in the western borderlands. But in the mid-1930s a new solution was found, when about half of the region's Poles and Germans—some 105,000 people—were shipped to the east in order to secure the sensitive western frontier. Brown shows that the first wave of deportations swept those deemed untrustworthy, but later bureaucrats became seduced by their own ethnic taxonomies and statistical representations. Documents from 1936 speak openly about deporting "Poles and Germans" (p. 146). Interestingly, the Polish deportees, most of whom ended up in northern Kazakhstan, were transformed there "into mostly willing colonizers of the Kazakh steppe as they took up a stake in the Soviet modernizing project" (p. 173).

During the Great Purges, the Soviet bureaucrats who had pondered the ethnicity of Ukrainian-speaking Catholics found themselves accused of forcibly Polonizing them, allegedly on the orders of the clandestine Polish Military Organization. The NKVD disproportionately targeted national minorities in general and Poles in particular, having arrested "in the Polish line" a total of 143,810 people—56,516 of them in Ukraine (pp. 160 and 277, n. 22). But before the wave of terror swept over them, Soviet functionaries and ethnographers had so thoroughly inscribed nationality onto the region's landscape and people that in 1941 the Nazis had only to consult the Soviet data in order to locate and kill the Jews. The Germans' program in the Right Bank was not limited to murder, however. They sought to identify and favour the local ethnic Germans, but ran into the same difficulty as the Soviets had during the 1920s: the local Germans, they found, rarely knew German or were blond and were almost indistinguishable in appearance and customs from their Slavic neighbours with whom half of them had intermarried.

One interesting question for which Brown provides an original answer is why the groups of Ukrainian nationalists from Galicia found so little response in the Right Bank during the war and, when they did, it came primarily from educated people. Unlike the peasants, those who had attended Soviet educational institutions "had been trained to think in taxonomies," including the national taxonomy of reform and repression (p. 215).

In the end, the modern idea of nationality triumphed in Right-Bank Ukraine more because of the sheer violence of deportations, ethnic cleansings, and resettlement than the classificatory and educational efforts of ethnographers—but it was the latter that made the former possible.

Throughout the book, Brown refers to the region she studies as the *kresy*. I found this usage a bit confusing for the specialist reader, who is familiar with the traditional Polish geographical vision of the *kresy* as all the eastern borderlands of historic Poland. Brown is really discussing Right-Bank Ukraine minus the city of Kyiv—and at a time when Polish influence there was no longer significant. Much of her analysis is even more narrowly framed in that it deals primarily with the Volhynian countryside.

Brown's first-person narrative of her travels in the Right Bank and her thoughts on this land make it difficult for her to engage directly the arguments of other scholars. For instance, Amir Weiner's 2001 book, *Making Sense of War*, covers the same region and makes many points relevant to the author's analysis. Yet Brown refers to it only in the most general terms as a work that proves the importance of the Soviet West, employs the concept of "welfare state," and shows the war's impact on postwar identities. In fact, chapter 8 of Brown's book is thematically so close to Weiner's monograph—it even uses some of the same quotations from the documents—that a clear statement of the difference in her approach was a must.

Finally, in subsequent editions the author may want to correct the spelling of place names, which all too often present a hybrid of their Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish names—as in Kalinivka, Belia Tsirkiv, and Kam'ianetz-Podolsky. (Yet such errors are somehow subconsciously persuasive in a work dealing with hybrid borderland cultures!) The name Marchlevsk is a special case, for the town (now Dovbysh) is the focus of the author's research, but it too is a cross between the Ukrainian or Russian Markhlevsk and the Polish Marchlewsk.

These minor reservations aside, I was highly impressed with Brown's book, which will undoubtedly be a success with both the specialist and general reader.

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Mariia Helytovych. *Ukrainski ikony "Spas u Slavi."* Natsionalnyi muzei u Lvovi. Lviv: Vydavnytstvo "Drukarski kunshty," 2005. 95 pp.

Mariia Helytovych is the head of the Department of Old Ukrainian Art at the National Museum in Lviv (NML), which houses the most important collection of old Ukrainian icons anywhere. This volume is primarily a catalogue of the museum's holdings of one particular type of icon, the Saviour in Glory (also known as the Saviour among the Powers). The NML owns thirty-four of the fifty to sixty icons that have survived to our day, and each is beautifully reproduced and carefully described in this album. For each of the thirty-four icons Helytovych provides the following information: its origin, how the NML came to own it, its

current state, the history of its conservation and restoration, a detailed verbal description of the icon, including the transcription of all text, its dating and attribution, and any relevant bibliography. This is a work of high professionalism.

The author has a sensitive eye for artistic differences and similarities, and she has developed criteria to date the icons to within a quarter of a century. This is a particularly valuable contribution, since it will help to clarify the dating of other icons that contain as one element images related to the Saviour in Glory, such as the Ascension and the Last Judgment. Helytovych also compares her thirty-four icons to each other and to icons on other themes in the NML and elsewhere in order to attribute the works to particular (usually unnamed) painters or to particular “schools.” This, of course, is not an exact science, but her refined judgments will have to be taken into account by all future researchers.

The catalogue is preceded by a substantive introduction (pp. 3–23), with an English-language summary (pp. 24–5). The focus is on art history narrowly conceived. Larger historical questions are not handled in a sophisticated fashion. One interesting feature of the Saviour in Glory icon is that it is also an icon typical of northern Rus'. There are a number of links between the fifteenth-century iconography of the Ukrainian Carpathians and the contemporary iconography of Novgorod and Muscovy. Why this should be so is by no means obvious. In fact, it requires some kind of explanation. But we shall not find one here. Instead a protective fence is thrown up around any suggestion of links with Russian iconography. The only thing Helytovych has to say about the Russian connection is this rather vague statement, which appears also in the English summary, from where I quote it: “The appearance of ‘The Saviour in Glory’ in Ukrainian iconography in the formative stages can be traced to the painting of the Church of The Holy Trinity in Lublin, Poland in 1415. It is more problematic to propose that this theme was brought in from Russia, after being presented by Theofan the Greek and developed by Andrei Rublev. In Ukrainian iconography it may have had a separate development” (p. 24). Thus the discussion of an interesting scholarly question falls victim to a perceived need to distance Ukrainian iconography from Russian. In fact, the introduction makes almost no comparisons with other post-Byzantine iconographies at all. The brief and vague mention of Moldavian influences on the work of one master had to be “balanced” by this declaration: “Some Polish investigators exaggerate the significance of these influences” (p. 18). Ukrainian art historians would do better, I think, to relax about the elements of Orthodox universalism in Ukrainian sacral art and to research these issues more open-mindedly than is now generally the case. The same kind of nationalist obstacle to investigation appears in another context. To explain the introduction of “folkloric elements” into the icons, Helytovych writes: “These tendencies reflected the social-historical processes that transpired under the sign of humanistic and state-building ideas” (p. 10). It is

much more plausible that the changes she is referring to reflect changes in the qualifications of the icon painters.

An interesting aspect of the introduction is the information on the chronological and territorial extent of the iconography of the Saviour in Glory. For a certain time and in a certain region this icon appeared in the iconostasis, paired with the icon of the Mother of God with prophets (which Helytovych calls *Bohorodytsia z Dytiam z pokhvaloiu*, and which is inaccurately translated in the English summary as “The Theotokos with Child and receiving worship”). Helytovych concludes that the Saviour in Glory emerged in the mid-fifteenth century and disappeared before the middle of the seventeenth. As to the territorial extent, the introduction is not so clear. At one point it states that most of these icons come from Galicia, but they also existed in Volhynia for at least a century (p. 14). Nearer the conclusion of the introduction, it is stated: “The rather wide territorial boundaries of the origin of these icons—they encompass the lands of Western Ukraine—allow us to affirm that the phenomenon did not have a local character. (On the spread of this theme in East Ukrainian iconography we have no information because of the loss here of the iconographic legacy before the seventeenth century)” (p. 19). The English-language summary, on the other hand, says: “All of these icons come from the western part of Ukraine — Boykivshchyna and Lemkivshchyna” (p. 25). These rather different formulations suggest that researchers need to work more on the issue of the territorial extent of various iconographic themes.

The main weaknesses of this study are those that have plagued Ukrainian studies in the humanities for some time: nationally inspired defensiveness and the lack of interdisciplinarity and comparative methods. But there is a high degree of professionalism here nonetheless, and the work makes a major contribution to the underdeveloped field of Ukrainian icon studies.

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Natalia Khobzei. *Hutsulska mifolohiia: Etnolinhvistychnyi slovnyk*. Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha, 2002. 216 pp.

The I. Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine has published an interesting book—Natalia Khobzey’s (Khobzei’s) ethnolinguistic dictionary of Hutsul mythology. The book consists of an introductory article by Professor Pavlo Hrytsenko, “On the Problem of the Linguistic Description of Ukrainian Demonology” (pp. 3–18), the author’s introduction (pp. 19–21), a register of analyzed words (pp. 22–199), a list of

abbreviations—bibliographical, geographical (settlements), linguistic, and dialectal, and other linguistic remarks (pp. 200–15).

The book is a valuable contribution to the study of the Hutsul mythological lexicon. It is based on field notes, and artistic and critical materials that were published previously. This is a work that sums up all previous research in the field of Hutsul mythology.

In her book Khobzey analyzes about a hundred of the most widespread and stable lexical mythological units in the Hutsul region, which express popular beliefs about evil spirits and demons. These expressions are found not only in the dialects of the Hutsul region and the regions adjacent to it, but also in the languages and dialects of other Slavic peoples.

The book is also valuable because Khobzey not only gives the meaning of a mythological lexeme in the settlement where the lexeme was registered, but also compares the meaning of the lexeme to its meanings in other dialects that are adjacent to the Hutsul one.

In most cases the author provides not only the basic meaning but also the supplementary meanings of the mythological unit and the derivatives and phonetic variants of mythological lexemes.

Let me illustrate how Khobzey organizes and interprets the lexical meaning, distribution, and origin of mythological lexemes with an example. The account of the various meanings, distribution, and origin of the mythological lexeme *mará* takes up three pages of the book (pp. 125–8).

Here is how the author describes this lexeme: “Spectre, spirit of a killed person, which appears to people is one of the mythical personalities signified by the word *mará* in the Hutsul dialects” (p. 125). The word is also used in the sense of ‘unclean power,’ ‘evil demon in the shape of a woman who covers the eyes of a person with an invisible netting and confounds the mind in order to lead the person to a dangerous place,’ ‘devil,’ ‘witch’ (p. 126). *Maryshche* is ‘the name of a demonic figure.’ All these meanings are illustrated by many examples selected from the works of Volodymyr Shukhevych, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, and others.

The word *mara* is also found in other Slavic languages and dialects (Russian, Belarusian, Polish, and Bulgarian) with the same or similar basic meaning: *mara, maria* ‘spectre, temptation, darkness, trouble, spell’ (Russian); *mara* ‘phantom, (bad dream) nightmare, dream’ (Belarusian); *mara* ‘dream, phantom,’ dialect *zmora, mara; mora* ‘vampire, ghost, spectre that strangles people or animals during sleep’ (Polish); dialect *mára* ‘fear in sleep, nightmare,’ *mará* ‘drowsiness, spectre’ (Bulgarian) (p. 127).

To further illustrate the meanings of mythological lexemes Khobzey cites a whole array of examples from different sources—besides belles lettres, she uses critical studies and dictionaries (K. Moshynsky, Ie. Zhelekhivsky, I. Verkhtsky, B. Hrinchenko, I. Franko, and others).

Explaining various views on the origin of the mythological lexeme *mara*, Khobzey refers to etymological dictionaries (*Etymolohichnyi slovnyk ukrainskoi movy* [An Etymological Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language], ed. O. Melnychuk, and the etymological dictionaries of A. Preobrazhensky, M. Fasmer, A. Brückner, et al.) (p. 127).

In her dictionary the author analyzes other words in the same spirit; for example, *aridnyk*, *vidma*, *vovkun*, *vorozhka*, *diavol*, *didko*, *lisovyk*, *liutsyper*, *opyr/upyr*, *potopelnyk*, *ruslaka*, *satana*, *charivnyk*, *chort*, *shchezby*, *vin/toi* ‘devil.’

In cases in which there are gender pairs (masculine and feminine) in the Hutsul dialects, the dictionary favours nouns of the masculine form. This is true of such pairs as *vizhlun*—*vizhlunka*, *vishchun*—*vishchunka* ‘a person who can foresee the future,’ *charivnyk*—*charivnytsia*, *charodiinyk*—*charodilnytsia*, *sheptukha*—*sheptun*, *vorozhka*—*vorozhbyt*, and so on.

Some of the analyzed mythological lexemes are recorded in old monuments of the Kyivan Rus' period (*Povist vremennykh lit* [The Tale of Bygone Years] and *Slovo o polku Ihorevi* [The Tale of Ihor's Campaign]) and Ukrainian monuments of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries (mostly charters), as well as Old Ukrainian dictionaries, particularly Pamva Berynda's *Leksykon slavenorosskyi* (A Slavonic-Ruthenian Lexicon) (1627). Khobzey uses all this data effectively.

In her introduction the author points out that the basic sources of the study are the dialectal records of the catalogue *Slovnyk hutsulskykh hovirok* (Dictionary of Hutsul Dialects), which is constantly supplemented with new materials, and the catalogue of M.A. Hrytsak's *Slovnyk hovirok Zakarpatskoi oblasti* (Dictionary of the Dialects of the Transcarpathian Oblast). But the proper names of well-known fortune-tellers, such as the anthroponyms *Daraduda* and *Mádar*, are not registered in the dictionary. Obviously, she does not mention the surnames of fortune-tellers in order not to embarrass her informers by linking them with certain ancestors, parents, or acquaintances.

Some of the words analyzed in the dictionary are also found in the Ukrainian dialects in Romania with the same basic lexical meaning. They include words like *antkhryst*, *baba*, *boilnyk*, *bida*, *vidma*, *vishchun*, *vorozhka*, *didko*, *znakhar*, *mara*, *nechystyi*, *potopelnyk*, *satana*, *upyr*, *chort*, and *shchezby*.

Although all the words-lexemes are presented in the dictionary in alphabetical order, a one-page list (index) of all the entries at the end of the dictionary would be helpful. This list could be arranged alphabetically or in thematic groups so that all words that refer to one and the same concept would be grouped together. This would make it easier for the reader to locate a given word and, in general, to use the dictionary.

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а—а
б—b
в—v
г—h
г—g
д—d
е—e
є—ie
ж—zh
з—z
и—y

і—i
ї—i
й—i
к—k
л—l
м—m
н—n
о—o
п—p
р—r
с—s

т—t
у—u
ф—f
х—kh
ц—ts
ч—ch
ш—sh
щ—shch
ю—iu
я—ia
ь—omit
ий—y in endings of
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